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
HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

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COMMAND HISTORY

1970

ANNEX B

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

MACSOG-50

8 April 1971

SUBJECT: Promulgation of the USMACV 1970 Command History (Annex B, Studies and Observations Group)


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JOHN F. SADLER
Colonel, USA
Chief, SOG

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

MACSOG-50

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John F. Sadler

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Colonel, USA
Chief, SOG

MACSOG-50

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PREFACE

(§) The 1970 annual historical report for the Studies and Observations Group, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACSOG), is published and distributed separately as Annex B to the 1970 MACV Command History due to the sensitivity of MACSOG's operations. It is intended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the operations and problems faced by the command during 1970. Additionally, the required report preserves the History of MACSOG and provides an insight into the activities, major decisions, directives, and other significant accomplishments that occurred during the year.

(§) The history describes the functions of the different staff elements and commands, and, in general, follows the basic organization of preceding years. However, the style and format of the report have been changed to conform with the MACV Command History guidelines as requested by the MACV Command Historian. In addition, more information has been incorporated to provide a greater understanding of MACSOG actions and operations.

(U) The 1970 history was prepared under the supervision of LtCol John H. Blair (USMC), Director, Plans Division. LCDR Mark H. Waggoner (USN), Navy Plans Officer, was directly responsible for the writing and compilation of the history and acted as the MACSOG Historian for 1970. Members of the Plans Division who aided significantly in the editing and finalizing of the history included: MAJ Robert J. Kuska (USAF), MAJ A.H. Walters (USA) and SFC Kenneth Mathis Jr. (USA). SSG George R. Currin Jr. (USA) almost single handedly accomplished the enormous task of typing (and retyping) the entire history. SP6 L.J. Rhodes (USA) was responsible for the graphic work. Appendix contributions from the staff elements were coordinated by members of each staff and included the following: MAJs J.O. Adams (USAF), L.M. Pelot (USA), K.P. McDonald (USAF), H.R. Holaday (USA), and M.D. Eiland (USA); LCDRs D.W. Percell (USN) and H.E. Staples (USN); CPTs A.T. Dean (USA), R.S. Brewer (USA), R.K. Simmons (USAF), S.J. Spoerry (USA), R.L. Gagnon (USA), C.J. Kraft (USA), Z.E. Watson (USA), and T.J. Robinson (USAF); LT J.D. Snyder (USN); and SSGT M.J. Ferrara (USAF).

(U) The history could not have been prepared without the cooperation and assistance from all members of the MACSOG staff. We are grateful for this support.


MARK H. WAGGONER
LCDR, USN
1970 MACSOG Historian

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ANNEX B TO MACV 1970 COMMAND HISTORY

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

INTRODUCTION

(S) Studies and Observations Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACSOG), continued to execute special operations missions throughout 1970 as directed by COMUSMACV and higher authorities. Activities were conducted under the cover of being a MACV staff agency charged with the preparation of classified studies for MACV, CINCPAC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In actuality, SOG has been, and continues to be, a MACV subordinate command with the normal command and staff relationships. Operational control of SOG forces was exercised by COMUSMACV.


(TS) SOG was activated on 24 January 1964 for the purpose of conducting unconventional warfare (UW) and special operations in Southeast Asia (SEASIA) and has been the only major US military organization to conduct these operations since the Korean war. All activities were conducted in conjunction with the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), the RVNAF UW/Special Operations element directly under the Commanding General of the RVNAF Joint General Staff. Operations were coordinated with US diplomatic and military forces in CAS, the Vietnamese Government, RVNAF, and the STD, but because SOG/STD operations were, and continue to be, extremely sensitive, many had to be approved at CINCPAC, JCS, and in some cases, at the presidential level. Advisory support to the Republic of Vietnam, pertaining to covert and cross-border operations, was a responsibility based on guidance received from higher levels.

(TS) The year 1970 was marked by increased requirements, tighter controls, added restrictions on some programs, some minor reorganizations and increased emphasis on improvement and modernization of the STD. Programs against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) elements in-country and in Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ continued. Intelligence information gathered by MACSOG reconnaissance efforts was exploited and utilized in the major US/Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia. Planning for contingency and long range UW activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans continued. Advice, training and support to the STD in maritime, cross-border, unconventional, and psychological warfare increased.

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MACSOG ORGANIZATION

FIGURE I



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ORGANIZATION

General

(S) In terms of organization and functions, SOG is in effect, a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), tailored to perform specific tasks. The headquarters was organized with the normal staff sections and complete logistics support capabilities. Operational elements included seven subordinate commands, known as Studies Groups to maintain their cover on organizational charts, and the Recovery Studies Division or Joint Personnel Recovery Center (Figure 1).

Office of the Commander

(TS) Chief, SOG, under COMUSMACV, exercised operational command over the US forces and personnel assigned or attached to MACSOG and continued to develop RVNAF unconventional warfare (UW) capabilities through advice, assistance, and support. He was responsible for the preparation of UW plans for SEASIA and acted as the Commander (designate) JUWTF for the area encompassing Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam, the Red China provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Hainan Island (Figure 2). Chief, SOG was directly assisted by a Deputy, an Executive Officer, a Command Sergeant Major, and an administrative section. In addition, the Office of the Commander included a CAS representative in the position of the Special Assistant (MACSOG-03), a Headquarters Support Branch (MACSOG-05), and an Inspector General (MACSOG-04).

Headquarters Support Branch

(U) The Chief of MACSOG-05 served as the civilian personnel officer for the hiring of indigenous drivers, guards, maids, maintenance, and clerical personnel. He also acted as the MACSOG Postal Officer and supervised the billeting and messing for transient personnel assigned to MACSOG. He provided all vehicle and equipment maintenance support for HQ MACSOG and administered the supplies and equipment issued to the various staff agencies, including weapons and vehicles.


Inspector General

(U) Although MACSOG has had an acting Inspector General (IG) since July 1969, the first full time IG was authorized by the MACSOG Joint

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FIGURE 2

**JUWTF
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY**



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Table of Distribution (JTD) dated 28 November 1970. The JTD also provided two additional positions within the IG office for administrative and clerical support.

(U) The IG provided Chief, SOG a continuing assessment of the operational and administrative effectiveness of SOG activities through evaluation of managerial procedures and practices pertaining to personnel, materiel and fund resources; identified problems areas, situations, and circumstances which impaired mission performance; determined the necessary corrective action and evaluated the adequacy of such actions; and determined the state of MACSOG discipline and morale. The IG was also charged with making inspections, investigations, inquiries, surveys, and studies as directed by Chief, SOG and as prescribed by law or regulations. Reports were made directly to the Deputy Chief, SOG.

(S) The IG accomplished several major tasks during 1970.

1. The first Annual General Inspection (AGI) of MACSOG Headquarters was conducted 7 - 18 September 1970. This included inspection of Headquarters Support Branch, Personnel and Administrative Division, Intelligence Division, Operations and Training Division, Logistics Division, Plans Division, Communications Division, and the Comptroller Division.

2. A designated inspection team also conducted AGIs and Operational Readiness Inspections of the Command and Control Detachments and all Studies Groups. The inspection team consisted of at least 10 individuals in addition to the team chief and the IG. Each team member was responsible for inspecting one of the following areas: Personnel, Logistics, Security, Administration, Intelligence, Operational Readiness, Training, Command Crypto, Medical, Clubs and Funds, and Communications. Audits of mess associations and funds were an inherent part of the AGIs.

3. The Quarterly Complaints Sessions were initiated by the IG under the provisions of AR 620-1, and sessions were held at all MACSOG activities during staff visits.

4. Close liaison with the MACV, USARV, USAHAC, and 7th AF IGs was maintained.

5. The IG initiated and established an IG section within the STD organization. Five ARVN officers formed the nucleus for this IG section and briefings were conducted in their duties and functions. The transition between concept and implementation was accomplished in four months, and the first combined SOG/STD AGI was conducted on 19 October 1970.

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Staff Elements

(U) The staff elements of the command were designated as divisions and encompassed all of the major areas required to effectively supervise the activities and operations of MACSOG. There were seven divisions.

1. Personnel and Administrative Division, MACSOG-10 (Appendix I).
2. Intelligence Division, MACSOG-20 (Appendix II).
3. Operations and Training Division, MACSOG-30 (Appendix III).
MACSOG-30 was further divided into five sub-elements:
 - a. Maritime Studies Branch (MACSOG-31).
 - b. Air Studies Branch (MACSOG-32).
 - c. PSYOP Studies Branch (MACSOG-33).
 - d. Ground Studies Branch (MACSOG-34).
 - e. Status and Analysis Section (SAS).
4. Logistics Division, MACSOG-40 (Appendix IV).
5. Plans Division, MACSOG-50 (Appendix V).
6. Communications Division, MACSOG-60 (Appendix VI).
7. Comptroller Division, MACSOG-90 (Appendix VII).

Operational Elements

(TS) There were eight operational elements with the mission of executing the special operations assigned to MACSOG.

1. Ground Studies Group, MACSOG-35 (Appendix VIII). The principle efforts expended by the Ground Studies Group were directed against specified areas of Cambodia and Laos, which served as NVA/VC sanctuaries or base areas. These areas were identified by the nicknames SALEM HOUSE (SH) for Cambodia and PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) for Laos. Subordinate elements of the Ground Studies Group were the Command and Control detachments, referred to as C&C's. Each C&C detachment was organized basically the same and could be correctly called a strategic reconnaissance battalion. In addition to a normal staff, the detachment had two launch teams for control of operations launched from any

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of several sites located along the South Vietnamese border. A security company provided security for the forward operating bases and any forward launch sites established. Two exploitation companies were available to exploit targets uncovered by the reconnaissance teams (RTs) - the basic units and work horses of the C&Cs. Each C&C was authorized 20-35 RTs of 12 men each, and each team was made up of three US or three ARVN, plus nine Special Commando Unit (SCU) personnel. There were three C&Cs:

a. C&C North (CCN) was located in Da Nang, and had primary interest in the northern PF AO and the DMZ.

b. C&C Central (CCC) at Kontum, operated in both the PF and SH areas.

c. C&C South (CCS) at Ban Me Thuot, had primary interest in the SH AO.

2. Airborne Studies Group (Appendix IX). MACSOG-36 was responsible for agent operations which complemented other cross-border intelligence and psychological warfare programs. Originally, the group's assets were targeted against North Vietnam, but since the bombing halt, most activities against North Vietnam have ceased. MACSOG-36 was, however, charged with maintaining the capability to go north, and re-oriented its assets to other MACSOG cross-border areas of operations.

a. The SINGLETON agent program used single individuals in low level clandestine collection of information. The agents were indigenous to Southeast Asia and were targeted against MACSOG areas of interest in Cambodia during 1970. Concepts for their employment were coordinated with MACV J2 and CAS.

b. The EARTH ANGEL program employed former NVA ralliers to perform as 3 - 4 man intelligence collection teams. These personnel were carefully screened and recruited at Chieu Hoi centers, and had to successfully pass a polygraph examination before being accepted into the program. They were given five weeks of training in intelligence collection procedures in an isolated training facility near Saigon. Then, documented and outfitted as NVA soldiers, teams normally walked into and out of short to medium range target areas in Cambodia, spending an average of seven days in enemy controlled areas. Ten EARTH ANGEL teams were authorized.

c. Ethnic Khmer intelligence collection operations, with the nickname PIKE HILL, used South Vietnamese citizens of Cambodian ancestry to operate in Cambodia. Using their language fluency and knowledge of the area and customs, 3 - 5 man teams established a cover as Cambodian citizens residing in or transiting assigned target areas and provided information. PIKE HILL teams were inserted and extracted overland or by helicopter, and were trained to receive resupply, communicate with the control station in Saigon, and direct TAC AIR strikes. Ten teams were authorized.

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d. Preparations for a program to develop a modest UW capability within the Cambodian armed forces began in November 1970 under the nickname CEDAR WALK. The program concept envisioned 25 FANK military volunteers, provided by the GKR, to be integrated into the PIKE HILL program, initially, and then returned to the GKR. Training for the program was scheduled to commence in early 1971.

e. Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) teams maintained their proficiency and capability to resume operations in NVN by conducting similar operations in Laos and Cambodia. A transition of STRATA teams from a mixture of civilians and military to all ARVN personnel was completed on 1 July 1970. The teams operated from a base near Da Nang, and nine twelve-man STRATA teams were authorized.

f. Project OODLES (Ø) was the nickname for notional agent teams designed to portray an apparently extensive and successful agent network operating within North Vietnam. Fourteen of the eighteen notional teams created to support this project, have been activated. Prior to the bombing halt, radio message traffic and air drops of re-supply bundles, notional personnel parachutes, and actual pseudo agents, were used to credibly establish and maintain the existence of these notional teams. Since November 1968, notional teams presence has been maintained through the use of family morale messages sent via one-way voice link radio.

g. The BORDEN (Ø) program was another diversionary program that employed volunteer prisoners-of-war to create the illusion that extensive agent activities existed in NVA controlled areas. The recruited agents were provided approximately three weeks of training in selected subjects and were then parachuted into specially selected objective areas. Missions were fully expected to be compromised; the probability that an agent would be captured by the enemy was high. Consequently he was given deceptive information to be revealed in detailed interrogation, and/or compromising documents and materials were concealed on his person. Over 130 BORDEN (Ø) agents have been inserted into areas of North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos.

3. Maritime Studies Group, MACSOG-37 (Appendix XV). The Maritime Studies Group was responsible for covert maritime operations conducted by the Vietnamese Navy Coastal Security Service. The capability to carry out missions against North Vietnam was maintained through extensive training at Da Nang and by conducting operational missions against selected targets in South Vietnam. Four Vietnamese Navy boat crews were well-trained and capable of operating PTF's on operations without US advisors. Six cross-beach action teams with 15 Vietnamese per team were authorized; four teams were operationally ready for raid or interdiction missions and a sufficient number of Vietnamese PSYOPS/interrogation teams were available to accompany the PTF's and PCF's on operations in northern waters.

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4. Psychological Studies Group, MACSOG-39 (Appendix X). The Psychological Studies Group

5. Radio Studies Group, MACSOG-70 (Appendix XI). The Radio Studies Group operated the Voice of Freedom (VOF) grey radio station and was a joint SOG/STD operation. The US had fiscal control, and programs closely followed US/GVN policies and philosophies. The Director of VOF was a foreign service officer under the auspices of USIA through JUSPAO and operated VOF with a budget of 1.3 million dollars.

6. Air Studies Group, MACSOG-75 (Appendix XIV). The Air Studies Group provided and coordinated aircraft support from the US Air Force, US Marine Corps, US Army, Vietnamese Air Force, and third-country contracted sources for all MACSOG programs. Approximately one-hundred aircraft of many types were fraged daily to support SOG operations. In addition, FAC pilots supporting SOG teams could and did call for additional emergency TAC AIR when needed. Three Air Force operating units which employed specially modified aircraft were dedicated for MACSOG use.

a. First Flight Detachment was located at Nha Trang and consisted of four C-123Ks.

b. 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) moved to Cam Ranh Bay in September and continued to provide helicopter support for all operations.

c. 90th Special Operations Squadron (formerly the 15th SOS) was located at Nha Trang and flew four C-130Es.

7. Training Studies Group, MACSOG-38 (Appendix XIII). The Training Studies Group was located at Long Thanh and conducted the necessary training to insure qualified personnel were available for MACSOG programs. MACSOG-38 was formerly directly subordinate to Chief, SOG; however, on 23 October the command relationship was realigned, and MACSOG-38 was placed under the operational control of the Director, Operations and Training Division.

8. Recovery Studies Division, MACSOG-80 (Appendix XII). The Recovery Studies Division is the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). It acted as the clearing house and coordinating agency for operations undertaken to recover missing and captured personnel in Southeast Asia.

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However, there were no recovery assets under the direct control of the JPRC. Functionally the JPRC acted as a sub-element of SOG; in matters concerning missing in action and captured personnel, it was under the authority of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC in performing liaison with US agencies throughout Southeast Asia. The JPRC maintained close liaison with MACV J2, CAS, CINCPAC, and the Southeast Asian Embassies. In addition, contact officers for PW matters were maintained by each military region.

Personnel Strengths

Headquarters

(U) MACSOG Headquarters began 1970 operations under a JTD approved by the JCS on 21 May 1969 and revised in October 1969. The authorized strength was 394 spaces. On 10 February 1970, a revised JTD was submitted which contained 383 authorized spaces; it was approved by the JCS on 19 March. Another revision was submitted to JCS on 28 November 1970 which shifted several positions within the organization but did not change the number of authorized spaces. Approval had not been received at the close of the year.

Command

(S) SOG was authorized about 10,000 US, Vietnamese, and third-country personnel, but the assigned strength averaged a little over 8,000 during 1970 (Table 1). Most of the US personnel were furnished by the 5th Special Forces Group and 7th Air Force and were placed under the operational control of MACSOG. The large number of Vietnamese civilians were recruited as mercenaries and paid by SOG to perform any one of the many missions assigned. The Chinese were contracted to service and fly certain aircraft. The Filipinos were craftsmen, technicians, and maintenance supervisors stationed at various SOG locations.

TABLE 1

MACSOG PERSONNEL ASSETS

<u>-US</u>		<u>VN</u>		<u>3rd Country Nationals</u>	
Army	1,041	Military	3,068	Chinese	81
Air Force	476	Civilian	5,402	Filipino	44
Navy	74		8,470		125
Marine	17				
Civilian	7				
	<u>1,615</u>				
				TOTAL:	10,210

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Key Personnel

(U) Personnel who occupied key positions within MACSOC are indicated in Table 2.

TABLE 2
KEY PERSONNEL, 1970

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>
1. Chief, SOG	1 Jan - 7 Jul 8 Jul - 31 Dec	COL S.E. Cavanaugh COL J.F. Sadler
a. Deputy	1 Jan - 20 Feb 21 Feb - 31 Dec	COL B.P. Gibson COL L. Franklin
b. Executive Officer	1 Jan - 10 Mar 11 Mar - 16 Dec 17 Dec - 31 Dec	LTC F.G. Wilmot LTC W.E. Little LTC R.T. Holden
c. Special Assistant	1 Jan - 31 Dec	Mr. J.H. Malone
d. Acting Inspector General	1 Jan - 21 Jun 22 Jun - 31 Dec	LTC A.C. Monshower LTC H.C. Hudlin
e. Command Sergeant Major	1 Jan - 3 Mar 4 Mar - 14 Dec 15 Dec - 31 Dec	CSM A.E. Schmidthans CSM J.W. Crawford CSM H.P. McCullah
2. Director, Pers & Admin Div	1 Jan - 18 Mar 19 Mar - 9 Jun 10 Jun - 31 Dec	MAJ E.D. Duran CPT W.L. Nixon MAJ H.J. Hagerty
3. Director, Intel Div	1 Jan - 1 Nov 2 Nov - 31 Dec	COL J.F. Smith COL C.J. Portaluppi
a. Chief, Security Br	1 Jan - 15 Jan 16 Jan - 14 Feb 15 Feb - 31 Dec	MAJ H.W. Areheart SA D.M. Rudd CPT K.A. Rogowski
4. Director, O&T Div	1 Jan - 18 Mar 19 Mar - 11 Aug 12 Aug - 31 Dec	COL T.E. Marriott COL F.C. Petway COL B.J. Pinkerton
a. Chief, Maritime Studies Branch	1 Jan - 17 Jan 17 Jan - 31 Dec	CDR J.F. Baumgardner CDR T.H. Millen

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>
b. Chief, Air Studies Branch	1 Jan - 15 Apr 16 Apr - 10 Nov 11 Nov - 31 Dec	LTC K.E. Heller LTC R.T. Hillerud LTC D.R. Graham
c. Chief, PSYOPS Studies Branch	1 Jan - 10 Feb 10 Feb - 27 May 28 May - 31 Dec	MAJ D.J. Thiessen MAJ J. Klapp MAJ H.R. Holaday
d. Chief, Ground Studies Branch	1 Jan - 10 Mar 11 Mar - 5 Jul 22 Aug - 31 Dec	LTC E.T. Hayes LTC F.G. Wilmot LTC G.W. Radke
e. Chief, SAS	1 Jan - 21 Feb 22 Feb - 13 Jul 14 Jul - 15 Nov 16 Nov - 31 Dec	MAJ R.W. Wall MAJ N.B. Lang MAJ A.R. Foss MAJ J.O. Adams
5. Director, Logistics	1 Jan - 21 Oct 22 Oct - 31 Dec	LTC T.C. Perkins LTC D.W. Huff
a. Chief, Medical Branch	1 Jan - 24 Apr 25 Apr - 31 Dec	LT R.A. Gross LT J.H. Ganchan
6. Director, Plans Div	1 Jan - 22 Jun 23 Jun - 31 Dec	LTC H.A. MacDonald LTC J.H. Blair
7. Director, Commo Div	1 Jan - 17 Feb 18 Feb - 31 Dec	CDR W.T. Hollenback CDR M.E. Emmerson
8. Comptroller	1 Jan - 29 May 30 May - 31 Dec	LCDR L.H. Klosky LCDR A.F. Wilson
9. Director, Maritime Studies Group	1 Jan - 18 Aug 19 Aug - 31 Dec	CDR H.W. Bergbauer CPT W.A. Sundt
10. Director, PSYOPS Studies Group	1 Jan - 15 Jun 16 Jun - 31 Dec	[]
11. Director, Ground Studies Group	1 Jan - 27 Feb 28 Feb - 31 Dec	COL J.J. Isler COL D.F. Schungel
12. Director, Airborne Studies Group	1 Jan - 2 Jul 3 Jul - 31 Dec	LTC R.E. Scofield LTC E.W. Hollenbeck
13. Director, Radio Studies Group	1 Jan - 31 Dec	[]
14. Director, Recovery Studies Division	1 Jan - 3 Jul 4 Jul - 2 Oct 3 Oct - 31 Dec	LTC G.R. Reinker LTC R.L. Morrissey LTC G.E. Mcilmoie

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OPERATING AUTHORITIES

Cambodia

(TS) SALEM HOUSE (SH), formerly DANIEL BOONE, was the unclassified nickname for MACSOG cross-border operations into Cambodia. The stated mission for SH operations continued to be intelligence collection and verification (Msg (TS), JCS 172009Z Dec 68). This mission has been modified explicitly by authority to control tactical air strikes (Msg (TS), CJCS 240136Z May 70) and implicitly by authority to conduct platoon size operations (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 011520Z Jul 70).

Area of Operations

(TS) At the end of 1970, SH operations were authorized in zones ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE (Msg (TS), CJCS 240136Z May 70) and in the FREEDOM DEAL Zone (Msg (TS), CJCS 092315Z Jun 70). (See Figure 3.)

1. Zone ALPHA was the northern zone and extended from the Laotian border to Rt 13 at a uniform depth of 50km from the Vietnamese (SVN) border.

2. Zone BRAVO was the southern zone and extended from a line drawn west from Lo Go, RVN (WT 9775) to the Mekong River at a uniform depth of 30 km; and from the Mekong to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 km.

3. Zone CHARLIE was the mid-section and extended from Rt 13 to Lo Go at a uniform depth of 30 km.


4. The FREEDOM DEAL Zone, or Air Interdiction Zone (AIZ), was that portion of Cambodia bounded on the north by the Laotian border, on the east by the SVN border, on the south by Rt 13, and on the west by a line 200 meters west of the Mekong River. MACSOG was authorized to conduct SH operations throughout the FREEDOM DEAL Zone. In effect, Zone ALPHA was extended west to the Mekong River, however, this authority expires on 1 May 1971 (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 06047 Z Nov 70).

Operating Restrictions

(TS) There were no restrictions on the number of operations that could be conducted in Zones ALPHA and CHARLIE, however, a two day intent was required (Msg (TS), JCS 172009Z Dec 68 and Msg (TS), JCS 271617Z Nov 70). Operations in Zone BRAVO had to be approved on a case-by-case basis, and a five day intent was required. Operations in Zone CHARLIE were seldom conducted due to the density of the civilian population.

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FIGURE 3



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(TS) On 1 July, US personnel were prohibited from participating in cross-border operations in Cambodia, and all ground operations had to be conducted by ARVN and/or indigenous personnel (Msg (TS), CJCS 272237Z May 70). The employment of platoon size forces (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 011520Z Jul 70) and the use of ethnic Cambodian assets in the SH AO was authorized.

(TS) Restrictions were also placed on air operations after 1 July.

1. Trooplift Helicopters. The use of US trooplift helicopters in support of SH operations was prohibited (Msg (TS), CJCS 272237Z May 70). The VNAF 219th Squadron supported SH operations and was tasked to provide MACSOG with ten (10) operational CH-34 helicopters per day.

2. TAC AIR and Helicopter Gunships. The use of US TAC AIR and helicopter gunships in support of SH operations was authorized when such support was beyond VNAF's capability (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 011520Z Jul 70).

3. Air Interdiction. MACSOG FAC's were authorized to conduct air strikes against targets of opportunity within SOG no bombing lines (NBLs) (Msg (TS), CJCS 240136Z May 70). TAC AIR was also authorized throughout SH Zones ALPHA and CHARLIE (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 060647Z Nov 70). Targets of opportunity outside NBLs had to be reported to the appropriate DASC and assets were allocated by DASC.

(TS) The insertion of US-led BRIGHT LIGHT teams into Cambodia was authorized only when there appeared to be a reasonable chance for the successful recovery of US evaders/PWs. Use of US helicopters and TAC AIR was authorized in support of these operations. Notification to CINCPAC, with info to JCS, was required for each US-led BRIGHT LIGHT team inserted into Cambodia under this authority, together with supporting intelligence evaluation which generated the operation, and results of the operation. This authority was scheduled to expire on 1 May 71 (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 060647Z Nov 70 TANGO 16).

Additional Authorities

(TS) Several additional authorities were granted which increased the effectiveness of operations.

1. Mining Authority. SH teams were authorized to insert antipersonnel and anti-vehicular mines throughout zones ALPHA and CHARLIE, and, until 1 May 71, throughout the FREEDOM DEAL Zone (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 251247Z Dec 70).

2. Based upon MACV Rules of Engagement for Cambodia, SH teams could employ artillery from gun positions in South Vietnam against enemy targets in Cambodia (Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 281208Z Jun 70).

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3. Sensors. Emplacement of sensors in the SH AO was authorized (Msg (TS) ADM MOORER CJCS 101043Z Jun 70 (BC)). Selection of sensor locations is dependent upon read out capabilities at Nui Ba Ra and the aerial orbiting platform.

Laos

(TS) PRAIRIE FIRE (PF), originally known as SHINING BRASS, was the unclassified nickname assigned to MACSOG covert cross-border operations in Laos. The basic concept of PF operations was one of reconnaissance and interdiction. Operations were to counter infiltration of enemy forces through Laos. The basic operating authorities were specified in CINCPAC message 310138Z Mar 67, subject PRAIRIE FIRE Operation Order.

Area of Operations

(TS) The PF area of operations (AO) in Laos was from UTM grid coordinate XD 430980, to XD 430400, to XD 700000, to XC 800950, to YC 030890, to YB 496801, to YB 497380, to YB 400380, to YB 400020, thence along the Laos, Cambodian border to SVN (Figure 4).

(TS) COMUSMACV Message 141103Z May 70 proposed a five km change to the PFAO just north of the tri-border area to enable MACSOG RT's to monitor and exploit targets on the road net entering this area from the west. The proposal was considered but not approved.

Operating Restrictions

(TS) Multi-platoon exploitation operations were authorized in the PFAO, but forces could not exceed three platoons in any single operation.


(TS) There were no restrictions by area or time frame as to the number of RTs that could be inserted within the PFAO. RTs could also be inserted outside the boundaries for operations inside the AO, subject to the concurrence of AMEMB Vientiane (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 032012Z Apr 68).

(TS) There were no restrictions as to the number of personnel by ethnic origin that could comprise any given RT. Thus the number of US personnel that could be inserted was not restricted by the rules of engagement. However, US leadership and participation in these operations has been directed to cease on 1 April 1971 (Msg (TS), SECDEF 160011Z Dec 70).

(TS) US/VNAF aircraft were authorized to infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply PRAIRIE FIRE forces. Airborne forward air controllers,

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FIGURE 4



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visual and photo reconnaissance, and radio relay flights were employed. TAC AIR was authorized within the full depth of the PFAO to exploit targets of opportunity, interdict lines of communications and to support the insertion and extraction of reconnaissance teams.

(TS) JCS Message 7312/262148Z Sep 67 (TS) authorized the deployment of personnel to Nakhom Phanom, RTAFB, to establish a launch facility to support MACSOG operations. Restrictions and limitations were formulated by command agreements, coordination conferences, and/or Chief, SOG directives. AMEMB Bangkok message 021015Z Nov 70 (TS) expanded the restrictions to allow more personnel to remain at the facility for a longer period of time.

1. A maximum of 24 indigenous personnel were allowed to remain overnight (RON).

2. No more than one case officer per STRATA or ARVN team could remain at NKP to monitor teams.

3. Teams had to remain in isolation during RON.

4. Teams could not remain overnight for a period longer than four consecutive nights. If it was necessary for a team to remain overnight, the Political/Military Section of the American Embassy in Thailand had to be contacted and advised of the team's presence by means of a prearranged message.

(TS) AMEMB Bangkok message 220/070955Z Dec 69 (TS) authorized Ubon, RTAFB to be used as a launch facility. Verbal agreement of the Royal Thai Government (Msg (TS), MACTHAI 130410Z Jun 70) authorized MACV to utilize Ubon as a permanent launch site subject to certain restrictions.

1. No team personnel could RON at the Ubon facility. If an insertion was not accomplished during the hours available, the team had to be returned to Nakhon Phanom.

2. The maximum number of US personnel that could be stationed at Ubon for duty as the launch control team was three officers and ten enlisted personnel. These personnel were assigned to the 46th SF Company, and used a cover story of supporting a Special Forces FTX.

3. Indigenous personnel could not be stationed at the launch site.

4. The maximum number of personnel staging thru Ubon, at any one time, could not exceed two RTs totaling not more than six US and twenty indigenous personnel.

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Additional Authorities

(TS) Additional authorities were granted to increase the effectiveness of PF operations and aid the RTs.

1. Mining. There were no stipulations restricting the use of mines within the PFAO. M-14 anti-personnel mines were employed to reduce the aggressiveness of enemy trackers. The locations of emplaced mines were reported as soon as possible thru channels in eight digit coordinates.

2. Artillery Support. MACV rules of engagement for Laos authorized the use of artillery fire from RVN against valid military targets in Laos (Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 221149Z Dec 69).

3. Sensors. Sensors could be emplaced in the PF AO under authorities granted in the IGLOO WHITE program. IGLOO WHITE operations were conducted in Laos in support of the personnel/vehicular anti-infiltration system, primarily by USAF elements.

4. CS/CN Gas. The authority to use CS/CN gas within the PF AO was held by the US Ambassador to Laos. Its use was considered on a case by case basis and was last utilized to assist in an extraction of an exploitation force on 14 September.

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

(TS) MACSOG operations conducted in the DMZ south of the Provisional Military Demarkation Line (PMDL) were assigned the unclassified nickname NICKEL STEEL (Msg (TS), JCS 6319/142123Z Feb 67). The basic concept for operations was reconnaissance to counter infiltration of enemy forces and provide early warning for use by other agencies and military units.


Area of Operations

(TS) The NICKEL STEEL AO (Figure 5) was defined as the area within the DMZ south of the PMDL and west of north-south grid line YD 00 (Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 42037/141145Z Dec 68). Other MACV forces operated east of YD 00. The YD 00 phase line evolved through coordination with the first military region and XXIV Corps by MACSOG (CCN).

Authorities

(TS) Basic operating authorities as they applied to NICKEL STEEL operations were established by JCS Message 2865/201835Z Oct 69. This message cancelled all previous DMZ authorities and contained all authorities for the conduct of friendly operations in and near the Vietnam DMZ.

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1. Squad-size reconnaissance patrols, with appropriate infantry unit backup to assist in extraction if required, could be conducted in the DMZ south of the PMDL.
2. Artillery, Naval gunfire, Tactical Air, and B-52 strikes were authorized south of the PMDL as required by the situation.
3. Enemy small arms/artillery/motar/rocket fire from north of the PMDL could be countered with heavy ground, naval or air fire until enemy weapons and ancillary facilities were neutralized.
4. Sensors could be implanted south of the PMDL.
5. No ground forces were authorized north of the PMDL.

(TS) Authority was requested to employ unlimited size patrols in the DMZ south of the PMDL, artillery, TAC AIR strikes and Naval gunfire north of the PMDL as the situation required, and the right of overflight north of the PMDL by observation aircraft (Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 29851/171253Z Jun 70) and to employ PRAIRIE FIRE platoons in the DMZ south of the PMDL (Msg (TS), CINCPAC 200517Z Jun 70). These requests were denied by JCS message 041659 Sep 70 (TS).

OPERATIONS

Targeting Process

(S) Targets for operations conducted by SOG were recommended by several sources and underwent critical examination before final approval. SOG operational elements were one source of targets. Other targets were nominated by the Field Forces and 7th Air Force to MACV J2, where they were combined with targets nominated by various MACV J2 agencies. J2 and the SOG agencies then forwarded their targets, together with assigned priorities, to a target workshop, which reconciled SOG operational capabilities with target feasibility and intelligence collection requirements. The workshop was composed of representatives from MACSOG-34, 35, and 36 and the C&Cs. A review panel, composed of the Deputy Chief, SOG and Directors of MACSOG 20, 30, 34, 35, and 36, then met and produced a final target list for Chief, SOG's approval. SOG's Operations and Intelligence Division commenced development of target packages for use in team preparation.

(S) The approved target list was forwarded to J2 for presentation to COMUSMACV and final approval on or about the 20th of each month. Operations commenced the first day of the target month.

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(S) New targets, requiring immediate action, could be nominated at any time. The target panel met weekly, or as needed, to make adjustments in the monthly target list.

Reconnaissance Information

(S) Information collected by SOG forces was reported to the intelligence community by several means.

1. While the team was still in the field, important information was reported to a FAC or radio relay site, who further relayed it to a C&C detachment. The C&C detachment then issued a Spot Report with the information to Headquarters, SOG, and the Field Force concerned.

2. When a team returned, an Advanced Intelligence Report was filed immediately. A detailed After-Action-Report followed the thorough debriefing of the team. These reports were forwarded to MACSOG-20 for further dissemination to MACV J2 and the US intelligence community in the form of Intelligence Reports.

1970 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS


General

(S) Periodic wrap-up briefings were presented to COMUSMACV and key members of his staff throughout the year which summarized MACSOG's activities. The briefings included detailed presentations of operations and served to keep COMUSMACV fully cognizant of SOG's capabilities, limitations, restrictions, and accomplishments. Resumes of the briefing highlights follow which represent a chronological summary of MACSOG operations during 1970. Although reconnaissance teams (RTs) were assigned specific target areas within or near a given base area (BA), only the general BAs are referred to in summarizing the operations (Figure 5).

Wrap-Up: 1 - 14 January

BAs 350/351

(TS) An RT heard an unknown number of trucks moving south on Route 14 during the night of 4 January and a tracked vehicle moving north the next



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morning. On 6 January, the RT made contact with an enemy platoon and was extracted under heavy fire. Based on past experiences in this area and the fact that the Cambodians were keeping VC/NVA traffic off of its major routes, the traffic heard by this RT was evaluated as Cambodian. Another team surprised two NVA soldiers and tried to get them to surrender; however, both soldiers attempted to escape and were killed. As the team moved forward to search the bodies, approximately 12 additional enemy were observed moving into the area, forcing the teams extraction. Three teams reported no significant sightings.

(TS) SOG aerial observers photographed an extensive Cambodian village on a well used road leading into BA 350. The village was not there in April 1969, and most of the construction had taken place since September 1969. Low level photographs verified that the village of over 95 dwellings was occupied by Cambodian civilians. It was speculated that the Cambodians built the village near BA 350 and astride a major road to impede VC/NVA use of the area.

BA 740

(TS) One RT walked in from the Bu Prang Special Forces Camp, but was extracted a short time later after being compromised by 3 civilians. Two EARTH ANGEL teams walked in from the Duc Lap Special Forces Camp on 11 and 12 January and continued their missions of area reconnaissance.

(TS) North of BA 740, three teams encountered squad size NVA/VC elements and were extracted under fire.

BA 702

(TS) A company walked from the Duc Co Special Forces Camp to an area just east of the Cambodian border and established a 10-day patrol base for operations. They made contact with an estimated squad on 11 January but sustained no casualties and continued operations. Two RTs walked into Cambodia from the base, made contact with platoon or larger size elements, and were extracted under fire on the second day of their mission.

(TS) On 9 January, while moving to an extraction LZ, an RT made contact with an estimated enemy squad after eight days in the area. During the initial exchange of fire, the two US team members were killed. After 10 to 15 minutes of heavy firing, three SCU team members succeeded in breaking contact and were extracted. A BRIGHT LIGHT team returned to the area, and shortly after insert, was affronted with an unknown size force. One SCU and an NVA were KIA. The enemy broke contact and the team then recovered the two US bodies along with all equipment and personal items.

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(TS) On 1 January, having been shot off its primary and alternate LZ on 31 December, an RT was walked into its target area from SVN. The team made contact with an unknown size force and was extracted under heavy fire. Another team spent six days on the ground and reported no significant enemy activity.

(TS) The Cambodians continued to build-up military positions south of the Tonle San River and a no fly area was established to preclude any incidents between SOG aircraft and Cambodian AAA positions.

BA 609

(TS) Four RTs conducted area reconnaissance missions, the most significant report was from an ARVN team which had spent five days on the ground. On 14 January between 0800 - 1000 hours an estimated enemy regiment moved past their position from southeast to northwest. A short time later they made contact with an unknown size enemy force and were extracted.

(TS) Six roadwatch teams spent a total of 32 days on the ground. In most instances the teams were only able to observe the road for short periods of time due to the enemy's road security and overall high level of activity. Trucks were heard or sighted by most of the teams; the engines were well tuned and the vehicles ran with black-out lights on. The trucks were 2½ tons, stake bed style with sideboards that struck overhanging foliage. The general flow of traffic ran from west to east and then south into Cambodia to a possible transshipment point immune to TAC AIR and exploitation forces. Two teams on Highways 96/110 reported 34 vehicles passed their locations between 12 - 14 January. Another team reported sighting or hearing over 100 vehicles, 61 moving west to east and 40 east to west, along Highway 110 over a 7 day period. A fourth team reported observing 60 vehicles from 10 to 13 January. Half of these appeared to be loaded when moving east. A team located on Highway 613 reported that 32 trucks moved during the hours of darkness over a seven day period. The team estimated that an enemy way station or truck park was located in the area as vehicles appeared to leave the area empty, move north and return loaded approximately four hours later. This report was based on the sounds of the engines laboring on the return run since heavy vegetation and enemy activity prevented the team from moving close enough to observe.

(TS) A patrol base was operational for 14 days and five team walk-ins were attempted. Three of the five teams made contact and had to return to base. The other two elements spent a total of 4 days on the ground and reported no significant enemy activity.

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(TS) TAC AIR and AC-130 aircraft were called in by several teams resulting in 25 vehicles destroyed. On 13 January, four F-4s delivered 44 750-pound bombs on Highway 110. The road was badly damaged for approximately 100 meters, however trucks were reported to be moving past the interdicted section on the 15th. Artillery from Ben Het was also employed against the road with unknown results.

Northern PFAO

(TS) In the northern half of the PFAO, weather limited operations, and only two teams were able to get on the ground. One RT was inserted on 13 January and extracted on the 14th after contact with an unknown size enemy element. Another team was launched from Quang Tri, but a FAC found the target area saturated with enemy personnel and the team was diverted back to the mission launch site. TAC AIR was employed, but the exact enemy casualties could not be determined due to rapidly deteriorating weather.

Wrap-Up: 15 January - 4 February

(TS) An EARTH ANGEL team tried to re-establish contact in Cambodia with a Montagnard family that a previous team had met in November 1969. The family in question was no longer in the area; however, the team was successful in winning the confidence of another Montagnard who stated he had at one time lived near Duc Lap. This individual reported that no VC had been in the area during the past month, and that the villagers did not like the NVA or VC. A gift kit containing a mosquito net, pajamas, sweater and personal items was given to him, and he agreed to report any enemy activity to the EARTH ANGEL element when it returned.

(TS) A SINGLETON agent, who was responsible for obtaining an official Cambodian party document in December 1969, operated near Minut, Cambodia as a wood cutter. While in Minut, he learned of a VC sapper training area just south of the city. The instructors were reported to be Chinese Communists, and the class was composed of 40 males and 30 females, all SVN citizens between the ages of 15 and 20. This class was supposed to have graduated on 15 January.

BAs 350/351

(TS) Three RTs encountered squad to platoon size elements on the second and third days of their missions and were extracted. One of the teams observed over 140 enemy moving both southeast and northwest near Highway 131 on 25 January. Between 19 and 23 January, one of three

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other teams observed 15 vehicles moving from the northeast to the southwest along an unmarked 3 meter wide road. Short stay times of these elements confirmed that enemy activity in this general area remained relatively high. A night parachute infiltration team in another area was on the ground for five days and reported no significant activity.

(TS) A two platoon patrol left the Bu Dop SF Camp and established a patrol base in SVN. After launching one RT, the PB covered its movement and then moved east where it made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The platoon broke contact after 3 SCU were slightly wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown.

BA 702

(TS) On 20 January, an ARVN team was compromised by an estimated enemy platoon shortly after insert and was extracted. Ten days later, another ARVN team was reinserted, also compromised, and subsequently extracted the same day. The first team observed about 40 enemy in the platoon, only half of which were armed. The unarmed individuals were believed to be laborers working cultivated areas seen in the immediate vicinity.

(TS) North of BA 702, three elements made contact with platoon size units and were forced to be extracted from hot LZs.

(TS) The Cambodians continued to build up south of the Tonle San River and photo intelligence indicated that they were also building a semi-permanent base north of the river. This activity was believed to cause the enemy to move a regiment south into BA 701.

BA 609

(TS) Six teams operated in the Cambodian salient, five of which engaged unknown size enemy units. Between 25 and 29 January, one of these teams heard over 75 vehicles moving both north and south along Route 613. The sixth team was an EARTH ANGEL team which was listed as MIA on 3 February.

(TS) In the PF portion of BA 609, two ARVN-led teams were on the ground for 13 days before making contact; both elements were extracted under fire. A team made up of eight US and two ARVN moved to a position 200 meters south of Route 110 on 21 January to capture a PW. They heard an estimated 75mm to 105mm artillery piece firing and impacting approximately 4,000 meters from their position. This was the fifth report in a month of artillery firing generally to the west. (In May 1969, recon teams reported similar artillery firing before an attack against Ben Het.) The RT kept the road under surveillance from 21 thru 23 January and over 100 vehicles carrying rice and POL were seen or heard. The following pattern of enemy activity was noted:

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1. At 1730 hours, a five man security element cleared the road and individual guards were randomly posted along the road.

2. At 1900 hours, two shots were fired from the west, followed by two shots from the east, then trucks began to move from west to east.

3. The trucks moved at about 15 to 20 MPH and only drivers were seen in the vehicles.

4. Whenever an aircraft was heard, a signal shot was fired, followed by two rapid shots, and the trucks would come to a halt on the road. At one time due to an orbiting FAC, it took one group of vehicles an estimated 2½ hours to go roughly 3,000 meters.

(TS) On the night of 23 January, the RT established its ambush, and twenty vehicles passed thru the ambush before a target was selected. A truck carrying 50 pound sacks of rice and one POL drum was hit but unfortunately the driver was KIA. The RT immediately came under fire by an enemy security force and evaded to an LZ where it was extracted under heavy ground fire.

(TS) On 25 January, a second RT was inserted along Route 110 and engaged an estimated company before it could take up a position to observe the road. They were extracted under the cover of TAC AIR and helicopter gunships. Two other teams observed only 20 vehicles on Route 110 over a period of 7 days and were extracted under light small arms fire. Decreased truck activity was attributed to TAC AIR, RT activity along Routes 96/110, and a diminishing of the enemy's "Crash Program" to resupply units in the south.

(TS) Photos taken by RTs and FACs indicated Route 110 was highly maintained. When the route was interdicted, it was usually repaired within 3 to 4 hours. On 21 January, a FAC flying in support of operations spotted nine vehicles on the road, called for TAC AIR, and all nine vehicles were destroyed.

BA 614

(TS) Northwest of BA 614, a STRATA team was inserted on 23 January. On the 25th, the team sighted a small enemy force and became split. Three of the six team members were extracted; the others were listed as MIA.-

BA 607

(TS) Three teams west of the base area confronted unknown size enemy forces and were extracted under fire. Another RT was able to conduct a 10 minute wire-tap before making contact with an estimated platoon. The team was extracted under fire, and the tape was released to the 8th Radio Research Group (8RRG) at Phu Bai.

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BA 611

(TS) The northern portion of the PFAO continued to be a center of high enemy activity. Nine teams operating in this area were beset with platoon size elements and one team encountered an estimated company after discovering a 30 bunker complex. The enemy's anti-commando activity kept RT stay times to less than 2½ days in their respective target areas.

(TS) One team was able to complete a wire-tap on a six wire multiplex system before being compromised. Unfortunately the wire-tap devices could only record up to 10 kilohertz band width, and the enemies system in this case was about 35 kilohertz band width. Only a very limited signal could be picked up, but the tap was forwarded thru RR channels.

Wrap-Up: 5 - 25 February

BAs 350/351

(TS) On 14 February, an EARTH ANGEL team observed five groups of enemy moving northwest to southeast on Highway 13 ranging in size from one man to an estimated company. On 15 February, the team observed an additional three groups of NVA/VC totaling 41 people moving in the same direction. On the 16th, the team moved to a new vantage point and sighted four groups of enemy moving southeast ranging in size from 3 to 20. Most of the elements sighted wore green fatigues, web gear and were armed with AK-47s and B-40 rocket launchers. The team returned overland to the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp on 17 February after completing its mission.

(TS) A two platoon patrol base (PB) continued operations out of the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp and covered the movements of three recon elements to a drop-off point near the SVN border. In one incident the PB made contact with an unknown size enemy force shortly after launching an RT. The platoons were successful in engaging the enemy and giving the recon team additional time to clear the area and continue its mission. All three RTs were extracted on the third day of their missions after making contact with unknown size enemy forces. One team reported that a track vehicle was heard moving north between 7 and 8 February. Four trucks and what was believed to be earth moving equipment were also heard. Another team found two east-west oriented roads four meters wide, capable of accommodating up to five ton vehicles. One of these roads showed signs of recent heavy use.

(TS) While performing a trail watch mission on a southwest-northeast oriented trail, an RT observed approximately 300 enemy moving southwest in six groups. Two groups sighted were accompanied with

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six large individuals that appeared to be Chinese. They spoke in a dialect not recognized by any of the team members and they wore green fatigues, black berets and were armed with pistols. The enemy troops themselves wore clean green fatigues, black or gray head bandanas, rucksacks and web gear and carried AK-47s. The soldiers were carrying their weapons in a relaxed manner, and no point or flank security was observed, indicating that the troops had recently left a bivouac or rest area in or near BA 351. The team was compromised by an unknown size enemy force; gunships supporting the extraction reported an estimated 30 enemy KBA and 60 enemy WBA. A second team was reinserted into the same target area, but it was immediately compromised and extracted.

(TS) Four teams spent eight days on the ground and all four were extracted after being compromised by unknown size enemy forces. One team heard a total of 19 trucks moving near its position over a two night period. Another team in the same target area between 19 - 21 January, observed 15 trucks moving on a northeast - southwest oriented road.

(TS) A team inserted on 20 February was extracted on 23 February after reporting negative enemy activity. Another team was reinserted on 25 February and was shot out of its LZ by an unknown size enemy force.

BA 740

(TS) On 20 February, an RT observed seven enemy armed with AK-47s moving northeast along a trail. On the 21st the team observed four NVA pulling a cart which contained an 82mm mortar. All uniforms appeared fresh. The team was later compromised by an estimated two squads of enemy and was extracted under cover of helicopter gunships.

(TS) An EARTH ANGEL team walked into the area from Duc Lap Special Forces Camp on 20 February to reestablish contact with a Montgnard in the area.

Wasteland

(TS) In the wasteland area, one RT was inserted by parachute from a helicopter during hours of darkness with the mission of trailwatch but was compromised the first day and extracted. An ARVN-led team was compromised by an unknown size enemy force on the fourth day of its operation.

BA 702

(TS) In BA 702, seven teams were active. Five team were compromised by small numbers of enemy shortly after insertion. Two ARVN led teams

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were compromised by squad and platoon size enemy forces. All units were immediately extracted under gunship cover.

BA 609

(TS) In Cambodia, four of five teams were extracted without incident after completing their missions. The fifth team observed a well maintained 3 - 4 meter wide north-south by-pass road off Route 613 before being compromised by an estimated enemy squad and extracted. None of the five teams observed equipment or supplies moving into SVN.

(TS) From 1450 to about 1530 on 21 February, an Army FAC from CCC observed a 40-man enemy formation moving south along Highway 613. Twenty-five of the enemy wore green fatigues, web gear and ruck sacks and carried small arms; the remaining 15 wore black pajamas and carried heavy loads with no weapons. The formation extended 30 meters with 10 - 15 meters between individuals and moved along both sides of the road. A US type 1/2 ton jeep led the formation with a second jeep in the rear. Each time the FAC came within range, the enemy fired at the aircraft. The SH rules of engagement at this time precluded the employment of TAC AIR or artillery from Ben Het against this lucrative target.

(TS) In the Laotian section, nine teams operated in six target areas. Two teams spent a total of 18 days on the ground. Between 7 and 8 February, one of the RTs reported hearing 22 trucks and 8 other vehicles moving east on Route 96G. Based on truck noise and gear shifting the team estimated that all of the trucks were loaded. Throughout the six days that it was on the ground, the same team heard 82mm and 105mm artillery fire northeast of its position. Impact areas could not be determined. This was the sixth report in one month of artillery firing in this area. An ARVN-led RT was inserted into the same target area on the 11th and was extracted without incident on 21 February.

(TS) Two teams were shot out of their LZs. A third RT, conducting a roadwatch mission on Routes 96/110, observed an enemy company size complex containing 15 - 20 bunkers, each with an overhead cover constructed of dirt and bamboo. Fields of fire had been cleared for 100 meters in all directions. On the second day of its mission, the RT made contact with an enemy platoon and was extracted. Another team heard a total of 70 trucks moving west to east on Route 110 over a period of seven days.

(TS) A two platoon size force of 107 personnel was inserted on 23 February under the cover of TAC AIR on a roadblock mission. The operation was conducted in 3 phases. In the first phase an LZ and a vantage point overlooking Highway 110 were selected and subsequently secured. In the second phase, the force seized and physically blocked

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a portion of Highway 110 for interdiction. Phase three included reconnaissance along the highway to determine the flow of traffic, interdict targets of opportunity, and capture a POW. TAC AIR, which included C-119s, C-130s and F-4s, and 175mm artillery from Ben Het were employed to interdict the highway, strike enemy troop concentrations, and counterattack enemy ground probes. Over 165 enemy rounds of mixed 60mm, 82mm and 57 RR of both HE and CS varieties were directed at the force, and enemy ground probes were continuous. No vehicular traffic attempted to pass the interdiction point and the only traffic sighted or heard was west of the road block. Portable loudspeakers were used in an attempt to get enemy soldiers to Chieu Hoi but the only results were mortar rounds. On 24 February, an all ARVN RT provided a diversionary effort and early warning for the two-platoon force. On the 25th, the RT engaged an estimated platoon size force. One SCU and the ARVN team leader were KIA and the team was subsequently extracted.

BA 613

(TS) Three RTs were beset with unknown size enemy forces, but reported no significant vehicle sightings. One team sighted a slightly damaged bulldozer on 26 February and TAC AIR was employed to destroy it. Helicopters supporting extractions received small arms and 37mm AAA fire.

BA 614

(TS) Two STRATA teams were descended on by estimated platoons and extracted under ground fire. Two RTs were compromised shortly after insert by unknown size enemy forces and extracted.

BA 607

(TS) An RT conducted a wire-tap on a wire that was attached to overhead poles and trees by glass insulators. The team tapped the wire for an hour and a half; tapes were forwarded to the 8th RRG at Phu Bai for evaluation.

(TS) Approximately 30 enemy armed with AK-47s compromised one team on the third day of their mission, but weather prevented a quick extraction. The enemy jammed the teams FM radio after making contact; radio contact was reestablished on an alternate frequency, and TAC AIR was directed on the enemy positions. One machine gun was destroyed and there was one secondary explosion. On the fourth night, the team leader called in C-119 gunships to within 15 meters of his position by using a mini-ponder transmitter which positioned the team on the aircraft radar. Screams and cries from the enemy were heard throughout the night. The weather broke the next morning, and the team was extracted under cover of TAC AIR.

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BA 611

(TS) An RT was extracted on the second day of its point reconnaissance mission after being compromised by trackers. Two other teams spent a total of 14 days in one target area. The first RT inserted on 6 February to conduct a wire-tap and was extracted 8 days later without incident. The second team, ARVN-led, was inserted as the first was extracted. The team was extracted when three SCU became ill.

(TS) An ARVN-led team was inserted on 15 February and extracted on 19 February after two team members became ill. Another RT was inserted on the 24th with the mission of roadwatch on Highway 921B. It was extracted on 26 February after making contact with an unknown size enemy force.

(TS) In Laos, one team came under attack by an estimated platoon necessitating its extraction on the second day of the mission. North of BA 611, two teams launched together on 17 February were inserted on separate LZs. Collateral sources, however, reported that the enemy had seen the insert and both teams were extracted the same day.

BORDEN (C) Program

(TS) The activities of several BORDEN (C) agents were brought out in a document captured on 19 January in Phu Yen Province by an element of the Capital ROC Division. This document indicated that SOG diversionary efforts were receiving satisfactory results and listed the names of eight ex-BORDEN (C) agents; five were inserted in Laos and three in SVN from November 1968 to April 1969. The document was hand written by a political officer in Phu Yen Province utilizing guidance he had received from the B-3 Front, and it ordered the arrest of captured NVA soldiers employed in intelligence activities by the enemy. The document described the method by which agents were infiltrated; described their mission in part as persuading members of VC/NVA units to respond to the Chieu Hoi Program; and described their uniforms and equipment.

Wrap-Up: 25 February - 18 March

(TS) Inserts in the SHAO were restricted during the visit of the US astronauts to Cambodia and were also curtailed in BAs 701/702 because of increased Cambodian military activity. The percentage of ARVN-led reconnaissance teams, however, steadily increased. In December 1969, 20% of the total inserts were VN-led. In January 1970, 18%; February 28%; and during this period the percentage of VN-led teams reached 65%.

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BAs 350/352

(TS) Three EARTH ANGEL teams were inserted overland from the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp. These teams were the first reconnaissance elements to be reinserted into the Fishhook area since August 1969. On 14 March, one team observed what it believed to be an NVA/VC platoon moving SE into SVN. It returned to Loc Ninh on the 15th.

BA 351

(TS) Although reliable sources reported no known enemy elements of major size in BA 351, SOG teams experienced difficulties with what was believed to be rear service elements, especially in LZs west of BA 351 near Reiners Road, the bypass of Highway 131. Truck traffic had been entering BA 351 from the west; however, during this period, FACs flying out of Quan Loi observed that traffic moved into the base area from the north. Teams were targeted accordingly, and it was discovered that between 350/351, a large enemy build-up had taken place which included a divisional headquarters, two regimental size units and several unidentified elements.

(TS) One team was compromised by an unknown size enemy force on the first day of its mission and extracted under cover of gunships. While located on a three meter wide trail, another element observed several small groups of enemy moving to the west. Most were engaged in some type of logistical activity such as transporting rice. On 4 March, the team found a hootch containing from 40 to 50 large bags of grain. The RT was extracted by helicopter the next day after being compromised by an unknown size enemy force.

(TS) An RT monitoring a northeast - southwest trail on 9 March observed approximately 40 NVA/VC moving northeast. The enemy wore clean green fatigues, belt type web gear, heavily loaded rucksacks and carried AK-47s. They moved single file on the trail with 2 - 5 meters between individuals and were led by what appeared to be a Chinese. This was the second report of personnel with Chinese characteristics in this area. The team was compromised shortly thereafter and extracted by STABO rig without further incident.

(TS) A recon element, launched overland from the Bu Prang Special Forces Camp on 27 February was compromised on 1 March. During extraction, a UH1H was shot down by intense enemy ground fire, seriously injuring a US team member. Team and crew were extracted under cover of gunships.

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BA 740

(TS) An EARTH ANGEL team walked overland from Duc Lap Special Forces Camp on 27 February and contacted a friendly Montagnard farmer. The farmer stated that he had observed many NVA/VC in the hills about two kilometers northwest of his village, but he could not give an exact location. When the team returned to Duc Lap, one agent defected to the enemy and unsuccessfully attempted to capture one of the other team members to take with him.

(TS) Three teams reported negative enemy activity, and an ARVN RT was extracted on the 2nd day of its mission because of Cambodian civilian activity in the area. One RT made contact with an estimated two platoons and was extracted under fire. On 19 March, another team was extracted with a POW, but the POW died from wounds received during a firefight with the RT.

BA 701

(TS) South of BA 701, an RT was compromised by an unknown size enemy force on the 2nd day of its mission and extracted under light small arms fire. In the BA, an EARTH ANGEL team found a storage area containing a rice cache and a bunker complex during a seven day mission but sighted no troops.

BAs 609/613

(TS) Traffic was monitored in Cambodia to ascertain whether supplies were stopping in this area or moving into SVN. A FAC photographed a newly constructed bridge, estimated to be 75 meters long and 4 meters wide. There were definite signs of recent use, probably by trucks moving south. CAS also reported that supplies (mostly food and POL) were being shipped from the northwest for temporary storage in this area prior to being moved south toward BA 702 and into SVN.

(TS) In Laos, photographs of Highways 96/110 were taken by FAC riders on the evening that the two platoon road interdiction force was extracted. The photos clearly showed that the highways were impassable at several points. At 1000 the next morning, the FAC returned to the area; photographs showed that the road was repaired and had already been used. In addition, new security bunkers had been established.

(TS) Two teams reported hearing an estimated 65 2½ ton trucks on Highway 110 on 2 and 8 March. Another team was inserted on 15 March to conduct a roadwatch on Highways 96/110, but was extracted on 17 March because of heavy enemy activity. Three elements were extracted immediately after insert under heavy enemy ground fire.

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Three other elements spent from two to four days in their target areas before being compromised.

(TS) An ARVN-led BRIGHT LIGHT team was inserted into a target area with a mission of recovering an ARVN team leader lost in the same area in late February. While searching, the element was compromised and in the ensuing fire fight, the ARVN team leader and one SCU were WIA.

(TS) Northeast in BA 613, one recon element was attacked by an estimated two enemy squads on 25 February. The team detonated claymores and hand grenades, killing an estimated 10 NVA and withdrew. It was extracted on 27 February.

BA 614

(TS) In the base area, an RT was active for six days before being extracted, reporting no activity. Northeast of the BA, two RT's made contact with an estimated two platoons resulting in 3 NVA/VC KIA and 5 NVA/VC WIA. This heavy contact plus FAC reports of ground activity indicated that BA 614 and surrounding area was a probable logistical base and staging area.

BAs 607/611

(TS) An RT was inserted in BA 607 on 13 March, but was compromised by an undetermined size force and extracted the same day. Southwest of the area, a STRATA team reported no enemy activity.

(TS) In the southern portion of BA 611, one RT contacted an estimated two squads of enemy and was extracted on 5 March. Another team was compromised by an estimated platoon and extracted on the same day of insertion. A STRATA team was separated after contact with an unknown size force on 19 March; three team members were extracted on the 20th reporting that the other 3 were KIA.

(TS) North of BA 611, two teams spent 11 days on the ground. The first team discovered a cache of five 140mm rockets. When it was extracted on 13 March, the second team was inserted to destroy the cache and continue the mission of area reconnaissance. This team was extracted on 16 March after a SCU stepped on an M-14 mine. On 13 March, another team discovered a camouflaged communications/liaison station containing 10 hootches. TAC AIR was directed against the area and dense black smoke indicated that the strike hit some type of fuel storage. This area was also believed to be a troop infiltration route between the DMZ and the Khe Sanh area. Two other elements were beset with an unknown size enemy force and were lifted out shortly after insertion.

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DMZ

(TS) One team reported numerous enemy sightings during nine days in its operational area, and discovered a total of 29 rounds of 82mm mortar ammo stacked near a suspected firing position on 27 February. Enemy security precluded destruction of the cache. This team was extracted on 5 March and another team was inserted. The second team was extracted on 9 March after being compromised. Another flip-flop operation was a roadwatch mission and terminated on 13 March after 4 SCU became ill.

(TS) The radio relay site north of Khe Sanh continued to provide an exceptionally useful means of maintaining contact with teams operating west of the DMZ. Seven US and 35 SCU were normally on top of the hill armed with two 4.2 mortars, a 57mm recoilless rifle and machine guns. They were capable of directing the fires of 175mm from a fire base to the east. Despite difficulties in resupply the risk and hazards to the personnel were offset by the advantages of having a radio relay site capable of monitoring team activity with secure voice 24 hours a day.

Cross-Beach

(S) Twenty-two cross-beach missions were conducted from 1 January to 15 March. Operations were conducted along the coast of I Corps, II Corps and the Delta. Missions in the Delta were along the southern coast of the Ca Mau Peninsula and were conducted under the nickname IVY COVER. SOG teams utilized the MARKET TIME facilities at Seafloat to conduct nine separate missions in coordination with NAVFORV SEAL teams. The four most successful operations resulted in 11 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA and 5 VC captured.

Wrap-Up: 19 March - 1 April

BAs 350/351

(TS) An EARTH ANGEL team was captured by the NVA while enroute to its objective area on 15 March. During interrogation, team revealed that they were on a routine mission from the Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp. On 19 March, the team leader was forced to transmit a message to a radio relay aircraft that his team had captured an NVA prisoner and had a wounded team member who required helicopter evacuation. By using a predesignated duress signal, he alerted his Vietnamese case officer that the team had been compromised. On 21 March, the leader overpowered a guard, escaped, and returned to Loc Ninh the same evening. During the debriefing, the team leader stated that 26 NVA

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armed with AK-47s, 8-40 rockets and two 12.7mm AAA guns were deployed in an attempt to destroy any evacuation helicopters that were sent for the reported POW and hypothetical wounded team member. Since SOG policy does not permit use of helicopters to extract EARTH ANGELS, the enemy plans could not have been successful - even if the duress signal had not been transmitted. This was the second known occasion in which the NVA/VC attempted to set up a helicopter extraction for EARTH ANGELS.

(TS) Between the two BAs, two platoon patrol bases launched seven RTs from SVN into Cambodia. Three teams were extracted by helicopter shortly after insertion because of contact with enemy elements. One of two teams launched into another target area reported hearing a track vehicle on 23 March. This was the third occurrence since mid-February where track vehicles had been heard in this area. The second team was attacked by an unknown size enemy force on 28 March resulting in 1 SCU KIA and 1 US WIA. A sixth team reported hearing four groups of enemy, ranging from 10 to 100 in size, moving northeast and west between 25 and 28 March. The team also reported hearing or observing a total of twelve 2½ ton trucks. Two trucks contained eight bags of rice, estimated at 400 pounds each.

(TS) On 24 March, the third day of its mission, an ARVN RT came in contact with an estimated 40 enemy accompanied by two dogs. Three NVA/VC and one yellow enemy dog were KIA; the RT was safely extracted.

(TS) Two teams operated in another target area. The first team located an estimated 10 ton rice cache being stored in a bamboo hootch. The hootch was 25 feet long, 15 feet wide and 13 feet high with a floor two feet off of the ground. The rice was stacked in 150 pound bags, three bags deep, five high, in nine rows. This team also found a heavily used unmarked road oriented northeast to southwest that was not indicated on any maps. The second team was compromised by an unknown size enemy force after one day and extracted.

BA 609

(TS) On 19 March, a two platoon patrol base from Dak To established a position along the SVN border in the northern Plei Trap Valley. The PB launched nine reconnaissance elements into Cambodia to reconnoiter suspected supply routes leading into SVN. Photographs from the teams indicated well used trails and possible bivouac/way stations. There was also photographic evidence that supplies were being transported by man-pack conveyance, including bicycles and two-wheel carts. One team reported a foot bridge across a 5 - 7 meter wide stream and a trail oriented north/south that ran parallel to the stream. Two other trails were oriented generally northwest to southeast and were about 1.5 meters wide. The surface of one trail was covered by bamboo mats that appeared to be about four

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months old. The second trail appeared to be frequently used and well maintained. This trail led into an area that contained 15 bamboo houses in good repair, believed to be a bivouac area or way station facility.

(TS) Northeast in the area an RT reported negative enemy activity. Another team was active for 6 days reporting heavy trail activity on trails oriented north-south and east-west. On an east-west oriented trail, a multi-company size base camp was observed with 30 bunkers and 10 sleeping huts. These trail networks strongly suggested an infiltration route or resupply LOC where supplies were being man-packed toward BA 702. FAC photographs of an east-west oriented bridge, estimated to be 25 - 30 feet long and capable of handling vehicular traffic of up to 2½ tons, further increased this speculation.

(TS) In another target area, one RT was shot out of the LZ on 20 March. On 23 March, the team was reinserted, but it was surrounded the next day by an estimated three squads. Helicopter gunships engaging the enemy caused the grass to catch on fire near the teams position. Because of the impending hazard caused by the combination of the superior enemy force and the fire, a UH1H chase ship landed to recover the team. As the aircraft lifted off the LZ, it exploded and crashed into the burning jungle, bursting into flames on impact. Four US crew members, 3 US team members and 5 SCU were considered MIA. The fire prevented immediate insertion of any rescue force and subsequent elements were aborted because of heavy enemy ground fire.

(TS) In the PF portion of BA 609, an RT reported no activity on Highway 110 from 19 to 21 March. On 26 March, an RT was reinserted into the same area. At approximately 2130 hours on 29 March, the team detonated claymore mines which destroyed the front wheels of a 2½ ton truck moving from east to west along Highway 110. The driver of the vehicle was dazed by the blast, quickly apprehended, and removed to a rally point. The vehicle was destroyed with thermite grenades. The team and POW were extracted to Kontum on 30 March.

(TS) Interrogation of the POW was conducted in Saigon. The POW stated that he was a corporal in the 1st Squad, Transport Platoon, 40th Artillery Regiment, and that his unit was responsible for hauling food from a pick-up point in Laos to a delivery point in Vietnam west of Ben Het. He further stated that the 40th Artillery Regiment was composed of the 44th, 1st, and 33rd Battalions and that he thought these units were located west of Ben Het. The prisoner knew nothing of Chinese advisors in the area. He gave details of his pick-up of supplies and delivery to elements of the 40th Regiment, and spoke of rumors in his unit about an offensive in the western part of the central highlands.

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(TS) In another target area, a team met heavy enemy resistance on 25 March and was extracted the next day after contact with a platoon size enemy force. Another recon element was inserted into the area on 31 March and reported negative enemy activity.

(TS) An ARVN-led element was inserted on 24 March on Route 16. The team was extracted in two groups on the 28th after making contact with an enemy platoon. Ten enemy were KIA and 1 SCU MIA. The missing SCU walked into the G-5 radio relay site on 29 March.

BA 607

(TS) In BA 607, three RTs and a STRATA team were active. In one target area a team reported making contact with an estimated company shortly after insert on 20 March, but weather precluded extraction of the team until the 24th. While supporting the teams movement to an LZ, a Marine UH1E gunship was hit by enemy ground fire and crashed killing all aboard. Two other RTs made contact with an estimated platoon and were subsequently extracted.

BA 611

(TS) In the Laotian salient, a STRATA team made contact with a company size unit on 18 March resulting in one team member MIA. North of BA 611, a team located and destroyed a cache of 140mm rockets previously located by another RT. They also discovered an elaborately constructed and recently used bunker complex that contained six large bunkers with interspersed foxholes, and commanded an excellent view over Route 925.

(TS) North of BA 611, an RT conducted a successful wire-tap of enemy wire traffic. After recording for 15 minutes, the team severed the wire, secured a cross piece with insulators and wire attached, and moved to an LZ for extraction.

Sapper Attack

(TS) On the morning of 1 April, approximately six sappers attacked CCC at Kontum. They were supported by mortars and succeeded in penetrating the north wall of the camp. As a result of the approximately eight minute attack, the CO's billet and headquarters building were completely destroyed, and 16 SCU were wounded. There was minor damage to other buildings. The sappers successfully escaped.

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Wrap-Up: 2 - 22 April

BAs 350/351

(TS) South of BA 350, two EARTH ANGEL teams were active, both conducting trail watch missions on suspected border crossing points. Over 100 enemy troops were observed crossing from Cambodia into SVN. BA 350 remained an enemy strong point and missions were temporarily curtailed.

(TS) A two platoon size PB launched a team on 31 March, in BA 351. The RT observed over 160 enemy troops moving along a well used road network, Rhiners Road, which had a heavy canopy making it very difficult to see the road surface from the air. The team also observed a company-size base camp which had been recently used. Attempts were made to insert three teams in another area, but two were aborted because of heavy ground fire on the LZs, and the third team was extracted the same day of insertion. During the aborted inserts, one large cache and an estimated 400 - 500 enemy were seen on and around the LZs. One of three other elements observed both NVA soldiers and Montagnards during its mission.

(TS) A second PB was inserted from Bu Dop on 22 April and the patrol captured an unarmed male west of Bu Dop who was sent to the Special Forces Camp for interrogation. The POW was subsequently turned over to the 11th Armored Cav Regiment.

(TS) Reconnaissance reports indicated that the enemy was building up a base of supply in the eastern part of BA 351. This assessment was based on the amount of truck traffic monitored by FACs and RTs since mid-March, and the fact that Cambodian pressure was increasing to the west.

Wasteland

(TS) On 18 April, an ARVN-led team located a platoon size bivouac area and found a briefcase and rucksack containing a notebook and other personal items. The notebook, which was written in Cambodian, was the property of an individual possibly assigned to a rear service unit of a Cambodian Communist organization in northeastern Cambodia. The latest information in the book was dated January 1970 and referred to various logistical activities for support of the VC/NVA.

(TS) A company-size patrol was active from 1 - 14 April in the area south of the Tonle Srepok River. One of two teams operating with the patrol observed a well used trail. The other team was compromised by an enemy patrol with a scout dog. One US and two SCU were wounded;

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three enemy and the dog were killed. A UH1H helicopter was lost during extraction when a B-40 rocket hit its tail boom.

(TS) One RT located a well used trail oriented northwest to southeast. Another located a north-south trail and also observed four deserted bivouac areas or base camps. A third team was compromised by an estimated platoon accompanied by a dog. Thirteen VC/NVA were KIA and two US and two SCU were WIA.

(TS) In other target areas, five RTs were extracted after encountering unknown size enemy units. One element located an enemy base camp on the night of 22 April where three generators were heard running and a large building, 15 feet wide, 30 feet long and 20 feet high was observed under construction. A series of 6 trails and many signs of foot traffic were also observed. Early the next morning, the team was compromised by a platoon size element with a leashed scout dog. This was the fourth sighting of a patrol and dog in the Wasteland area.

(TS) On 19 April, a FAC flying out of Ban Me Thuot observed 10 enemy pushing bicycles loaded with bags of grain. This was the fifth sighting by FAC pilots of this type activity, each identical in nature including direction of movement to the south. The same day, another FAC photographed a 40 foot suspension bridge crossing the O Phlay River and the first AAA position located in the Wasteland. Other photographs indicated that the enemy was bringing in bamboo matting in an effort to build up the roads prior to the rainy season. This was a change in transportation emphasis since the enemy by-passed this area in the past. This increased buildup and improvements in the Wasteland area fell into line with other enemy troop movements southward.

BA 609

(TS) On 20 April, one team engaged an unknown size force in Cambodia and captured a POW and 2 AK-47s. The POW was wounded in the neck and was placed in the hospital under heavy guard. Interrogation revealed that the POW was a member of the 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 2nd TC Battalion of the B-3 Front. At the time of capture, he was engaged in rice planting with other members of his squad north of a base camp located across the border from Dak To District, Kontum Province. He stated that his battalion was engaged in rice growing and in transporting weapons, food and ammo into SVN.

(TS) In Laos, eight out of ten teams were compromised before completing their missions.

(TS) One team was almost surrounded by an estimated two squads of enemy while conducting a wire-tap. The NVA wrapped their feet in rags to suppress noise as they walked through the jungle, but the team still got away. The tap readout revealed that the enemy was knowledgeable of someone tapping their wire.

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(TS) A second team was attacked by an enemy platoon, five NVA were KIA and the team evaded. Later they observed an estimated 100 enemy sitting in a clearing as if they were in a class and a regimental size bivouac area containing approximately 850 camouflaged foxholes and bunkers.

BA 614

(TS) In BA 614, three out of five RTs were extracted after contact with enemy elements. One platoon (4 US and 35 SCU) also established a mobile patrol base along the Laotian border on 17 April. On 21 April, the PB engaged an estimated platoon resulting in one SCU KIA.

BA 607

(TS) On 9 April, a pen flare from the ground was sighted near an insertion LZ. It was a signal from the co-pilot of a Marine AH-1G Cobra gunship that had crashed on 21 March while supporting another SOG element in this area. When picked up, the co-pilot stated that he had been thrown clear of the aircraft as it crashed and that the pilot was KIA. The co-pilot was taken to the 85th EVAC at Quang Tri where he was treated for malnutrition and injuries suffered in the crash.

BA 611

(TS) Information from a team on a riverwatch mission south of BA 611, indicated the Xe Sap River was not being used as an infiltration route. Inside the area, four ARVN teams were continually in contact with enemy elements. North of BA 611, nine reconnaissance elements engaged enemy elements. A team from NKP met an NVA squad shortly after insert, and one of the wounded enemy surrendered to the team as a POW. He stated that he was an LZ watcher and had notified a squad of eight Laotians that the RT had landed in the area. The POW and several Laotians were wounded by claymore fragments during contact; the POW surrendered when his friends withdrew leaving him to die.

(TS) From the preliminary interrogation of the POW it was learned that the prisoner was a 29 year old NVA Lieutenant named Tran Dinh Thang. While in NVN, he had been chief of an ordnance sub-section, rear service section, 27th Regiment, B-5 Front. In early February 1970, he was assigned to a twelve man civilian proselyting team to organize and train the local inhabitants in Western Quang Tri Province. After arriving in the target area, the team members separated, moved to their assigned areas, and were not in contact with each other thereafter. He lived and worked with the mountain tribes in Laos and Western Quang Tri Province where he helped the local inhabitants increase

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food production and organize an area defense force. He stated that the 27th Regiment operated out of the central DMZ area with the mission of attacking allied forces and interdicting Route 9. He also indicated that the 3rd Bn, 27th NVA Regiment was located in Western Quang Tri Province.

West DMZ/DMZ

(TS) West of the DMZ an RT was active for two days before making contact with an estimated enemy platoon. In the DMZ, two RTs were extracted after compromise by an estimated two enemy squads. A third team remained active.

Wrap-Up: 23 April - 6 May

(TS) The JCS approved the PATIO (C) program for the conduct of tactical air strikes in Cambodia on 20 April, and a SOG FAC directed the first attack on 24 April against an enemy column of 125 troops in the Wasteland area. A total of 175 sorties were directed against lucrative targets during this period.

(TS) Only 10 US-led RTs were involved in the PATIO (C) operation until 5 May, when the close hold nature of the program was lifted. Then it was decided to utilize both US and ARVN-led teams to direct TAC AIR. In addition to these recon elements, nine FACs flying seven O-2s and two OV-10s and four Army observers flying O-1s out of Ban Me Thuot covered the 740, 701 and Wasteland complex; and three FACs and four Army observers from Kontum covered BA 609 down to the 80° east-west grid line. Four F-4s from Phu Cat supported BA 609 efforts, while six F-100s were dedicated to support strikes in the 740, Wasteland, and 701 areas.

BAs 350/351

(TS) In BAs 350/351 and vicinity, three RTs were active with PATIO (C) missions. One RT was extracted on 4 May after contact with an unknown size enemy force, but not before the team observed an occupied base camp and bunker complex. TAC AIR struck the target on the morning of 5 May, resulting in 7 bunkers destroyed and several secondary explosions and sustained fires. All SOG elements active in BAs 350/351 were extracted by 5 May to accomodate pending allied cross-border operations in the area.

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BA 740

(TS) Four TAC AIR strikes were employed against lucrative ground targets in BA 740. An F-100 strike resulted in five military structures destroyed, an anti-aircraft position containing a .51 Cal. machine gun destroyed, one large secondary explosion with numerous balls of black smoke and flying debris, and ten enemy KBA. Four F-100s struck an occupied base camp and destroyed 15 bunkers/structures and 200 meters of trench line; 15 enemy were KBA. Two sorties of F-100s struck an area described by the FAC as a small city under complete camouflage. The FAC also stated that while the TAC AIR strikes were doing considerable damage, they were not getting the desired results in this type double canopy and the target was better suited for an ARC LIGHT strike.

(TS) Nine TAC AIR strikes were directed against targets in the Wasteland. One target reported by an RT was identified as an occupied bunker complex and suspected ammunition storage area. TAC AIR destroyed three large structures, and there was a large secondary explosion with a fireball rising to 500 feet.

BA 701

(TS) PATIO (X) operations expanded to BA 701 on 5 May in order to screen the southerly movement of any enemy forces evading the thrust of IFFV elements in BA 702. Twenty-six TAC AIR sorties were employed against 12 targets. On 5 May, 4 F-4s and 8 F-100s struck an occupied enemy base camp containing an estimated 150 enemy in trenches and a river crossing point; 14 structures, 24 bunkers and 150 meters of trench line were destroyed. There was one secondary explosion and 40 enemy were reported KBA. Another strike the same day included six sorties of F-100s which struck an occupied base camp and river crossing point. Eighteen structures, 12 bunkers, and 3 boats were destroyed. On the 7th, two F-4s struck a reported occupied base camp resulting in three large secondary explosions and ten hootches and five bunkers destroyed.

(TS) SOG air assets were utilized to resupply FANK units at Ba Kev and Labang Siek in a liaison effort nicknamed Operation STICK.

Wasteland

(TS) In the Wasteland area, eight RTs were active in six target areas. Three teams were extracted when team members became ill; four teams were extracted under fire after compromise by unknown size enemy forces. The eighth RT observed heavy enemy activity around its trail-watch position from 25 - 30 April. It also observed a large bunker complex and a well used north-south trail in the vicinity. TAC AIR was directed against the bunker complex and several structures and one bridge were destroyed.

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BA 609

(TS) In Cambodia, two RTs reported no significant activity and a third RT had contact with an estimated two enemy platoons. On 1 May, BA 609 was added to the PATIO (C) target area, and on the 5th, the area was expanded in order that SOG elements could screen the northward movement of evading enemy from BA 702. Eleven strikes were directed against targets in this area. On 5 May, the first 175mm artillery strike from Ben Het was employed against a suspected truck park. Results of the strike were unknown.

(TS) In Laos, six elements reported negative enemy activity. Two teams were extracted after compromise by unknown size enemy forces.

BA 614

(TS) A STRATA team reported no significant enemy activity during an 11 day mission. A platoon size patrol base launched three teams into target areas and combatted an estimated platoon; one SCU was WIA and three enemy KIA. One of the PB RTs was extracted on the eleventh day of its operation after contact with a possible Pathet Lao squad. The enemy wore blue-gray uniforms and were armed with AK-47s and one Soviet 7.62 PPS.1943 sub-machine gun.

BA 611

(TS) South of BA 611, four RTs were extracted after compromise. A fifth team recovered the remains of a helicopter pilot from a chopper that crashed on 21 March while supporting a SOG operation. North of BA 611, two RTs were affronted by NVA squad size elements and subsequently extracted. A STRATA team continued to report negative enemy activity.

Wrap-Up: 7 - 27 May

Zone CHARLIE

(TS) SOG cross-border operations expanded during the reporting period to the area west of the Dog's Head and BA 353 to complement allied operations, specifically those of the 25th Infantry Division. Operations had not been conducted in this vicinity in the past, primarily due to the density of the civilian population.

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(TS) One element was extracted the same day of insertion after compromise by an unknown size enemy force. A second team observed approximately 20 VC/NVA standing by a hut wearing gray shirts, khaki trousers and armed with AK-47s. The team was compromised by a screaming Montagnard woman and withdrew, throwing a WP grenade into the hut. Ten enemy were killed in an ensuing fire fight, and eight helicopter gunships supported the extraction; an estimated 50 enemy were KBA. Another RT was reinserted on 25 May with a JPRC mission of locating an underground POW camp recommended by the 25th Inf Div. The camp supposedly contained 11 US prisoners and 80 ARVN soldiers. The team located the underground facilities, but they had been vacated.

(TS) Northwest of the Dog's Head, RTs sighted several well used roads oriented east/west and northeast/southwest. Approximately ten dark colored 3/4 ton trucks were observed along one of these roads. The vehicles were in a complex of small buildings with an estimated 50 enemy soldiers. At 2000 hours a generator was started and ran throughout the night; at 0600 the generator was stopped. The troops then remounted their trucks and departed the area. The generator was believed to power some type of communications equipment and the enemy element was possibly a mobile communications unit.

BA 740

(TS) Two RTs were extracted before completing their missions when team members became ill. A third team was inserted and extracted the same day due to impending IFFV operations.

BA 701

(TS) Operations south of BA 701 to the Prek Nam Lieu River were terminated on 10 May to provide a buffer zone between SOG operations and allied elements.

(TS) A company size patrol base launched RTs into Cambodia and conducted reconnaissance patrols on the west side of the Tonle Srepok River to the SHAO western limit. The patrols had a mission of locating cache sites along the river and exploiting targets of opportunity with TAC AIR. Twenty-five targets were struck by 66 sorties resulting in 126 bunkers/structures destroyed and three secondary explosions.

(TS) One RT engaged a company size enemy force on 28 May resulting in one SCU KIA, three SCU WIA, four VC/NVA KIA, and two AK-47s captured. Eight sorties of TAC AIR were employed in breaking contact. One wounded POW was captured; he was a platoon leader in the 32nd Company of a bicycle rice transportation unit. Nine other reconnaissance elements encountered enemy elements and were subsequently extracted. One RT was extracted because 6 team members became ill. Only one team reported negative activity.

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Ba Kev

(TS) SOG's mission team at Ba Kev continued to advise the FANK force in rifle marksmanship, patrolling, and small unit tactics. FANK patrols with US advisors commenced overnight operations which produced several targets for TAC AIR. Air strikes destroyed 172 bunkers and caused 32 secondary explosions.

BA 609

(TS) ARC LIGHTs limited team activity in the Cambodian portion of BA 609 during this period. FACs flying out of Kontum identified an extension of a previously discovered trail that ran almost to BA 702 and noted a great deal of activity along the trail; numerous hootches were seen and at one point row crops were spotted just off the trail. TAC AIR struck 22 targets resulting in 223 bunkers/structures destroyed, three secondaries, and 30 NVA/VC KBA.

(TS) In Laos, five teams were active. Two elements reported no significant information. Two ARVN RTs were compromised by an estimated enemy platoon armed with AK-47s. A US-led RT reported hearing 3 trucks moving southeast.

BA 614

(TS) Two STRATA teams spent a total of 22 days in the AO. One team completed its mission; the second was extracted after contact with an unknown size enemy force. One RT was also extracted after enemy contact.

BA 611

(TS) South of the BA, one RT was in almost constant contact with enemy elements for three days. Then the team was ambushed by an estimated ten NVA armed with AK-47s and rocket launchers on 15 May. There were only light casualties and the team was extracted without incident after a days weather delay. North of BA 611, an ARVN RT completed a seven day mission, and three other teams encountered NVA forces necessitating extraction.

DMZ

(TS) Two RTs observed and heard truck traffic moving west on a suspected east-west road. This traffic was probably carrying supplies into Laos for subsequent transshipment across Laos into SVN. Other sources also reported that the number of transportation elements in the DMZ area had increased.

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Wrap-Up: 28 May - 10 June

(TS) On 28 May, SOG received approval to utilize ethnic Cambodian teams as stay behind elements in base areas after allied elements pulled out. The program was initiated under the nickname PIKE HILL (See Appendix IX).

BAs 350/351

(TS) No reconnaissance missions were conducted within the base areas because of allied operations. Six teams, north of BA 350, located eight trails, six of which showed signs of extensive use. These sightings and the extensive trail activity indicated that sizeable enemy forces remained north of the BAs 350/351 out of contact with allied forces. On 31 May, one team observed 50 - 75 VC/NVA in a bivouac area. Armed helicopters and F-100s struck the target, but heavy foliage prohibited accurate bomb damage assessment (BDA).

BA 740

(TS) On 8 June, while making an insertion, two helicopters were hit by ground fire and could not lift off the LZ. Two F-100s and four helicopter gunships supported the recovering of helicopters, crews, and recon teams later the same day. Both helicopters were recovered from the area by CH-47 helicopters.

BAs 701/702

(TS) A platoon size element began operations on 4 June. On 7 June the platoon located a bivouac area containing 22 large structures and a large munitions cache. The structures were burned, and the munitions were evacuated the same day to Duc Co for subsequent issue to the FANK forces at Ba Kev. On 10 June the platoon captured a wounded POW after a short fire fight. The POW underwent treatment at the 18th Surgical Hospital, Pleiku. In a separate action on the 10th, the platoon engaged an unknown size force with light casualties. Operations continued with periodic contact with a determined enemy force believed to be members of the T-12 Communications Liaison Station reacting to B-3 Front instructions.

(TS) One RT called in air strikes on an estimated enemy platoon position; there were five secondary explosions and 15 bunkers and 10 hootches destroyed. Six other elements were extracted after engaging enemy elements. One RT did locate three recently used trails and on 2 June, the team heard an unknown number of trucks moving west.

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This was the third time since January that RTs had heard truck traffic in this general area. The enemy was probably moving supplies deeper into Cambodia because of the allied operations.

(TS) Thirty-nine targets were struck by 190 TAC AIR sorties. Results: 500 structures destroyed/damaged, 73 bunkers destroyed/damaged, and 52 secondary explosions. The BDA was confirmed by SOG covey riders flying with FACs using low-level hand-held photography techniques.

Ba Kev

(TS) A SOG team continued liaison efforts with FANK forces at Ba Kev. On 7 June a convoy arrived at Ba Kev from Labang Siek consisting of two bulldozers, two road graders and a dump truck. This equipment was used to improve the defensive positions at Ba Key and to extend the length of the runway. Supply levels however remained critically low. FANK training continued to stress local patrolling and defensive techniques.

(TS) On 6 June an ARVN-led liaison team was inserted into Labang Siek to effect coordination with HQ MR5 and to direct TAC AIR strikes. Thirty-three TAC AIR sorties were flown in the Ba Kev/Labang Siek area with the following results: 87 structures destroyed/damaged, 18 bunkers destroyed/damaged, and five secondaries. These TAC AIR strikes were considered successful in relieving enemy pressure around Labang Siek and Ba Kev. However, in order to simplify command and control problems in the Labang Siek area, SOG control of TAC AIR in that area was relinquished to 7th Air Force on 10 June.

BA 609

(TS) Three RTs were extracted after completing their missions reporting nothing significant. A fourth RT located four recently used trails before being compromised and extracted under fire.

(TS) A platoon size element was inserted 28 May to assess ARC LIGHT strikes. The platoon investigated and searched bunkers and craters and looked for tunnel and cave openings. On 30 May, it was compromised by 15 - 25 VC/NVA. During extraction, a UH1H helicopter was struck by enemy ground fire, crashed and burned on the LZ killing 1 SCU and one US crew member. On 3 June, a second platoon located a 3 meter wide bypass of Route 613 oriented NE/SW. Newly constructed bunkers were built along the road about 50 meters apart. On 4 June, the platoon was attacked by an estimated two squads of VC/NVA and the US team leader was killed, four VC/NVA were KIA. A1Es and helicopter gunships struck the enemy enabling the platoon to be extracted; 20 enemy were estimated KBA.

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(TS) Sixty-six TAC AIR sorties were flown in BA 609 during this period resulting in 349 structures and 10 bunkers destroyed, 20 NVA/VC KBA, and four secondary explosions.

(TS) In Laos, two ARVN teams reported no vehicle traffic for 17 days. A US-led RT reported sightings of VC/NVA on 3 June. On the 4th the team engaged the enemy with a total of two US and six SCU wounded in action and was extracted under light ground fire.

BA 607

(TS) Southwest of BA 607 four teams were inserted from a new radio relay site. The teams reported extensive agricultural activity, groups of well-armed enemy, increased trail activity, and suspected communications liaison or way stations. One RT discovered six recently used bamboo houses containing normal household equipment and several NVA khaki uniforms. The team also observed 58 enemy dressed in khaki shorts and long sleeved shirts armed with AK-47s, B-40s and RPDs. They were moving in groups of 8-10.

(TS) Photographs taken in the area indicated wood chips were used to make trails more trafficable during the rainy season. Hootches were permanent and well constructed with thatch roofs supported by 10 to 12 foot steel beams.

BA 611

(TS) North of BA 611, a team ambushed three enemy on 31 May; two were killed, and a wounded POW died enroute to the hospital. The team was reinserted in the same target area on 6 June. On the 8th the team ambushed four enemy; again all but one enemy were killed, and the wounded prisoner died of wounds. The team did, however, recover documents that identified these enemy as part of a road maintenance crew.

(TS) In another target area an RT was shot out of its LZ on 1 June and reinserted the next day. They engaged enemy units on two occasions. In the second engagement, three NVA were KIA; a wounded captured NVA died of wounds in the 18th Surgical Hospital. The team also observed a communications liaison or way station overlooking Route 1032B. The enemy units encountered were believed to be part of the security elements of this complex.

DMZ

(TS) In the DMZ one team was active for seven days and reported no significant information. Another RT was engaged by an enemy squad and was extracted under light ground fire. Results of SOG team activity

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west of the DMZ continued to confirm large numbers of enemy troops in this area. SOG and 7th Air Force FACs continued to report large concentrations of POL barrels floating in the river networks of the northern PFAO. From 1 April to 10 June, approximately 10,000 barrels were counted.

(TS) Since the middle of May, SOG covey riders from NKP reported extensive and rapid road construction along Route 1032B from the western edge of the DMZ south to Route 925. Bulldozers widened the road to 30 feet and fording sites were improved with crushed rock. Bunkers and shelters were constructed in the banks of the road. Aircraft also reported an increase in 14.5 and 12.7 millimeter anti-aircraft fire. SOG FACs noticed a peculiar ten foot high fence running down the center of Route 1032B that was constructed of bamboo and elephant grass. Close-up photography indicated that the fence was well maintained and that it camouflaged the size of the road by causing shadows and blending in with the surrounding vegetation. A photograph taken on 5 June showed the end of the fence, several roadside bunkers, and a drive-in bunker under a large earth mound. The entrance of the bunker was shored much like that of a mine shaft entrance and was 8 - 10 feet high. A turn around point with vehicle tracks was evident at the entrance.

Wrap-Up: 10 June - 7 July

(TS) SOG assets were necessarily realigned when US forces were prohibited from operating in the SHAO on 1 July 1970. RTs were reassigned and the 219th VNAF CH-34 helicopter squadron was deployed in support of SH operations. Ten RTs were organized by the ARVN during June at each of the three C&C detachments, increasing MACSOG assets to 20 US teams and 10 ARVN teams at each location. ARVN-led RTs and selected personnel at CCN were reassigned to CCS on 28 June for SH operations. Fifteen US-led teams at CCS were reassigned on 30 June for operations in the PFAO.

BAs 350/351

(TS) In BAs 350/351, five teams reported extensive well used trails oriented northeast to southwest with heavy enemy patrolling activity. Visual reconnaissance reports of bunkers, tents and above ground cache sites indicated a possible base area along the Prek Pour River.

BA 702

(TS) A patrol base was operational for 25 days to determine whether or not VC/NVA were constructing base areas west of the border sanctuaries and to determine if the enemy had re-entered the base areas in strength. RTs operating from the base confirmed the presence of sizeable security forces and active enemy patrolling by squad sized elements. The patrol base made almost daily contact with small patrols. Information from

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POWs and documents captured by the patrol base indicated that a way station existed in the vicinity.

(TS) In another target area, an RT observed a group of 15 enemy, seven farming and eight acting as guards. Later the RT was descended upon by 30 enemy and was extracted under heavy ground fire. Another team observed 11 enemy armed with an RPD, a B-40 and AK-47s within 500 meters of a hospital and storage complex located and reported by conventional forces operating in the area. The team also reported that the enemy moved west carrying fully loaded ruck sacks and returned with them empty. A third RT made contact on 26 June with an unknown size enemy force. During the extraction, helicopters received an intense volume of 12.7, AK-47 and RPD fire.

(TS) Results of these RT activities and FAC reconnaissance sightings indicated that the enemy was continuing to use BA 702 as a major refitting and restaging area. On 25 June a PIKE HILL team was inserted on the Tonle San River west of BA 702. On 2 July the team met an unknown size enemy force and split up to evade. The team was successfully extracted from two locations on 3 July.

AIZ

(TS) In the AIZ, 15 teams were operational from 16 to 30 June. All teams were ARVN-led and were targeted against the principal route networks and the Mekong, Tonle Kong, Tonle San, and Tonle Srepok Rivers. Enemy sightings were infrequent and logistic movements on the routes and waterways was not as active as was expected.

(TS) On 19 June, an ARVN roadwatch team on Highway 13 heard four 3/4 ton trucks moving in an undetermined direction. On 20 June, the team sighted 18 motorbikes, five jeeps and ten 3/4 ton trucks all moving from west to east. All motorbikes stopped at a suspected check point on the highway, but none of the trucks stopped. The team encountered an estimated platoon on 21 June and was extracted under fire. On 25 June, another RT sighted a platoon size force moving southeast and, later in the evening, northwest. They were singing in Chinese and North Vietnamese. On 29 June, just before being extracted, the team observed a 1/2 ton truck and an old French tank possibly abandoned by the FANK.

(TS) A riverwatch team reported four motorized boats operating on the Mekong River. Another team on the Tonle Srepok River observed no river traffic from 19 to 26 June. A roadwatch team near Route 194 reported several civilians carrying household goods moving west from 16 to 25 June. The route was well used by ox cart, but no other vehicles were sighted.

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(TS) A STRATA team was launched on 21 June from Ubon to the Tonle Kong River. This was the only team that reported a significant degree of river or route traffic. On 23 June, the team spotted a battalion sized force, but weather was unworkable for TAC AIR. On 25 June, a seven meter boat was observed moving north on the river with a crew of four. A machine gun of undetermined size was mounted on the boat. Two boats, approximately five meters long were observed at dusk on 26 June moving north. Five men, dressed in black uniforms, were in each boat.

Ba Kev

(TS) On 21 June, a half starved Montagnard male surrendered to the garrison at Ba Kev. He stated that he had defected from an armed group of 40 men and 10 women, all from his tribe, that had been pressed into service as laborers by the NVA. He indicated that he would be willing to accompany a force to induce the remainder of his tribe to surrender. A US-led patrol escorted the individual to the area on 23 June and located and evacuated two men, two women and a child. All were suffering from malnutrition. On 23 and 24 June the SOG liaison teams at Labang Sjek and Ba Kev returned to Pleiku.

BA 609

(TS) Two platoon-sized reconnaissance-in-force operations engaged large enemy forces, possibly of company size and reported that the enemy was well disciplined, used fire and maneuver and arm and hand signals, and were heavily armed. Experience still indicated that infantry line units were present in considerable strength, and substantial enemy forces from Dak Seang/Ben Het campaigns were known to have retired to this area.

(TS) In Laos an ARVN team with an area recon mission affronted an unknown size enemy force on 12 June killing one enemy. On the 13th, the team emplaced M-14 mines to harass trackers following the team. One mine detonated shortly afterwards, and the team heard screaming and heavy firing in all directions. A second mine detonated, and the team evaded without detection. In another target area a team engaged a small group of VC/NVA and killed one enemy armed with an AK-47. The team was in the area for six days and reported that segments of Route 110 were in bad state of repair and had not been used by vehicular traffic. Enemy transport and logistical activity appeared to be dormant throughout BA 609. Road and trail activity was negligible; routes were not being repaired when interdicted; and route maintenance did not appear to be emphasized.

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BA 607

(TS) Southwest of BA 607 two teams walked from the SUGAR LOAF radio relay site. Both teams encountered severe electrical storms and returned to SUGAR LOAF because the Montagnard team members were firmly convinced that evil omens had beset the operation; one team had three members wounded by wood splinters when lightning struck their location.

BA 611

(TS) North of BA 611, a US sniper team located a recently used AAA position with approximately 200 expended 12.7mm casings. On 13 June, the team engaged two enemy squads supported by 60mm mortar. The enemy force used fire and maneuver and was heard to call instructions to capture one of the team members. The team was extracted without further incident. A STRATA team was inserted on 12 June from NKP, encountered an enemy platoon, and evaded with no casualties. On 17 June, the team located a battalion size base camp that had been unused for about three months. On 18 June, 30 men, women and children were seen planting rice and corn. While under the teams observation, the laborers were warned of approaching aircraft by signal shots at which time all work ceased. The team was extracted on 19 June.

DMZ

(TS) West and southwest of the DMZ, teams reported frequent contacts. The enemy patrolled the area extensively with squad size elements. A STRATA team reported several trucks moving on Route 1032B. Additionally, heavy road equipment operated almost continuously during their nine days in the area. The team had five confrontations with enemy forces and was extracted under light ground fire on 27 June. Another STRATA team reported light enemy activity in another area and was extracted without incident on 28 June. A US team was extracted under emergency conditions after having been surrounded by a superior enemy force that attempted to induce the team into surrendering. Several enemy were shouting in English. Five teams were extracted under heavy fire after combatting unknown size enemy elements. A trailwatch team heard extensive bulldozer activity and several trucks on Route 1032B from 21 to 23 June. The team was compromised on 24 June and extracted under light ground fire.

(TS) On 30 June, an OV-10 aircraft from NKP was flying a visual reconnaissance mission to locate landing zones west of the DMZ and was downed by enemy AAA. The co-pilot bailed out at 300 feet and was recovered with minor injuries. During the SAR effort however, an Air Force CH-53 helicopter was downed by AAA fire that exploded and ripped off the left side of the aircraft. The CH-53 inverted and exploded on impact. Crew members were listed as MIA.

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(TS) An ARVN team successfully evaded an unknown size enemy force in the DMZ and continued to note extensive activity. On 22 June a US RT was inserted in the same area and reported that it was surrounded by enemy forces the next day. The team was extracted under heavy ground fire. Twenty enemy were killed by helicopter gunships supporting the extraction. On 27 June another US team was inserted and engaged forces the next two days. The team was extracted on 30 June under light ground fire.

(TS) An ARVN team made contact on 12 June and was extracted the next day. On 21 June, a US team in this same area was surrounded. C-119 gunships expended on suspected locations and the team evaded until 22 June when they were extracted under light ground fire. In a third target area a US team reported hearing several trucks moving north to south during the evening of 21 June. During their three days in the area several explosions were heard in groups of two and three along Route 1032B. On 22 June, the team was attacked by about 70 VC/NVA, and was extracted under heavy gunfire.

(TS) The enemy reacted very aggressively during this period to reconnaissance activities in the DMZ and the area in Laos west and southwest of the DMZ. This strong reaction was evidenced by the large number of enemy encountered, the proliferation of tracking elements, extensive AAA fire received by air assets, and by the use of mortars to probe and attack SOG reconnaissance teams. Two conclusions were drawn from the enemy's apparent over-reactions, either the enemy had moved into the western portions of the DMZ in strength, or the enemy possibly believed that increased activities, which included many false insertions and extractions, were a prelude to future larger scale military operations into his Laotian and DMZ sanctuaries. In either event the enemy was laboriously improving Route 1032 southwest from North Vietnam and skirting the western portion of the DMZ. Evidence of this activity was noted by numerous FAC and RT reports. RTs heard numerous explosions indicating probable road construction and also heard continuous nocturnal bulldozer activity and occasional truck movement. Several visual observations were made of actual working parties on this route. Building and maintenance efforts on Route 1032 strongly suggested that it would be a major infiltration supply route to the south.

Wrap-Up: 8 July - 19 August

(TS) The all-Vietnamese effort in Cambodia had better-than-expected results under the new SH authorities and restrictions that were effective on 1 July. The ARVN teams proved to be very reliable and team stay times were all at three times what was expected. Training for the teams had been an on-going program for several months, but it was designed for a much smaller scale of participation. The ARVN staffs, case officers,

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launch site commanders, and team members accepted their expanded responsibilities and turned in some excellent missions. MACSOG intelligence analysts, using all available collateral sources for verification, did not detect any degradation of the information reported in the SH program.

(TS) Problems included shallow reserves for teams, a lack of ARVN leadership available for exploitation forces, and limitations for troop lift helicopter assets. SH troop lift was provided by one VNAF helicopter squadron with 27 CH-34 aircraft. Twelve to fourteen aircraft were provided each day in an operational ready status. This figure compared favorably with other VNAF rotary wing units, however the CH-34 was an old helicopter and required a great deal of maintenance. Additionally, the number of hours flown by the squadron was far above the average usage factors for other VNAF units. The squadron supported three launch sites at Quan Loi, Ban Me Thuot and Duc Co. The end result was that the 219th, the sole SH source of helicopter lift capability, was spread extremely thin and had no reserve capability. SOG's concern was how long the unit could maintain their current rate of activities before they experienced serious maintenance difficulties.

(TS) Ninety-one teams were active during this period spending 646 days in the SHAO. Teams were generally targeted to monitor water and land lines of communication in the AIZ and to determine enemy activity in BAs 702, 701 and the 350/351 complex.

BAs 350/351

(TS) In and near BAs 350/351 teams made frequent contact with the enemy. The NVA was apparently reestablishing way stations and base camps in western BA 351, and a significant amount of truck traffic was heard by teams operating north and west of the base areas. One ARVN recon team supporting a JPRC mission had one of the best team missions in months. Inserted on 23 July, the team was moving towards a possible POW camp, descended on a group of NVA with a large box, and set up a successful ambush. The box contained a CHICOM 15 watt CW and voice receiver transmitter in excellent condition. The radio and the auxiliary equipment were brand new, and CMEC considered it a significant find since this radio was issued normally only to large headquarters. The radio and its components were turned over to a radio research unit for possible use in the field.

BA 740

(TS) RT and visual reconnaissance (VR) information indicated a build-up of enemy activity around the O Rang area. One intelligence collection team was active for 8 days before radio contacts indicated that the team had been captured.

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Wasteland

(TS) A PIKE HILL team was continuously active for 52 days and reported substantial low level information from two small villages. In general, other teams made contact with individuals and small groups of enemy who did not appear to be patrolling. The teams were not pursued and encountered no fire and maneuver. The nature of contacts in the Wasteland supported the assumption that the enemy were rear service troops, probably of the 250th Transportation Regiment responsible for moving supplies through this area. Several reports indicated increased agricultural activity in the Wasteland. The enemy was forced to rely on locally grown foodstuffs due to the closing of the port of Sihanoukville, the damage to the rice crop in North Vietnam, and the allied incursions in Cambodian base areas.

AIZ

(TS) In the lower portion of the AIZ, teams reported increasing truck traffic. Trails were widened into single land roads, and one new road was opened. On 25 July, a low level VR aircraft was able to spot a truck on a segment of the new road, but, except for sporadic vehicle sightings and this new route, enemy activity appeared to be light in the lower portion of the AIZ.

(TS) In the northern AIZ, teams were targeted against LOCs throughout the AIZ with specific interest on the principal route networks and the Tonle Kong, Tonle San, and Tonle Srepok Rivers. Enemy sightings were infrequent and logistical movements on the routes and waterways were not significant. In general, teams monitoring the LOCs reported that the area was not as active as was expected. This indicated that the enemy was not yet moving large amounts of supplies south on the river networks. Collateral information from 7th Air Force VR missions supported this conclusion.

BAs 701/702

(TS) Teams were targeted in this area to determine whether or not VC/NVA were constructing base areas west of the border sanctuaries and to determine if the enemy had re-entered the base areas in strength. During the first half of July teams generally reported little enemy activity; however, during the latter part of July and early August both areas showed signs of a build-up of enemy activity. The enemy was apparently reestablishing way stations, infiltration routes, and base camps. VR missions indicated that a transshipment point was being established near Lomphat. Frequent sightings of vehicle traffic on the routes and sampan traffic on the Tonle Srepok River were reported. Additionally a great amount of agricultural activity was noted.

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BA 609

(TS) Weather in the Laotian Panhandle had a significant effect on MACSOG operations for the first three weeks in July and severely limited team insertions and extractions by helicopter. In and near the Laotian portion of BA 609, analysis of team activity and VR sightings indicated that enemy transport and logistical activity appeared to be dormant. Road and trail activity was negligible. Routes were not being repaired when interdicted, and route maintenance did not appear to be emphasized. Routes 96/110 were still not being used.

SUGAR LOAF

(TS) Near the SUGAR LOAF radio relay site, a US team attempted a POW capture by the deception technique of declaring a false emergency and simulated extraction under fire. The team was in ambush to engage any enemy that would investigate the area after the mock battle. The ruse worked too well; a large enemy force swept the area and in fact surrounded the ambushing force. The team was extracted under heavy fire.

(TS) On 14 August, a point reconnaissance team was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Three members of the team were wounded and the team declared a PF emergency. A BRIGHT LIGHT team was inserted to assist the team during the attempted extraction. Two UH-1 helos crashed, and, during a subsequent extraction attempt, another UH-1 crashed when its ladder became entangled in a tree. Total casualties were three US and two SCU KIA and six US and five SCU WIA. Three helos were destroyed, two of which were lost to ground fire. Further insertions by helicopter were suspended in this area pending a re-evaluation of the enemy threat.

DMZ

(TS) West and southwest of the DMZ, 18 teams were active. Teams were targeted on roadwatch missions to monitor logistics activities on the Route 1032B complex and almost every team made contact with enemy forces. On three occasions the enemy was heard to shout instructions in English. In the western portion of the DMZ, all teams made contact with enemy forces. In the eastern portion of the DMZ AO, there was a distinct lack of enemy activity. With increased activity in the western areas, it was assumed that the enemy had geared his security forces to counter small reconnaissance team operations. As a result SOG began development of new techniques for insertion of team assets which included parachute operations with standard and high altitude drops.

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MAROPS

(TS) Maritime operations (MAROPS) along the South Vietnamese coast were nicknamed DODGE MARK or DEWEY RIFLE and used the PARBOIL (C) assets. Twelve DODGE MARK missions were completed along the MR 1 coast. All missions were considered successful, however only two made contact with the enemy. On 5 July, "Nasty Class" PTFs landed a cross-beach team south of Da Nang to reconnoiter the beach. The team leader smelled mosquito repellent and crept up to four sleeping VC. The team surrounded the four VC; three enemy were killed, one was captured and taken prisoner. Two weapons, several grenades and 5 lbs of documents were also confiscated. The documents included information pertaining to village level VC/VCi activities in Quang Ngai Province. Significant was a list of persons in the province whom the VC had marked for assassination. All information was provided to the Quang Ngai PHOENIX coordinator. On 11 August, a Sea Commando Team ambushed a sampan with two armed VC south of Da Nang. Both VC were killed, and a pouch of documents was recovered.

PSYOPS

(TS) During this period, [

] Two official reactions were noted in captured documents. One document was a security regulation that prohibited listening to enemy radio stations; the other was a training document which described false ammunition and contained methods to check suspected ammunition to determine if it had been tampered with. [

JPRC

(S) JPRC operations were mostly unsuccessful. Available information was not exploited on a timely basis and there was a distinct lack of coordination for conducting recovery operations. Operations emphasized the need for more rapid reaction in recovery operations, and an operations plan was coordinated to establish procedures for major commands to authorize unilateral recovery operations against perishable intelligence data in their respective areas (See Appendix XII).

(S) On 15 July a SEAL platoon conducted a raid against a POW camp containing 30 ARVN and 2 US prisoners. The point man tripped a booby trap and the prisoners and guards scattered, thinking that they were

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receiving a mortar attack. One ARVN prisoner was recovered later that same day. Subsequently, a PSYOPS boat with loud speakers attempted to have all escapees turn themselves in to friendly forces, and ARVN outposts in the area were cautioned to be on the look out for the ex-prisoners. None of the escapees turned themselves in.

(S) A SEAL platoon was inserted in Kien Hoa Province on 31 July acting on information from a 525th MI Group agent. Voluntary information received from a local villager confirmed the presence of 3 US PWs but indicated that they had been routinely moved approximately 4 hours before the raid.

(S) An agent report indicated the location of a POW camp in MR 1, and an RT from CCN was inserted on 1 August. The team approached the target area, came under attack, and extracted under emergency conditions on 3 August. A team was reinserted on 5 August to locate the same camp, but again encountered heavy resistance and extracted on 8 August.

Wrap-Up: 20 August - 11 September

BA 350

(TS) West and northwest of BA 350, team sightings indicated an increase in enemy activity. Trails were widened into single lane roads, and the number of team contacts with enemy forces increased. One team received an estimated 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on three separate occasions. On 23 August the team eluded a platoon wearing khaki uniforms and pith helmets and armed with AK-47s and light machine guns. On 25 August the team out maneuvered about 15 enemy who were similarly equipped and was successfully extracted without incident. Another team was beset with an unknown size force and called helicopter gunships which killed seven enemy. A third team killed two enemy and captured three Enfield rifles, a MAT-49, and a 2.36" bazooka of WWII vintage.

(TS) On a new high speed road constructed in this area, teams and VR aircraft continued to report vehicle traffic; one team observed a total of ten 2½ ton trucks operating on and near Highway 13. Low-level photographs were taken of a camouflaged bicycle and honda convoy south of the Mekong. Some of the vehicles were carrying rice bags and some were carrying boxes with unidentified cargo. This general area was one of the suspected locations for elements of COSVN Headquarters, and it was speculated that the enemy was also establishing base camps and storage areas in the area east and south of Kratie.

BA 351

(TS) Northeast of BA 351, a PIKE HILL team was inserted on 4 August.

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On 14 August it was determined that the team had been compromised and was transmitting duress signals. The team was declared MIA on 31 August.

(TS) A STRATA team conducted a roadwatch on Highway 14 from 21 to 28 August. Over 50 enemy were observed moving both east and west on the road. Sixteen enemy moving east wore mixed uniforms and carried AK-47s; some wore gray uniforms and gray baseball caps with red stars on them.

BA 740

(TS) East of BA 740, a three platoon mobile patrol base was inserted on 7 September for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance-in-force along the border and launching recon teams overland. On 10 September, one team observed an enemy platoon and a suspected way station. The team was later compromised by an unknown sized enemy force and extracted under light ground fire. On 11 September, another team killed three enemy wearing black and white checkered head bands and then was extracted later that same day without incident.

BA's 701/702

(TS) In and west of BA's 701 and 702, enemy elements were returning in strength. Teams could not move as freely in the area and contact with enemy forces was more frequent. The troops were line combat soldiers and not the rear service elements previously observed in July and early August. Platoon and company sized elements armed with AK-47s, B-40 rockets and light machine guns were observed moving north as well as south. Infiltration routes, bivouac sites, and way stations used prior to the conventional cross-border operations were apparently being re-established. Teams found it increasingly difficult to remain on the ground in areas that historically contained cache sites and storage areas. Analysis of team activity and visual reconnaissance missions indicated that a transshipment point was being established near Lomphat. There were frequent sightings of vehicle traffic on the routes and sampan traffic on the Tonle Srepok River. Additionally, a great amount of agricultural activity was observed.

(TS) A platoon sized ARVN-led exploitation force, the first of its kind for MACSOG, was active for seven days with a reconnaissance-in-force mission to locate a way station. The platoon was launched and supported by a US-led company from a patrol base established on the Vietnamese side of the border. The ARVN platoon encountered the enemy on three occasions and called for TAC AIR support with unknown results. Five abandoned platoon sized bivouac areas were searched and an ammo cache consisting of approximately 400 rounds of mortar and B-40 ammunition was destroyed. The mission provided an opportunity to evaluate ARVN exploitation leadership and was judged moderately successful.

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AIZ

(TS) In the northern AIZ, only light and scattered traffic was observed on the routes and waterways. Route 194 was not yet being used and was still in a state of disrepair. Significant sightings of boat traffic, however, were made on the Tonle San. On 23 and 24 August, a STRATA team reported 10 large motorized sampans, each approximately 8 meters long, moving in both directions on the river. The sightings were made just before nightfall, preventing observation of the cargo and TAC AIR exploitation.

BA 609/613

(TS) Four teams and a two platoon exploitation force operated in and near the Laotian portion of BA 609. One team observed two enemy soldiers and heard other enemy talking in what the team interpreter thought was a Chinese dialect. To avoid a suspected ambush the team moved away and called in gunship strikes with unknown results. The team returned to the Golf-5 radio relay site and a two-platoon force was infiltrated to exploit a suspected platoon-size base camp. The exploitation force established a patrol base and dispatched recon patrols to search the area, but nothing was found. The exploitation force was extracted and another recon team walked off the Golf-5 site to continue the mission. This team discovered an 82mm mortar pit about two kilometers southwest of the site constructed with bunkers built into the side of the pit and containing nine misfired 82mm CS and HE rounds and three 82mm fuzes.

(TS) Teams operating near Routes 96/110 continued to report negative truck traffic. Enemy contacts were not aggressive, and it was suspected that the enemy was preoccupied in agricultural activity, training, and political indoctrination for future offensive operations.

BA 614

(TS) West of BA 614, Operation TAILWIND, consisting of two pathfinder teams and three platoons, commenced 11 September in conjunction with [] Operation GAUNTLET. The force had the mission or reconnaissance-in-force with a secondary mission of diversion for operation near Chavane. Several major supply caches were destroyed and contact with the enemy was heavy. See Appendix VIII for further details. -

SUGAR LOAF

(TS) Near the SUGAR LOAF radio relay site, one team encountered approximately twelve enemy troops, and a second team reported no

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activity. On 30 August an OV-10 aircraft flying a VR mission crashed 500 meters north of the site. A BRIGHT LIGHT team was immediately dispatched from the site and recovered the bodies of the two crew members. Cause of the crash was undetermined.

DMZ

(TS) In the area west and south of the DMZ a team on an area recon mission discovered two ammo caches near Route 9. One cache contained 100 to 200 rounds of 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds; the other cache had approximately 250 rounds of 7.62mm and 12.7mm ammo. The caches appeared to have been partially destroyed by airstrikes. On 25 August, the team engaged an unknown size enemy force and called in helicopter gunships; five enemy troops were KBA. Route 9 was not being used, but it was in good condition and could support heavy traffic with only a little improvement.

(TS) An ARVN-led team encountered a possible North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao platoon-sized element, and received B-40 rocket fire and mortar rounds. The immediate and persistent pursuit of the recon team indicated a continued high enemy counter-reconnaissance effort in this area.

(TS) Recent FAC debriefs and results of several VR missions indicated that heavy rains significantly damaged the motorable routes and trails in the DMZ. Route 1032 had several large wash-out areas and there were deep ruts where heavy trucks attempted to traverse the route. However, engineer crews were continually repairing the damaged areas, and the route was able to sustain wheeled vehicle traffic.

MAROPS

(S) Ten cross-beach missions were conducted by the Maritime Studies Group. DODGE MARK 37-70 was aborted when the scout swimmers detected enemy forces on the beach. Three groups of approximately six to eight men each were crouched along the beach with weapons pointed seaward. The team returned to the patrol boat and artillery was called in with unknown results. Local commanders in the area believed the enemy was preparing to attack a nearby Popular Forces camp.

(TS) DODGE MARK 39-70 consisted of two cross-beach teams with insertion targets in the DMZ. The first team aborted when a voice on a radio said, "We know there is a rubber boat coming ashore." Immediately thereafter, three red lights appeared on the beach at the insert point. The second team inserted well to the south of the first team's location and established an ambush site. They observed nine unarmed men early the next morning, but the group was not engaged, and the team withdrew to the PTF.

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(S) On 8 September, three teams were placed under the operational control of the Americal Division and conducted cross-beach missions into a VC/NVA operating base. During one mission, a team received sniper fire, but destroyed four bunkers. There were no casualties.

JPRC

(TS) The number of intelligence reports and recovery operations increased, indicating that field commanders had added their personal emphasis to the POW recovery program. Six recovery operations were conducted during this period, and one operation was conducted in Laos. Twenty-nine ARVN personnel were recovered.

Wrap-Up: 12 - 23 September

BAs 350/351

(TS) Northwest of BA 350, teams reported considerable bicycle and motorbike traffic moving in both directions on Route 13, and one team avoided ten enemy armed with AK-47s and B-40 rockets.

(TS) In and near BAs 350/351, seven RTs reported very little significant enemy activity. A STRATA team reported groups of six to eight gray-uniformed enemy moving on Highway 13 carrying AK-47s. An EARTH ANGEL team walking into their target area spotted 20 enemy in black pajamas and armed with AK-47s; the group included three females. On 13 September, the team broke contact with an unknown size force and returned to their SVN infiltration point. A PIKE HILL team established contact with a friendly village and was developing a low level intelligence net.

BA 740

(TS) In and west of BA 740, five teams tried to determine a reported movement of enemy supplies from the Nam Lyr Mountain storage areas. Monitoring began on 5 September, but no significant movement was sighted. A three platoon patrol base operated for 17 days on the South Vietnamese side of the border. On 22 September the base reported that they had seen an estimated 65 trucks in the early hours of the evening moving from west to east. FACs and a Flare Ship were alerted but could not locate the column.

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AIZ

(T/S) In the northern AIZ, teams reported negative traffic on Highway 194, and only scattered boat traffic on the Tonle San and Tonle Kong Rivers. Highway 19 seemed to be the most active LOC. A STRATA team observed a total of nine 2½ ton trucks and two 3/4 ton trucks moving southeast and northwest. Four trucks carried about 50 enemy soldiers with weapons. Due to darkness, the team could not identify the type of equipment or exact number of soldiers.

BA 609/701/702

(T/S) Enemy activity was very light in all three base areas, and weather continued to be a significant factor in TAC AIR and helicopter operations. An ARVN led RT in BA 702 was attacked by two enemy squads. Three VNAF A1Es supported the team and killed an estimated ten enemy. The team was then extracted without further incident.

BA 607

(T/S) On 14 September a team was extracted under heavy ground fire from a target area west of BA 607. One UH-1H helicopter was shot down and destroyed. During their mission, the team observed the confluence of the Xe Sap, Xe Kong and Xe Ron and estimated that the junction was not navigable by boats due to rapids, large boulders and sand bars. Another team also reported that the Xe Ron and Dak Polly Rivers were not navigable. The team did observe a cable suspended across the Xe Ron, and numerous cultivated fields were observed along the banks of both rivers. Team sightings and VR missions consistently verified agricultural activity in this area.

BA 611

(T/S) North of BA 611, three enemy carrying AK-47s were sighted on a trail: two were dressed in brown shirts; the third was wearing a blue shirt and carrying a white bag. The team attempted to capture a POW, but all three enemy fled and a search of the area produced negative results. A second team was extracted after compromise by an enemy squad. On 22 September, a third insertion was aborted when the lead helicopter received intense ground fire from both the primary and alternate LZs.

DMZ

(T/S) Southwest of the DMZ, an RT reported that an unknown size enemy force was attempting to surround them. Two five man elements

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approached their position from the north and west, but the team evaded to the east where they were extracted without incident. On 3 September, two BORDEN (S) agents were parachuted into the area carrying homemade chemical time bursters to be emplaced in the bung of a POL barrel. They also had instructions to notional teams for the destruction of POL facilities. Collateral information indicated that the agents were captured within 12 hours of insert and that NVA security forces were subsequently alerted to guard against C-130 parachute insertions under the cover of leaflet drops.

(TS) No teams were inserted in the DMZ. PAC debriefs and VR missions indicated that the major routes were being repaired, and bulldozers and work parties were sighted on Route 1032B. The roads were fairly dry, and most of the interdiction points appeared open.

JPRC

(S) The remains of two US Army crew members were recovered that had been missing in action for over a year. Negotiations for 21 US POWs held near Nui Ba Den were in progress with the VC Camp Commander. This was to be a straight money exchange, but the situation was believed to be compounded by internal greed.

(S) II Field Force Units conducted two unsuccessful attempts to locate six suspected US POWs based on information given to the 25th US Division by a GVN sympathizer. A Hoi Chanh reported that he knew the burial location of two crew members from an L-19 crash in early May 1970, but during an attempted search the Hoi Chanh became sick and refused to lead the recovery team.

(S) US Navy SEALs received word that US prisoners were being held at a POW camp. During the operation two VC guards were killed, one VC was wounded and one VN prisoner was liberated. Debrief of the prisoner and examination of documents captured contained no indication of US among the prisoners.

Wrap-Up: 24 September - 9 October

Zone CHARLIE

(TS) One recon team encountered enemy forces on three occasions in Zone CHARLIE. During the second contact on 4 October, the team directed helicopter gunships against the enemy positions with unknown results and evaded. On 6 October, the team skirted an enemy squad and was extracted without incident. During the extraction, a pilot saw an occupied enemy base camp, and two Air Force A-37s were employed against the camp. There were secondary explosions with orange flame and black smoke. An artillery

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position was observed by another team before encountering an estimated platoon. The team broke contact and withdrew. Later that same day the team returned to the gun positions and observed several field artillery pieces of unknown types oriented in an easterly direction. TAC AIR struck the target resulting in one weapon destroyed and several secondary explosions. The remaining weapons were camouflaged after the air-strike. On 6 October, the team made contact with an unknown size enemy force and was extracted under light ground fire. The employment of TAC AIR on these two targets was an excellent example of the effective combination of reconnaissance and exploitation.

(IS) An EARTH ANGEL team observed an estimated 100 enemy troops wearing khaki uniforms and armed with AK-47s on 6 October.

(IS) Low level photography missions indicated Route 75 from Ph Chhland to Dambie was very active. Observers saw numerous Hondas with trailers and personnel on bicycles loaded with supplies. The bulk of traffic was moving north. Many small side roads along the route showed signs of heavy use and large bags of rice were photographed stacked under the trees. The area around Dambie seemed to be the controlling point for the movement of supplies. The enemy was probably moving supplies north on Route 75 to Chhlong, then across the Mekong River for further shipment to enemy units operating around Kampong Cham and Kompong Thom. On 7 October, a VR plane observed heavy bicycle traffic loaded with supplies moving north on Routes 243 and 244. Nine sampans were also observed by a damaged bridge across the Kompong spear River. The boats were probably used to ferry personnel and equipment.

BAs 350/351

(IS) Southwest of BA 351 in SVN, a two platoon patrol base with a secondary mission of reconnaissance-in-force was active for 12 days. They located and destroyed a company size bivouac area and a bicycle repair shop. On three nights the PB heard an unknown number of heavily loaded trucks moving in a westerly direction north of their location.

(IS) Six RTs provided area coverage for movements of enemy supplies and personnel north and west of the 350/351 complex.

(IS) A PIKE HILL team was active for 23 days and was able to solicit the willing support of Pu Char - a Montagnard village of about 60 persons. The team used one of the villager's huts as a safe house and often talked to the village chief about VC/NVA activity in the area. An interesting note was that the VC/NVA enjoyed vast quantities of the the Montagnard rice beverages with the attendant results.

(IS) A STRATA team on Highway 13 from 19 to 29 September reported 103 sightings of civilian and military movement and observed an enemy checkpoint. The checkpoint was a cement house, 3 meters square and 5 meters high, manned by two enemy in khaki uniforms and armed with SKS

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rifles. Vehicles were not stopped at the checkpoint during daylight, but were delayed for approximately five minutes during the hours of darkness. There were 44 sightings of motorcycles and 30 sightings of bicycles; all but 18 were ridden by military personnel. Eleven ½ ton vehicles and twelve heavily loaded trucks were heard during the hours of darkness moving both north and south. Helicopter gunships were directed on the check-point with unknown results.

BA 740

(TS) An RT discovered a battalion size base camp containing 40 huts, 60 bunkers, a kitchen, and a dispensary. In the camp were two caches consisting of 150 B-40 rockets, 210 60mm mortar rounds, and 400 brand new gas masks. On 25 September the team evaded 10 to 15 enemy and was extracted under light and scattered ground fire. TAC AIR was employed on the cache sites with unknown results.

(TS) During a resupply mission on 25 September a US Air Force UH1P helicopter gunship struck a tree, crashed, and caught fire. Two of the crew were killed, and the bodies were recovered by a SOG BRIGHT LIGHT team the next day. A FAC also received ground fire and directed three VNAF A1Es and two USAF F-4s against the enemy. There were four secondary explosions, two secondary fires, and 16 enemy estimated KBA.

(TS) A STRATA team on Route 141 observed over 60 NVA/VC in small groups moving south from 21 September to 9 October. Most of the enemy wore khaki uniforms with green hats, and were armed with AK-47s. One other STRATA team was active for 16 days and reported negative enemy activity. A third STRATA team observed a NVA company on 4 October wearing khaki and black uniforms moving northwest on Route 132. On 6 October, the team observed seven trucks driving without lights traveling northwest. The team was not able to determine if the trucks carried supplies. TAC AIR struck the area on 7 October, destroyed a truck, and caused two secondary explosions.

(TS) Two members of a three man PIKE HILL team missing since 31 August, escaped from the enemy on 29 September and walked into a night defensive position of a US Infantry Company. The third member of the team was killed during their escape. Both individuals were carefully interrogated, and a Polygraph examination substantiated their story.

Northern SHAO

(TS) Thirteen teams were targeted against base camps, storage areas, land and water LOCs in the northern SHAO. The teams reported little significant NVA activity. A STRATA team destroyed a bridge on

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Route 19 on 2 October. They had hoped to destroy the bridge as a vehicle was crossing, however the amount of traffic was minimal. A Cambodian on a bicycle observed the team as they were about to blow the bridge; he was detained and extracted with the team. This mission added a new capability for SOG STRATA teams which was developed to insure lucrative demolition targets in North Vietnam could be attacked with a minimum of advanced warning should the need arise.

(TS) On 25 September an RT located three wooden buildings near a lake. One building contained two generators which were in good condition. Another team located two parallel trails five meters apart oriented north to south which had a double strand of commo wire laying beside them. While photographing the wire the team was descended on by 8 to 10 enemy, but the team evaded and was later extracted without incident.

BA 609

(TS) On 24 September a VR aircraft saw a set of bulldozer tracks on Route 110. These track sightings represented a significant change from previous sightings and mining missions were conducted. One US team mined Route 110E on 4 October with two M-7A2 mines and two pounds of TNT. On 9 October, the road was mined again with two M-7A2 mines and a Claymore mine with an antisturbance device.

(TS) Near the Golf-5 Radio Relay site, one team ambushed eight enemy on 25 September, killed four and captured two SKS rifles and a PPSH-41 submachine gun. A second team was attacked by an unknown size enemy force on 8 October and one SCU was KIA and one wounded.

BAs 607/611

(TS) Jamming was experienced by an RT in BA 611 on both the emergency UHF frequency and the FM frequency. Two other teams by passed unknown sized enemy forces and were extracted under light small arms fire. A fourth team experienced enemy radio operators attempting to contact the team using the SUGAR LOAF Radio Relay Site Call Sign.

(TS) In BA 611, one team reported that they had enemy movement on three sides. The two US team members and 2 SCU were shot and were listed as missing. One A1-H aircraft supporting the extraction crashed in South Vietnam. North of BA 611, another team was engaged by 10 - 15 enemy, but was safely extracted. On 24 September, during an insert of a US-led RT, an enemy transmission was monitored which stated "The Americans have landed". The team was immediately extracted and reinserted on another hill. The team found several small caches, US concertina wire, and bunkers. One SCU team member stated that he was in the 33rd Laotian Battalion at Lao Bao in 1967 during the Khe Sanh Operation and was stationed on this hill with three platoons. He

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showed the team that the entire hill top was mined, and the team was extracted when the SCU refused to move off the hill.

DMZ

(TS) Southwest of the DMZ, two road-watch teams on Route 925 heard heavy vehicles moving in both directions on the road. One ARVN and one US team were confronted with unknown sized enemy forces and extracted under small arms fire. In the DMZ three teams made contact with enemy forces, although no significant enemy sightings were noted.

Analysis.

(TS) During the 3rd quarter of 1970, 74 teams were inserted into the northern PFAO. Two out of three teams experienced significant enemy contact at some time during the conduct of the mission. The NVA/VC had obviously intensified its counter-reconnaissance activities in the DMZ and more noticeably in the northern PFAO west and southwest of the DMZ. Reconnaissance teams experienced an increasing number of enemy tracking units, many with dogs. The NVA was also apparently making a concerted effort to monitor and occasionally jam team radio frequencies. Although these expended efforts were apparent, they did not interfere with team operations to any appreciable degree. One hundred and sixty-five intelligence reports were submitted as a direct result of these reconnaissance operations which confirmed the fact that the enemy had developed a relatively sophisticated rear area security system.

MAROPS

(S) A forward operating base was temporarily established at Qui Nhon to furnish a quick reaction capability for perishable intelligence. Information was provided locally by a Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer, and operations were conducted from 24 September through 9 October as an adjunct to normal operations from Da Nang. Seven missions were planned, but only three were conducted due to weather conditions; these did not precipitate any enemy contact.

(S) DODGE MARK-51 was launched on 7 October with a mission to capture a small band of VC/VCI. The team infiltrated ashore and set up an ambush approximately 200 meters inland. At 2330 hours a flashing light appeared 500 meters from the teams position. A sampan came into the beach at the light and departed 10 minutes later. Coastal Group 13 was called to interdict the sampan but was unable to navigate among the fishing weirs in the area. No VC were captured.

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PSYOPS

(TS) Voice of Freedom programs for the month of October were written with the viewpoint that the South Vietnamese people were more determined than ever to prevent SVN from falling under Communist control. It was pointed out that SVN continually strived for peace at the Paris Peace Talks and that the North was merely using the talks as a sounding board for its propaganda lines. The POW situation was stressed as a very sensitive political problem; in that North Vietnam had never officially acknowledged the fact that they had troops in SVN. VOF continued to air a program called "Bridge of Love", on which the names of NVA soldiers who had rallied or who had been identified as KIA were broadcast for the information of their families back home. President Nixon spoke at 0900 hours on 8 October. By noon-time the same day his speech was put out over VOF; even before Hanoi could react to it and expend their own anti-propaganda. For more VOF information, see Appendix XI.

JPRC

(TS) SOG representatives flew to Ca Mau on 25 September to assist in planning a PW recovery operation. Navy SEAL Team One, which had previously recovered 28 ARVN PWs, had information on a camp reported to contain two US, 40 ARVN and 150 Political PWs. The source was a local school teacher and a former VC, who had contact with the camp security guard. The SEALs had been working on this operation for some time, but the camp was moved and required a change in plans. The operation was supposed to commence within 24 hours after the source had reestablished contact with the security guard.

(TS) In late September, an NVA Lieutenant rallied to the Cambodian Army in Phnom Penh and during debriefing furnished information regarding a VC PW camp. It supposedly contained 12 US and 24 ARVN PWs. An EARTH ANGEL team was inserted in the area on 3 October to verify its existence but did not locate the camp. MACV J-2 dispatched an interrogation team on 8 October to Phnom Penh with a polygraph and verified the rallier's report. FANK gave permission to JPRC to use the rallier, who volunteered to lead a PW rescue operation. A US led rescue operation was planned as soon as the PW camp was accurately located.

Wrap-Up: 10 - 23 October

Zone CHARLIE

(TS) A STRATA team monitored Route 7, and the majority of the traffic seemed to be civilians on Hondas, with only sporadic military

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traffic. On 9 October, the team came under small arms fire and B-40 rockets and was extracted without incident the next day. An EARTH ANGEL team conducted a JPRC mission from 3 to 18 October, trying to locate a POW camp which supposedly contained 12 US and 24 ARVN POWs. The team got within 500 meters of the reported location, but was forced to withdraw by enemy forces before it was able to confirm the camp. Aerial photographs of the area indicated smoke penetrating the jungle canopy at one point. Further blow-ups of the selected area showed the smoke in greater detail indicating a possible camp. One photograph showed three people on the road and two people taking a bath in a bomb crater. Laundry was laid out to dry on a log in another. All of these activities indicated a possible static type facility in this area.

BA 740

(TS) West of BA 740, a team observed two enemy moving southeast on 18 October and then was extracted under enemy ground fire. A STRATA team, inserted on 17 October, ambushed four NVA three days later. Two of the enemy fell face down, and the other two fled without firing. The team was then extracted due to its compromise. Also on 20 October, an RT skirted an estimated 10 enemy and was extracted under light ground fire.

(TS) In BA 740 an EARTH ANGEL team, conducting area recon from 3 to 11 October, discovered 20 foxholes, 10 meters apart, in an "L" shape. The team estimated that the positions had been abandoned about one month. A STRATA team combatted an unknown size force immediately after insertion on 14 October. During the exchange of fire and subsequent evasion, the team observed numerous bunkers and huts. Several horses were tied to trees, and a well-used trail showed signs of recent use by 2½ ton trucks. The team was extracted that same afternoon, and a FAC directed nine VNAF A-1s and two F-100s against the enemy troop concentration; seven structures were destroyed, two secondary explosions erupted and an estimated 55 enemy were KBA.

(TS) Northwest of BA 740, an RT observed two enemy dressed in khaki uniforms and armed with AK-47s, moving north. The team then encountered an unknown size enemy force and was extracted. A STRATA team observed numerous secondary trails with negative activity, and on 15 October, a company-sized rest area with fresh-cut lumber was located. The team was extracted on 16 October without incident.

BA 701

(TS) An RT, inserted on 6 October, found 100-200 foxholes with bamboo and rice thatching which appeared to about two months old.

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In a nearby location, ten rectangular foxholes and two medium-sized bamboo houses were observed. On 9 October, three NVA were observed moving southwest, but a capture was not attempted due to the suddenness of the sighting and the team not being in an ambush position. The team was extracted on 12 October.

(IS) On 19 October an RT reported observing an estimated enemy company 150 meters south of its position, but TAC AIR could not be called because the team did not have communications with a FAC. Continuing their mission, Route 19 was found to be in a poor state of repair, and two trails and a large punji field were located off Route 19.

(IS) A platoon met with stiff resistance during its stay on the ground on 21 and 22 October. During the insertion, the enemy used loudspeakers telling the platoon to surrender or be killed. Four languages were used: North Vietnamese, Chinese, Cambodian and Montagnard. The platoon circumvented three separate enemy forces ranging in size from an estimated squad to two platoons, and when the platoon was extracted, it came under heavy ground fire, which included 12.7 AA fire. VNAF A-1s destroyed the gun position.

BA 702

(IS) On 13 and 14 October, an RT located a wire north of BA 702 and tapped it for 11 hours and 45 minutes. The tape was translated, but only small pieces of information were picked up due to a high noise level. The number of conversations, however indicated that the wire was connected to a switchboard with more than one subscriber. On 15 October, the team fell upon five enemy and killed three. The team was then extracted.

(IS) A FAC directed three VNAF A-1s against five structures on an insertion LZ. All structures were destroyed and a team was inserted. As the team was being extracted on 14 October, another enemy camp was seen. VNAF A-1s again struck and four structures were destroyed.

(IS) On 22 October, a hi-low VR mission was flown along Routes 197 and 19 and the Tonle San River. No enemy activity was sighted and there was very little civilian activity. Substantial amounts of abandoned Cambodian equipment was located and photographed. A Soviet BTR-152 armored personnel carrier and two Allis Chalmers bulldozers were located near the village of Labang Siek. Photographs of the airfield at Virachey indicated it was clear of trash and destroyed equipment, but it had not been used. This was the only low-level hand-held aerial photography mission flown during this period due to the non-availability of assets. The importance of these missions in SOG reconnaissance efforts was an accomplished fact and discussions commenced for the procurement of aircraft. The low-level program was firmly established under the nickname FORD DRUM.

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AIZ

(TS) In the western portion of the AIZ, five teams were active near the Tonle Kong River. A riverwatch team was extracted on 10 October and reported night boat traffic and barges. A second team was inserted on 16 October and reported heavy traffic in the form of motorized boats moving both north and south. Lack of communications during the hours of darkness precluded the use of TAC AIR.

(TS) One RT, discovered twelve punji traps from 10 to 13 October. On the 13th, the team observed and attempted to photograph the fin assembly of a suspected 60mm mortar, but the device exploded, killing one SCU and wounding another. Another team was active from 12 to 17 October and eluded five NVA and eight to ten NVA on 14 and 15 October respectively.

(TS) A PIKE HILL team reported motorized sampan traffic on the Prek Smong River from 2000 to 2300 on 21, 22 and 23 October. During normal radio traffic with the team, however, the team responded with duress signals, indicating that they were under enemy control.

BA 609/613

(TS) In BA 609, a point recon team was inserted on 18 October to locate an NVA training camp. On 19 October, the team was pursued by two NVA squads. The team broke contact and then combatted four other NVA. CS was thrown and the team continued to withdraw. Three SCU and one US were WIA and one SCU and one US became MIA. A "May Day" was transmitted by the US MIA, and AK-47 fire was heard in his direction. The rest of the team was extracted on 19 October. On 22 October, audio distress signals were monitored and a SOG rescue team attempted insertion on the 23rd. Enemy action precluded the insertion and TAC AIR was employed with unknown results.

(TS) On 9 October a team observed three trails and 15 bunkers. On 14 October, an enemy soldier was captured when the team leader simply jumped out on the trail and told him he was a prisoner. The NVA immediately put up his hands and offered no resistance. At that same instant four more enemy were observed about 60 meters down the trail. The team fired at them; two NVA were KIA and two were wounded. The team and the POW were subsequently extracted on 14 October without incident. The POW was a medic PFC and assigned to the D-2 Engineer Battalion doing road construction on 8 kilometers of Route 110. The POW expressed fear of the RT due to warnings from his CO that he would receive bad treatment if captured. He also expressed some knowledge of the reconnaissance practice of insertions of SOG teams. Further interrogation revealed that many members of the POW's unit suffered from malaria, swollen limbs, and low morale.

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(TS) Three US-led platoons established a patrol base on 19 October on the SVN border. On 21 October, contact was made with an estimated enemy squad, and 175mm artillery from Ben Het was directed against suspected enemy positions.

(TS) On 13 October, B-40 rockets, RPD and AK-47s were expended 25 meters south of a US-led teams location. The team moved north and directed two helicopter gunships on the suspected enemy position with unknown results. On 14 October the team made contact with about eight enemy, moved 50 meters to the south, and then directed two A-1s and four cobra gunships against the enemy with unknown results. The team was subsequently extracted under heavy small arms fire.

(TS) Several major trails were crossed and 20 - 30 smaller trails were noted by other RTs. All trails appeared recently used. Most of the teams also made contact with an unknown sized enemy forces.

BAs 607/611

(TS) A team was inserted and extracted on 23 October after contact was made with an estimated enemy squad. One SCU was KIA and there were unknown enemy casualties. North of BA 611, a team spent only 39 minutes on the ground and engaged the enemy twice.

DMZ

(TS) On 10 October, a team made two attempts to insert west of the DMZ, but was prevented because of grass and brush fires caused by the suppressing gun support. An insertion was made on the third attempt and a radio transmission was monitored in North Vietnamese. It said "The team just landed, everybody move up." The supporting helicopter immediately returned to the LZ and extracted the team without incident. During the extraction, a second transmission was monitored, which stated, "The team is going back, everybody stay alert." A second team was inserted on 13 October and was on the ground for five hours. The team could not move because of the extensive enemy activity in their immediate vicinity. A third insertion on the 14th was hindered by two SCU being injured upon insertion. The team subsequently extracted without incident. A fourth insertion resulted in contact with an estimated enemy squad on 23 October. Prior to extraction, two A-1s and an OV-10 armed FAC expended in support of the team.

(TS) In another target area, a team was inserted without incident on 18 October. The team made contact the following day with four enemy, resulting in one injured SCU and unknown enemy casualties. The team attempted to extract only the wounded SCU, but an estimated five enemy advanced on the team and everyone was extracted.

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(TS) In the DMZ, one team was active from 14 to 17 October and reported extensive enemy movement. Another team attempted a walk-in on 22 October from an LZ that was secured by the ARVN. On the 23rd, contact was made with an unknown size enemy force, and the team was extracted by helicopter.

MAROPS

(S) DODGE MARK-50 was the third in a series of four riverine missions. This mission was conducted on 10 October with the objective to ambush or capture VC/VCi using the rivers south of Da Nang as an avenue of travel. Three ambushes were set up, but there were no contacts.

(S) In support of COMNAVFORV attempts to counter mining in the Cua Viet River area, a team was dispatched to Coastal Group 11 on 12 October. The objective was to observe villages from across the river with starlight scopes in an attempt to spot sapper activity, and to capture one of the sampans believed to be bringing sapper supplies into the area. Ambushes were set up on the nights of 13, 14 and 15 October with negative results. While these operations were conducted, however, no mining incidents occurred.

(S) On 20 October, the Commanding General, 1st Military Region requested CSS to conduct operations during the next four weeks in Tuy Loan, Yen and Cau Do Rivers in conjunction with Hieu Nhon District forces. The objective was to interdict enemy boating and logistics, especially those in support of enemy rocket attacks on Da Nang Air Base. DODGE MARK-54 was the first of these missions, and was conducted on 20 October with negative results.

JPRC

(S) A JPRC mission was conducted on 23 October, and the remains of an O-1 pilot were recovered.

(S) On 11 October, JPRC representatives returned to Tay Ninh to continue negotiations for repatriation of 21 US, two Thai, and 47 Vietnamese POWs. Letters signed by COMUSMACV were delivered to the alleged POW camp commander which appeared to allay any previous doubts on the part of the camp commander. However, direct questioning concerning the US POWs brought evasive answers, and the representatives were told again that negotiations would take time and must not be hurried. US representatives were requested to not visit Tay Ninh again until they had been contacted, and arrangements were made for the VC to contact JPRC through B-32 5th Special Forces or Advisory Team 90.

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(S) On 9 October, a FAC reported the wreckage of an OV-10 and JPRC requested II Field Force and 7th Air Force to investigate. The 25th Infantry reported ground forces located the plane and found it to be an old wreckage. An intensive search of the crash area was conducted but nothing was found.

(S) On 23 October, the Chief of Staff approved OPLAN 201, "BRIGHT LIGHT," which prescribed an operational concept for recovery of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces. This new plan was drawn up because the rescue and recovery of PWs had met with little noticeable success. The plan outlined general considerations for recovery and indicated some of the enemy tactics.

Wrap-Up: 24 October - 18 November

Lower AIZ

(TS) On 9 November, a STRATA team commenced a roadwatch on Highway 13. From 1700 to 2300 hours, 10 November, the team observed twenty 3/4 ton trucks, each carrying about eight enemy, moving in both directions. The following day the team observed an NVA platoon moving southwest followed shortly by an estimated enemy battalion. Unfortunately a FAC was not on station and TAC AIR could not be used. On the night of 13 November seven motor bikes with trailers moved south, each ridden by two NVA soldiers armed with AK-47s and carrying rucksacks. Five trucks carried four to five enemy each and moved southwest on 15 November. The next day, the team had to elude an unknown size enemy force and abandoned its rucksacks. The team was resupplied on 17 November and continued its mission.

(TS) A second STRATA team, inserted further west on Route 13 skirted four enemy accompanied by a dog on 10 November. The following day, two GMC trucks were seen moving west. No cargo was observed and TAC AIR was not used because a FAC could not be reached. On 12 November, the team met seven NVA, and in the ensuing fire fight, two NVA were KIA. A scheduled resupply was later cancelled when the team reported that it was being followed by an unknown size enemy force. The team finally evaded and was extracted without incident on 18 November.

(TS) On 24 October an RT made contact with an unknown size enemy force, separated into two elements, was rejoined by a FAC aircraft, and extracted without further incident. This team was reinserted on the 28th, and was descended on by an estimated enemy platoon on 30 October. The team broke contact and evaded southeast. Two other teams on the Prek Te River reported negative enemy activity.

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(TS) Six teams operated east of Kratie on Highway 13 and observed continuous nighttime motorized traffic. Each team was in the target area about one week, and, as one was extracted, another was inserted in a flip-flop manner. One of the teams was pursued and fired upon by an estimated enemy platoon on 31 October. The team did not return fire, but evaded to their extraction point on the following day. A STRATA team in the same general area observed a daily pattern of seven enemy soldiers moving north to south at 0900 hours from 23 - 30 October and was ordered to take a prisoner. As the team prepared the ambush site, ten enemy approached on bicycles, and asked if the team were friendly. The team answered yes, but panicked and fired into the group, killing two. The remaining enemy then fled to the opposite side of the road and engaged the team with small arms. The team fired claymores, threw grenades, and withdrew, suffering no casualties.

BA 350

(TS) In BA 350, A STRATA team observed a new road 5 meters wide that had been used by tracked vehicles. Routes 13/11 showed signs of heavy GMC type truck traffic in both directions. Two bridges were also observed. An enemy Cambodian platoon was in the vicinity of one bridge and was joined by a second platoon on 25 October. On 26 October, the team spotted four caches of ammunition containing an estimated 280 cases of ammunition. One of the enemy platoons began closing in on the team's position, and the team withdrew. Following an extraction without incident, a FAC directed six VNAF A-1s against the enemy caches with unknown results.

(TS) Northeast of BA 350, a PIKE HILL team was inserted to obtain POW information. On 25 October, local inhabitants were questioned about the location of US POWs with negative results; however, on the 27th, the team received information that a US POW camp was located in the area. Camp security was reported to consist of 130 enemy at the camp itself and an unknown number of additional enemy stationed in civilian houses around the camp. On 28 October, the team reported that a villager had observed two US Negro POWs being escorted to a stream to take a bath. In addition to the POW information, a villager also reported that the enemy was moving south on Route 14 using ox carts during the hours of darkness, and that they were digging foxholes on both sides of the highway. On 29 October, a sympathizer reported an estimated enemy company had moved into the area and one anti-aircraft weapon had been emplaced. On 30 October, an enemy cache was located in Kapot Village which consisted of clothing, weapons, ammunition, and rice and was guarded by 45 enemy soldiers. The team was extracted without incident on 3 November, due to illness of a team member.

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BA 740

(TS) An EARTH ANGEL team observed a recently used enemy base camp composed of 16 bunkers on 23 October. On 27 October, the team inadvertently met an NVA soldier, who fled upon seeing the team. A search of the area produced two M-16 rifles. The following day the team exfiltrated overland to Duc Lap Special Forces Camp.

(TS) An estimated ten enemy were heard talking in a Cambodian dialect and moving towards an RT's position on 26 October. When the enemy group was approximately fifteen meters from the team, a claymore mine was detonated and the team got away. On 6 November, in the same vicinity, a STRATA team observed three VC armed with SKSs, moving south to north. Two hours later, approximately twenty enemy with two scout dogs were observed moving north to south. On 7 November, seven enemy with a dog were bypassed. On the 8th, a dog and handler moved towards the team's location. When they were approximately seven meters away, the team leader opened fire and killed both the dog and handler. An estimated enemy platoon then closed in on the team, but the team broke contact and was extracted without incident the following day.

Wasteland

(TS) A STRATA team ambushed four enemy moving south on Route 141 on 18 November and three enemy were KIA. As the team moved forward to search the area, another group of about nine NVA opened fire. The team broke contact and directed four F-100s against suspected enemy positions, resulting in three secondary explosions. The team was subsequently extracted without incident.

(TS) On 12 November, a PIKE HILL team was inserted with an ARVN-led RT to provide security. On 15 November, the PIKE HILL team made contact with the village chief in Mereuch, who informed the team that he had observed a well camouflaged enemy base area 50 kilometers northwest of the village. He reported that the site contained a hospital, two large rice warehouses, an artillery site, and one battalion of enemy troops. The chief also said that his people wanted to move to South Vietnam.

BA 701

(TS) West of BA 701, a team located a six meter wide road which was not on any map, not visible from the air, and showed signs of recent use by track vehicles. On 31 October, while observing the road, the team made contact with an estimated enemy platoon. An emergency was declared, and two helicopter gunships provided suppressive fire during the extraction. Four team members were listed as MIA. An RT in supporting an ARVN operation in BA 701, found abandoned gear and STABO rigs on 16 November that presumably belonged to the four MIA team

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members; but no trace was found of the personnel. Shortly afterwards, the team located a possible enemy headquarters building and was surrounded by an enemy platoon. The team was reinforced by a recon company from the 22nd ARVN Division and escaped; ten enemy were KIA. On 17 November, the force located three caches of 85mm ammunition, totalling 9000 rounds, revetments for ten tanks, a full fifty-five gallon gas drum, and four empty twenty liter gas cans. Tank tracks were also observed in the area. TAC AIR was directed against the positions. Later the same day, two additional caches of 3,000 AK-47 rounds each were located. The next day, the team captured two radios, a switchboard, two belt-driven generators, one heavy SG-43 Soviet Machine Gun with trailer, plus numerous documents from the K-37 Sapper Battalion.

BA 702

(TS) An RT observed an abandoned enemy staging area, consisting of numerous bunkers, trenches, and hootches on 4 November. The team estimated that the area served a battalion or larger size force and had been abandoned for about two months. On 5 November, the team combatted an estimated enemy platoon; one team member was KIA, one was WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. The team was extracted under fire. Another mission was aborted when heavy ground fire killed a team member during insertion. A third team succeeded in placing several mines along Route 194 on 26 October before encountering an enemy squad.

Northern AIZ

(TS) An ARVN-led roadwatch team on Route 19 observed one enemy on a Honda moving northeast on 28 October. Two hours later, two enemy riding a Honda passed the team's position. As the team moved closer to the road, eight to ten enemy from across the road came into view and opened fire. When the team returned the fire, the enemy withdrew into the woods. The team was then extracted.

(TS) From 16 to 20 October, a riverwatch team observed numerous motorized boats during the hours of darkness on the Tonle Kong River. No traffic was heard from 20 to 26 October. This team also observed a woman, of possible caucasian origin, taking a bath in the river. Another team observed the river from 26 October to 2 November and heard three motorized boats. A third team was inserted without incident on 5 November and extracted on the 12th. This team heard a total of 14 motorized boats, which indicated a pick-up of river traffic.

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BAs 609/613

(TS) On 1 November, after a second attempt to insert, an RT was attacked by an unknown size enemy force on the LZ and was extracted under extensive small arms and rocket fire. A second team was inserted into the same target area on 12 November, encountered NVA/VC on several occasions the next two days, and was extracted.

(TS) A US-led team, active from 7 to 12 November in another target area, heard enemy tracker activity in the vicinity of its RON position on the 12th. Later the same day the team again heard extensive enemy movement, evaded to the southwest, and was extracted. On 13 November, a US-led platoon, with a reconnaissance-in-force mission, was inserted into this area and killed three enemy the next day. On the 15th, the platoon was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon, suffered heavy casualties, and was subsequently extracted.

(TS) Aircraft supporting an insertion on 6 November received heavy ground fire from 100 to 200 meters east of the LZ and the insertion was aborted. A pilot supporting the insertion observed a two meter wide trail that showed signs of extensive and heavy use off of Highway 96. Photographs of Highways 96/110 also showed extensive road repair and construction by bulldozers.

(TS) A US-led company size patrol base was set up on 19 October. Severe weather conditions that plagued the area had its effects on the US and SCU, causing coughs, colds, water-logged extremities, immersion foot, fever, and heat exhaustion. Eighteen men were extracted because of these problems, and on 3 November, the company was extracted.

(TS) A US-led team was confronted with an estimated platoon on 4 November, armed with RPD machine guns, B-40 Rockets, AK-47s and hand grenades. The team broke contact, evaded to the west, and was extracted under small arms fire. Another team observed a two month old regimental size bunker complex that could hold about 1,000 personnel. After the teams extraction, a FAC directed two F-4s against the bunker complex, resulting in four large fires, five small fires, and one possible secondary explosion.

(TS) On 4 November, after four days in its target area, a team engaged an unknown size force and one NVA was KIA. The team broke contact and evaded during the night. On 5 November, the team reported extensive enemy activity from trackers with dogs and killed two NVA when they closed on the team. An AK-47, a K-54 pistol, and several documents were removed from the bodies. The documents revealed that one of the NVA was a senior sergeant assigned to the 40th Regiment. The team was extracted later the same day under heavy ground fire.

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SUGAR LOAF

(TS) SUGARLOAF Radio Site was closed on 4 November because of the Northeast Monsoon. This caused a concurrent reduction of insertions into the surrounding area.

BA 611

(TS) On 13 November, after seven days in its target area, an RT encountered three enemy. There were no casualties. Later the same day, an NVA squad fired at the team with AK-47s, and the team called for TAC AIR. Enemy casualties were unknown. The team was then extracted under automatic and small arms fire.

(TS) Another team noted extensive enemy movement in its area and requested that an exploitation platoon be inserted to possibly intercept the enemy force. The platoon engaged enemy forces on four separate occasions, suffered light casualties, and requested air support. The 101st Airborne Div reported 37 KBA. The RT was extracted on 7 November; the platoon was extracted on 9 November under intense enemy ground fire.

DMZ

(TS) Enemy movements west of the DMZ increased. An estimated twenty-five enemy engaged one team during an extraction on 24 October and a UH-1H was lost. Another team was on the ground only thirty-five minutes before being hit by about ten NVA. On 8 November, a team made contact with an NVA squad and was extracted. On 14 November, a team encountered an estimated 30 - 40 NVA troops. An emergency was called, but the team was unable to contact anyone. One US team member was KIA; seven members were WIA. The team was extracted after a second encounter with the NVA.

(TS) In the DMZ, a US-led trailwatch team heard movement of approximately six tracker personnel about 20 meters southwest of their location on 24 October. Shortly after seven hours on the ground, the team declared a tactical emergency, and was extracted without incident. A second team was inserted on 3 November into this same area and reported no enemy activity for eight days. Four other teams reported some enemy movements, but nothing significant.

MAROPS

(S) DODGE MARK 56 was a two team mission on the night of 11 November with a mission to capture or ambush VC/VCI using trails in MR I. The teams established their ambushes but did not make contact. DODGE MARK 57 was a one team mission conducted during the night of 15 November. A SEAL

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team inserted into a lake by An Tra Hamlet and established an ambush location at 1845 hours. At 2130, a combined force of a PF platoon and a US Marine squad began patrolling toward the SCT location in an effort to flush out the enemy. At 2140, two sampans were observed with four VC moving south along the lake, and the SCT team opened fire at about 20 meters. The VC fell into the lake, and the sampans swamped. Two ammunition cans were recovered containing documents, several bags of food, clothing, and two grenades. Initial readout of the documents revealed that the four VC in the sampan were members of the VC District 3, Da Nang Finance Economy Section, tasked with the collection of taxes and food from local villages.

JPRC

(S) Two US Navy personnel were lost at sea on 30 October. On 31 October, two Vietnamese fishermen from Co Luy Village reported to the US Naval Coastal Group 16 that they had found their bodies and were paid 27,500 piasters under the JPRC reward program. On 5 November, the 1st Cav Division advised JPRC that a detainee told of a small POW camp which contained two US PWs and was guarded by one platoon. Five Air Cav Recon teams were inserted between 9 and 12 November but were unable to find any evidence of the alleged camp.

Wrap-Up: 19 November - 11 December

Zone CHARLIE

(TS) FORD DRUM missions out of the Quan Loi Launch Site were especially active in Zone CHARLIE. Along Route 154, to the northwest of Tay Ninh, considerable bicycle traffic, loaded with supplies, was photographed heading in a northwesterly direction. A large barn-type aluminum building, used as a rice storage shed was observed on Route 155. On 22 November, a mission on Route 154 was flown in response to J-2 for ARC LIGHT BDA; photographs indicated there were no damaged or undamaged structures in the area and that all bomb craters were within the strike box. On the same day, a photo was taken of a check-point where a well-used trail intersected the highway. The check-point was a platform built between two trees and covered with a poncho. Photographs of a damaged bridge on Route 75 indicated a large raft and a cable stretched across a river just beneath the surface of the water, apparently part of a ferry system. At one point, a man in uniform was photographed carrying a pack board with 4 - 6 rockets and a rocket launcher.

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(IS) Near the intersection of Route 1543C and Route 155, a FORD DRUM crew observed supplies camouflaged with rice straw. Two enemy soldiers were also seen riding west with AK-47s and various assortments of web gear. The crew continued along Route 155 and a photo was taken of a partially camouflaged jeep. No people were in or around the jeep, but the engine was still running because exhaust fumes could be seen. On 20 November, a second mission was flown in this same area plus Routes 15 and 7. The aircraft was fired on with 60 to 80 rounds of automatic weapons fire from three or four men concealed in the trees during this trip. At one point the pilot saw a tank, but there was a heavy canopy, and it could not be determined if the tank was operational or not. A large rice storage area was also photographed.

(IS) On 20 November, a STRATA team made contact with an enemy squad north of BA 352 and evaded west. On 22 November the team reported that it had been followed by an estimated enemy platoon throughout the day. Two helicopter gunships struck enemy positions in support of the team and destroyed two structures. The team was extracted on the 23rd due to continued enemy tracker activity. Two RTs spent a total of 17 days in other target areas and reported no enemy activity or sightings.

BA 350

(IS) A STRATA team observed three enemy moving south on Route 13 northwest of BA 350 on 6 December. On 8 December, the team ambushed a Lambretta, killing five enemy and capturing one SKS rifle and numerous documents. The documents contained political lessons written by a member of the Khmer Rouge Party, stating that the main purpose of the revolution was to liberate the people from the domination of American imperialists, feudalists, and reactionary capitalists. One captured pamphlet included instructions for training farmers and rural workers in party policies.

(IS) An RT located an abandoned platoon size bivouac area on 18 November. At 0300 hours on 19 November, several vehicles were heard moving for about ten minutes, and at 0330, the team heard more equipment moving and people talking. An enemy company was believed to be moving to the south. The team was followed on 20 November by an unknown size force, and the next day three enemy advanced toward the team's location with AK-47's in the ready position; two were killed by claymore mines and the other was wounded. The team then came under heavy fire from approximately thirty enemy. When a FAC came overhead, the enemy stopped their pursuit and the team was extracted the next day.

(IS) A trailwatch team eluded enemy squads using dogs on three different occasions. This team's reporting of dogs coincided with reports by other teams working in the area around Kratie, and it appeared that the enemy was making more extensive and effective use of

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tracker dogs. Instructions pertaining to counter-measures against tracker and scout dogs were disseminated to all SOG field elements.

(TS) Along Route 13, enemy traffic was heavy from 15 to 22 November; one RT observed 132 2½ ton trucks moving east and 53 2½ ton trucks moving west. In addition, 12 ½ ton vehicles were seen and 12 enemy on nine Hondas passed the team's location. From 22 to 28 November, another team observed 19 2½ ton trucks, 13 of which were moving west. On 28 November, the team ambushed a 2½ ton truck using three claymores, causing the truck to go out of control and stop. Automatic fire northwest of their position precluded a search of the truck, and the team evaded to the northeast. No traffic was seen by a third team from 29 November to 2 December. Then, on 3 December, nine 2½ ton trucks, one three-wheeled motorbike, two Hondas, and 17 enemy were observed moving on the road. On the 5th, the team ambushed a 2½ ton truck, but a second truck loaded with troops precluded a search of the wrecked vehicle. The team engaged the troops with automatic weapons fire, broke contact, and withdrew in two elements. The following day the team was reunited by a FAC and extracted as a fourth team was again inserted in a "flip-flop" manner.

(TS) On 29 November, a STRATA team located a four bunker complex in BA 350. The bunkers were covered by a bottom layer of logs, a sheet of plastic, a layer of dirt, and a second layer of logs twenty centimeters above the dirt layer. Three bunkers contained wooden packing crates believed to contain ammunition; the fourth was empty. A fifth bunker was later found which contained fifteen 55 gallon drums of gasoline. Near this bunker was a partially constructed platoon size camp. That evening the team began observing a bridge six meters long and a little over three meters wide. At 1820 hours, the team observed a green colored 2½ ton truck moving from north to south hauling a full load of white covered objects. A second truck's headlights were observed at 1920 hours. The next day, at 1500 hours, the team heard a group of enemy soldiers moving in the vicinity of the bridge, cutting wood, and singing. At 1800, a truck stopped at the bridge for a few minutes, then moved across the bridge and stopped again. The truck then continued north. A second truck went through the same routine. Then, the team heard men speaking in both the North and South Vietnamese dialects. The team believed the trucks were bringing in sentries for the bridge and road. Between 2200 and 0030, the team heard foot traffic and ten trucks moving without headlights from north to south. On the morning of 1 December, the team moved to within 25 meters of the bridge and gave a FAC the distance and direction to the target. The FAC located the bridge and was then told the direction and distance from the bridge to the POL bunker. The STRATA team then moved to the ammunition cache and placed 2½ pounds on C-4 in each bunker, primed with a ten minute length of time fuse. The ammunition and storage bunkers were destroyed. The FAC also directed two F-100s against the targets, resulting in two secondary explosions near the bridge. The team was then extracted.

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BA 351

(TS) Three EARTH ANGEL teams were inserted in SVN for subsequent overland infiltration into Cambodia. All three teams observed extensive enemy activity in the BA and returned overland to Bu Dop Special Forces Camp.

Wasteland

(TS) On 19 November, a PIKE HILL team reported that the enemy controlled the population in and around Mereuch by confiscating and holding all personal papers. There were no markets in Mereuch and the villagers had to travel to Khao Nhek, about 38 kilometers to the west. Written permission had to be obtained to travel between the two villages. On 2 December, three enemy entered Mereuch and impressed three villagers and three elephants into service. On 6 December, a villager informed the team that three Cambodian communists and six Montagnards conducted a meeting with 115 villagers of Mereuch and Otien. Four points were covered. First, an appeal was made for the villagers to move to Khao Nhek because US aircraft would attack those living along the border. Secondly, each villager was required to contribute 500 Riels (about \$6.30 US) to the communists. Third, a tax of 30 kilos of rice was levied on each family and fourth, Mereuch villagers were told to provide 10,000 two-meter long punji stakes to be placed around the villages. The communists stated that they would return in ten days and escort the villagers to Khao Nhek.

BA 701

(TS) Three RTs attempted unsuccessfully to locate the headquarters of the K-37 Sapper Battalion. One team discovered a large rice cache. Another team found six hootches with rice caches, some tank revetments, and four storage houses with boxes which contained one Soviet and eleven CHICOM 85mm rounds. Tank repair tools, a US made sensor device, two Soviet R-108 radio sets, and a 55-gallon drum were also confiscated.

(TS) On 18 November, an RT discovered a platoon size staging area containing thirty covered bunkers and numerous foxholes. Four tin cans of rice, a basket of fruit, and a rock cooking pot, which was still warm were found in one of the shelters. The team was then extracted without incident.

BA 702

(TS) West of BA 702, an RT encountered an estimated 20 enemy on 7 December. The team directed three A-1s against the enemy positions,

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resulting in 10 enemy KBA and two secondary explosions. During the teams subsequent extraction, 40 structures were observed in the area. Two helicopter gunships and five VNAF A-1s damaged or destroyed 38 of the structures and caused five secondary explosions.

BAs 609/613

(TS) On 28 November, an RT was in almost continuous contact with the enemy for seven hours. Three anti-personnel mines and fifteen claymores were detonated against approximately 100 enemy moving towards the team. The enemy opened fire with AK-47s, RPDs and B-40s, and the team suffered heavy casualties. As the team became surrounded, Cobra gunships and A-1s were directed against the enemy, and the team was extracted. On 29 November, another team suffered light casualties against an enemy squad. The team was extracted under cover of A-1s and helicopter gunships, and a Covey aircraft reported that an entire hilltop in the area was honey-combed with buildings and bunkers.

(TS) On 23 November, a team observed a recently used north/south trail and two partially constructed foxholes that showed signs of use within the previous two hours. Movement, voices, and whistles were heard and two A-1s and three Cobras were directed against suspected enemy positions. The activity ceased, but the team was extracted due to compromise of its location. On 25 November, another team observed numerous recently improved trails. That evening approximately 100 - 150 enemy were heard setting up for an RON. On 26 November, the team encountered three different groups of NVA, suffered heavy casualties, and extracted under small arms fire. On 27 November, a mission was aborted when helicopters received small arms fire from the LZ. On 4 December, a team that was inserted on 30 November ambushed and killed two NVA who were over six feet tall and weighed between 180 and 200 pounds. The team later made contact with an estimated enemy company, suffered heavy casualties, and was extracted under heavy ground fire.

(TS) One US-led exploitation platoon investigated a previously reported regimental bunker complex area, located a high-speed trail, and implanted anti-personnel mines in the area. A second platoon engaged 14 to 20 enemy on 25 November and suffered light casualties. The next day, the platoon discovered and destroyed a three ton cache of rice and fresh vegetables. On 27 November, the platoon received sporadic small arms fire and B-40 rockets fire, but sustained no injuries. On the 28th, the platoon discovered a ten ton rice cache and encountered an estimated 50-man company of enemy. Heavy casualties ensued, and the platoon was extracted under heavy ground fire the next day.

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BA 614

(TS) On 28 November, a US-led RT, composed of three US and three SCU were HALO-dropped into the area at 0200 hours. Although the weather was extremely poor and the team became separated, the mission was considered successful. See Appendix VIII for further details.

BAs 607/611

(TS) On 6 December, west of BA 607, an RT was extracted after spending thirty-two minutes on the ground. Twelve NVA affronted the team ten minutes after landing; three NVA were KIA.

(TS) In BA 611, an RT made contact with the NVA twice in three hours and fifteen minutes on the ground and was extracted under extensive small arms fire on 23 November.

DMZ

(TS) 7th Air Force requested an investigation of Ban Seu Doun Village, and a US-led platoon was inserted on 20 November; the village was uninhabited. On 24 November, the platoon reported that it was surrounded by an unknown size enemy force with one US KIA, one US WIA, and one SCU WIA. At 1500 hours, the KIA and WIA were extracted by helicopter while under intense small arms fire. A second UH-1H helicopter, while attempting the extraction of remaining platoon members struck a tree and crashed in the vicinity of the LZ. VNAF A-1s and helicopter gunships provided effective suppressive fires and after a successful extraction of the platoon and crew, destroyed the downed aircraft. The pilots of these aircraft estimated that four to six platoons, in three separate positions, provided anti-aircraft and supporting fire for two enemy assault platoons attacking the US forces. All three supporting positions were engaged by the Cobra gunships and A-1 aircraft. The composite BDA for all A-1 and Cobra gunships was 75 enemy killed, possibly 75 to 100 more enemy KBA, and three automatic weapons positions destroyed.

MAROPS

(S) Weather conditions limited DODGE MARK operations. Two missions were run, 6 and 10 December, and both had negative results. Three PTFs supported MARKET TIME operations from 26 November to 4 December to counter possible enemy trawler resupply attempts in the vicinity of the Batangan Peninsula. A number of craft were checked by the 18-man PTF crews, but no enemy craft were intercepted.

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JPRC

(S) On 22 November, nineteen ARVN POWs were rescued by a Navy SEAL team. On 28 November, the 1st Air Cav Division found a possible prison complex about 85 miles northeast of Saigon. There were four bamboo pens, 25 feet in diameter and 10 to 15 feet high, and two structures, 20 feet by 20 feet, with locks on the doors. The area was burned, and all structures were destroyed. On 7 December, a VC platoon of 30 men and four caucasians, were seen in and around An Hoa. Residents of the hamlet reported that the caucasians were not prisoners, but were operating with the VC. The unit was armed with AK-47s and three M-16 rifles.

Wrap-Up: 12 - 31 December

Lower AIZ

(IS) ADSID and SPIKESID sensor devices were placed in the vicinity of Kratie on 20 and 22 December to be monitored by TACC-ALPHA, the Cambodian communications relay aircraft, between 0700 and 0100 daily.

(IS) The National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington requested FORD DRUM missions southeast of Dambie to locate stocks of supplies or rice. High altitude US Air Force photos taken on 8 November and 6 December had indicated stacks of supplies or rice, and possible anti-aircraft positions. SOG crews located the areas in question, and low-level photographs indicated the rice straw had been harvested and that the anti-aircraft positions were rice straw stacks.

(IS) On 13 December, FORD DRUM crews observed nine POL drums on Hwy 73, stacked along side a house. In the village of Chak, 15 to 20 bunkers and trenches were photographed. On 16 December two photos of Krabau Village indicated that foot and bicycle traffic could still cross a partially destroyed bridge. Photographs of other destroyed bridges indicated that effective ferry systems had been set up to shift cargo from one side to the other. On 22 December, a FORD DRUM crew flew southeast along Route 13 to a destroyed bridge. New defensive positions were observed at the bridge, and as the crew started east along the Prek Te River, approximately 400 rice bags and supplies stacked under trees on both banks of the river were photographed. TAC AIR destroyed approximately 90% of these supplies on 23 and 24 December.

(IS) On 29 December, an RT avoided an enemy platoon and shortly thereafter found 20 bunkers, 10 thatched huts and many ration cans. On 31 December, the team bypassed another platoon and found a platoon size bivouac area, abandoned approximately two days. The bivouac area

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included two dug-in bunkers, 20 to 30 individual foxholes, three huts and one latrine. A company-size bivouac area was then located which consisted of ten dug-in bunkers, ten huts, and 70 to 80 individual foxholes. This area also had been vacated about two days.

(TS) On 28 December, an RT observed a well-maintained portion of Route 13. Metal telephone poles, carrying four lines, paralleled the road. That evening, the team heard four 2½ ton trucks moving southeast at ten minute intervals. The next evening the team heard several 2½ and 3/4 ton trucks moving in small groups at 10 to 20 minute intervals. On 30 December from 2000 to 2130 hours, the team heard seven 2½ ton trucks moving southeast. On the 31st, the team observed 23 2½ ton trucks moving northwest at ten minute intervals. TAC AIR was not used because the team leader felt it would have endangered his personnel and compromised his position.

BA 350

(TS) An RT, operating northwest of BA 350 from 7 to 15 December, observed truck, jeep and Honda traffic on Route 13 during the last four days of its mission. On 12 December an enemy patrol discovered an electric wire from one of the RT's claymore mines and then opened fire on the team. The RT detonated two claymores and evaded. On 14 December at 2200 hours, the team ambushed a Soviet-made truck carrying a heavy load of rice and about nine people. As the team moved toward the disabled truck, they were forced back by the heavy fire coming from the truck and both ends of the road. The team evaded and was extracted on the 15th under heavy ground fire. Two other teams in this area reported no significant enemy activity.

(TS) Between 16 and 25 December, AC-119 gunships destroyed or damaged 11 trucks and 17 sampans, substantiating reports of increased traffic on Route 13. Trucks continued to turn off their lights and shut-down engines whenever an aircraft was heard or seen.

(TS) On 17 December, four Cobras destroyed an underwater bridge and raft in BA 350. On 20 December, an RT observed an estimated 100 NVA/VC moving in small groups on Route 13. Two Cobra gunships struck the troops with unknown results. On 21 December, a FAC directed two F-4s against an enemy base camp discovered during a routine VR mission. There were two secondary explosions. On 29 December, a team observed an abandoned enemy base camp northwest of BA 350 containing 20 structures. While searching the camp, the team heard dogs barking and movement of about 20 enemy and evaded. On the 30th, the team began moving back toward the enemy base camp to mark it for TAC AIR exploitation. The team was discovered by tracker dogs and engaged an estimated 20 enemy, resulting in no friendly casualties and three enemy killed in action. After breaking contact, the team successfully

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evaded the enemy force and was extracted. The RT was reinserted on an alternate LZ without incident that same day and located another camp. While searching the camp, an unknown size enemy force descended on the team, but it successfully evaded. A second team was inserted into this same general target area on 31 December, but was compromised shortly after insertion. The team was extracted and reinserted into an alternate LZ. One hour later, the team was affronted by ten enemy and one team member was WIA. The team withdrew to its reinsertion LZ and was extracted under enemy small arms fire.

BA 740

(TS) On 14 December, a FAC directed two F-4s against an enemy base camp discovered during a routine VR mission. Six structures and one bunker were destroyed. On 15 December, another FAC directed two F-4s against a truck park. One unidentified vehicle was destroyed, and there were two secondary explosions.

Wasteland

(TS) In Mereuch, where a PIKE HILL team had been operating since 12 November the villagers abandoned their homes for fear of communist oppression and began to move toward the South Vietnam border on 10 December. The villagers killed most of the livestock for food and turned the remainder loose, after trying to sell the livestock to the team. On 12 December the team reported that a total of 150 villagers had crossed the Tonle Srebook River. On 15 December, the villagers and 16 elephants arrived at Ban Drang Phok. The refugees were secured by the 72nd ARVN Ranger Battalion and were resettled by Dar Lac Province civic action organizations. On 17 December the PIKE HILL team was resupplied in the Mereuch area and five old and sick villagers were extracted by helicopter and reunited with their people. On the 23rd, a false helicopter extraction, using dummies was conducted, and the PIKE HILL team and several sympathizers stayed in the target area. On 30 December, the team was extracted with three Cambodian sympathizers by helicopter without incident, after spending 49 days in the target area.

(TS) On 18 December, an RT observed a battalion size base camp with 60 to 70 thatched huts, two kitchens, some fresh bamboo hut frames, and several zigzag trenches. Approximately 150 to 200 NVA were working on the huts. The team requested TAC AIR, and five A-1s struck the enemy positions for thirty minutes, resulting in three secondary explosions.

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(TS) A STRATA team spent five hours and fifteen minutes in another target area on 31 December. Shortly after insertion, the team found a recently used platoon size enemy bivouac area. Five enemy engaged the team. As the team was evading this group, an unknown size enemy force bore down on the team, and two team members were WIA. The team was then extracted under heavy ground fire.

Northern AIZ

(TS) Two teams encountered unknown size forces the second day of their mission along the Tonle Kong and were extracted. Another RT spent only twenty-five minutes on the ground on 20 December before making contact with an unknown size enemy force. From 6 to 12 December, between 1900 and 0600 hours, an RT heard numerous convoys of 2½ ton trucks moving on Route 19 moving in groups of two and three. The road was six meters wide, had a hard surface and was well maintained.

(TS) On 13 December a riverwatch team observed two motorized sampans moving east on the Tonle San. The next day, the team killed an NVA soldier, but his companion escaped. The team was extracted without incident due to its compromise. Another RT observed a motorized sampan on the Tonle Srepok on 15 December. On the 17th, the team stopped two farmers traveling west on a trail from Lomphat. The detainees carried a travel pass issued by their hamlet chief which said, "I, the Chairman of Neang Ny Hamlet, Lomphat Village, Lomphat District, Ratanakire Province, authorize Mr. Non, living in Neang Ny Hamlet, to go to Lomphat District to get vegetables for food. Mr Non will stay for two days with our brother of the front in Lomphat Village and then return." The two farmers were extracted with the team.

(TS) A Tonle Kong riverwatch team heard one motorized sampan moving north on 24 December. No other river traffic was observed or heard. On the 26th, the team combatted three enemy, broke contact, and was then extracted without incident. On 30 December, a team was extracted after five hours in its area due to compromise by three NVA. Three A-1s struck suspected enemy positions with unknown results. On 31 December an RT was confronted with an estimated 30 - 40 enemy, resulting in no friendly casualties and two enemy KIA. The team evaded successfully.

BA 701

(TS) On 13 December, a STRATA team on the Tonle Srepok found two underwater cables, used to pull boats across the river, and sighted four enemy in a motorized sampan loaded with bananas. On 16 December, an RT eluded an estimated 30 enemy one hour after insertion. On 17 December, the team encountered an enemy platoon, and four enemy were KIA. The team was then extracted without incident.

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(TS) The area west of BA 701 was increasingly active and the enemy appeared to be re-establishing the area as one of his major base areas, possibly to launch future operations into MR 2. The importance of the Tonle Kong to the NVA was becoming apparent as teams had considerable difficulty operating in the area. The enemy appeared to be moving several units to secure the entire river before an anticipated flow of supplies began in volume.

(TS) On 23 December, an RT discovered a company size camp west of BA 701. The camp was 150 meters long, 200 meters wide, and contained four thatched structures and numerous bunkers. Inside one of the structures, the team discovered a cache of 12.7mm ammunition. TAC AIR was requested, and on the 27th, a FAC directed two A-1s and two F-4s against the camp, resulting in one cache destroyed and two secondary explosions. On 25 December another team observed a four meter long, 80 centimeter wide bridge. While trying to photograph the bridge, 20 enemy attacked the team. One team member was WIA and two enemy were KIA. The team broke contact and became separated into two groups. Enemy troops were throughout the area, and the team suffered several casualties. They were extracted under light small arms fire on the 26th. Two other teams were extracted under heavy fire on 27 and 28 December.

(TS) An EARTH ANGEL team was walked into the area on 20 December and changed into NVA uniforms. On 22 December, the team observed four NVA soldiers moving from northwest to southeast. The next day, the team observed a one month old NVA base camp, consisting of 24 bunkers. On the 27th, the team had completed their mission and exfiltrated overland to the Duc Co Special Forces Camp. On 25 December, another EARTH ANGEL team was inserted by helicopter. On the 27th, this team observed an unarmed enemy platoon carrying supplies south on a trail. The team also observed a fenced-in area, surrounded by punji fields, and reported that the area was a possible PW camp or PW transshipment point. On the 29th, the team was beset with three armed enemy, resulting in no friendly, and unknown enemy casualties. The team then exfiltrated overland.

BAs 609/613

(TS) A US-led RT spent only one hour and thirty minutes on the ground on 10 December, reinserted on the 11th, and subsequently extracted on the 12, because of continued enemy tracker activity. Another RT met heavy resistance two and one half hours after insertion. The team suffered heavy casualties and was extracted under continuous ground fire.

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(TS) A FAC directed two A-37s on a road-cut mission against a Route 110 bypass on 13 December. The strikes resulted in two, five meter wide cuts, one secondary fire which burned for four hours. On the 14th, in this same general area, another FAC received 12.7mm ground fire and directed two F-4s against the AAA positions, suppressing the fire.

(TS) On 20 December, a team observed a suspected enemy way station, which had approximately 40 new buildings with bunkers constructed under the floors. The next day, the team observed approximately 20 enemy, and was extracted after hearing numerous signal shots and trackers. The team felt they were being forced into an ambush. On 22 December, a FAC directed two A-1s against the suspected enemy way station, resulting in three medium size secondary explosions and three secondary fires. A parachute insertion mission in another area on 22 December was terminated after seven hours and fifteen minutes because one SCU member was killed and a US member fractured his leg on the landing.

(TS) On 25 December, an RT discovered ten enemy in an "L" shaped ambush. Five of the enemy were about 6 feet tall, weighed about 165 pounds, and looked like Chinese. As the team attempted to evade, the troops opened fire with AK-47s and B-40s, but there were no casualties. The team was then extracted under heavy 12.7mm machine gun fire. A-1s and helicopter gunships silenced the guns, and two helicopters sustained numerous hits but returned safely to the base.

(TS) On 27 December, an RT wearing NVA uniforms came face to face with nine enemy on a security patrol. The patrol said they were searching for a force that had been inserted by helicopter the previous day. When the enemy force requested to search the team's rucksacks, the team opened fire, immediately killing five of the enemy. The remaining four returned fire, and the team radio operator was killed by a B-40 rocket. The team withdrew and secured an LZ. An attempted extraction was aborted when one of the helicopters was hit by two rounds of 12.7mm AA fire. The next day 21 sorties of VNAF A-1s struck suspected enemy locations around the team's position, silencing the AAA position, and the team was then extracted.

(TS) On 26 December, while hovering to insert an RT, the lead helicopter received automatic weapons fire from a bunker adjacent to the LZ. The insertion was aborted and an attempt was made to insert into the secondary LZ. This also was aborted because of intense small arms fire. Three other missions were likewise aborted due to heavy concentrated fire in the LZs.

BA 611

(TS) On 17 December, a team observed six enemy and heard additional movement. The team evaded, using rockets fired by a FAC to support its

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evasion. The team was extracted after spending only twenty-one minutes on the ground. Another mission was aborted the same day when the lead helicopter received ground fire from the vicinity of the intended LZ. On 18 December, another team observed a file of four enemy troops followed by another six further behind. The RT attacked and killed the first four. The other six were fired upon with unknown results. The team then called for extraction and was lifted out with no further incidents.

DMZ

(TS) A US-led RT found a company size bivouac area right after insertion on 13 December. A couple of hours later, the team heard movement around their position and began transmitting an emergency distress signal on its URC-68 radio. At the same time, the team heard the emergency signal being received on another radio approximately 30 meters to the east. The team continued to hear movement and whistles and helicopter gunships were directed against the suspected enemy positions. All activity ceased, and the team was extracted without further incident. An ARVN-led RT was engaged by an unknown size enemy force in an LZ on 16 December. One UH-1H helicopter crew member was KIA, and two helicopter gunships were directed against the enemy positions forcing the enemy to break contact. The team was extracted after only 18 minutes on the ground. Another RT was extracted under heavy small arms fire after three hours on the ground. On 23 December, an ARVN-led team made contact with an unknown size enemy force after three days. The team was then extracted under heavy small arms fire, while four helicopter gunships were directed against the enemy positions.

(TS) On 26 December, after four days in its target area, an ARVN-led RT heard an estimated 10 enemy moving approximately 30 meters to its northwest. At this time, the team also heard a previously implanted M-14 mine explode, and several of the enemy started yelling. Later, the team engaged an enemy squad, resulting in no friendly and unknown enemy casualties, and was then extracted without incident. A US-led RT was able to spend only two hours and thirty minutes in its target area on 27 December. The team heard enemy activity 125 meters northwest of the LZ, and was extracted after directing two helicopter gunships against the enemy positions.

(TS) SOG operations in the northern PFAO and the DMZ were at a low level due to the weather. However, reports continued to show increasing enemy activity. In the area just north of BAs 609 and 613, RTs were reasonably successful, even though enemy reaction increased. MACSOG/STD teams continued to locate base camps, bivouac areas, caches and communication wires with increasing frequency. The enemy continued preparations for an influx of personnel and supplies in the coming dry season.

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MAROPS

(S) DODGE MARK 59-70 and 60-70 were run during the nights of 10 and 11 December to ambush a group of 20 to 30 NVA reportedly coming down from Elephant Valley to procure rice. Both of these two-team missions produced negative results. DODGE MARK 63-70 was a two-team mission conducted the night of 19 December. The team inserted across the beach at 2015 hours and established ambushes near several bunkers. They remained at their ambush sites until 0230 without contact. The Sea Commando Teams then recovered to the PTFs and the PTFs moved in close to the beach and bombarded the bunker area with mortar and 40 millimeter gunfire. DODGE MARK 65-70 was a one-team mission conducted 22 December, but scout swimmers observed what appeared to be armed personnel on the beach, and the Sea Commando Team returned to the PTF. Again, the PTF moved in close to the beach and bombarded the area with mortar, 40mm and 20mm gunfire for a period of 20 minutes.

JPRC

(S) On 17 December, the Vinh Binh Popular Forces conducted a raid on a POW camp which resulted in the release of 49 POWs. This included 31 civilians, eight ARVN and ten VC who were being punished. One of the released POWs knew of another camp and led a force against the camp on 20 December. The camp had been vacated four to five hours earlier and no POWs were recovered. Documents recovered in this second raid included the preliminary interrogation of two US pilots who were shot down in a Mohawk on 15 November 1969. The document gave a description of how the aircraft was shot down, the damage it suffered, and the tactics used to capture the two pilots.

Recapitulation

(TS) Extensive statistics for MACSOG operations are provided in the supporting Appendices, however a short recap is presented below to provide an insight into the scope of SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE activities.

Table 3

1970 RT ACTIVITIES RECAP

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>SALEM HOUSE/RVN</u>	<u>PRAIRIE FIRE/DMZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Number of Inserts	612	491	1,103
Enemy KIA (Counted/Estimated)	227/93	490/701	717/794
Operational Days	3,284	1,770	5,054

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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>SALEM HOUSE/RVN</u>	<u>PRAIRIE FIRE/DMZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Enemy POWs Captured	9	3	12
Caches Destroyed	26	6	32
Vehicles observed	540	187	727
TAC AIR Sorties	1,324	1,439	2,763
Aircraft Losses	18	28	46
Friendly KIA/MIA	24/12	68/10	92/22

NEWS RELEASES

(TS) Personnel assigned to MACSOG, or who have access to its sensitive information, are thoroughly indoctrinated in the required security measures for its clandestine operations. However, in spite of the precautions taken to keep SOG activities undercover, the size and complexity of its operations have not gone unnoticed by the news media. As early as October 1967, an issue of RAMPARTS magazine had an article on the Vietnam war which related to SOG. The largest outflux of information occurred in 1969 when the eight Special Forces personnel gained so much notoriety with the alleged killing of a Vietnamese National. The incident received nationwide coverage and many articles included information on SOG and its activities. With the incursions of allied forces into Cambodia in 1970, increased speculation about US involvement in cross-border operations also produced articles containing information on SOG.

(TS) Although these articles touched on many facets of SOG operations, not all of the information printed was accurate. In fact, some of them included invalid data, were incomplete, or misrepresented the facts; however, there could not be a denial or confirmation of the information without further compromising SOG's cover. Excerpts from several articles are included in this year's history, not to give credence to their authenticity but rather to give an indication of the type of news that was printed.

1. RAMPARTS Magazine, October, 1967.

...Special Forces loaned [personnel in 1965] to the CIA for their SOG project (Special Operations Group -- a name so obvious that the CIA changed it to Studies and Observation Group). SOG drops "long range" teams into North Vietnam (OP-34), as well as Laos. Most of these have been remarkable for their lack of success, OP-35 -- "Shining Brass," ...was more successful. Most of the group's operations are short range jaunts into Laos and North Vietnam... The teams are led by US personnel, usually Special Forces types...In addition to the "hunter-killer" type mission, the teams also tap telephone lines.

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One method is to steal an insulator, bring it back and rebuild it with a voice activating bug. They also plant seismic graphic listening devices along trails that record traffic. In Laos the teams are often sent to call in air strikes on villages and trails. Other times in Laos they approached team member's old village for the purpose of bribing the villagers to set up future in-country bases for longer range operations...

2. New York Times, 15 August 1969, "4 Berets Linked to a Secret Unit" by James P. Sterba.

- Saigon, South Vietnam, Aug 14 — Reliable sources said today that at least four of the eight Special Forces soldiers facing possible murder charges in the fatal shooting of a Vietnamese national worked in highly secret intelligence and guerrilla operations with special ties to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Informants here and in NhaTrang, the headquarters of the Fifth Special Forces Group, said that several of those detained by the Army in the case were members of the "B-57 detachment" of an organization known as the Special Operations Group, or S. O. G.

The organization, the informants said, conducts clandestine operations, ranging from intelligence gathering to kidnapping, on special assignments from the United States military command in Vietnam and the Central Intelligence Agency...

...Although the specific details of the operations of these detachments were not available, the informants said they performed missions on assignment for high-ranking members of the United States intelligence establishment in South Vietnam. The missions included intelligence-gathering, sabotage, kidnapping and, not too infrequently, the elimination of certain persons in South Vietnam and the bordering countries of Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam...

...The organization known as S.O.G. is said to work only on delicate assignments ordered directly by high officials. In general it works at a higher level than the intelligence-gathering units of Army divisions...

- ...The Special Forces make use of aircraft supplied by the 14th Special Operations Wing of the Air Force, based in NhaTrang. Tucked in back of the airfield proper, there is a section used exclusively by the Special Forces. There one can see huge transport planes with black and green camouflage paint and slip-in and slip-out insignia...

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3. Baltimore Sun, 24 August 1969, "Some Things the Spooks Do"
by John S. Carroll.

"Remember the stories about Red Flag?" my friend, a Green Beret officer, asked one afternoon last year as we shared a table on the veranda of the Continental Palace Hotel...

...I remembered Red Flag. A few months earlier the Saigon newspapers had gleefully told of broadcasts monitored from a clandestine Viet Cong radio station which called itself by that name. Apparently the broadcasts were aimed at Viet Cong units in the field, for they enumerated the mistakes made in the recent Tet offensive and called on the insurgent forces to pull themselves together.

"Yes," I replied, "I remember. The V.C. radio station."

The officer grinned. "Wrong. The station was ours. We did it. We wanted to undermine their morale by convincing them that Tet was a failure..."

From time to time in Vietnam one gets a glimpse into the murky netherworld inhabited by the Special Forces, the CIA, Army Intelligence, the Navy Seals, informers, agents, double agents, and other assorted dark figures. Often one's brief insights come from people like the Green Beret officer, who should have kept quiet but didn't.

At present the whole world is getting a look at the activities of the Special Forces thanks to the strange case in which seven officers and a senior noncom have been jailed...

...There is to my knowledge, neither a SPECTRE nor a SMERSH in Vietnam, but there really is a SOG.

SOG -- the Studies and Observations group -- is about as spooky an outfit as there is. Whether some of the eight detainees were assigned to SOG is an unanswered question. The New York Times, in a recent dispatch from Saigon, says yes; Pentagon sources say no, adding that SOG is not a Green Beret outfit at all. At any rate, some Special Forces men, including my friend at the Continental Palace, find themselves assigned to SOG, sans beret...

...SOG is, or at least was, involved in snatching fishermen. When I was in Vietnam, Hanoi Radio used to complain almost daily about piracy and missing North Vietnamese civilians.

What is behind the bitter broadcasts is SOG's practice of using fast boats to swoop down on hapless North Vietnamese fishing vessels and kidnap the crews. On occasion, victims have even been plucked from the shore.

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The captives are whisked south for interrogation about conditions in North Vietnam, troop and gun positions, and such matters. Then, like fish, some are kept and some are let go.

SOG was also responsible for sending patrols into North Vietnam. Seldom, if ever, did the Americans themselves go on the missions, although Americans went into North Vietnam in helicopters to "insert" and "extract" the patrols. The patrols themselves consisted of Vietnamese, Montagnard tribesmen, and Nungs, who are of Chinese descent.

Some of the patrols were gone as long as a year. These were resupplied by parachute drops from specially outfitted transport planes or, if a patrol found itself in a well defended area, bundles were parachuted from jet fighter-bombers. How the patrols are supplied since the bombing halt I don't know, but I do know that the SOG people were concerned about this problem last fall.

The patrols had a number of functions. One of the main ones was directing the bombers to traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They also helped the pilots in dropping other things, such as transistor radios which tune only to South Vietnamese propaganda broadcasts, and devices that look like rocks but explode when trod upon.

What else is SOG up to?...

...Answers about the spook trade come slowly and in pieces. Perhaps by virtue of the murder case before us we will be able to pick up a few more fragments for our collection.

4. Newsweek, August 25, 1969, "The Case of the Green Berets."

...The fact...is that while almost all Green Berets are potential intelligence agents, only a relatively few are involved in purely covert operations. Those who are so employed belong to SOG -- the so-called Studies and Observation Group whose assignments reportedly include missions into Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam, as well as the assassination of enemy commanders. One SOG unit, known as the B-57 detachment, was based at Nha Trang, and of the eight Green Berets allegedly involved in the Chuven murder, six worked in B-57...

5. New York Times, 1 October 1969, "Behind the Intelligence Curtain" by Joseph B. Treaster.

...In the sketchy reports on the recent Green Beret case, there have been repeated references to two secret intelligence-gathering units, Detachment B-57

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and the Studies and Observation Group, or S.O.G...
...Some dispatches from Saigon identified B-57 as a part of the Studies and Observation Group, an element of the American command, subsequent investigation indicates that they are separate units. Both seek tactical intelligence, but S.O.G. also engages in sabotage and places emphasis on operations outside South Vietnam.

The Studies and Observation Group, which seems to have no less sensitive mission than B-57, operates without cover from offices in central Saigon in the compound from which Gen. William C. Westmoreland once ran the war. It is listed as a staff section of the American command and draws personnel and necessities from all branches of the armed forces.

There are thought to be as many as 2,000 Americans and many more Vietnamese in S.O.G. Informed sources say that the Americans seldom if ever go into North Vietnam on missions except for brief helicopter trips to emplace or recover teams.

The group's commander, an Army colonel, has an Air Force colonel as his deputy, and there is a "civilian special assistant" who presumably serves as liaison with the C.I.A.

Because of their extensive training in guerrilla warfare, Special Forces soldiers are assigned to both B-57 and S.O.G...

...Vital as they are, B-57 and S.O.G. are like the exposed peak of an iceberg. Much more work, less spectacular but no less necessary, goes on unnoted.

"A lot of it is just day-to-day plugging," said a former province senior adviser. "The little things they put together don't make headlines and by themselves they're not very important. But eventually you get a picture..."

6. The New Republic, 4 October 1969, "Revolt in the Pentagon?"
by Zalin B. Grant.

...The Special Forces, with its close CIA ties, may be viewed by the Pentagon's generals as the paleolithic...stage of this evolving politico-military force.

The 5th Special Forces arrived in Vietnam on special CIA assignment in 1961, and for four years worked in close coordination with the Agency. The CIA provided its protégé with excellent supplies and much money, a fact that rankled more conservative elements of the US Army. During the buildup in 1964 and 1965, however,

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the Green Berets were diluted by new soldiers, less experienced and less enthusiastic than the original contingent had been; predictably, the gilt began to wear off the Green Beret image. Then the 5th Special Forces was reassigned to the same command and supply channels as other American units in Vietnam. It no longer operated as a free-swinging arm of the CIA.

With a big exception: the Studies and Observation Group soon appeared on Saigon military organization charts as a new and independent unit. Commanded by an Army colonel, SOG in reality was a special operations group that continued to work under CIA direction. (The CIA operates under the unlikely nom de guerre of Combined Area Studies, or simply CAS -- rhymes with mass.) The SOG agents mainly were Green Berets based on Okinawa and sent to Vietnam on temporary duty under civilian cover. The job was to mount intelligence operations, train saboteurs for insertion into North Vietnam and run border-crossing operations in Laos and Cambodia. One example of a CAS-SOG operation was the formation of counterfeit VC guerrilla units. SOG recruited and reindoctrinated Communist defectors who had joined the South Vietnam government side. The ex-enemy soldiers were outfitted with VC and NVA gear and sent into contested areas to pose as political cadre, where they frequently kidnapped or killed village leaders. The Vietcong, of course, took the blame with the local peasants. During Saigon street fighting last year, one such counterfeit unit infiltrated among tired enemy soldiers and convinced them to surrender.

SOG's most noticeable activities were its border-crossing operations. To monitor and harass the Ho Chi Minh Trail, SOG established its own highly restricted compounds within 5th Special Forces camps near the borders of Laos and Cambodia. Small patrols of American SOG agents and Chinese Nung mercenaries were landed in Laos by unmarked Vietnamese helicopters whose pilots -- the only Vietnamese involved -- reportedly were handpicked by then Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. SOG suffered heavy casualties. North Vietnamese observation posts often spotted the Americans as they infiltrated Laos...

7. Newsweek, 23 March 1970, "Laos: Plain (and Fancy) Talk." -

Most, if not all, ... incursions into Laos are run by the US Studies and Observation Group (SOG), which has its headquarters in a heavily guarded and rarely visited building in downtown Saigon. And there the secrecy is impressive. Reporters are strictly non grata, and Newsweek correspondents were sternly

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warned last week that detailed reporting on U.S. operations across the border into Laos would be in contravention of "Ground Rule 5." This military regulation forbids the press to report on specific "intelligence activities, methods of operation or specific locations." A possible penalty for violating Ground Rule 5 is the revocation of press credentials in South Vietnam.

8. Message (U), USINFO, Washington, DTG 281851Z Oct 70. This message reported that Tammy Arbuckle had written the following in the October 28 issue of the Washington Star:

Vientiane — U.S. advisers have been on the ground working in combat situations in Laos since 1964, Lao military sources say.

Lao military sources, commenting on stories Monday that U.S. troops have been leading ground strikes in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in South Laos said "Yes, sometimes there are Americans and South Vietnamese in attacks there. The North Vietnamese have taken over that part of Laos. We have no control over it now. Souvanna Phouma has said the trails are part of the Vietnamese War.

The sources admitted they knew of occasions when U.S. advisers were present during fighting in other parts of Laos.

U.S. ground advisers in Laos break down into three categories.

One group is composed of advisers belonging to the Studies and Observation Group of the Special Forces. These men, apart from certain special operations, operate against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos Panhandle. Their missions include leading troops of various Asian nationalities in what the Lao military call "2 Commando Destruction" operations against parts of the trail...

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APPENDIX I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

GENERAL

(U) The Personnel and Administrative Division (MACSOG-10) performs the functions of G-1 and Adjutant General Staff organizations; therefore, it acts in the capacity of both a coordinating and special staff agency.

(S) The division continued to supervise and exercise control of the personnel and administrative functions of MACSOG and to advise and assist the administrative sections of the Strategic Technical Directorate.

ORGANIZATION

(U) In June, 1970, the Personnel and Administrative Division changed the internal organization to conform with actual functions performed by realigning missions and changing the names of the two internal branches. The Personnel Services Branch became the Personnel and Administrative Branch. The Administrative Services Branch became Classified Control, Publications Supply and Records Branch.

Personnel and Administrative Branch

(U) The Personnel and Administrative Branch is under the direction of an Army Captain and:

1. Recommends, prepares and disseminates MACSOG personnel and administrative policies and procedures from guidance received from the Director.

2. In-processes and allocates personnel resources in accordance with operational priorities and policies.

3. Recommends personnel policies pertaining to local national - civilian labor forces, maintains local national civilian table of distribution and case files of local national employees.

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4. Processes all personnel actions to include: awards and decorations, extensions, rest and recuperation leaves, verification and initiation of security clearances, Off/EM efficiency/fitness/effectiveness reports, and feeder casualty reports.

5. Processes requests for TDY, emergency and ordinary leave for military personnel assigned to MACSOG.

6. Publishes MACSOG administrative publications. Provides reproduction service support to MACSOG activities.

7. Processes and authenticates outgoing correspondence, to include congressional correspondence and special actions.

8. Maintains a reference library of military publications.

9. Provides technical supervision on unit mail postal matters to the support section.

Classified Control, Publications Supply and Records Branch

(U) This branch is also under the direction of an Army Captain and:

1. Provides administrative procedural guidance in functional areas to the staff and specifically to the administrative personnel assigned to each staff activity.

2. Distributes MACSOG administrative publications.

3. Processes incoming correspondence.

4. Receives, processes and distributes electrically transmitted messages. Processes outgoing messages from headquarters staff activities for transmission.

5. Operates the headquarters distribution center to receive, process and control all incoming and outgoing correspondence.

6. Formulates procedures to handle and control classified documents, and serves as the MACSOG classified control office.

7. Provides forms control for the headquarters and provides reproduction service for forms.

8. Consolidates requisitions for publications and forms required by staff activities.

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9. Provides records management support and inspects all MACSOG activities on the MACV Records Management Program.

10. Maintains the Headquarters files plan.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(e) The following projects and programs were accomplished during 1970:

1. The MACSOG Joint Table of Distribution was completely revised to conform with organizational changes as required by mission and role revisions. The revision was completed and forwarded to HQ MACV on 31 August 1970. The JTD as approved by HQ MACV was received 6 December 1970. The authorized strength remained the same, 382 military personnel and one civilian.

2. The Director's office and Personnel and Administrative Branch was relocated from room 401 to room 201, Building 3, MACV 1 Compound during the month of August, 1970.

3. The MACSOG Personnel Sponsorship Program was formally established with the publication of MACSOG Directive 600-5 (Personnel Sponsorship Program) on 25 August 1970. The program has proven to be very effective and rewarding for newly assigned personnel.

4. The MACSOG Records Management Program was officially initiated 13 September 1970 with the publication of MACSOG Directive 340-4 (Records Management).

5. The MACSOG Suggestion Awards Program was established 28 September 1970. Seven suggestions were received and evaluated by the Incentive Awards Committee.

6. The MACSOG Accident Prevention Program was established under the control of Director, Personnel and Administrative Division. MACSOG Directive 385-1 (Accident Prevention Program) was completed on 24 December 1970 and submitted for staffing.

7. The Studies and Observations Group's Organization and Functions Manual was revised and sent to HQ MACV for publication on 24 December 1970. The effective date is 1 January 1971 and the manual is classified secret.

8. Continuity files and desk SOPs were revised/updated or established to conform with mission changes.

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9. 79 out of a total 105 directives were revised or published during the year. Of the 79 directives revised or published, 16 were new directives.

WORKLOAD STATISTICS

(U) The following statistics are indicative of the 1970 workload:

1. 671 U.S. awards and 98 foreign awards were processed.
2. 750 letter orders were published.
3. 5,070 personnel actions were processed on many varied subjects.
4. 1,569 civilian personnel case files were processed.
5. 651,798 unclassified pieces of correspondence were processed through Classified Control, Publications Supply and Records Branch.
6. An average of 12,120 controlled secret and top secret documents were on hand.
7. 150,885 impressions were reproduced in support of SOG's mission.
8. 20 of a total of 79 forms were revised.
9. 19 new forms were published.
10. 9 of a total of 40 policies were revised.
11. 14 new policies were published.
12. 32 Staff Digests and 8 MACSOG Bulletins were published.

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APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

GENERAL

(S) The goals set forth by the Intelligence Division (MACSOG-20) for 1970 included continued improvement in both quality and quantity of intelligence produced from MACSOG operations in terms of timeliness, substantive content, and utility. Increased participation by Vietnamese counterparts in the division's activities was established as a major goal for the year.

(S) Through initiation of new concepts, refinement of existing techniques, exploitation of all available intelligence, and direct personal contacts, MACSOG-20 continued to improve its position with respect to established goals. Further development of the Targeting Workshop concept achieved a coordinated intelligence collection and dissemination program responsive to the needs of all command components concerned. Continued refinements in photo-intelligence and collection techniques have insured thorough mission planning support for field elements and have improved quality and content of mission results. The Intelligence Division has continued the use of intelligence data handling systems and explored methods of adapting new technology to increase support of the intelligence mission. Daily contacts and organized training programs have provided Vietnamese counterparts with knowledge and experience in intelligence procedures and techniques.

(S) The Intelligence Division continued in its mission to collect, collate and disseminate intelligence information to MACSOG staff agencies in support of MACSOG operational elements, and to receive, collate and disseminate intelligence information derived from those operations to the intelligence community.

ORGANIZATION

(S) During the first ten months of the year, the Intelligence Division operated under the JTD dated February 1970, with an authorized strength of 57, and an actual strength of 54. The last two months of 1970 were manned under the JTD approved in November 1970 by MACV, with an authorized strength of 55, but an actual strength of 50.

(S) At the close of 1970, the division was organized into four branches.

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1. Operations Branch. The Operations Branch managed all aspects of operational intelligence and was composed of five sections.

a. The Laos Studies Section managed intelligence relative to MACSOG operations in Laos and the DMZ.

b. The Cambodian Studies Section managed intelligence relative to MACSOG operations in Cambodia.

c. The North Vietnam Studies Section maintained available intelligence information on North Vietnam for contingency planning.

d. Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Section provided automated intelligence data to support MACSOG operational elements.

e. The Exploitation Section was responsible for intelligence exploitation of SOG POW's, other detainees, captured enemy documents, and material, and for headquarters staff supervision of RODCA and all matters related to MACSOG Agent Programs.

2. Photo Analysis Branch. The Photo Analysis Branch provided photographic intelligence and photographic laboratory assistance to MACSOG staff agencies in support of MACSOG operational elements. Assigned tasks were accomplished by five sections within the branch.

a. The Imagery Interpretation Section provided photo intelligence reports and materials on all MACSOG targets as well as special studies.

b. The Photographic Lab Section provided a variety of photo processing and photographic activities in support of all MACSOG staff and operational elements.

c. The Photo Analysis Support Section provided photo reconnaissance requirement support, film and map library facilities, and photo intelligence research in support of the Intelligence Division.

d. The Aerial Surveillance Section provided low-level hand-held aerial photographic reconnaissance activities within the SALEM HOUSE area of operations (SH AO).

e. The Support Section (Team) was responsible for branch administration.

3. Security Branch. The Security Branch advised the Director, Intelligence Division on all matters of internal physical security and prepared necessary security directives.

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4. Administrative Branch. This branch provided administrative support to the Intelligence Division.

MAJOR PROGRAMS

SALEM HOUSE

(TS) The Cambodian Study Group, with representatives from all military intelligence collection agencies in Vietnam, State and MACV J2 continued to meet monthly and discuss over-all Cambodian collection requirements. In addition, a pilot group consisting of CAS, State, MACV J2 (EIIB, CIED, and SRA), and SOG, met prior to the regular monthly meetings to discuss all-source intelligence on Cambodia and to prepare the agenda for the regular meeting.

(TS) Special briefings were given throughout the year in support of various units and operations.

1. In January, CG, IFFV was briefed concerning the northern movement of enemy line units through the wasteland into Base Area (BA 702. The purpose of the briefing was to inform CG, IFFV that the enemy units involved in attacks against Bu Prang and Duc Lap in November and December of 1969 were moving north and would possibly become involved in attacks against allied installations in the central portion of MR II.

2. In April, a briefing was given to CG, 7th Air Force concerning lucrative targets located in Zone Alpha for the PATIO (X) program. This program involved 7th AF strikes on sanctuaries and base areas in Cambodia in support of the May cross-border operations into Cambodia. The first PATIO (X) target was struck on 24 April resulting in 100 enemy KIA.

3. During April, a series of briefings was given in support of the impending conventional force cross-border operations into Cambodia. COMUSMACV was briefed by Chief, SOG concerning the importance to the enemy of Base Areas in zones Alpha and Charlie, and what MACSOG felt should be the priority of attacks against these Base Areas. CG, IFFV and CG 4th Infantry Division were briefed specifically on Base Areas 701 and 702. Representatives from G-2, IFFV were briefed specifically on Base Areas 350, 351 and 352. Allied units entered all of these Base Areas, utilizing intelligence provided by the SH desk.

(TS) SH collection capabilities changed extensively during the year as a result of the conventional force cross-border operations and requests originated by MACSOG.

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1. After 30 June, when the conventional force cross-border operations ceased and all US personnel were ordered out of Cambodia, MACSOG was no longer authorized to employ US led teams in Cambodia (CJCS msg 1049/272237Z May 70). At the same time, however, all indigenous teams were authorized and MACSOG operational limits were extended from a uniform depth of 30km to 50km in Zone Alpha; from 20km to 30km in Zone Charlie; and from 20km to 30km in Zone Bravo from the boundary with Zone Charlie to the Mekong River. From the Mekong River to the Gulf of Thailand, the Zone Bravo depth remained 20km from the RVN border.

2. Prior to 30 June, MACSOG received authority to operate in the Air Interdiction Zone which encompassed the area bounded on the north by the Laotian border, on the west by a line 200 meters west of and paralleling the Mekong River, and on the south by Route 13 running southeast from Kratie to the point where it intersects the other established operational limits (CJCS msg 2006/092315Z Jun 70). This authority was extended to 1 October 1970 (JCS 3821/300012Z Jun 70). At MACSOG's request, it was extended again to 1 May 1971 (JCS msg 6781/271617Z Nov 70).

(IS) From 1 January to the time of the conventional force cross-border operations in May and June, SH teams continued to collect intelligence on known enemy base areas and infiltration and supply routes. After the conventional force cross-border operations, SH teams expanded their intelligence collection to determine if the enemy would return to his old sanctuaries, and reestablish old infiltration routes and lines of communication, and to determine which areas would be developed for future use as the enemy now controls all of northeastern Cambodia.

(IS) SH Intelligence Reports written and distributed by MACSOG-20 during 1970 included:

1. 41 spot reports on enemy activity, provided to MACV J2 (CIIB).
2. 477 Intelligence Information Reports (IIR's) on enemy activity and terrain. This compares with 607 IIR's written during 1969.

(IS) Target selection and development during 1970 included:

1. A total of 840 targets, as compared to 901 targets during 1969.
2. Four wire tap operations, conducted under the CIRCUS ACT program (MACV Directive 381-45, Exploitation of Enemy Landline Communications Systems (S)). Two of these operations were successful.

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(TS) A total of 544 missions were conducted during the year, as compared with 443 in 1969. Significant intelligence was produced and disseminated as follows:

1. 1,014 trails were reported.
2. 176 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were reported.
3. 23 sightings of communication wire were reported.
4. Six PW's were captured.
5. 9,171 enemy were sighted.
6. 791 vehicles and cycles were observed.
7. 12 storage sites and caches were discovered.
8. Four training areas were discovered.
9. Three truck parks were located.
10. Aerial and ground photography was taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage and bivouac areas, enemy fortifications and Cambodian terrain.

PRAIRIE FIRE

(TS) During 1970, the Laotian monthly targeting workshops were expanded to include participation by representatives from the Field Forces, HQ 7th Air Force and Vietnamese counterparts of MACSOG personnel. This direct participation has provided a better understanding of MACSOG capabilities and resulted in more realistic target requests.

(TS) Several events produced significant intelligence concerning the PFAO.

1. In late March, a POW who had been assigned to the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment provided intelligence about his unit, which is subordinate to the B-3 Front. The presence of his unit in the area indicated that two headquarters elements, the B-3 Front and the 559th Transportation Group, shared responsibility for activities in Base Area 609. A document also captured in March north of Base Area 609 revealed additional Order of Battle (OB) on the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment and the Headquarters, B-3 Front. This document also helped to further delineate the AO of the 559th Transportation Group.

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2. In September, an operation on Route 966 on the western edge of the PFAO yielded 34 documents. Some 400 pages of these were evaluated by the MACV Combined Document Exploitation Center as Category A, containing significant intelligence. They were described by MACV J2 as "appearing to be the most significant collateral intelligence on the 599th Transportation Group since the beginning of the war."

3. A POW captured in October provided further information on the 559th Transportation Group, which has the highest intelligence collection priority in Laos. He was a former member of the D2 Engineer Battalion, Binh Tram (Military Station) 34, 559th Transportation Group, and provided information on the unit's OB, its training and tactics, and on the effects of allied interdiction efforts.

4. In November, another operation in Base Area 609 found and destroyed an estimated 40 tons of rice. The cache was in an area which has been extensively used by enemy units during the periodic attacks against 5th SFGA units at Dak Seang and Ben Het, and it is believed that the rice had been stored for use by units in similar future attacks.

(TS) During 1970, fewer IIR's on enemy activity and terrain in the PFAO were prepared by the PF section due to revised criteria for the submission of terrain IIR's. Whereas such reports were previously written on each mission, they are now prepared only when held information is more than six months old, or when there is a discrepancy between current maps and the actual terrain.

(TS) PF Intelligence Reports written and distributed during 1970 included:

1. 10 spot reports on enemy activity, provided to MACV J2 (CIIB).

2. 558 IIR's on enemy activity and terrain.

(TS) Target selection and development included:

1. A total of 645 targets as compared to 864 targets in 1969.

2. Ten wiretap operations were conducted under the CIRCUS ACT program; seven were successful.

(TS) A total of 436 missions were conducted during the year, as compared to 458 in 1969.

1. 540 trails were reported.

2. 39 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were reported.

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3. 1,789 vehicles were observed.
4. Seven enemy cache sites were discovered.
5. Two PW's were captured.
6. Aerial and ground photography was taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage and bivouac areas, enemy fortifications and Laotian terrain.

PARBOIL (S)

(TS) As a result of the 1 November 1968 standdown on operations in North Vietnam, PARBOIL (S) (previously PLOWMAN (S)) operations have ceased. Since that time, MACSOG has been required by JCS to maintain the capability to conduct operations against NVN. In light of this requirement, the establishment and maintenance of contingency target packages was the primary concern of the NVN Studies Section. Order of Battle information was maintained so that targeting could be accomplished by analysis of the threat.

TIMBERWORK (S)

(TS) With the cessation of operations against North Vietnam, all TIMBERWORK (S) assets were shifted for use in Laos and Cambodia. Intelligence support was provided by respective intelligence sections in coordination with the Exploitation Section. In addition to spot reports of significant information to MACV J-2, all relevant data was reduced to an IIR for widest dissemination within the intelligence community.

(TS) Contingency planning for possible NVN operations continued to be supported by NVN desk personnel.

INTELLIGENCE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM

Computer Output

(S) During the first seven months of CY 70, the IDHS program was monitored and administered by the North Vietnam Study Section. In August, the IDHS Section was created and expanded to three NCO's, including the Air Intelligence Analyst. All inputs into the system were accomplished by this section. An average of 300 creation sheets were submitted weekly to update the MACSOG file.

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(TS) Computer products consist of three basic printouts:

1. VC/NVA Use of Laos Vol I: This volume is a CONFIDENTIAL monthly listing of items of intelligence reported exclusively by MACSOG assets. Distribution of Vol I was made to non-SOG units.

2. VC/NVA Use of Laos Vol II: This volume is a CONFIDENTIAL monthly listing of items of intelligence derived from both SOG and non-SOG assets. It was distributed to MACSOG operational units.

3. VC/NVA Use of Cambodia: This printout is a CONFIDENTIAL monthly listing of SOG and non-SOG derived intelligence and is the most comprehensive intelligence file for the eastern portion of Cambodia. Distribution of the printout was increased to 33 copies and was supplied to all SOG operational units, J-2 and other units requiring knowledge of this area.

(S) Monthly printouts give a six-month history of the complete PF and SH AOs and are arranged in UTM coordinate sequence. The printouts are classified CONFIDENTIAL because no SOG operational data is included and the source of information is indicated by number only. The source code key list is classified TOP SECRET/LIMDIS and disseminated on a strict need to know basis.

(TS) The MACSOG computer listing was of great assistance to the Field Force Commanders in their planning for the Spring cross-border operations into Cambodia. During and immediately after these operations, the IDHS Section (then the NVN Section) encoded and put into SOG's program such items of intelligence value as cache sites, troop contacts, AAA firings, etc. This was done for correlation of SOG reported intelligence with the materiel and troops actually encountered. A special compilation of all intelligence derived from the Cambodian operations was produced in a CONFIDENTIAL printout and disseminated to units receiving the monthly printout. This compilation provided a graphic display of the material utilizing the Gerber Plotter with different color overlays showing RT reports, FAC reports, VR reports and conventional troop findings. It aided immeasurably in the analysis of SOG's effectiveness.

(TS) Special data handling included:

1. Target Mission Packages. A TOP SECRET/LIMDIS printout and CONFIDENTIAL machine plotted overlays were provided for each target approved by COMUSMACV. This printout contained all SOG operational data as well as a compilation of all intelligence data in the MACSOG file for the past six months. Acetate overlays were keyed to 1:50,000 AMS sheets and graphically displayed the material listed in the printout. Distribution of this product was limited to SOG operational units.

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2. AAAOB Computer Listings. A SECRET printout containing AAAOB information was distributed to SOG operational units twice a month. The primary data source in this printout was the Pacific Air Defense Analysis Facility (PADAF) weekly update. The printout contained AAAOB information for the SHAO, PFAO and AAA threat areas of Laos and NVN up to 20 degrees North Latitude.

Air Intelligence Activities

(TS) The Air Intelligence Section, due to reorganization of the Division, was reestablished under the newly formed IDHS Section. This was accomplished so that all intelligence inputs into the computerized file could be centralized and better controlled.

1. The section maintained Order of Battle on aircraft and airfields (AOB), Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Automatic Weapons (AAAOB) and Electronic Systems (EOB) of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; as well as Surface to Air Missiles Order of Battle (SAMOB) of North Vietnam and enemy AAA threat information in South Vietnam for use by MACSOG and its subordinate units.

2. All applicable information on enemy aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery radar and SAMs was forwarded to MACSOG operational units as it became available.

(TS) The production of a computer listing of AAAOB was expanded to include NVN south of 20°N and all AAA threat in all southern Laos in addition to the PF and SH AO's. The printout format was adapted to be compatible and integrated with the existing MACSOG format. Dissemination was increased to twice monthly and was made to headquarters elements and to all MACSOG operational elements.

PHOTO ANALYSIS

Target Materials

(TS) During 1970, continued improvements were made in intelligence support for MACSOG operational teams. Target materials derived from photo reconnaissance imagery and other forms of intelligence were prepared, produced, and disseminated. These target materials were in the form of area analysis of 10 x 10 kilometer squares which were target centered. Photo maps were compiled at a scale of 1:50,000 and reproduced at a scale of 1:25,000 on waterproof paper. Comprehensive narrative reports were also prepared, detailing: terrain and vegetation, rivers and streams, roads and trails, military activity/defenses,

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village/civilian activity, agricultural activity, landing and drop zones, avenues of movement and miscellaneous information. SH Photo Interpretation Section produced 505 Target Material packages during 1970; PF Section produced 416.

LLHHAP

(S) A major program developed during 1970 was Low-Level Hand-Held Aerial Photography (LLHHAP). The program had its ad hoc beginning in July 1969, and consisted of obtaining hand-held aerial photography from an aircraft flying at tree top level. It was expanded into a sophisticated intelligence collection effort which consisted of a Photographer/Aerial Observer flying in the rear seat of an O-1 aircraft at tree-top level, using an Asahi Pentax Spotmatic camera with either a 135mm or 200mm telephoto lens. A second aircraft was employed, normally an O-2 or OV-10, at an altitude of 1,500-3,000 feet. This combination proved very effective in producing valid intelligence reports supported by excellent photography from 125 LLHHAP combat missions flown over the SH and PF AOs.

(S) The LLHHAP program was formalized on 21 October 1970 under the nickname FORD DRUM. In November 1970, dedicated O-1 and O-2 aircraft flying hours for FORD DRUM were obtained from MACV J-3 and 7th AF. This provided a responsive and unique intelligence collection system for use by Chief, MACSOG and COMUSMACV.

(S) As a result of the increased emphasis on LLHHAP activities within the branch, on 18 August 1970, a proposed change to the JTD was submitted requesting the establishment of an Aerial Surveillance Section with one officer and four NCOs. Based on the requested JTD change, one officer and two NCOs were provisionally assigned to man the section.

Training

(S) Continued and expanded instruction in ground and airborne hand-held photography was presented in the RT Leaders Course at Camp Long Thanh. Instruction included data on camera operation, items of intelligence value to be photographed, and techniques of obtaining the best photography possible.

(S) As a result of the Vietnamization effort within MACSOG and the proposed STD takeover of many programs currently operated by MACSOG, a LLHHAP training program for Vietnamese Officers and Non-commissioned Officers was developed and presented at the Camp Long Thanh training center from 31 August to 18 September 1970. Eight Officers and one NCO from STD operational detachments were graduated with sufficient expertise to organize, conduct and train others in the LLHHAP techniques.

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Capabilities

(S) In May 1970, a photo lab was planned and established at CCC by the Photographic Lab Section. CCC personnel were trained to operate and maintain the new lab.

(S) In early August, the Photo Lab Section was relocated from the building adjacent to the MACV-1 Compound to the second floor of Building #4 of the Compound. The new quarters provided adequate space for new equipment and expanded activities of the lab.

(S) Production was greatly expanded during the year, as reflected by the following figures:

1. Prints (B&W)

20" X 24"	-	528
11" X 14"	-	2,460
8" X 10"	-	44,400
5" X 7"	-	6,984
4" X 5"	-	8,796
2½" X 2½"	-	5,880

2. Film (Processed)

35mm (B&W Rolls)	-	1,250
35mm (Color Rolls)	-	744
35mm (Copy Slides)	-	4,584
4" X 5" (B&W Frames)	-	2,268
4" X 5" (Color Frames)	-	144
8" X 10" (B&W-Viewgraphs)	-	1,272
8" X 10" (Color Frames)	-	12
4" X 5" (Polacopy Frames)	-	796

3. Award/Ceremonial

Photographic Requirements	-	252
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(TS) The Photo Analysis Branch Support Section maintained an average of 30,000 to 35,000 feet of aerial reconnaissance film representing coverage of MACSOG's AOs. An additional 6,000 to 7,000 feet of film were borrowed each week from the 12th RITS at Tan Son Nhut in order to provide photo analysis for preparation of the target material packages produced by the branch. An estimated 5,000 to 6,000 maps and charts were continuously maintained to supply the Photo Interpretation Section, staff divisions within MACSOG Headquarters and the STD Liaison Officer with required maps.

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SECURITY BRANCH

(S) Throughout 1970, Security Branch (MACSOG-21) increased emphasis on security programs which needed bolstering and prepared appropriate guidelines for strengthening the entire security posture of MACSOG. Security directives were reviewed and updated to provide more specific guidance. The most significant documents revised were:

1. MACV Directive 380-29 (S), Access to Studies and Observations Group Information. This directive was prepared by MACSOG-21 to provide guidance to all MACV elements requesting access to SOG information. The associated briefing program was revised during the period April to August 1970 and again during November and December 1970. Appropriate changes to coincide with these revisions were made in the MACV Directive.

2. MACSOG Directive 380-7 (U), Access to Studies and Observations Group Information. A change in the briefing program necessitated a revision of this directive in an effort to establish policy and procedures for requesting MACSOG briefings. Responsibilities for the presentation of these briefings were also delineated.

3. MACSOG Directive 380-5 (U), Military Security, Safeguarding Defense Information. This directive provided guidance in areas of document, personnel, and physical security, particularly concerning the protection of working papers. It incorporated miscellaneous policy documents into one directive, and gave guidelines consistent with operational requirements.

4. MACSOG Directive 380-11 (S), Cover Stories (S). Cover stories utilized by SOG activities were reviewed and revised as necessary to conform to current situations.

5. MACSOG Directive 606-1 (U), SOG Headquarters Pass System. This directive outlined procedures for entry into the MACV-1 Compound. In conjunction with its revision, a new series of access passes was issued to all personnel assigned to Headquarters MACSOG and stationed in the Saigon area. Special Instructions were issued to the Military Police posted at the front and rear of the compound to enforce provisions of the directive.

(S) A series of 51 security inspections began on 1 April 1970 in an effort to identify and correct deficiencies in the security program of MACSOG. Inspections were first performed at the initiation of Security Branch, secondly as part of the annual general inspection, and then as a follow-up to the annual general inspection. In addition, the following technical surveys were conducted throughout MACSOG activities by representatives of the 525th Military Intelligence Group at the request of Security Branch:

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1. All sensitive areas of Headquarters MACSOG, including the communications center. (This had not been previously accomplished.)

2. The Tactical Operations Center for both CCC and CCS. (This had not been previously accomplished.)

3. The sensitive areas of the Naval Advisory Detachment, and Detachment B, Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36).

(X) The Security Branch conducted police checks on all indigenous personnel employed by MACSOG. The system for getting these forms to Security Branch had broken down, and consequently the program was backlogged. To reestablish the program and eliminate the backlog, over 3,000 police checks on this category of personnel were conducted. In addition, a dossier for each individual was initiated.

(X) The security officer of STD is the point of contact for all background investigations, and over 200 security clearances for the MACSOG Civilian Personnel Officer were processed through STD. One applicant was discovered to be a Viet Cong sympathizer and was released from employment.

(U) Preliminary and formal investigations involving MACSOG personnel or information were conducted under the supervision of MACSOG-21.

1. Six preliminary investigations were conducted. Five were possible security violations involving MACSOG information, and one was an incident investigation involving apparent misconduct.

2. Eight formal investigations were conducted. Six were possible security violations involving MACSOG information and two were incident investigations involving apparent misconduct.

(X) The MACSOG Permanent Access Roster (PAR) underwent a general revision. This roster is an integral part of the briefing program and is the basic document authorizing access to SOG information to units and staff agencies throughout Vietnam. Correspondence which ultimately tasked all units concerned with reevaluation of their requirements for this roster was prepared for the Chief of Staff, MACV. PAR inputs were compiled into one document and approved by Chief, SOG.

(X) In conjunction with the briefing program, two machine printout rosters, organized alphabetically by unit/staff agency, are prepared monthly. One roster contains the names of all personnel who occupy positions on the SOG PAR and have received briefings. The other contains names of all personnel who have received one-time briefings. Frequent personnel changes require continuous efforts to maintain current rosters. A copy of each roster is distributed to units listed thereon for their use.

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(S) The JTD positions were realigned and included a position for a warrant officer trained as a polygraph operator. In conjunction with this, a Stoelting Polygraph Machine, Executive Model, was obtained, given a thorough check by 525th MI Group personnel, and found to be in perfect condition. At the end of CY 70, a qualified operator had not yet been assigned.

(S) Continuous liaison was maintained with the 525th MI Group, Vietnamese National Police, U.S. Embassy, Strategic Technical Directorate (through a counterpart, LTC Jacques), CI Directorate, MACJ222 and other miscellaneous agencies for security matters.

(S) Biographic data files on STD personnel were updated and a program was regenerated, whereby MACSOG personnel provide continuous data on their counterparts.

(S) Security Branch provided advice and assistance to all staff sections during a reconfiguration of the MACV-1 Compound. Of major significance was the relocation of approximately 12 staff sections, and the construction of a new conference room. This conference room was specifically designed to provide a secure facility for classified briefings. Specifications were presented by Security Branch, which also monitored the entire construction.

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APPENDIX III

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION

GENERAL

(S) The Operations and Training Division, MACSOG-30, provided the essential staff support for all air, ground, maritime, and psychological operations conducted by MACSOG during 1970. The division continued to make recommendations, during planning and operations, concerning the utilization of and priorities for MACSOG assets, including personnel, supplies, installations, and equipment. It coordinated and integrated support from all services, US agencies, and counterpart organizations necessary to accomplish the MACSOG mission. In addition, it supervised the training programs of MACSOG to ensure that the proper personnel assets were available to conduct assigned missions.

ORGANIZATION

(S) MACSOG-30 was divided into five separate sub-elements to accomplish its assigned tasks. These were:

1. Maritime Studies Branch, MACSOG-31.
2. Air Studies Branch, MACSOG-32
3. Psychological Studies Branch, MACSOG-33.
4. Ground Studies Branch, MACSOG-34.
5. Studies and Analysis Section, SAS.

In addition, on 23 October, the Director, MACSOG-30, assumed operational control of the Training Studies Group, MACSOG-38 (Figure III-1).

CAS/SOG CONFERENCES

Purpose


(S) The Director, MACSOG-30, acted as Chief SOG's principle assistant for CAS/SOG conferences and was directly responsible for

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FIGURE III-1

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION ORGANIZATION



RECAPITULATION

	AUTH	ASG
OFF	31	32
EM	26	27

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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the planning and conduct of a series of these conferences. The conferences were initiated in August 1970 to provide an interchange of information, along with coordination and discussion of matters pertaining to the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas of operation.

(TS) As the tempo of operations changed in Southeast Asia, it became necessary to have a closer exchange of ideas and concepts between CAS and SOG since both organizations conduct operations in the same general areas. Accordingly, an understanding of operating authorities, reconnaissance team locations, targets, stay times and other significant matters germane to the mission typified the subject matter of these conferences.

(TS) The initial CAS/SOG conference was held on 24 August 1970. Subsequent conferences have consisted of a review of the previous agenda items as well as new, timely topics for discussion, intelligence updates and plans for future joint operations. At the close of each meeting, a decision was made on the location of the next conference.

Participants

(TS) Attendance at the conferences included selected representatives from the following agencies:

1. MACSOG
2. CAS, Vientiane
- []
5. 7th Air Force
6. MACV J-2

Locations

(TS) Locations of 1970 conferences and dates were as follows:

1. [Udorn RTAFB, Thailand]- 24 August 1970.
2. [Bangkok, Thailand]- 28 September 1970.
3. MACSOG, Saigon, RVN - 28 October 1970.
4. [Udorn RTAFB, Thailand]- 1 December 1970.

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MARITIME STUDIES BRANCH

General

(S) Maritime Studies Branch, MACSOG-31, continued to exercise staff supervision and coordination for MACSOG covert maritime and cross-beach operations. Maritime operations (MAROPS) were actually conducted by Maritime Operations Group, MACSOG-37, under the cover name of the Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang (NAD), in conjunction with the Coastal Security Service (CSS) of the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate.

(TS) The type and tempo of MAROPS conducted in 1969 continued in 1970. Restrictions of the Nov 68 stand-down precluded the conduct of PARBOIL (et) missions north of the 17th parallel; however, the requirement to resume these operations at any time remained in effect. Patrol Torpedo Boats (fast) (PTFs) and cross-beach action teams were maintained in a high state of readiness by conducting in-country operations in Military Regions I, II, and IV and the DMZ. These operations were normally conducted at the request of Field Force Commanders.

(TS) During the latter months of 1970, a number of new concepts in MAROPS were attempted. These included simultaneous forward operating bases (FOBs), multiple team missions, riverine operations, shore bombardment in conjunction with cross-beach missions, and coordinated operations with conventional forces. Additionally, PTFs were utilized in support of MARKET TIME operations from 26 Nov to 3 Dec in an attempt to interdict trawler infiltration of supplies into the coastal waters of South Vietnam.

Activities

DODGE MARK

(TS) Conducted under combat conditions from NAD, Da Nang, DODGE MARK missions were targeted primarily against the Viet Cong and Viet Cong infrastructure located within 5,000 meters of the coast in MR I, with a few missions in MR II and the DMZ. During the latter part of the year, authority for these operations was expanded to allow operations to be conducted in any of the rivers and waterways of SVN to a depth of 5,000 meters on either side of the banks. The prisoners and the documents captured during these operations proved invaluable in aiding other allied units.

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(S) High surf conditions hampered DODGE MARK operations during the northeast monsoon season. During the first part of 1970, maritime missions shifted to MR IV with a new nickname, IVY COVER, and were under the general auspices of COMNAVFORV rather than MACSOG. During the latter part of the year, the poor surf conditions were partially circumvented by establishing FOBs at Cua Viet and Qui Nhon.

1. On 22 Aug, one Sea Commando Team (SCT) and one PCF were deployed to Vietnamese Coastal Group 11 (CG 11) Headquarters on the Cua Viet River. This FOB remained in operation until 2 Sep, at which time the boat and team were withdrawn. However, at the request of COMNAVFORV, it was reopened on 12 Oct and remained operational until 22 Oct. The specific purpose of this FOB was to gain intelligence on, and prevent the mining of, the Cua Viet River by enemy forces. Although no contact was actually made with enemy units, it is significant that there were no mining incidents in the Cua Viet while the team was deployed there.

2. In late September, one action team and PCF were deployed to the MARKET TIME base at Qui Nhon to conduct operations in MR II. The FOB was operational from 24 Sep until 22 Oct. Operations from this FOB were plagued by bad weather, poor or no intelligence, and support craft mechanical failures.

(S) On 9 Sep, a combined operation, using the SCTs and PTFs of NAD/CSS, and conventional forces from the Americal Division, was targeted against suspected enemy concentrations south of Chu Lai. The SCTs approached their objective from the sea while the Americal Division troops approached their objective by helicopter. No significant contact was made; however, several bunkers were destroyed and the SCTs came under light sniper fire. This was the first combined operation utilizing conventional forces along with SCTs and opened a new area of cooperative effort.

(S) During 1970, 73 successful missions were executed with the following results: 16 enemy KIA; 7 VC captured; 2 sampans and 8 bunkers destroyed; 5 weapons, 13 grenades, 130 rounds of ammunition, 12.5 pounds of explosives, 7 pounds of medical supplies, and 13 pounds of documents were captured; at a cost of 2 friendly KIA and 2 friendly WIA.

IVY COVER

(S) As a result of marginal surf conditions in MR I during Jan and Feb 70, an action team was deployed to a US Navy FOB at SEAFLOAT on the Son Cai Lon River in MR IV to conduct operations under the nickname IVY COVER. These services were specifically requested by COMNAVFORV to complement a SEAL detachment at SEAFLOAT. The overall objectives and method of operation were similar to DODGE MARK missions, i.e., the ambush/capture of VC/VCI/NVA through the use of cross-beach action teams inserted

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from boats or by helicopter. PCFs, PBRs, SSCs, sampans and HELOs were all used for insertions.

(S) During the period of operations, a total of 9 missions were conducted with the following results: 11 enemy KIA; 2 VC WIA; 5 VC captured; 27 sampans, 30 hootchs, 2,500 kilos of food, 5,400 gallons of water, 460 gallons of gasoline, and two gasoline motors were destroyed; 11 weapons, 30 uniforms, and 5 kilos of documents were captured; 46 suspects were detained; at the cost of one friendly KIA.

Training

Boat Crew Training

(S) Continuous operational and refresher training was conducted for the boat crews at NAD, stressing problem areas encountered during operational missions. Emphasis was placed on damage control, fire fighting, gunnery, communications, unit tactics and engineering casualty control. In October, a new program of assigning boat crews permanently to specific boats was instituted with a monthly award given to the crew with the best boat. As a result of this policy, the readiness of the PTFs showed a marked increase.

Cross-beach Action Team Training

(S) The action teams were continually undergoing training in ambush tactics, small arms firing, map and compass reading and physical fitness. In June and September, courses were started to train new recruits for the action teams. These recruits were given rigorous training in all facets of the SCT operations. Upon completion of their training the individuals were assimilated into the various teams. The teams developed a unique capability of cross-beach landing an 81mm mortar for use in specific operations.

In-Country PTF Overhaul Capability

(S) In October, staff action was initiated to develop an in-country PTF overhaul capability. The most desirable location for this facility was the Small Craft Repair Facility (SCRF), Da Nang. It was determined that in-country PTF overhaul, less engines will be feasible by SCRF, but the time of such capability is yet to be determined. Arrangements are also in progress with SCRF to provide skids for in-country drying out of the wood hull PTF "NASTY" Class by June 1971.

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Vietnamization and Navalization

(S) Considerable progress was made in the Vietnamization of MAROPS. CSS forces in the latter part of the year proved that they were capable of planning, coordinating and executing cross-beach missions. Repair and maintenance of the boats and facilities by the CSS personnel continued to improve. Considerable help from US personnel will be necessary until the CSS realizes the importance of preventive maintenance.

(S) More important is the fact that CSS made considerable progress toward becoming a completely Naval unit during the year. Plans for phasing out all Army and civilian personnel attached to CSS and replacing them with VNN personnel were completed. Although the change-over to an all VNN element was to occur simultaneously with the reorganization of the STD on 1 January 1971, a six month extension was granted to ensure adequate training of the VNN replacements. The civilians and ARVN personnel held approximately 40% of the key positions within the headquarters and the Sea Commando Teams, and could not be simply replaced with untrained personnel without seriously degrading the CSS's capabilities. The ARVN and civilian personnel should be phased out by 1 July 1971.

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AIR STUDIES BRANCH

General

(S) The Air Studies Branch, MACSOG-32, continued to obtain and coordinate air support for MACSOG clandestine and covert combat operations in Southeast Asia and to coordinate airlift for logistical support of MACSOG activities.

(S) A wide variety of aircraft types were used to support MACSOG activities. Air Studies Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN provided four specially equipped C-130E (COMBAT SPEAR) aircraft and four C-123K (HEAVY HOOK) aircraft for combat operations and logistical support. The C-130E IRAN and modification schedule in CONUS continued throughout CY 1970; therefore, only three such aircraft were continually available for MACSOG support. A C-7 aircraft was provided by 7th AF on a daily basis to assist in compensating for the loss of the C-130 aircraft. Helicopter, Tactical Air and FAC/Liaison assets were provided daily from various USAF, USA, USMC and VNAF units as requested from MACVJ3, VNAF and 7th AF. Project JENNY (NC-121) terminated on 30 June 1970.

ORGANIZATION

(S) MACSOG-32 was managed by a USAF Lieutenant Colonel, responsible to the Director, Operations and Training Division, and was divided into two major sections:

1. Airlift Section. The airlift section was responsible for the daily scheduling of combat logistic airlift and the coordination for combat missions supported by C-130 and C-123 aircraft under the SHEDDER (S) concept of operations.

2. Helicopter Section. The helicopter section was responsible for daily coordination of helicopter, FAC, liaison, and TACAIR in support of MACSOG ground reconnaissance operations, and maintaining close coordination with other MACV staff agencies, 7th AF and VNAF to establish requirements and priorities for future air supported operations.

AIRLIFT SECTION SIGNIFICANT FACTS

(S) 1970 was marked by a year-long series of justifications and re-justifications for these assets, beginning in January with a 7th AF proposal to relocate or deactivate the COMBAT SPEAR unit, and extending

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through three separate JCS queries relative to relocation of this unit to an off-shore base. The thrust of the USAF/JCS position was that the aircraft were not being sufficiently utilized in a combat role to justify their retention in a combat zone, and that the passengers and cargo could be transported by the Common Service Airlift System. The MACV position insisted that these assets were required to remain in Vietnam. Rationale cited by MACV included the "Maintain in Readiness" doctrine postulated by the JCS after the bombing halt in 1968, and the fact that security considerations preclude the use of Common Service Airlift to transport MACSOG sensitive cargo and passengers. The issue has remained dormant since the last exchange of messages in October 1970.

(TS) A new type of airborne insertion for SEASIA was conducted in the PFAO during CY 70. RTs were trained in the High Altitude, Low Opening (HALO) technique so as to avoid stereotyped, low altitude insertions. Team preparation included high altitude physiological training as well as practice jumps on Okinawa and in Vietnam. An actual combat insertion was conducted on 27 November 1970. Additional HALO teams were scheduled to commence training in January 1971.

(TS) In an effort to provide added air support for counterinsurgency operations in Cambodia, a proposal was submitted to the JCS which would authorize continued use of HEAVY HOOK aircraft for airborne team insertion and aerial resupply missions in Cambodia. Such missions would be flown by Chinese aircrews. The JCS reply indicated that a final determination would be made at the Washington level, based on political constraints. Government of the Republic of China approval has been obtained to utilize aircrews in Cambodia and Laos.

(S) During December 1970, a HEAVY HOOK aircraft, manned by a Chinese aircrew, sustained moderate damage when the left wing tip struck the runway. The accident occurred on takeoff from Tan Son Nhut and was apparently caused by wake turbulence from a departing 707, civilian aircraft. There were no aircrew or passenger injuries and an estimated 2,500 man hours were required to repair the aircraft. It is anticipated the aircraft will be returned to operational status in late February 1971.

HELICOPTER SECTION SIGNIFICANT FACTS

(S) During 1970, Forward Air Guide (FAG) training continued for RTs. The training consisted of ground instruction and an airborne demonstration on how to direct air strikes from the ground.

(TS) RTs were launched into the PFAO from Nakhon Phanom AB and Ubon AB, Thailand. The Ubon launches, using CH-3 helicopters, were staged through PS-2 []

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PS-2 was closed in August due to heavy enemy activity, but fortunately, CH-53 helicopters became available for use in Thailand at this time and PS-2 staging was not required due to extended operational range of the CH-53. Thailand launches provided PF area coverage when weather prohibited operation coverage with in-country helicopter assets.

(8) The 219th Helicopter Squadron (VNAF) was maintained at a UE strength of 25 aircraft. CH-34s in US storage facilities were made available to offset combat losses and to insure that the UE strength was maintained. It was agreed that flying hour allocation would be distributed with 85% in support of the MACSOG mission and 15% to meet unit training, functional test flights and unit administrative requirements. The squadron is scheduled to convert to UH-1 aircraft during the 4th quarter FY 72.

(TS) Prior to 1 July 1970, the 20th SOS was tasked to provide four USAF helicopter gunships and three trooplift helicopters on a daily basis to support the Ban Me Thuot launch sites. Subsequent to the change in SH authorities, the 20th SOS was capable of providing only four gunships due to a shortage in gun kits and UH-1P air frames. On 25 September 1970, the 20th SOS was relocated from Tuy Hoa AB to Cam Ranh Bay AB. The unit is presently converting to UH-1N aircraft and received the first contingent on 21 November 1970.

(8) An Air Studies Branch seminar was conducted during December 1970 as a means to improve launch site air operations. Subject seminar was attended by ALOs and Senior FACs from the separate Command and Control Detachments. Agenda items included: Tactics and techniques used in support of insertion/extraction operations; communication security, FAC call signs, visual reconnaissance requirements, utilization of TAC AIR, and recommended A-1 ordnance loads.

(TS) After approval was obtained from the American Embassy Vientiane, Laos CBU-19/30 (CS Gas) was air delivered on two occasions in support of RT emergencies in the PFAO. On 27 February and 14 September 1970, subject teams were surrounded by hostile forces and could not be extracted due to intense enemy fires. Although the agent did not completely silence enemy activity due to force size and disposition, it was suppressed to a point where a successful team extraction was accomplished.

OPERATIONS

Combat Missions

(TS) Both COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft continued combat support activities in the PFAO during CY 70. Such activities included air resupply and personnel infiltrations. During CY 70 HEAVY HOOK aircraft participated in seven combat missions over Laos and COMBAT SPEAR aircraft participated in 16 combat missions in the same general area.

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(TS) HEAVY HOOK aircraft, manned by Chinese aircrews, participated in 11 combat missions in support of the Cambodian incursion during June. Such missions provided air resupply of food and combat essential equipment to FANK ground forces during the siege of LaBang Siek, Cambodia.

(TS) on 9 June, the VNAF received an urgent request from General Neag-Sam at Bung Lung, Cambodia for supplies. The request was forwarded to MACSOG via 7th AF and MACV, J3, and supplies for 15 days were prepared by MACSOG-40 for delivery. Fifteen tons of rice and six tons of munitions, weapons, and CHICOM ordnance were air dropped into Bakev and LaBang Siek from 19 - 21 June.

(S) Project JENNY air operations continued during the first half of CY 70. An NC-121 aircraft, call sign BLUE EAGLE ONE, participated in 93 separate missions over the Gulf of Tonkin. Subject aircraft conducted black radio broadcasts from the Southern orbit area (18.40N-107.00E to 19.00N-107.40E) until the project was terminated on 30 June.

PRAIRIE FIRE

(TS) During CY 70, PF operations were conducted from launch sites in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. On 1 July, authorities for employment of US trooplift helicopters were changed, and VNAF CH-34 aircraft previously supporting PF operations were necessarily redirected to support SH activities. The following air assets reflect a daily average which were tasked to support PF operations for the period indicated.

1. Prior to 1 July 1970.

<u>Number Of Aircraft</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Organization Tasked</u>
11	CH-34	VNAF
3	CH-3	7th AF
8*	A-1E	7th AF
3	UH-1 (trooplift)	XXIV CORPS
6	UH-1/AH-1 (gunship)	XXIV CORPS
4	UH-1	IFFV
4	UH-1/AH-1 (gunship)	IFFV
2	U-17	VNAF
2	O-1	IFFV
8	O-2/OV-10	7th AF

*Additional TACAIR requirements were provided by diverting airborne sorties.

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2. Subsequent to 1 July 1970.

<u>Number Of Aircraft</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Organization Tasked</u>
3/2	CH-3/CH-53	7th AF
8*	A-1E	7th AF
8	UH-1 (trooplift)	XXIV Corps
6	UH-1/AH-1 (gunship)	XXIV Corps
6	UH-1 (troop lift)	IFFV
4	UH-1/AH-1 (gunship)	IFFV
2	O-1	IFFV
9	O-2/OV-10	7th AF

*Additional TAC AIR requirements were provided by diverting airborne sorties.

SALEM HOUSE

(TS) SH operations were conducted from launch sites in South Vietnam. On 1 July 1970, SH authorities were modified to delete utilization of US trooplift helicopters. In addition, US TAC AIR and helicopter gunships were authorized only when VNAF was incapable of providing such support. Although VNAF A-1 aircraft provided a majority of TAC AIR support after 1 July, US helicopter gunships continued to support SH operations. The following air assets reflect a daily average which were tasked to support SH operations for the period indicated.

1. Prior to 1 July 1970.

<u>Number Of Aircraft</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Organization Tasked</u>
4	UH-1 (trooplift)	IFFV
4	UH-1 (gunship)	7th AF
5	UH-1 (trooplift)	IIFV
4	UH-1 (gunship)	IIFV
4	O-2 FAC	7th AF

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<u>Number Of Aircraft</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Organization Tasked.</u>
2	0-1 Observation	IFFV
2	0-1 Observation	IIFV

2. Subsequent to 1 July 1970.

<u>Number Of Aircraft</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Organization Tasked</u>
10	CH-34	VNAF
4	A-1E	VNAF
4	UH-1/AH-1 (gunship)	IFFV
4	UH-1 (gunship)	7th AF
4	AH-1 (gunship)	IIFV
10	0-2/OV-10 FAC	7th AF
7	0-1 Observation	IFFV
3	0-1 Observation	IIFV
2	U-17	VNAF
2	0-1	VNAF

Support Missions

(8) Combat support airlift was scheduled in response to requests submitted from other MACSOG agencies. Airlift was provided by the Air Studies Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN utilizing COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft. Classified cargo, equipment and personnel were transported, as required, for specific mission accomplishment.

(8) During CY 70, COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft airlifted 8,233, 297 pounds of cargo and 45,975 passengers. COMBAT SPEAR aircraft flew 2,789 sorties utilizing 2,739.2 hours and HEAVY HOOK aircraft flew 3,420 sorties utilizing 3,749.4 hours (See Appendix XIV, Air Studies Group). Daily utilization of dedicated C-7 aircraft continued throughout CY 70. The C-7 was programmed for 180 hours per month and was furnished by 7th AF to partially compensate for the loss of one C-130 to the IRAN/Modification program in CONUS.

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(S) MACSOG Directive 59-4, Air Transportation - Airlift Support Procedures was rewritten and re-issued on 1 Oct 70. In addition, the Fragmentation Order Format was greatly simplified to conform to a standard airlift format. A new signature service for cargo pallets was also introduced to provide a more positive control over sensitive cargo and equipment.

Training

(S) ECM training was considerably reduced during CY 70. BLACK BARON ECM training with fighter aircraft was reduced due to the redeployment of the F-102s from Thailand and the non-availability of F-4s due to other operational commitments. RED BARON ECM training with ground AAA radars increased over CY 69 activity.

1. COMBAT SPEAR aircraft accomplished only nine BLACK BARON training missions during the year as compared to 18 missions during CY 69.

2. HEAVY HOOK aircraft accomplished only one BLACK BARON training mission during the year as compared to 20 missions during CY 69.

3. RED BARON was conducted against SAC Sky Spot radars by COMBAT SPEAR aircraft and against Chinese radars on Taiwan by HEAVY HOOK aircraft. COMBAT SPEAR conducts RED BARON training during in-country airlift missions and does not schedule specific sorties for this purpose. HEAVY HOOK aircraft completed 14 scheduled RED BARON missions during CY 70.

(S) Fulton recovery training and demonstrations continued throughout CY 70. COMBAT SPEAR aircrews demonstrated eight live pick-ups and accomplished 85 practice pick-ups for training purposes.

(S) Low level training was accomplished on Taiwan for HEAVY HOOK aircrews and in the Philippine Islands for COMBAT SPEAR aircrews during CY 70. HEAVY HOOK aircrews received this training approximately once every six weeks and the COMBAT SPEAR aircrews approximately once every three months. The COMBAT SPEAR training cycle is considered an absolute minimum to maintain a mission capable status.

(S) China Air Lines (CAL) continued to provide a Tradewind(modified C-45) aircraft for use by Chief, SOG and other VIP travel. A C-47 was provided for general passenger use. These two contract aircraft transported approximately 5,500 passengers during the year. CY 70 expenditures for utilization of subject aircraft (EM-2 and EM-3) totaled \$233,465 US.

(S) Reconnaissance team training at Camp Long Thanh was supported with SOG air assets. Helicopter support was provided 15 days per month and FAC support was made available five days each month.

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These assets included:

<u>Number Of Aircraft</u>	<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Organization Tasked</u>
4	UH-1 (trooplift)	IIFV
2	UH-1 (gunship)	IIFV
1	O-2 FAC	7th AF

VNAF Air Asset Support

(S) Helicopter support was provided by the 219th VNAF Squadron (CH-34), and other aircraft support was provided by the 110th VNAF Squadron (O-1/U-17), the 114th VNAF Squadron (O-1/U-17), and the 514th VNAF Squadron (A-1). A support summary is provided in Table III-1.

TABLE III-1

1970 VNAF Air Asset Support Summary

1. (S) 219th VNAF Squadron Summary

<u>Month</u>	<u>Hrs Flown</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Pax Carried</u>	<u>Cargo Carried</u>
Jan	1,152.8	1,557	2,477	132,550
Feb	1,136.7	1,488	2,288	89,100
Mar	1,218.2	1,664	2,441	75,130
Apr	1,244.5	1,623	2,173	69,960
May	1,230.2	1,633	2,085	155,320
Jun	1,020.7	1,258	1,616	84,040
Jul	1,378.2	1,693	3,942	68,200
Aug	1,426.8	1,784	3,574	82,720
Sep	-1,124.0	1,638	3,473	89,980
Oct	1,048.4	1,412	3,404	51,040
Nov	1,116.1	1,649	4,056	92,180

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Hrs Flown</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Pax Carried</u>	<u>Cargo Carried</u>
Dec	<u>1208.2</u>	<u>1390</u>	<u>3358</u>	<u>80,520</u>
TOTALS	14,354.8	18,789	34,887	1,070,740

2. (S) 114th VNAF Squadron Summary

<u>Month</u>	<u>Hrs Flown</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Pax Carried</u>
Aug	105.3	45	62
Sep	167.2	72	104
Oct	175.0	81	112
Nov	137.4	55	74
Dec	<u>107.5</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>54</u>
TOTALS	692.4	283	406

3. (S) 110th VNAF Squadron Summary (O-1/U-17 Aircraft)

<u>Month</u>	<u>Hrs Flown</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Pax Carried</u>
Jan	160.5	124	145
Feb	157.1	88	138
Mar	143.4	85	125
Apr	171.3	93	152
May	168.4	94	160
Jun	197.1	122	187
Jul	234.7	146	203
Aug	251.0	140	197
Sep	264.4	161	215
Oct	257.3	152	210
Nov	281.5	167	223
Dec	<u>285.5</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>231</u>
TOTALS	2,462.2	1,527	2,186

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4. (S) 514th VNAF Squadron Summary (A-1 Aircraft)

<u>Month</u>	<u>Hrs Flown</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
Jul	96.5	53
Aug	208.2	120
Sep	288.6	136
Oct	278.1	138
Nov	188.0	108
Dec	<u>314.2</u>	<u>157</u>
TOTALS	1,372.6	712

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES BRANCH

General

(S) Psychological Studies Branch, MACSOG-33, was responsible for the staff supervision of MACSOG psychological operations against North Vietnam and VC/NVA elements in Southeast Asia and provided conceptual guidance to the Psychological Studies Group and the Radio Studies Group.

(S) The ultimate objective of PSYOPS was to bring the Vietnam war to a successful conclusion. Operations were designed to convince leaders of the Lao Dong Party and subordinate communist agencies that the war in South Vietnam could not be won and that resources and energies would better be used to rebuild North Vietnam. Black and gray radio broadcasts were the primary means of executing these operations. While the impact of these radio operations is always difficult to evaluate, it is known that about two official statements a month appeared in the North Vietnam news media warning the people not to listen to reactionary programs and additionally, interrogation of POW's and Hoi Chanhs revealed that both the black and gray radio programs had a large listening audience.

(TS) Psychological operations conducted against North Vietnam were identified by

(S). Table III-2 indicated the PSYOPS programs conducted by MACSOG in conjunction with the RVN Joint General Staff subordinate elements, Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) and the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). Additional program details and statistics are discussed in Appendix X, Psychological Studies Group, and Appendix XI, Radio Studies Group.

TABLE III-2

MACSOG PSYOPS PROGRAMS

PROGRAM	UNITS PER WEEK	TARGET	ORIGIN
	84 hrs	NVN	STD
	28 hrs	NVN	GPWD
	7 hrs	SVN	GPWD
	21 hrs	SVN	GPWD
	4 (Avg)	SVN/Trail	GPWD
	40 (Avg)	NVN	STD
	3 (Avg)	SVN/Trail	STD
	-	-	STD


	350 hrs	NVN/Trail	STD

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6. [] During the last two years of Ho Chi Minh's life, the []

[] SOG reconnaissance teams began [] insertions into the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas of operations during the first week of December and will continue through January 1971. The objective of the program is []

Future Operations

(TS) JCS planning guidance, contained in ANNEX J (Special Operations) to the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan, published in March 1970, called for the []

1. On 16 October 1970, MACSOG requested that the US Mission formulate a US Government policy position regarding continued support []

2. On 30 November 1970, [] recommended to Chief, SOG, that the transfer of []

[] This recommendation was concurred in by Chief, SOG, and forwarded to COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV has sought CINCPAC and JCS approval for the plan.

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GROUND STUDIES BRANCH

General

(S) The Ground Studies Branch, MACSOG-34, continued in 1970 to provide staff support for the activities of the Airborne Studies Group, Ground Studies Group, and Training Studies Group in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations, agent operations, training, and diversionary operations.

Organization

(S) The Ground Studies Branch consisted of the Office of the Chief and three organic sections: Special Studies, Field Studies and Training Studies.

1. The Special Studies Section administered the TIMBER WORK (S) program, monitored the MACSOG sensor program, and maintained liaison with MACV scientific and technical offices.

2. The Field Studies Section administered the PRAIRIE FIRE/ NICKEL STEEL and SALEM HOUSE programs.

3. The Training Studies Section administered the training program to support TIMBERWORK (S), PRAIRIE FIRE, and SALEM HOUSE programs.

Special Studies Section

TIMBERWORK (S)

(TS) The Special Studies Section continued to maintain staff responsibility for administering the agent operations programs for North Vietnam under the code word TIMBERWORK (S). Overall operational proficiency and limited capability to expeditiously reinstitute TIMBERWORK (S) operations in NVN were maintained with four major sub-programs: FORAE (S) (Diversionary Operations), STRATA (Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition), EARTH ANGEL (3-4 Man Intelligence Collection Teams), and SINGLETON (Clandestine Agent) Operations.

1. FORAE (S) diversionary operations continued to be administered under two subordinate programs: OODLES (S) and BORDEN (S).

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a. Project OODLES (C) is designed to portray an apparently extensive and successful clandestine agent network in selected areas of NVN. Fourteen notional teams were maintained in 1970, primarily by family morale messages sent by the HUMIDORE (C) SSPL Black Radio Programs (See Section 3).

b. Project BORDEN (C) continued to employ NVA volunteers to convince NVN that a successful penetration of the NVA is being conducted with the mission of inducing defection and collecting intelligence. During 1970, fourteen BORDEN (C) missions were conducted with a total of 22 agents infiltrated, principally into the PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) area of Laos (Figure III-2). A total of five agents returned to friendly control after being inserted into target areas; however, four were terminated and returned to POW channels while one agent was transferred to the EARTH ANGEL program. Throughout the year, the project remained oriented toward the diversion of NVA security forces and resources to counter a non-existent penetration of the NVA organization and units in the VC/NVA controlled areas of Laos and along the border of SVN.

2. STRATA teams conducted a total of 75 missions in 1970. During the year, STRATA teams were inserted into the SALEM HOUSE (SH) area of Cambodia (Figure III-3) on fifty-six missions and into the PF area of Laos on fifteen missions. In addition, four STRATA missions were deployed in support of an in-country JPRC mission. STRATA operations in 1970 were influenced by three significant highlights. In March 1970, STD phased out the operational civilian assets and intensified the effort to convert STRATA into an all-ARVN program. This, in part, alleviated one of the major problem areas in 1969 - that of maintaining a sufficient pool of trained personnel. In July 1970, STRATA teams phased out of the PF AO and began to operate exclusively in SH AO. The nine authorized twelve-man teams were restructured into eighteen teams of six men each to conduct reconnaissance missions in Cambodia. In August 1970, an intensified training program was initiated to maintain selected STRATA teams in a ready posture for special contingency missions. Emphasis was placed on demolition and parachute insertion capabilities.


3. The EARTH ANGEL program continued to employ former NVA personnel for 3 to 4 man roadwatch and reconnaissance teams. These personnel were recruited from the Chieu Hoi Centers, carefully screened, subjected to polygraph examinations, and then provided intensive training in intelligence collection and reporting procedures. During 1970, a total of six EARTH ANGEL teams completed 40 missions in the SH AO. These teams were dispatched against short to medium depth targets, and due to their indigenous character and previous association with the NVA, EARTH ANGEL personnel readily adapted to the environment in enemy controlled areas. Toward the end of 1970, insertion of teams by helicopter complemented the more frequent infiltration by foot. Teams continued exfiltration by foot.

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FIGURE III-2



PRAIRIE FIRE AREA

THAILAND

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PS-2

DAK PEK

DAK TO

CCC

I CORPS

II CORPS

III CORPS

IV CORPS


PRAIRIE FIRE AREA

0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

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FIGURE III-3



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4. The SINGLETON agent program involves the use of single individuals in low level clandestine collection of information, and is reported under the RODCA (U) system. In accordance with existing security directives, it will not be discussed in this document.

(TS) Long term TIMBERWORK (C) in-place team operations were terminated in 1970 after being initiated [] in 1961. MACSOG inherited the operations in January 1964 and, at that time, 23 agents were assigned to five in-place teams. The initial MACSOG mission for these operations was to recruit, train, and equip agent teams for infiltration into NVA in order to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews. From February 1961 to October 1967, a total of 52 teams, composed of 332 personnel, were infiltrated. TIMBERWORK (C) operations were influenced significantly by operational restrictions for NVN imposed in April and November 1968, and by a joint [] security evaluation in June 1968 which concluded that all TIMBERWORK (C) in-place teams were compromised and under the control of NVN intelligence. The program was then reorientated to encompass a diversionary effort in support of a notional resistance organization in NVN. In June 1970, MACSOG terminated contact with all in-place teams when the last of the teams, ARES, was officially declared KIA. The overall success of the in-place team program has been manifested in the continual concern of the NVN government.

PIKE HILL Program

(TS) In addition to TIMBERWORK (C) related activity, the Special Studies Section also maintained staff supervision over a JCS approved program to use ethnic Cambodians in long term, low level intelligence collection operations in the SH AO in Cambodia. In May 1970, Airborne Studies Group, in conjunction with its STD counterpart organization, implemented this program under the nickname PIKE HILL.

(TS) PIKE HILL teams consisted of three to five ethnic Cambodians who were infiltrated into areas with a permanent civilian population. The teams established cover as Cambodian civilians in the target area and either through observation or contacting local inhabitants, obtained information on VC/NVA movements, intentions, and logistical build-up. During the period 25 June - 31 December 1970, a total of five PIKE HILL teams completed twelve missions. Teams remained in their target areas for periods up to 53 days and conducted successful operations with the support of local inhabitants.

(TS) The potential for success in the PIKE HILL program led to the development of a second similar program under the nickname CEDAR WALK in November - December 1970. In this program, the Government of Khmer Republic (GKR) agreed to provide volunteers to be trained by

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MACSOG/STD for the dual purpose of developing a Cambodian unconventional warfare capability and intelligence collection which will enhance SH operations. (See Appendix IX, Airborne Studies Group.)

Special Programs

(S) In June 1970, the Special Studies Section was designated to exercise staff supervision over the MACSOG sensor program to provide advice and guidance on employment of unattended ground sensor devices in support of various MACSOG tasks.

(U) In October 1970, the section was designated as the MACSOG contact office for coordination and liaison with the MACV Science Advisor..

(S) The POLE BEAN program, in which the Special Studies Section was involved, was discontinued in February 1970. (See Appendix X, Psychological Studies Group.)

Field Studies Section

General

(TS) MACSOG cross-border operations began in September 1965, under the nick name SHINING BRASS. The program continued with various changes in operational areas and rules of engagement of the two separate cross-border ground operations: PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL operations in Laos/DMZ, and SALEM HOUSE operations in Cambodia. Both programs were under the staff supervision of Field Studies Section, MACSOG-34. Actual operations were conducted by the Ground Studies Group (Appendix VIII) and Airborne Studies Group (Appendix IX).

Operations

(TS) The year 1970 was marked by a continual increase in the tempo of operations, introduction of new concepts and refinement of previous operational techniques. The most unique capability of PF/SH forces stems from MACSOG's mandate for unconventional operations. PF/SH elements were the only UW ground forces authorized to operate in Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ. As a result, these forces provided vital intelligence of VC/NVA intentions. They harassed and interdicted the enemy LOCs, way stations, and base areas, which denied the enemy vital supplies and spoiled his operational preparations. They also forced the

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diversion of large numbers of the enemy's forces from a primarily offensive role to provide rear area security.

(TS) The primary force utilized in the conduct of PF/SH operations was the reconnaissance team (RT), aided occasionally by exploitation forces.

1. Programmed mission duration for all RT operations was normally six days, but was extended if the situation permitted resupply of the team. The ideal level of operations was generally accepted to be 1.5 missions per team per month. Assuming all authorized RTs to be operational, the cross-border program was capable of launching 127 RT missions per month. These missions included:

- a. Area, point and route reconnaissance.
- b. Road, trail and river - watch.
- c. Route mining and ambush.
- d. PW capture.
- e. Bomb damage assessment (BDA).
- f. Ground photography.
- g. Wiretap.
- h. Hand emplacement of electronic sensor devices.
- i. Direction of artillery, TAC AIR and gunship strikes on detected targets.
- j. Limited direct ground combat (normally employed only in self-defense).

2. Exploitation or reaction forces were capable of rapid engagement of RT-developed targets by direct ground combat. The exploitation force organization permitted commitment of tailored elements ranging from one platoon to three platoons in size to perform the following:

- a. Reconnaissance-in-force (area, point, route).
- b. Route interdiction.
- c. Ambush and raid.

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- d. Establish and secure temporary patrol bases to support wide area RT operations.
- e. Short-term area denial (when resupplied).
- f. Cache destruction.

Restrictions and Limitations

(TS) Geographic restrictions affected both the PF and SH programs. In the northern two-thirds of the PF Zone, the spine of the Annamite Cordillera dominates the RVN/Lao border. During the northeast monsoon (Oct-Apr) precipitation, cloud build-up, and air turbulence above the eastern slopes of the Annamites severely restricted helicopter operations into the PF AO from RVN. In the southern portion of the SH AO large expanses of generally flat and relatively open terrain make it extremely difficult to operate undetected. These same areas become inundated during the southeast monsoon and were virtually impassable to foot troops operating off established trails and roads.

(TS) Because of the inherent political sensitivity, JCS imposed certain procedural limitations upon conduct of cross-border operations. In this respect, operations into the designated PF AO were relatively unrestricted, with exception that not more than three exploitation platoons could be on any given target at the same time and all operations had to be coordinated with CINCPAC 24 hours in advance. On the other hand, population density and political sensitivity dictated that SH operations in Cambodia be closely controlled and all operations had to be coordinated with CINCPAC 48 hours in advance.

Air Support

(TS) Operations required a high level of air support and coordination. The majority of operations, both reconnaissance and exploitation, were helicopter infiltrated and extracted. Light fixed wing aircraft were used to provide FAC, visual reconnaissance, and radio relay coverage for committed forces. Both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters were used for resupply of operational elements.

(TS) MACSOG had no organic helicopter or TAC AIR assets, however, units were dedicated to support MACSOG cross-border efforts. Further limited additional aircraft were provided by local arrangements with adjacent headquarters. Dedicated assets included:

1. VNAF 219th Helo Squadron
 - a. Authorized: 25 CH-34s

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- b. Average daily availability: 11
- 2. USAF 20th Special Operations Squadron
 - a. Authorized: 15 UH-1Ps
 - b. Average daily availability: 11

(TS) The average helicopter utilization for 1970 was 50 per day, the majority of which were provided from Field Force assets. Of the daily average, 27 were used to support PRAIRIE FIRE and 23 were used in support of SALEM HOUSE operations.

1. PRAIRIE FIRE. Helicopter gunship support was scheduled for all PF insertions and was the principle fire support weapon for exploiting targets of opportunity. However, dedicated TAC AIR was available to support planned insertions and PF emergency situations. Additional TAC AIR for exploitation of targets of opportunity was provided as required, through normal 7th AF Command and Control channels. Overall average of TAC AIR used in PF AO was 3.9 sorties per day. Normal support for a PF RT operation included:

- a. Four troop carrying helicopters (UH1D).
- b. Four helicopter gunships
- c. A-1E TAC AIR (as required)
- d. One O-2 FAC aircraft

2. SALEM HOUSE. SALEM HOUSE rules of engagement prohibited the use of TAC AIR in the SH AO prior to 1 May 70. Subsequent to 1 May 70, however, TAC AIR was authorized under highly restrictive controls and on 1 Jul 70, authority was greatly expanded. TAC AIR averaged 5.3 sorties per day during the last half of 1970 with the majority of TAC AIR support provided by VNAF assets. Normal support for for a SH RT operation after 1 July included:

- a. Three VNAF troop carrying helicopters (CH-34).
- b. Four helicopter gunships (US).
- c. A-1E VNAF TAC AIR (as required).
- d. One O-2 FAC aircraft.

PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL Operations

(TS) The PF program included cross-border reconnaissance and exploitation operations into the panhandle of Laos. Combined US/VN

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forces located, interdicted, and destroyed enemy personnel and equipment on infiltration routes and LOC's leading into RVN. PF RTs and STRATA teams were infiltrated by helicopter, overland and by parachute to reconnoiter assigned targets and exploit targets of opportunity. Detected targets were exploited by ground forces (up to three platoons), artillery, TAC AIR and, when justified, ARCLIGHT strikes. PF forces were authorized to operate within the areas depicted in Figure III-2 and supported IGL00 WHITE and COMMANDO HUNT programs as well as the basic PF program. Under specific case-by-case approval, PF assets were available for missions outside of the normal PF AO boundary.

(8) The basic element of the PF program was the RT. It had a flexible organization, but generally consisted of 9 personnel, 3 US and 6 indigenous or Special Commando Unit (SCU) personnel. A total of sixty US-led RTs and seven ARVN-led RTs were authorized at the end of 1970. The ARVN-led teams generally consisted of two Vietnamese soldiers (ARVN) as leaders and 6 SCU.

(18) PF assets available for exploitation roles consisted of 4 US-led exploitation companies with 3 US-led platoons each. Each platoon was composed of 6 US and 42 SCU. A major change in PF organization began during the third quarter when higher authority directed that US participation in PF exploitation operations would cease on 1 April 1971. The conversion from US to ARVN leadership exploitation forces began in the 4th quarter and, in December, PF exploitation forces consisted of 4 ARVN-led exploitation companies. These companies should be fully operational for cross-border deployment by April 1971.

(18) PF operations were conducted using the Mobile Launch Site (MLS) concept in the same manner as in 1969. Two Command and Control (C&C) detachments, one at Da Nang (CCN) and one at Kontum (CCC) exercised field control of operations in the PF AO. In the northern PF AO, under CCN, RTs and exploitation forces were launched from Phu Bai (MLS-1), Quang Tri (MLS-2), and Nakhon Phanom, Thailand (MLS-3). In the southern PF AO, under CCC, operations were launched from Dak To and Dak Pek. In addition, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, and the availability of PS-2, [afforded an added capability to reach high priority areas in southern PF AO. PS-2 was closed during the 3rd quarter due to enemy activity. At approximately the same time, however, NKP received CH-53 aircraft which have flight capabilities such that the loss of PS-2 was not significant. When adverse weather conditions and other operational priorities prohibited or hindered helicopter insertions, additional emphasis was placed on overland infiltrations from friendly forward units, patrol base operations, and Special Forces Camps strategically located along the RVN/Laos border.

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(TS) During 1970, PF elements mounted 491 operations, of which 441 were cross-border missions and 50 were in-country missions. This resulted in an average of 21 missions per month. A complete statistical summary of these operations is depicted in Table III-3.

(TS) PF teams contributed a major portion of the hard intelligence on VC/NVA use of Laos as an infiltration/staging area, and missions were conducted throughout the PF Base Areas (BAs) and the DMZ. (See Figures III-4 and III-5.)

1. There were 149 missions (roughly 31% of the entire cross-border effort) directed into the tri-border area (BA 609/613) along routes 96 and 110, yielding a considerable quantity of valuable hard intelligence.

2. Further north, in BA 614/Route 165/966 complex, 43 missions (11%) were conducted. Adverse weather conditions and high elevation added to the extremely hostile environment in this area.

3. In and around BA 607, 57 missions (14%) were conducted.

4. Further north in the vicinity of BA 611, to include the Laotian salient, 62 missions (15%) were conducted. The number actually operating within BA 611 itself was extremely small as was the case in 1969, due to the extremely high density of enemy troops and air defense in that area.

5. In the BA 604 complex, 24 missions (5%) were conducted.

6. Of the remaining 106 missions, 58 (13%) were conducted in the northernmost area of the PF AO and 48 (11%) were conducted in the NICKEL STEEL Zone of the DMZ. A substantial increase in operations in the DMZ (from 8 in 1969 to 51 in 1970) was due in part to a requirement to monitor an increase in enemy activity in the same area, and also due to the ten kilometer eastward expansion of the NICKEL STEEL Zone.

(TS) Thirty operations were launched from Ubon and Nakhon Phanom (NKP) bases in Thailand, and again demonstrated the feasibility of long range insertions from the west during periods of adverse weather in RVN.

(TS) The only major material losses attributable to PF operations consisted of helicopters downed and destroyed. Twenty helicopters were lost.

(TS) The following were significant operational aspects of PF/NS operations during 1970.


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TABLE III-3


1970 SUMMARY OF PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>LAOS</u>	<u>RVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Reconnaissance Teams	422	25	447
Platoon	16	24	40
Multi-Platoon	3	1	4
TOTAL	441	50	491
 <u>RESULTS</u>			
Gunship Sorties	1,116	64	1,180
TAC AIR Sorties	1,419	20	1,439
Secondary Explosions	57	2	59
 HELO Losses			
Combat	14	2	16
Operational	5	6	11
Unknown	1	0	1
TOTAL	20	8	28
 Structures Destroyed/Damaged			
Artillery Missions/Rounds	75/200	4/0	79/200
Vehicles Destroyed/Damaged	146/1,601	14/112	160/1,713
Bunkers Destroyed/Damaged	48/10	0/0	48/10
Bridges Destroyed/Damaged	9/0	0/0	9/0
Caches Destroyed	0/0	0/0	0/0
Weapons Captured	4	2	6
Personnel/Vehicular Mines Emplaced	17	0	17
Intelligence Reports	214/10	0/0	214/10
Prisoners	553	-	553
Enemy KIA (Body Count)	3	0	3
KIA (Estimate)	485	5	490
KBA (Incomplete)	701	0	701
TOTAL	82	0	82
	1,268	5	1,273
 US WIA			
KIA	98	1	99
MIA	12	2	14
TOTAL	4	0	4
	114	3	117
 VN WIA			
KIA	157	19	176
MIA	53	1	54
TOTAL	6	0	6
	216	20	236
US/VN TOTAL CASUALTIES	330	23	353



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FIGURE III 5



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1. Of major significance was a change in the operational restrictions governing the use of NKP. In September, the number of indigenous personnel allowed to remain overnight (RON) at NKP increased from 12 to 24, and teams were allowed to remain a total of four consecutive nights, instead of the previous two nights. These more flexible operating restrictions, coupled with assignment of CH-53 aircraft to NKP, provided a much greater capability for elements operating from this base. However, the northeast monsoon of this year greatly inhibited launches from both RVN and Thailand during the third and fourth quarters. The severity of the weather caused a complete close out of the Phu Bai Launch Site. Thus, these greater capabilities had not been fully exploited by the end of the year.

2. An especially noteworthy trend was the increased coordination with CAS, Vientiane. This coordination resulted in a greater exchange of information and also one major operation in September [redacted] Three additional operations were planned, but were held in abeyance pending higher authorities decisions and a change in MACSOG exploitation unit organization.

3. Greater emphasis in the third quarter was placed upon patrol base operations using the exploitation companies. However, a directed change by higher authority in the leadership of the exploitation companies from US to ARVN dictated a temporary halt of this effort.

4. The NICKEL STEEL Zone was expanded 10 kilometers to the east thereby allowing an intensification of reconnaissance efforts in reaction to an enemy build up in the DMZ.

5. In addition to the two semi-permanent radio relay sites (RRS), one in the southern PF AO and one in RVN south of the DMZ, one new RRS was established in the central PF AO to support operations in that area during the period May through November. Upon conclusion of these operations, this RRS was closed.

6. The American Embassy in Vientiane concurred in several outside zone insertions during this year. These insertions allowed teams to take advantage of being inserted up to 5 km outside the PF AO and approaching selected target areas in the AO from new directions, thereby increasing the security and surprise factors.

7. The enemy's counter-raider capability greatly improved. Mobile tracker teams were strategically placed along all significant high point observation sites. This, plus a more sophisticated communications system, allowed the enemy to monitor the insertion of teams, direct trackers into the area, and thereby directly influence the short stay-time experienced, particularly in the northern PF AO. A direct result of this enemy activity was an increased use of LZ blows, a system for quickly clearing an LZ with the use of explosives, to

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insure insertion away from observable areas. When the team was able to insert immediately after the LZ blow, the method provided successful in countering the normal reaction time for enemy trackers.

SALEM HOUSE Operations

(IS) Prior to 1 July 1970, reconnaissance operations into Cambodia included combined US/VN forces to collect intelligence and to verify suspected enemy locations, infiltration routes, and logistical complexes. Following the allied cross-border operations in May and June, US personnel were no longer permitted to operate in the SH AO; therefore, operations were continued using all indigenous forces.

(IS) The primary operational element in this area continued to be the RT during most of the year. The basic SH RT, consisted of 12 personnel, 3 ARVN and 9 SCU. Normally a split team was employed utilizing one or two ARVN and four to six SCU, except for offensive type missions when the full RT was employed. Thirty all ARVN RTs were authorized for the SH program at the end of the year.

(IS) Two Exploitation Companies, each with three platoons, were also targeted in the SH AO. These forces were used primarily to establish patrol bases in SVN for launching RTs into Cambodia and, on a limited basis, to exploit targets. More extensive use of these forces under ARVN leadership is envisioned for 1971.

(IS) During 1970, SH operations were conducted from launch sites located at Quan Loi, Duc Lap, Ban Don, Tieu Atar and Duc Co. A limited number of RTs were launched from mobile patrol bases along the RVN/Cambodian border. Field control of SH operations was exercised through CCS located at Ban Me Thuot, and CCC at Kontum.

(IS) During the first four months of 1970, the enemy continued his unhampered use of Cambodia as a sanctuary for operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Troops were infiltrated from Laos into secure base areas contiguous to all four military regions. Supplies destined for enemy forces operating in or near Base Areas 609, 702, and 701 were also infiltrated through Laos (Figure III-6). Supplies for enemy forces further south were generally shipped through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. The overthrow of Sihanouk, followed closely by the allied cross-border operations, severely disrupted enemy forces in Cambodia.

(IS) On 24 May, CJCS authorized the use of US TAC AIR throughout that portion of Cambodia bounded by a line 100 meters west of the Mekong River on the west, Rt 13 on the south, the Laotian border on the north, and the Vietnamese border on the east. This area was termed the Air Interdiction Zone (AIZ) and given the nickname FREEDOM DEAL Zone. On 2 June 70, COMUSMACV requested authority to insert reconnaissance teams into the air interdiction

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zone to locate and verify targets for exploitation by TAC AIR. This request was approved on 9 Jun 70, and during the remainder of the year MACSOG has inserted 113 reconnaissance teams into the AIZ beyond the SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations. Of these, 4 were infiltrated from Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. The FREEDOM DEAL authority was twice extended during 1970 and currently expires on 1 May 71.

(TS) On 27 May 70, JCS directed that SH operations be conducted by all-indigenous teams effective 1 Jul 71. This message further prohibited the use of US helicopter troopships or gunships in support of operations in Cambodia. It authorized, however, the use of ethnic Cambodians on MACSOG SH teams. Finally, it expanded Zone ALPHA to a uniform depth of 50 km, Zone CHARLIE to 30 km, and Zone BRAVO to 30 km north of the Mekong River and 20 km south of the Mekong to the Gulf of Siam. On 29 Jun, CJCS restated the prohibition on the use of U.S. personnel, in either a leadership or advisory capacity on cross-border operations in Cambodia, but rescinded the restriction on U.S. gunships in support of SH teams.

(TS) The transition to all indigenous operations was accomplished without significant difficulty, and by 2 July reconnaissance operations within the SH AO had been resumed using Vietnamese and Cambodian personnel exclusively. In order to comply with the restrictions, MACSOG realigned its reconnaissance assets. The ten ARVN-led reconnaissance teams at CCN were transferred to CCS giving it a total of 20 ARVN-led teams; CCC retained its ten ARVN-led teams and was given the responsibility for SALEM HOUSE operations north of the XA-YA 00 east-west grid line. Ten US-led RT's at CCS were transferred to CCN, five went to CCC, and five were retained at CCS to provide a training base and to provide CCS with the capability to conduct selected operations in the Republic of Vietnam. These five US-led RT's remained at CCS until December 1970, when three transferred to CCC and two were relocated to CCH.

(TS) MACSOG was further authorized to conduct platoon operations in the SH AO using all-indigenous assets. Without indigenous leadership, the six exploitation force (EF) platoons were limited to operating in the Republic of Vietnam, and were therefore primarily used with US leadership for patrol base operations. EF platoons participated in 7 US-led and 3 ARVN-led cross-border operations and 16 in-country patrol base operations. In late 1970, ARVN leadership became available for the Exploitation Force Companies, and by the end of December all leadership positions had been filled by ARVN personnel and unit training had been initiated.

(TS) In addition to the relocation of the ARVN-led assets of Ground Studies Group (MACSOG-35), to concentrate their operations in Cambodia, the Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36) was also directed to focus its operations into the SH AO.

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1. STRATA teams, which had been maintaining operational proficiency by conducting reconnaissance operations in the PF AO, began operating the SH AO in late June 1970. During the later months of the year these teams were the first to conduct raid and ambush operations, which were begun in SH AO in an attempt to interdict, to a limited extent, the extensive logistical operations being conducted by the enemy along major land and water LOC's. A total of 56 STRATA operations were conducted in Cambodia during CY 70.

2. EARTH ANGEL teams were inserted from border Special Forces Camps throughout 1970. The majority of operations were conducted in and between Base Areas 250, 351, 352, 353, and 740: and in those portions of BA 701 and 702 which could be reached by overland infiltration from the Duc Co Special Forces Camp. These teams regularly demonstrated their ability to travel almost at will through enemy held territory. A total of 40 EARTH ANGEL missions were conducted in 1970.

3. A program of low level intelligence collection using ethnic Cambodian teams was initiated in June 1970 with the code name of PIKE HILL. Twelve missions were conducted with mixed results. The success of these teams has been entirely dependent upon their ability to obtain the support of sympathetic native Cambodians.

(TS) On 10 Jun 70, the JCS granted authority for MACSOG teams to emplace sensors throughout the SH AO. The batteries of sensors emplaced by allied units operating in Cambodia prior to 1 July 1970, began to expire in December, and MACSOG emplaced two strings of sensors on Rt 13 and one string on Rt 131.

(TS) Also in June, COMUSMACV authorized the employment of artillery against verified enemy targets in Cambodia. In order to fully utilize this new asset, MACSOG coordinated with IIFFV Artillery and fire request channels were established to allow MACSOG to obtain artillery fire against targets located by deployed teams or air observers in southern Zone ALPHA and northern Zone CHARLIE.

(TS) Two authorities previously requested by MACSOG were granted in Dec 70. The restriction limiting 10 operations in Zone CHARLIE during any 30-day period was rescinded and MACSOG was authorized to emplace antipersonnel and anti-vehicular mines, equipped with self-destruct devices, throughout Zones ALPHA, CHARLIE, and the Air Interdiction Zone. Specific details for the mining authorities were being coordinated with AMEMB Phnom Penh at the end of the year.

(TS) Overall results of operations during 1970 reveal a marked increase in both the number of operations conducted and in team stay time over similar statistics for 1969. This increase can, to a large extent, be attributed to the turbulence within Cambodia resulting from the overthrow of the Sihanouk government and the allied cross-border operations. The only area not seriously effected was in the

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vicinity of BA 609. The extremely rugged terrain prevented allied operations in this area.

(TS) Along the remaining common border between Cambodia and Vietnam, allied operations in May and June were successful in causing severe dislocations of enemy troop concentrations and logistics operations. Enemy border base areas were, for the most part, rendered useless and were not reoccupied until late 1970. Enemy forces driven from the border appear to have relocated deeper within the country, and have focused their efforts on Cambodian military forces to develop a civilian support base to provide food and labor. During November and December it became apparent that the enemy was reestablishing his border sanctuaries. Base Area 702, and later 701 became untenable for extended operations. Base Area 740 is being redeveloped as a logistical base. It appears not to be occupied by major enemy tactical units, however, extensive logistical activity has been observed north of the base Area 350-351 complex. MACSOG teams operating in the SH AO conducted 577 reconnaissance operations. Of these, 558 were cross-border missions with the remainder conducted in-country. Other statistics which reflect the results of modifications to operating authorities are indicated in Table III-4.

Training Studies Section

(TS) Throughout 1970, the Training Studies Section continued to monitor and issue guidance for MACSOG training programs to support TIMBERWORK (2), PRAIRIE FIRE, and SALEM HOUSE requirements. In addition to regularly scheduled US and ARVN training conducted by the Training Studies Group at Camp Long Thanh, representatives from MACSOG and STD attended specialized training conducted by other than MACSOG resources. These included:

1. Sensor Training (Conducted by the U.S. Signal School at Vung Tau).
2. Sniper Training (Conducted by the 25th Infantry Division Advanced Marksmanship School at Cu Chi).
3. HALO Training (One phase conducted in Okinawa).
4. Off-Shore Training (Conducted at various locations in Okinawa and CONUS).

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(S) A minimum of three individuals per C&C detachment were kept proficient in both the sensor and sniper program. HALO training was conducted on a trial basis for one US-led RT. The HALO mission which followed was successful and provided justification to continue HALO training for additional reconnaissance teams.

(U) The following FY 72 Off-Shore Schooling requests were submitted to MACV Training Branch:

1. Intelligence Staff Officer Course - 4
2. Information Officer Basic Course - 2
3. Psychological Operations Unit Officer's Course - 1
4. Senior Foreign Intelligence Officer Course - 1
5. Special Officer/Leadership Course - 4
6. Infantry Officer Advance Course - 3

This was an increase of 5 allocations over the 10 allocations obtained for FY 71.

(S) A primary function of the Training Studies Section was to advise the counterpart Training Section of the STD. Close coordination was effected in all areas to maintain the US and VN training requirements levied on the Camp Long Thanh Training Center and to assure that Vietnamization would progress at the intended rate. (See Appendix XIII, Training Studies Group.)

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TABLE III-4

1970 SUMMARY OF SALEM HOUSE OPERATIONS

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SH AO</u>	<u>RVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Reconnaissance Teams	558	19	577
Platoon	16	14	30
Multi-Platoon	3	2	5
TOTAL	<u>577</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>612</u>
 <u>RESULTS</u>			
Gunship Sorties	1,548	39	1,587
TAC AIR Sorties	1,239	85	1,324
Secondary Explosions	221	8	229
HELO Losses			
Combat	10	3	13
Operational	1	2	3
Unknown	1	1	2
TOTAL	<u>12</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>18</u>
Structures Destroyed/Damaged	2,398/501	4/0	2,402/501
Vehicles Destroyed/Damaged	19/4	0/0	19/4
Bunkers Destroyed/Damaged	531/47	4/4	535/51
Bridges Destroyed/Damaged	11/12	0/0	11/12
Caches Destroyed	26	0	26
Artillery Missions/Rounds	11/120	9/41	20/161
Weapons Captured	45	0	45
Antipersonnel Mines Emplaced	53	0	53
Intelligence Reports	485	2	487
Prisoners	9	0	9
Enemy KIA (Body Count)	211	16	227
KIA (Estimate)	89	4	93
KBA	463	5	468
TOTAL	<u>763</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>788</u>
US WIA	28	7	35
KIA	5	0	5
MIA	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>33</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>40</u>
VN WIA	125	17	142
KIA	19	0	19
MIA	12	0	12
TOTAL	<u>156</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>173</u>
US/VN TOTAL CASUALTIES	189	24	213

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STUDIES AND ANALYSIS SECTION (SAS)

General

(S) SAS had two primary functions during 1970. The first was to prepare and present in-house and out-of-house briefings on the MACSOG mission, organization, and current operations. To support this first function, SAS supervised and maintained a complete briefing facility. The second function was concerned with Automatic Data Processing (ADP), and SAS insured that the necessary inputs into this Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) were accomplished.

Briefings

(S) During 1970, General Abrams, COMUSMACV, and his general staff were normally briefed twice monthly on current MACSOG operations. In October, General Abrams requested that his field commanding generals of IFFV, IIFFV, and XXIV Corps receive the same information. Consequently, the CG of IIFFV was briefed twice per month, and the CGs of IFFV and XXIV Corps received a briefing during the last week of each month. An exchange of up-date briefings was also started in October with CAS, Vientiane, and continued on a monthly basis.

(S) Numerous other briefings were presented to general officers and certain field grade officers of all services when it was determined that they had a definite need to know of MACSOG operations. Due to its extreme sensitivity, the dissemination of MACSOG information was closely monitored by Chief, SOG.

Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS)

(TS) IDHS inputs provided a computer-retrievable data base which was of current operational interest to higher headquarters, targeters, mission planners, and commanders. The information fed into the computer was extracted from the after action reports submitted by field intelligence sections on each team that was inserted in conjunction with cross-border operations. Both operational and intelligence information from both the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE programs were stored in the IDHS computer system so that the information could be selectively retrieved by subject, geographic area, time, or any combination of these factors.

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(U). The format of the output is based on the users desires. The user may request a printout of the information desired or he may request an overlay of this information which the computer will prepare for him. The user may also request a combination of the above. In any case the format of the output is definable by the user to meet the users needs.

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APPENDIX IV

LOGISTICS DIVISION

GENERAL

(S) During 1970, the Logistics Division (MACSOG-40) continued to provide logistical support to all elements of MACSOG. Emphasis was focused on improved management practices and adherence to established supply procedures.

(S) Support encompassed forecasting, procurement, storage, issue and delivery of all types of equipment and supplies; construction and maintenance of facilities; air delivery of supplies and equipment; research and procurement of conventional and unconventional warfare material for field evaluation; and medical support as directed by Chief, SOG.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Operations Support Branch

(S) MACSOG-40 augmented the AGI team, and performed the logistics inspection of all operational field elements and headquarters study groups. Follow-up visits to these accounts were scheduled, and attempts continue to be made to establish systems and procedures, which, when implemented, should preclude many of the supply and maintenance problems being experienced by the accounts. In addition, a conference for all MACSOG S-4 officers and interested staff agencies was held on 24 April 70 to discuss items of interest to and problems facing the units.

(S) To alleviate problems identified during the AGI and visits to staff and subordinate elements during the year, the following directives were up-dated or initiated:

1. MACSOG Directive 700-4 (Revised), Supply Procedures. This directive prescribes basic stock control policies and accounting procedures for all SOG accounts.

2. MACSOG Directive 700-X (Draft), Maintenance Procedures for Accounts. This directive prescribes maintenance policies and procedures to be used by MACSOG accounts for all vehicles and crew served weapons.

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3. MACSOG Directive 59-4 (Revised), Airlift Support Procedures. This change incorporates a cargo manifesting procedure to be used in the MACSOG airlift system, thus providing positive control for all cargo shipped.

4. Logistics Guide (Revised). This latest revision includes new chapters on maintenance, Class III support, construction, and medical procedures.

5. MACSOG Directive 700-8, (Draft)(Revised), Accounting for Lost, Damaged and Destroyed Property. This directive prescribes the policies and procedures to be used in accounting for lost, damaged, and/or destroyed MACSOG controlled accountable property.

(78) Tasking in support of other MACSOG elements varied throughout the year.

1. Logistics Division was tasked on 11 June 1970 to develop a logistics plan to support reconnaissance operations in the SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations utilizing only ARVN and indigenous ground personnel assets. Air support was to be provided by the 219th VNAF Helicopter Squadron. The plan was developed and tailored to meet specific requirements at CCS (Ban Me Thuot) and CCC (Kontum), and it was incorporated into Annex B of MACSOG SALEM HOUSE OPOD 1-70 dated 23 June 1970.

2. MACSOG LOI dated 24 September 1970 tasked the division to develop equipment packages and storage procedures to support High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) operations. These operations centered around inserting RT's in the PF AO using HALO parachute techniques to reduce helicopter losses. On 28 September 1970, a total of 48 sets of equipment were ordered to support the training and operational phases.

3. On 30 October 1970, MACSOG-40 was tasked by Ground Studies Group to provide certain combat support items and preposition them at CCC (Kontum) in support of Operation TAIL WIND. Support items totaling 3669 pounds were rigged for airdrop from C-123 and C-130 aircraft and available to support the project. The operation was conducted in the PF AO between 11-14 September, against a transportation staging area, with dramatic success.

4. The logistics Annex to MACSOG OPLAN 3-70 was developed to provide procedures for the Vietnamization of MACSOG's logistical support.

5. Logistics and personnel requirements for the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) were prepared in support of MACV OPLAN 5J22. Preparations included a recommended Organization and Functional Table.

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(IS) Captured Material stocks for several items have been depleted and outside sources have been contracted for additional procurement.

1. AK-47 Magazines and Ammunition. There was a large turn-over in these SOG assets during the past year. Sufficient quantities were accumulated for support of SOG activities and for air drops to support Cambodian forces at Ba Kev and Labong Siek in June. Stocks from captured material have been depleted without replenishment due to the fighting in Cambodia. An order was placed to Army Material Command for 650,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition. A contract with a Korean firm provided 3,000 AK-47 magazines, which is a year's supply.

2. Web Gear. The only reliable source for NVA web gear is local manufacture through CAS, since sufficient quantities have not been captured to support requirements.

(IS) Several new items were added to the SOG inventory during 1970.

1. Canopy Penetrating Rounds, 40mm. The 40mm marking rounds rise 250 feet when fired, and deploy a parachute that tangles in the jungle canopy, while smoke is produced. The test rounds have been distributed, and the canopy penetrating round will become an ASP item when quantities are available.

2. Mini-smoke Grenade, 35mm. The mini-smoke grenade is packaged in 35mm film can, and produces a large volume of smoke for about 20 seconds. It has been favorably received, and is now stocked at the ASP.

3. Mini-ponder/Transponder. The SST-210Z mini-ponder and AN/UPN-34 transponders have become items of major interest. Units have been obtained from USARV and LWL, and additional quantities are on order from Motorola. The items are in short supply as they are still undergoing tests before being accepted into the USARV inventory.

4. Mark 1610 Stabilized Image Binoculars. Eight pair of stabilized binoculars were obtained from ARPA and have been distributed to subordinate units. These items are used in the FAC aircraft to pick-out LZ's, DZ's, etc.

5. Piccotex. [] MACSOG with 130 pounds of Piccotex, a fuel contaminant. The contaminant dissolves in fuel, cannot be detected by ordinary means, and causes engines to be clogged by a tar-like substance after the engine has cooled off.

6. Minigrenade (V40). A shipment of 50,000 mini-grenades was received, part of which was delivered to the field activities. Although weighing only 4.2 ounces, the serrated steel body of the V40 explodes into about 326 fragments, yielding 100 percent casualties within a 3 meter radius. Five mini-grenades weigh less than 2 old-type fragmentation grenades.

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(TS) The following items were developed for MACSOG use in CY 71:

1. 60mm mortar elevation indicator.
2. Silencer for AK-47.
3. Silencer for 7.62mm Walther PPK and 9mm Corto/Kurz auto loading pistols.
4. Tunnel Weapon.
5. Covert Boat Destroyer.

Supply Branch

(S) The MACSOG Supply Branch requisitioned, received, stored, and issued all classes of supply and equipment required to support MACSOG operations. Items were primarily supplied through House-50, a supply warehouse and storage area located in Saigon.

(S) Required items of supply were obtained through the use of Interservice Support Agreements with the Army, Navy, and Air Force in-country, and the Counter-Insurgency Support Office (CISO), 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa, out of country. Materials and equipment were also obtained from the PX system, local purchases, and RMK. Specialized equipment not available through normal military supply channels was ordered through CISO. Seventeen accounts throughout South Vietnam and one account in Thailand were supported by the Supply Branch during 1970.

(S) Continued emphasis has been placed on the conversion of the "Pile System" of random ordering and stockage to a demand oriented configuration. Three demands within 180 days was established as the stockage criteria.

1. Beginning in the first quarter of CY 70, House-50 had 1,730 demand supported lines in the ASL. At the end of the year, this figure had increased to 3,500; and total lines had increased from 8,293 to over 12,000.

2. The later half year was strongly influenced by the addition of prescribed load lists of the major accounts, causing the number of total lines to move upward. Through continuous effort, House-50 achieved a demand accomodation rate of 86% by 30 October 1970, in spite of the uniqueness of a large military organization operating virtually without any authorization documents and presenting fairly erratic demands.

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3. At the close of each quarter, all stock record cards were purged, excess items with no demand in the past year were turned into supply channels when there was no indication their use would be required, and requisition objectives were recomputed.

4. Standard inventory procedures remained in effect and the stock record cards were updated per each inventory. The storage situation has stabilized to the point where cyclical inventories by materiel commodity (i.e. communication-electronics) are now conducted on an annual basis.

(8) At the close of the year total dollar inventory amounted to \$5.5 million. Total issues amounted to \$4.5 million and total receipts stood at \$5.4 million. Figures below display the increase of supply activity at House-50 during the past calendar year as compared to the previous year.

1. Stock Control Section.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>% INCREASE</u>
Requests	17,797	36,812	107
Releases	16,662	27,685	66
Receipts	9,866	12,937	32

2. Warehouse Section.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>% INCREASE</u>
Pounds Received (In millions - All Modes)	2.5	7.6	204
Pounds Shipped (In millions - Air and Sea Only)	3.4	4.0	18

(8) Several programs started in 1970 will continue.

1. Extensive emphasis was placed on modernization of vehicles throughout SOG. Directly affected were $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, 5 ton trucks, and sedans.

2. Efforts are being made toward standardization in all equipment areas such as generators, communications-electronics, general items, weapons, and commercial vehicles.

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3. With the phase down of combat activities of the 5th SFGA, House-50 has been very active in absorbing excesses as they become available. Available excesses are being matched against needs in order to maximize utilization, and material is transferred on a non-reimbursable basis.

4. Project REDBALL is being used to rapidly obtain Class IX (repair parts) supplies for deadlined major items. Response during the first month has been very favorable and the outlook for the coming year is very bright.

5. To reduce the number of line items with zero balance, a new and intensive Zero Balance Management Program was instituted in the 4th quarter. All line items costing more than \$10.00 are individually managed. Substitution is done where possible and all supply sources are cross checked to delete zero balances.

Construction

(S) The construction effort was primarily devoted to maintaining present facilities with some expansion and improvement projects. Utilizing existing structures rather than new permanent construction was in keeping with the austerity of the program.

1. At Camp Long Thanh, expansion of billeting and latrine facilities was accomplished in order to provide for company-strength training. Also, at this site, a new drainage system was completed, a new water well drilled, and a complete renovation of the indigenous mess accomplished. Several minor projects were completed to improve the habitation of indigenous personnel.

2. Extensive work was done on the outside storage site at House-50 to eliminate the flooding problems experienced during 1969. Work on the pumping station was completed. The northwest corner of the yard was completely filled in and gravel installed in low yard areas. POL storage was buried underground. Compound defensive positions were relocated and new bunkers were constructed.

3. At CCS, new indigenous barracks were constructed as well as modifications made to the mess. Other projects at the camp were aimed toward improving the security of buildings within the compound as well as perimeter defenses.

4. At CCC, the new TOC was finally completed and defenses established for it. Improvements in other defenses included capping all bunkers with concrete, repairing perimeter fencing, and establishing defenses at Outpost Eagle. Also completed was a new, larger indigenous mess. The old mess was then converted into additional billets. At the present time, work is aimed toward improvement in perimeter lighting and power generation.

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5. At CCN, repairs to the perimeter fence were accomplished as well as the capping of bunkers. A new helo pad was constructed and buildings damaged by a typhoon repaired. A new radio relay site was established.

6. At the Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang, most projects were repairs to living quarters and camp defenses which suffered extensive typhoon damage. Improvements were accomplished for the messing and billeting of indigenous personnel. New construction was limited to a chain-link fence around the compound.

7. Two major projects were completed for VOF. The first was the establishment of a new 10kw transmitter at Tay Ninh, RVN. This included moving an existing tower and building new generator facilities. The second project was the building of a new concrete sea wall around Con Te Island. This was accomplished prior to the rainy season and protected the island's sand foundation.

8. At Nha Trang, a new sewage system for Jackson Hall was installed.

9. In the Saigon area, the MACV-1 Compound was completely renovated to effect a decrease in the number of buildings utilized. In addition, as most divisions changed their location within the compound, internal changes were accomplished for the divisions. Also, the Airborne Studies Group at Pershing Field had their compound completely renovated. This was accomplished in the last quarter of CY 70.

10. For all of the camps, a conversion from wood burning to oil burners for cooking was effected in the indigenous messes. The oil burners are not only cleaner, but also less expensive.

Medical

(S) During the year, MACSOG medical facilities provided medical care for 3,309 inpatients and 63,215 outpatients.

(S) The MACSOG medical capabilities improved considerably during 1970. A surgeon was added to the Ground Studies Group in the 3rd quarter. Three Special Forces qualified surgeons filled heretofore vacant slots at the C&C's during the final quarter. An ARVN dental technician and lab technician were added to the staff of the Liaison Bureau, and in September, an ARVN medical officer was assigned to the Liaison Bureau. ARVN medics are also at all launch sites for SALEM HOUSE activities and at all C&C dispensaries.

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(S) Medical facilities at the C&C's greatly improved. CCS added one wing to its dispensary in April and is in the process of building an X-ray room, operating room, and recovery room. CCC extensively renovated the interior of its dispensary and plans the addition of an X-ray room. CCN maintained the excellent dispensary built during 1969. All C&Cs should have X-ray capabilities in 1971.

(S) The Medical pre-print supply system continued to function effectively and allowed rapid filling of standard medical items requests. Two extensive revisions of material available through pre-print channels were made and 244 items of medical materiel are now available and stocked at House-50 for rapid shipment. These items include drugs, biologicals, official reagents, laboratory supplies, surgical dressing materials, and general hospital supplies.

(S) Liaison visits between this branch and field medical facilities were frequent. Goals included early identification of medical problem areas, more frequent professional medical supervision, and improvement of camp sanitation. A camp Medical Inspection Outline, incorporating relevant medical directives and regulations, was composed to serve as guidance in sanitation of mess halls, barracks, and latrines and operation of a medical facility.

(S) Malaria rates among MACSOG personnel have been lower, particularly at CCN and CCC and, for the last quarter, at CCS. This can be directly attributed to increased command emphasis on chemoprophylaxis. The use of the Wilson-Edeson test for urinary chloroquine was introduced as an aid in establishing whether individuals have been taking the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

(S) In September, a change in reporting of morbidity statistics was introduced. Data is now being reported separately for US personnel, indigenous operational troops, and non-operational civilian personnel, including dependents. It is felt that this method of reporting gives a more useful indication of disease and injury incidence than the old procedure which lumped together all non-US personnel for reporting purposes.

(S) A revised first aid course for indigenous medics has been conducted quarterly. The course concentrates on field first aid and preventive medicine.

(S) The indigenous immunization program, begun in 1969, was continued in 1970. In addition, an immunization suspense file for all US headquarters personnel has been in operation since May.

Air Delivery Branch

(S) During 1970, the Air Delivery Branch supported 32 operational missions, including 18 personnel drops and 14 cargo drops. Sixty-one

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training missions were supported including 45 personnel drops and 16 cargo drops. A total of 97 tons of cargo were rigged and shipments through SOG ramp as aerial port activity totalled 526.2 tons.

(S) Research and development projects undertaken by the Air Delivery Branch included:

1. Final development of the LAU-59 Pod as a special air delivery container.
2. Total development of the BLU-23 Napalm Pod into a specialized air delivery container with multi-aircraft delivery capability.
3. Rehabilitation of all E&E kits.

(S) Equipment manufactured in the Air Delivery Branch for Airborne Studies Group included:

1. 330 Personnel Lowering Lines
2. 1,600 HELO Lowering/Rappelling Rigs
3. 100 Cargo Parachute Conversion Risers
4. 24 Personnel Control Lines
5. 2 Six-Man Pickup Lines

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APPENDIX V

PLANS DIVISION

GENERAL

(TS) During 1970, Plans Division (MACSOG-50) continued to develop and prepare combined and joint long-range, intermediate, and contingency unconventional warfare (UW)/special operation plans for Southeast Asia. Chief, SOG and appropriate staff elements were kept advised on all matters pertaining to UW contingency plans, US and allied forces capabilities for implementation of current UW plans, and STD capabilities for assumption of MACSOG responsibilities.

(S) Plans for the STD improvement and modernization and for the transfer of MACSOG responsibilities, missions, and capabilities in accordance with Annex J (Special Operations) to the JCS Report, "Vietnamization--Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and Related US Planning"(U), and MACV re-deployment programs received primary emphasis.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(TS) Accomplishments and projects completed by the Plans Division during 1970 included:

1. MACSOG OPLAN 1-70, "General Plan for MACSOG/STD Operations for FY 1971" (S). This OPLAN was completed in April, 1970 and supported Annex J (Special Operations) to the JCS Report, "Vietnamization--Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and Related US Planning"(U), JCSM-42-70, dated 29 January 1970. It provided guidance to MACSOG staff and subordinate commanders for the MACSOG/STD operations during FY 71 under the assumptions that hostilities would continue throughout SEA, the Paris Peace Talks would remain unproductive, US redeployment would continue, and MACSOG would continue to function with increased STD participation. The plan included the missions, objectives, concepts of operations, and tasking for MACSOG air, ground, and maritime operations in-country and in Laos, Cambodia, DMZ and North Vietnam (NVN).

2. Annex N to MACV OPLAN 5J22, "Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions" (S). This annex was completed in September, 1970 and provides for the US conduct of unconventional warfare and associated operations in support of revolutionary outbreaks in NVN. When implemented, control and direction of such operations is exercised

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through the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Southeast Asia (JUWTF, SEASIA). MACSOG will be augmented as necessary to be converted into a JUWTF with Chief, SOG as COMJUWTF (designate). This annex is MACSOG's supporting plan for MACV OPLAN 5J22 and was approved by CINCPAC in December 1970.

3. MACV/SEASIA JUWTF JTD. A proposed 802-man staffing for a JUWTF headquarters was prepared with full justifications and submitted to CINCPAC on 16 June 1970 as required by CINCPAC OPLAN 5022. Upon review of the proposed JTD, CINCPAC stated that present plans envisioned MACSOG as the JUWTF HQ and that until such time as MACSOG was substantially phased down, MACV would require little, if any assistance from the component commanders in staffing a JUWTF HQ. To be prepared to function when MACSOG is no longer capable of providing a JUWTF, CINCPAC directed that the proposed JTD be reevaluated using the CINCPAC "Policy and Planning Guide for Unconventional Warfare" as a guide. Two assumptions were also added; the JUWTF HQ is to be collocated with the MACV/SEASIA HQ, and uniservice UW operational bases are to be used as command and control HQ subordinate to the JUWTF HQ (CINCPAC Msg 122317Z Aug 70). The proposed JTD was reduced to approximately 80 personnel, reviewed, revised, and forwarded to CINCPAC on 9 October 1970. This JTD is designed only as an initial activation document for the post FY 72 period when MACSOG will be limited in providing a complete HQ element due to redeployments. It was approved by CINCPAC on 4 December 1970 with minor changes.

4. MACSOG OPLAN 3-70, "Strategic Technical Directorate Improvement and Modernization" (S). This plan was completed in December 1970 and addresses the conduct of special operations and unconventional warfare in SEASIA from the beginning of 1971 to mid-1973. It provides for the smooth and orderly transfer of certain MACSOG programs, operations and functions to the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). It also provides for the termination or transfer of selected activities to other agencies of the US Government or Government of Vietnam. The plan is a detailed description of MACSOG's phasedown to a MAAGV advisory element and the STD's reorganization, improvement, and modernization.

5. Appendix I to Annex C to COMUSMACV OPLAN J198, UW appendix to "Plan for the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV) (U). This appendix was completed in December 1970 and establishes the MAAGV UW advisory element to the STD. It addresses the UW situation for mid-1973 in which the STD has assumed most of the MACSOG missions and responsibilities. MACSOG assumes an advisory role under the title Field Advisory Element, Strategic Technical Directorate, (FAESTD), and all significant logistical, communications, and fiscal support for UW operations will be provided by RVNAF.

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6. "Guide for Helicopter Tactics and Techniques for use with Reconnaissance Teams," Lessons Learned No. 83, USMACV. Plans Division compiled and wrote this lessons learned summary which discusses tactics and operational techniques for infiltrating and exfiltrating long range reconnaissance teams (RTs) by helicopter. It provides guidance to the various armed forces components responsible for organizing, training, and employing helicopter elements in support of RT missions. The document received world-wide distribution to Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force and FWMF organizations.

7. "MACV SEASIA Strategy Concept", and "Strategic Objectives Plan for SEASIA". Director, Plans Division was assigned as a member of the MACV Strategic Objectives Task Force. Plans were reviewed and comments and recommendations for the conduct of unconventional warfare in SEASIA were incorporated into the SEASIA Strategy Concept.

8. Composite UW Staff Study. This staff study, "Future Unconventional Warfare and Special Operations for RVNAF," proposed the South Vietnamese Armed Forces organization for the conduct of unconventional warfare and special operations during Phase III of the Improvement and Modernization Program (1973-1974 time frame). It included a discussion of the chronological development of the existing STD and its capabilities and limitations, an analysis of three organizational concepts for a Vietnamese JUWTF, a proposed reorganization of the STD, proposed force structures for the Vietnamese Army, Navy, and Air Force UW assets, proposed aircraft and boat requirements for the VNAF and VNN, and recommendations to COMUSMACV for implementing the conclusions found in the study. COMUSMACV approved the study on 15 May 70.

9. STD Reorganization. Planning continued throughout 1970 for a UW/special operations force as directed by the JCS in 1969 (JCS Msg 021826Z Jan 69). Recommendations for the future role of the STD as this force and an outline for its reorganization were approved by COMUSMACV on 18 January 1970. On 2 February, Plans Division presented these concepts to General Cao Van Vien, and he appeared receptive to the proposals. He stated that President Thieu considered that a UW capability was both desirable and necessary for RVNAF and encouraged its development. The "Composite UW Study" was then prepared and approved by COMUSMACV in May. In consonance with President Thieu's Decree 614a-TT/SL of 1 July, "Organization of the National Defense Structure," further modifications were necessary to the proposed STD organization. These modifications were presented to the Combined Committee for Organization of UW Forces chaired by VN Major General Trang, JGS Deputy for Personnel and Administration, in September. MACSOG's committee representative was the Director, Plans Division. The proposed reorganization was studied by the JGS and then directed to become effective 1 November 1970 with the exception of the Special Mission Service (SMS) (the VN Special Forces). The effective date of the SMS organization was delayed until 1 January 1971.

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10. "MACV-1 Compound Defense and Security," MACSOG Directive 525-1. Plans for the defense of MACV-1 compound, MACSOG Headquarters, were rewritten to provide a phased defensive force based on MACV alert conditions. It provides the necessary defensive buildup which is dependent on enemy activity.

11. "MACSOG Documentation Study." Initial draft of the MACSOG historical documentation was completed on 10 July 1970 and forwarded to MACSOG for review. A comprehensive review was completed by Plans Division and MACV J3 and recommendations were forwarded to JCS and CINCPAC on 16 Oct 70.

12. 1969 MACSOG Historical Summary. Completed, staffed, edited, and published the 1969 MACSOG Command History (Annex F to MACV 1969 Command History).

13. Bangkok Conference, 29 June 1970. Prepared background information, made recommendations and reviewed reports concerning the "Conference on Cambodia and Regional Military Strategy Planning (et)" held in Bangkok, Thailand from 29 June to 2 July 1970. CINCPAC convened the conference to examine strategic possibilities and develop coordinated operational, training, and logistic plans for aid to Cambodia. Chief, MACSOG participated in the conference as the UW/special operations representative of COMUSMACV. The courses of action and recommendations which evolved were developed within the framework of a regional approach directed against the common VC/NVA threat. These recommendations included operational plans for utilization of limited SEASIA military resources to block NVA/VC advances in Cambodia, coordination of SEASIA intelligence efforts, third country aid potential, and logistical requirements and priorities. Participants included representatives of CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, CAS, and American Embassies Saigon, Bangkok, Vientiane and Phnom Penh.

14. Bangkok Conference, 19 October 1970. COMUSMACTHAI convened a "UW Planning Conference" in Bangkok on 19 October 1970 to discuss UW operations in Cambodia. Conferees included representatives from COMUSMACTHAI, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, American Embassy Bangkok and American Embassy Phnom Penh, Director, MACSOG Plans Division, represented COMUSMACV. The conference dealt primarily with UW operational possibilities in the northwest and developed concepts for a modest UW program in the GKR provinces of Oddak Meanchey, Siem Reap, and Preah Vihear. This program is primarily a RTG-GKR effort with a low US profile. NE Cambodian operations were considered by CINCPAC, AMEMB Phnom Penh and MACV representatives only. The concept for a very small UW force of 20 to 25 carefully selected indigenous Cambodians that could be integrated into the present SALEM HOUSE program was discussed. Its purpose would be to further the GKR presence in NE Cambodia and to form the nucleus for Cambodian UW development in that area. It is important to note that this concept led to the development of MACSOG's CEDAR WALK Program.

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15. Brigade Plan. Prepared initial plans for a brigade organization under US leadership with indigenous troops to conduct cross-border operations. The concept was proposed by Ground Studies Group in July 1970 and envisioned the conduct of paramilitary operations in company, battalion and possible multi-battalion strength with a consequent revision to the current organizational structure of MACSOG operational forces. The plan was overtaken by events and dropped in August when it became obvious that the organization could not function within current funding and manpower levels and COMUSMACV policies precluded further expansions. At this same time, JCS directed that plans be developed to intensify exploitation operations in PF AO using indigenous leadership (JCS Msg 7233/121213Z Aug 70). The planning for the Brigade concept was then utilized in proposing a Vietnamization plan for paramilitary operations that included six all-indigenous led company size forces capable of conducting cross-border combat operations without US ground presence in either leadership or advisory roles (COMUSMACV Msg 130015Z Sep 70). Upon approval of this plan by JCS (JCS Msg 281408Z Sep 70), an ad hoc committee, with Director, Plans Division as chairman, was established to address the problems associated with the Vietnamization and expansion of the exploitation forces. Training of six exploitation companies began in October 1970 and will continue with three additional EF companies to be acquired January 1971. The companies should become operational with ARVN leadership by mid 1971.

16. MACSOG Fact Book. Updated the MACSOG Fact Book to provide current objectives, methods of operations, authorities and summarized results of MACSOG programs. An updated Fact Book was presented to BG Blackburn, JCS (SACSA). A fact sheet on the origin and background of SOG was also prepared for General Rosson (Deputy COMUSMACV).

17. VNAF UW Equipment Report. Special equipment for VNAF aircraft required in the conduct of UW was studied and coordinated with 7th AF using results of the Composite UW Staff Study. Although no aircraft will be dedicated to the STD, some special equipment will be essential for proper support of STD missions: secure voice equipment for O-1 type aircraft to provide radio relay capabilities for RTs in the field, and special navigation radars for C-123s to enable night aerial deliveries.

18. STD Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). Draft proposals for the STD JTD and Table of Organization and Equipment for 1971 and 1973 were prepared, reviewed by the staff, and coordinated with the STD. Results should be reviewed by RVNAF, JGS in early 1971.

19. MACSOG Ø1A Briefing. From January to May, Plans Division acted as briefers for the category Ø1A briefing. This is the general information briefing on MACSOG's mission and organization to include PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE. SAS, under MACSOG-30, has been responsible for giving this briefing since May.

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20. Civic Action. Plans personnel undertook a civic action project from May through July during off-duty hours to build a playground for the children in the downtown area of the city of Saigon. Two seesaws, a swing set with eight swings, a jungle gym set, and a trapeze set were constructed of scrap materials and erected in the Chi Lang Park at the corner of Gialong and Tu-Do Streets. Colonel Do-Kien-Khieu, Mayor of Saigon, personally expressed his appreciation and those of the people of Saigon for the playground as a "worthy and worthwhile civic action."

21. COMUSMACV Briefings. A series of briefings on the MACSOG/STD organization and relationships with STD, the role of 5th SFGA advisors to the STD, and MACSOG's general improvement and modernization plans (MACSOG OPLAN 3-70) were presented to COMUSMACV from October through December. As a result of these briefings, the decision was made to redeploy the 5th SFGA by 31 March 1971, and in the decision briefing presented on 8 December, COMUSMACV approved the proposed concept of employment for the Special Mission Service (SMS), STD, and the proposed 136-man US SF Advisor Element for the SMS.

22. Special Liaison. Plans Division maintained liaison with the STD, MACV, and 5th SFGA and prepared preliminary plans concerning the future relationships between 5th SFGA and MACSOG.

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APPENDIX VI

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

GENERAL

(S) During 1970, communications activities continued on the same level as the previous reporting period. Even though teletype circuitry was decreased by one circuit and minimize imposed for a six week period, message volume increased approximately five percent. Throughout the year emphasis was placed on improving the communications security posture throughout SOG and the Vietnamization of communication facilities.

(S) The Communications Division (MACSOG-60) continued to provide communications systems support for MACSOG; to supervise, operate, maintain and control MACSOG communications and electronics (CE); to advise and assist the STD on CE matters; and to maintain close liaison with other staff and operational CE elements in Vietnam.

(S) Four communications conferences were held during the calendar year. The main purpose of these conferences was to exchange information of mutual interest, with the goal of improving communications within the command. Some of the subjects covered were:

1. Communications security.
2. Code requirements.
3. Vietnamization of communications.
4. Communications equipment procurement and standardization.
5. Frequency utilization.
6. Logistic support.
7. Maintenance policy and procedures.
8. Operations policy and procedures.

(S) Command cryptographic inspections were conducted at all MACSOG units. These inspections, required by Army Regulations, assisted in upgrading the quality of cryptofacilities.

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(TS) Concentration on security of communications continued.

1. As a means to this end, Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) equipment was installed to support high priority requirements at the following activities:

- a. Air Studies Branch with an extension in the Intelligence Division.
- b. Air Studies Group, Nha Trang, RVN.
- c. C&C South, Ban Me Thout East, RVN.
- d. C&C Central, Kontum, RVN.
- e. Support Facility, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.
- f. Camp Fay, Da Nang, RVN, in support of NAD and Monkey Mountain Forward Operating Base (MMFOB).
- g. Service was requested for AUTOSEVOCOM terminal at CLT.

2. STD was provided with five, three, and two family literal one-time cryptographic pads along with operational codes. This provided secure communications with STRATA and CSS cross-beach teams.

3. The MACSOG Personnel Code (USKAC-234) was revised to accomplish a more demanding role as MACSOG's primary off-line code system for non-secure radio and telephone networks. The need became apparent for a convenient, flexible, and easy to use operations code for employment within MACSOG. To provide such a system, the USKAC-234 was changed from a personnel code to a personnel/operations code and upgraded from Confidential to Secret. In October, a request was submitted to Director, National Security Agency to expand the code from 700 to 800 groups and was subsequently approved.

(S) From 11 to 19 May a representative from the Communications Division assisted NAD with a Fast Patrol Boat (PTF) communications test. The purpose of the test was to determine if a frequency or a group of frequencies could be found that would provide 24 hour communications from the base station at Da Nang to PTFs along the coast of RVN. The PTFs ranged from Da Nang to Vung Tau. The test indicated that communications could be maintained in the 8-10 MHz range on high frequency (HF) single sideband radios.

(S) Several modifications and additions to existing equipment and facilities were made during 1970 to improve communications.

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1. A 60 WPM half-duplex non-secure circuit was installed on 4 January 1970, between MACSOG Communications Center and Trai Hung Vuong Communications Center, STD, Nguyen Van Thoai Street. This circuit provided the STD counterparts of MACSOG-60 with an alternate route to the C&Cs.

2. The non-secure voice circuit (hotline) between MACSOG and C&C North was no longer required and was deactivated on 22 January.

3. A non-secure voice circuit was installed linking Ground Studies Group with the Tactical Operations Center, Liaison Service, Trai Nguyen Cao Vi, Cach Mang, Saigon.

4. A non-secure voice circuit was installed linking Voice of Freedom (VOF) studios with their transmitter site at Tay Ninh.

5. The BUGS/SOG teletype circuit changed from full-period to on-call status on 30 June 1970. This still provides for contingency reactivation on short notice while allowing circuit link diversion to other uses.

6. The communications unit supporting the very high frequency teletype circuit between C&C South and Quan Loi Launch Site was relocated in September. Two radio sets (AN/GRC-122) were obtained from USARV on a 180 day loan to provide the necessary radio-teletypewriter (RTT) link. This RTT system maintained a 90 percent plus circuit reliability. Replacement equipment was ordered.

7. As a result of a crypto facility inspection and survey in February, all equipment within the HQ Communications Center was modified in accordance with Defense Communications Agency (DCA) red/black installation criteria.

(U) During a commercial power failure on 3 September, the 300 kilowatt (KW) backup generator was damaged, resulting in the loss of all communications for over two hours. An emergency 100 KW generator was installed by Post Engineers to provide backup power for the communications center. This generator was not stable or reliable and failed twice over a five week period. Realizing the importance of this critical facility, the following actions were taken:

1. A request was submitted to 1st Signal Brigade through MACV to tie in the power supply serving the Integrated Communications System (ICS) located within the MACV-1 compound. This power had been very reliable and would provide us with 200 percent backup. The communications system would be on generator power at all times even though the headquarters complex would not have backup power.

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2. The first request was disapproved by 1st Signal Brigade. MACV rebutted the disapproval stating that it would be to everyone's advantage, including the 1st Signal Brigade, to have the increased load on the generators.

3. At the close of this reporting period, an approval had not been received.

SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS

Operations Security Survey

(S) An Operations Security (OPSEC) Survey of MACSOG operations was conducted by a Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) OPSEC team during the period of 18 January through 5 February 1970. The purpose of the survey was to analyze operational techniques of MACSOG activities, primarily PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) and SALEM HOUSE (SH), with a view toward identifying possible sources of enemy prior knowledge and ways to deny the enemy these sources.

(S) MACSOG's procedures and associated communications were considered more secure than any of the organizations and activities surveyed during the past three years. The majority of SOG personnel were found to have a keen awareness of operations security, the enemy's ability to analyze and determine weakness in friendly operational procedures, and the capability to intercept and exploit reconnaissance team communications.

(S) The survey did note certain procedures, primarily with the communications field, that could possibly provide the enemy with prior warning of operations, i.e., nicknames, call signs, frequencies, clear-text radio transmissions and stereotyped procedures.

(S) The findings were reviewed by MACSOG and 7th AF staffs to identify those areas of OPSEC requiring improvements and to implement corrective actions.

Cryptofacility Inspections

(S) A cryptofacility inspection survey was conducted on 15 February by representatives of 101st Radio Research Company. The results of the survey revealed that disastrously dangerous signals were being emanated from the communications center. To preclude further exploitation, minimize was imposed on all teletype traffic commencing on 22 February. During the period 22 February through 4 March 1970, a Field Radiation Test team from Headquarters, US Army Security Agency

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Pacific (USASA-PAC) conducted a test to determine the presence and extent of intelligence-bearing emanations generated in information processing equipment within the facility. It was recommended that all equipment within the communications center be modified in accordance with DCA red/black engineering-installation criteria.

(S) The rehabilitation of the communications center started on 5 April 1970. During the project installation phase, all teletype circuitry were terminated in two teletypewriter central office vans (AN/MGC-22 and AN/MGC-23). The vans were deployed from 160th Signal Group, Long Binh, RVN. The vans were operated from the courtyard of MACV-1 compound until redeployment on 8 May 1970.

(S) MACSOG faced reduction in ability to efficiently perform its mission under existing conditions and sustained command emphasis was applied to complete this project in the earliest time frame. Engineers and installers were diverted from other high priority projects in progress within the Pacific and Continental US (CONUS) areas. Efforts were accelerated to obtain CONUS procurement and shipments of all material to complete red/black installation.

1. Personnel from the Pacific Field Office, USA Strategic Communications Command-Pacific (USA STRATCOM-PAC), Fort Buckner, Okinawa, arrived on 5 April and began the conversion of the communications center to low level keying.

2. All approved devices for reduction of TEMPEST problems were received on 9 April 1970.

3. On 1 May 1970, the installation was completed at the cost of about \$40,000.00, and the communications center became fully operational on 5 May 1970.

(S) At the request of MACSOG, a red/black inspection was conducted on 18 August 1970 by a technician of the 101st Radio Research Company. The minor discrepancies were corrected within MACSOG resources and those not within our capabilities were corrected by personnel from the Pacific Field Office of USASTRATCOM-PAC.

(S) A field radiation test team from USASA-PAC conducted a survey during the period of 23 November to 2 December to check the effectiveness of this rehabilitation. This survey revealed that the two message preparation positions were improperly wired and emanating signals at a dangerous level. The MACSOG teletype repairmen, with technical assistance from the 509th Radio Research Communications Unit-Vietnam, converted the two positions to low level keying.

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Intercommunications Systems

(S) On 6 August 1970, representatives of 525th Military Intelligence (MI) Group conducted a technical inspection of the two intercommunications systems within the headquarters. The findings contained in that report indicated that the systems represented dangerous hazards to the security of information discussed within the headquarters.

(S) In an effort to improve the security and eliminate communications security (COMSEC) deficiencies, USASTRATCOM-PAC was requested to conduct a site survey and recommend a system that would eliminate the radiation hazards, continuous microphone connection, exposed wiring, and terminal strips which were all cited by 525th MI Group as COMSEC deficiencies. The site survey was conducted by a representative of the Communications Engineering and Installation Agency (CEIA) on 23 September 1970.

(S) The survey report received on 23 November 1970, recommended the installation of a dial selecting intercommunications system. The recommended system was approved by 525th MI Group and provides:

1. Disconnect devices.
2. Private conversation between two parties.
3. Prevention of inadvertant connection of a third party.

(S) The recommended system was approved and placed on order. The 1st Signal Brigade was tasked to engineer and install the system.

Signal Security Survey

(S) During the period 18 August to 22 October 1970, a team from the 101st Radio Research Company conducted a COMSEC survey of MACSOG, including all subordinate elements, at MACSOG's request. The team monitored and analyzed 9,744 transmissions on radiotelephone and 8,097 transmissions over conventional telephone. In addition, 102 hours of advice, assistance and training was provided.

(S) The survey revealed many areas regarding COMSEC within the organization which required improvement. These areas were:

1. The use of unauthorized codes.
2. Codewords and unauthorized call signs.
3. Basic emergency plans.

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4. Cryptonetting.
5. Secure Voice equipment.
6. Authentication.
7. Red/black requirements.

(C) The communications Division was responsible for corrective action within their jurisdiction and gave guidance to staff elements and subordinate units. In addition, Standing Signal Instructions (SSI) were written, and, at the close of this reporting period they were in the process of being published.

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APPENDIX VII

COMPTROLLER DIVISION

GENERAL

(U) Calendar year 1970 was the second full year of operation by the Comptroller Division (MACSOG-90) since it was separated from Logistics Division in October 1968.

(S) The Comptroller continued to act as the principal economic and financial advisor to Chief, MACSOG, and to be directly responsible for financial management of MACSOG. In addition to the responsibilities for accounting, auditing and disbursing, the division, under the Comptroller's guidance, formulated financial policies and regulations and instituted extensive internal controls.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Unclassified Funds

(S) MACSOG continued to receive its unclassified funds from CINCPAC through MACV. These funds are utilized to support the cover story that MACSOG is a staff element of MACV. Unclassified funds support travel costs of personnel assigned to MACSOG, one US Civilian payroll, and a limited amount of material procurement. Authorized funding for FY 71 was \$160,000.00, representing a reduction of \$240,000.00 following DOD budget cuts. Obligations as of 31 December 1970 were \$74,927.62.

Classified Funds

(TS) Budget revisions in January and April 1970 reduced the original FY 70 budget from \$25,778,400.00 to \$18,611,900.00. Obligations against FY 70 funds totaled \$17,734,500.00 through 31 December 1970.

(TS) FY 71 introduced a new and more urgent requirement to exercise monetary controls and restraint. Budget reductions at the DOD level were felt by MACSOG as Chief of Naval Operations reduced the original FY 71 budget submission by over two million dollars. A budget of \$22,466,500.00 was finally approved in April 1970; however, first quarter funding was further reduced by \$384,400.00. Second quarter funds were allotted as requested and Comptroller anticipates total funding for FY 1971 will approach \$22,082,100.00. Obligations as of 31 December were \$8,758,000.00.

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(TS) The approved and reduced budgets for FY 71 follow:

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>APRIL BUDGET</u>	<u>REDUCED BUDGET</u>
FOOTBOY (X)	\$8,461,400.00	\$8,523,000.00
PRAIRIE FIRE	\$8,424,100.00	\$7,957,500.00
SALEM HOUSE	\$4,730,000.00	\$4,801,200.00
IGLOO WHITE	<u>\$851,000.00</u>	<u>\$800,400.00</u>
	\$22,466,500.00	\$22,082,100.00

(X) An August 1970 visit by the CNO's budget head revealed that MACSOG could no longer expect the budget flexibility of previous years. With the prospect of reduced funding, Chief, SOG, upon recommendation of the Comptroller, stressed to the field Commanders the requirement to reduce expenditures where possible. A program of self-imposed and vigorous cost-consciousness became all the more germane as MACSOG sought to absorb within its existing budget, the unanticipated and unbudgeted costs of an increased number of strike force companies, additional training facilities, and increased expenses anticipated with initiating the Vietnamization program 1 January 1971.

(X) In July 1970, the Comptroller initiated an Activity Monthly OPTAR Report which has become an integral part of the effort to increase cost controls. Directed at providing activities with a current picture of their financial position, the OPTAR Report reflected expenditures against budgets submitted by each activity and projected the rate of annual expenditures. A six month review was made in December by Comptroller and adjustments made as warranted.

(TS) In addition to restricted funding in FY 71, new funding channels were established for MACSOG.

1. Though Chief of Naval Operations continued to provide funds, regular Navy funding channels replaced the CAS channels. Appropriate data was assigned, and MACSOG came directly under the funding supervision of CINCPAC.

2. Naval Support Activity (NSA), Saigon replaced the United States Embassy in making cash advances to the MACSOG finance officer, although the Embassy continued its contractual obligations of procuring various foreign currencies.

3. NSA Saigon also prepared payment for MACSOG billings for logistical support previously handled by Counter Insurgency Support Office, Okinawa.

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(S) The new funding procedures introduced the added requirement to pay accessorial charges, estimated at 400-500 thousand dollars per year, producing an additional unexpected burden upon the MACSOG FY 71 budget. Towards the end of December, Comptroller initiated several studies covering different areas of MACSOG expenditures in an effort to determine possible cost reductions. These studies will be completed early in 1971.

(S) MACSOG Directive 37-2 and the Civilian Personnel Manual Part II, dealing with operational employees, were updated and revised. The Paramilitary Pay Study, though completed, was shelved and never implemented. A pay raise of ten percent was granted to civilian employees following the lead of the US Embassy. Pay for civilian guards at Camp Long Thanh was increased twenty-five to fifty percent depending on an individual's grade. This action was taken to bring SG pay scales into line with those for other civilians employed by MACSOG. Operational personnel received no pay increase.

(TS) In July 1970, MACSOG began payment of per diem and bonuses for cross-border operations to pilots of the 114th and 514th VNAF Squadrons flying in support of MACSOG operations. Mechanics of the payment procedure were coordinated with SOG Comptroller's counterparts at the STD. Further steps were taken to coordinate training of finance officers within the STD to assume financial management duties under the Special Missions Service concept.

(S) Inflation in food prices throughout the Republic of South Vietnam in 1970 led the Comptroller to review contractual relations between field elements and local suppliers. This review was aimed at maintaining a stable level of ration costs throughout MACSOG. Some success was achieved by encouraging field elements to change contractors. Seasonal problems in food production as well as increasing demands within MACSOG point to the necessity of giving further study to the problem of food procurement.

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APPENDIX VIII

GROUND STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(TS) Ground Studies Group, MACSOG-35, continued to plan, coordinate, and conduct airborne/ground operations in support of PRAIRIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE, and NICKEL STEEL. The group recruited indigenous forces, equipped and trained combined US/RVN forces, and provided intelligence inputs for use by other agencies in interdiction or planning based on known enemy troop movement. Coordination with the STD Liaison Service continued in the execution of all functions.

ORGANIZATION

(TS) Headquarters, Ground Studies Group, is located with Studies and Observations Group at the MACV-1 Compound in Saigon and exercised operational control over the three Command and Control Detachments, the Support Facility at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, and the Liaison Bureau. Command relationships and HQ organization are indicated in Figure VIII-1.

(S) The three Command and Control Detachments (South, Central, and North) were located at Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, and Da Nang (respectively). They are similarly structured, with a headquarters element, a security company, a reconnaissance company, two exploitation companies, and two mobile launch teams (Figure VIII-2). Authorized strength for each C&C Detachment was 244 US and 780 indigenous troops.

(TS) The Support Facility at Nakhon Phanom (SUPPFAC, NKP) is included under the TD for Command and Control North (CCN), but operated as a separate element to provide an added launch capability during adverse weather conditions.

(S) The Liaison Bureau is included under the TD for Command and Control South (CCS), but continued to operate in Saigon and to provide liaison between Ground Studies Group and its STD counterpart organization, the Liaison Service.

(TS) Because of the change in the rules of engagement in Cambodia on 1 July 1970, US personnel were no longer permitted to operate in the SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations (SHAO). This resulted in the majority


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FIGURE VIII-1

GROUND STUDIES GROUP ORGANIZATION




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FIGURE VIII-2

COMMAND AND CONTROL DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION



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of the 95 US authorized personnel spaces in Recon Company CCS being deleted. Recon teams at CCC which operated in the SHAO were also limited to ARVN leadership.

OPERATIONS

(TS) The Cambodian incursion by US forces in May had a profound effect on Ground Studies Group operations in the SHAO. It resulted in exploitation of the information obtained by Ground Studies Group reconnaissance teams since the inception of the SALEM HOUSE (originally DANIEL BOONE) program.

(TS) Effective 1 July 1970 a change in SALEM HOUSE Operational Authorities required complete Vietnamization of the SALEM HOUSE reconnaissance effort. ARVN assets available to Ground Studies Group were concentrated in the SHAO. This included shifting the aircraft of the 219th VNAF Helicopter Squadron TDY from Da Nang to Ban Me Thuot, Kontum and Quan Loi, and expanding the number of ARVN led Recon Teams at these locations.

(TS) There were no major changes in the operating authorities governing operations in the PFAO or NSAO and ground operations were executed in furtherance of the reconnaissance and exploitation missions.

Air Interdiction in Cambodia

(TS) In April of 1970 Forward Air Controllers (FAC's) flying in support of SALEM HOUSE operations observed large numbers of enemy moving south in Cambodia. These enemy troop concentrations provided particularly lucrative targets for tactical air. As a result of these sightings, on 18 April 1970, COMUSMACV requested JCS permission to conduct air strikes for a 30 day period against enemy personnel and equipment in a specific area of Cambodia between NVA base areas 740 and 701, an area known to have no Cambodian military or civilian activity.


(TS) On 20 April 1970, JCS granted authority for the conduct of tactical air strikes for a thirty day period to commence at the option of COMUSMACV. Because of the sensitivity of this information, it was held on a very strict need-to-know basis. Only those personnel without whom it would be impossible to operate were briefed. In order to insure minimum dissemination of information, MACSOG was provided with dedicated strike aircraft briefed on the mission and rules of engagement. These were six F-100's located at Phan Rang and four F-4's located at Phu Cat. Air interdiction was delayed until a sufficiently lucrative target was detected on 24 April 1970, when a FAC observed a column of 125 enemy troops moving south on a trail in the authorized airstrike

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FIGURE VIII - 3




SALEM HOUSE
AREA OF
OPERATIONS

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FIGURE VIII-4



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zone. The column was struck with 6 sorties of F-100's resulting in an estimated 100 enemy killed by air--(KBA).

(TS) On 25 April 1970, JCS authorized the expansion of tactical air strikes throughout Zone Alpha and on 29 April 1970 expanded the authority to use artillery and helicopter gunships in an offensive role. On 5 May 1970, JCS rescinded the requirement for close hold security on tactical airstrike reporting in Cambodia. Air strikes were then reported through normal SALEM HOUSE channels.

(TS) On 27 May 1970, JCS authorized expansion of the tactical air strike authority to what is now known as the air interdiction zone (AIZ) through 30 June 1970. This authority was later extended to 1 May 1971.

Operation TAILWIND

(TS) On 4 September 1970, CCC was alerted for the requirement to conduct a company sized operation in support of a [] operation near Chavane, Laos. Project nickname was "Operation TAILWIND." Following LZ preparation by TAC AIR and the insertion of a pathfinder team, CCC, Company B, was inserted about 20 km SE of Chavane at 1232 hours 11 September 1970. Four CH-53's were used for airlift and four AH1G Cobra's for gunship support. Small arms fire was received from southwest of the insertion LZ. All CH-53's and AH1G's received hits, but all aircraft were able to return to base.

(TS) The company moved northwest 600 meters where they encountered a series of hootches used for the storage of 140mm rockets, 82mm mortar ammunition, 23mm AAA ammunition, B-40 rockets, small arms ammunition, and approximately 40 dismantled bicycles. Charges with delay fuses were placed on the 140mm rockets, and the company moved northwest 1,500 meters. The company counted 30 secondary explosions immediately following detonation and 75-100 during the following five hours.

(TS) Later the company made contact with approximately 40 enemy. The engagement lasted an hour and tactical air strikes were employed. When the enemy broke contact, the company moved south where they began preparation of an LZ for the extraction of wounded. The LZ was completed when the company again came under attack from 140-150 enemy. Nine US were wounded in this encounter, but extraction of wounded was not possible due to adverse weather.

(TS) Enemy contact continued throughout the night and fire support continued to be provided by Spectre (C-130) gunships. When enemy action decreased, the company moved to secure an LZ at a different location. A CH-53 helicopter attempted to land for medevac of wounded but was struck by numerous small arms and B-40 rocket rounds causing it to lose power and crash. The crew was successfully extracted by ladder. The company was directed to another LZ but weather prevented extraction.

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(T/6) Contact was again made with enemy units. This time they appeared to be defending. The company advanced on the enemy who withdrew beyond a battalion sized base camp containing 8,000 kilograms of rice, as well as numerous hootches and latrines. There was evidence that the area had been used as a truck park and maintenance point as some vehicle parts were found. A 120mm mortar was found and destroyed.

(T/6) The company, still receiving small arms and B-40 rocket fire, then moved to an extraction HLZ. Thirty-six sets of TAC AIR were used during the extraction. The company was extracted using 3 CH-53's and returned to Dak To. Total casualties for the operation were 3 SCU KIA, 33 SCU WIA, 16 US WIA, 144 enemy KIA, 50 enemy WIA (estimated) and 288 enemy KBA (estimated).

Parachute Insertions

(T/6) Parachute insertions were started in late summer with four static line and one High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) insertion being conducted as a means of altering the method of entry into the PFAO.

1. HALO. Chief, SOG approved the HALO insertion technique on 18 July 1970. A pilot training program was conducted after equipment requirements were determined, personnel were selected, and coordination was effected for 14 (7 US, 1 ARVN, and 6 SCU) personnel to receive training presented by the 1st Special Forces Group, (Airborne), 1st Special Forces on Okinawa. The training program was completed at Camp Long Thanh where final mission preparation took place. A six man (3 US and 3 SCU) team was inserted from a C-130 at 0200 hours on 28 November 1970 at 14,000 feet AGL. During descent the team members became separated because of poor visibility caused by clouds and drizzle. The team members remained separated and were extracted from four separate locations on 2 December 1970. As a method of entry this technique was considered proven as a means of entering the PFAO undetected since an active enemy search was not made to locate the team.

2. Static line. The four static line insertions were proven as successful methods of entering the PFAO but were marred by dispersion of personnel and difficulty in assembly on the ground. Each of the missions terminated in an effort to locate and group team members. As an alternate method of insertion, parachute insertions have created a new threat that enemy LOC security forces must be prepared to counter. -

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SUGARLOAF

(TS) The SUGARLOAF Radio Relay Site was established on 11 June 1970 as a radio relay site for reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces operating in the central PRAIRIE FIRE AO. It was also used as a walk-off point for operations in the immediate area and provided a location to which teams or individuals could evade if separated from friendly support elements. The Radio Relay Site was manned by one platoon from CCN and was closed on 4 October 1970 when weather effectively prevented air support in the central PFAO. It is anticipated the SUGARLOAF Radio Relay Site will be re-opened when weather improves sufficiently to make operations in that area again feasible.

Exploitation Force Conversion

(S) In late October a leadership conversion program for the exploitation forces was initiated. ARVN cadre were assigned leadership positions within the companies and the US personnel assumed an advisory role. An intensified training program at Camp Long Thanh after a change of command ceremony started the training. The companies returned to the respective C&C Detachments to enter Phase II, small unit training. Platoon operations were conducted to further the conversion program. A third and final phase of the program called for multi-platoon training and operations to provide a company level ARVN led exploitation force capability. At years end all companies were ARVN led and were well into Phase II of the conversion program.

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APPENDIX IX

AIRBORNE STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(TS) The Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36) continued to implement the TIMBERWORK (S) portion of the FOOTBOY (S) program through the deployment of agents (SINGLETON (S) and EARTH ANGEL), diversionary agents (BORDEN (S)), and Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) teams during 1970. In June, these four programs were augmented by a new program, PIKE HILL, which deployed Ethnic Khmer to establish low level intelligence collection nets in Cambodian villages and hamlets.

(TS) During November-December 1970, plans were finalized to expand the PIKE HILL program in 1971 by training and deploying GKR recruited indigenous Khmers into Northeast Cambodia. This expansion program was given the nickname CEDAR WALK.

(TS) The Airborne Studies Group maintained cadre and team capability to resume operations in North Vietnam by conducting missions in the PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) and SALEM HOUSE (SH) areas of operation. Cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia included intelligence collection, harassing and sabotage missions, and diversionary missions designed to deceive enemy security forces and cause them to deploy their resources.

(S) Advice and assistance to Groups 11 and 68 of the STD Special Mission Service, the group's Vietnamese counterparts, continued in order to accomplish the aforementioned tasks.

(TS) The Airborne Studies Group continued to function as a headquarters with two subordinate detachments: Alfa Detachment (Agent/Agent Teams), located with Group 68 (ARVN), STD near Tan Son Nhut with an isolation compound in Camp Long Thanh; and Bravo Detachment (STRATA-MMFOB), located with 11th Task Force Group (ARVN), STD in DaNang.

ACTIVITIES

(S) Director, MACSOG-36, exercised command supervision and operational control over all airborne programs.

(TS) Alfa Detachment and Group 68, STD, are responsible for five programs.

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1. SINGLETON (~~TS~~). The SINGLETON (~~TS~~) program is under the RODCA reporting system and, in accordance with current security directives, will not be discussed in this history.

2. FORAE (~~TS~~). FORAE is a diversionary program consisting of the OODLES (~~TS~~) project which portrays notional agent team operations in North Vietnam by means of family radio messages sent via [] and the BORDEN (~~TS~~) project which supports agent operations in PFAO through airborne resupply missions and the insertion of ex-North Vietnamese Army personnel on diversionary missions.

3. EARTH ANGEL. The EARTH ANGEL program is a low level intelligence collection effort using three man teams composed of Hoi Chanh outfits in NVA gear. These teams conduct cross-border walk-in roadwatch and area reconnaissance missions of six to eight days duration. Exfiltration is by foot.

4. PIKE HILL. The PIKE HILL program uses ethnic Khmer three man teams to establish low level intelligence collection nets in the SH AO. They are capable of operation for extended periods of time and providing shadow leadership to the villagers.

5. CEDAR WALK. This program is a modification of PIKE HILL and will integrate GKR personnel into the overall PIKE HILL program. These teams will be organized and equipped for missions in NE Cambodia for a one year period. After this period control will be returned to GKR for continued unconventional warfare employment. Approval has been granted to form five teams and training is scheduled to begin early in 1971.

(~~TS~~) Bravo Detachment and 11th TFG, STD, are responsible for the STRATA program. STRATA teams are intelligence collection teams capable of conducting roadwatch, riverwatch, and area and point reconnaissance missions. Additional capabilities of these teams include the installation of seismic devices, conducting ambushes, PW captures, bridge destruction, and sabotage. In March 1970 the civilians in this program were completely phased out and replaced with ARVN soldiers. Special characteristics include all ARVN team membership, CW communication capability and airborne qualification. Extensive demolition and special mission training was conducted in 1970.

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FORAE (~~TS~~)

(~~TS~~) Because of operational restrictions in North Vietnam, the OODLES (~~TS~~) project has been limited to sending radio messages to 14 notional teams. An average of two messages per week were transmitted.

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(TS) BORDEN (C) has been deployed in PF AO to cause diversion of NVA security forces. During 1970, twenty seven ex-North Vietnamese Army soldiers volunteered to participate. They were given airborne and specialized communication or demolition training and then inserted into PF AO either on a sabotage or diversionary mission. Agents were given false information and deliberately inserted into enemy controlled areas where it was expected that they would either be captured or return to NVA control. Four of these volunteers returned to ARVN control. One is presently in the EARTH ANGEL (U) program. The other three were returned to PW status.

(TS) Leaflet missions, resupply drops, self destruct radios, and radio beacons were used in conjunction with personnel drops.

EARTH ANGEL

(TS) 1970 has been a year for growth for EARTH ANGEL teams. Through extensive recruiting and training programs six teams developed into reliable short term walk-in walk-out reconnaissance teams. They are capable of moving approximately fifteen kilometers from point of departure to the target and observing for two to three days before overland exfiltration. Unique to EARTH ANGEL teams is their method of insert and exfiltration as well as limited requirement for air support.

(TS) Twenty four area reconnaissance and sixteen route watch missions were accomplished during the year. Eight EARTH ANGEL missions resulted in enemy contact in which five EARTH ANGELS were KIA, four were captured and one defected. Teams reported detailed information on use of trails, roads, and movement of small enemy units. Two teams were active in searches for PW camps. One team reported the possible location of 20 Allied prisoners.

PIKE HILL

(TS) The PIKE HILL program was initiated during the May-June cross-border operations conducted by Allied Forces. The concept was to form three man teams of ethnic Cambodians for insertion into non-communist controlled villages in the SH AO. These teams would then recruit sympathizers and form low level intelligence collection nets. Planning was concluded in late May and recruiting began immediately.

(TS) Fourteen ethnic Cambodians were recruited on 4 June and began their training. The teams were trained for long term (30-90 day) stay time. PIKE HILL 1 was inserted on 25 June and remained on target for nine days without making civilian contact but observed sampan traffic on the Ton Le Son River. On 2 July the team made contact with an NVA company in the vicinity of YA 088515. This contact caused no casualties but forced their premature extraction from the target area.

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(TS) During the remainder of the year, PIKE HILL personnel participated in eleven additional operations - seven of which resulted in enemy contact with the loss of two PIKE HILL men. On three occasions PIKE HILL teams called in air strikes on enemy locations.

(TS) Two target areas have proven exceptionally conducive to PIKE HILL operations.

1. Village of Mereuch (Target area A-77, YV 640460).

a. On 30 June PIKE HILL 2 was inserted into Mereuch and was able to establish friendly contact with the Khmer/Montagnard villagers. This was a period of political vacuum in Mereuch as communist security forces were trying to re-establish their control. On 6 August a communist battalion moved into the Kroto Mountains about two kilometers from the team's camp. Nine days later, after spending 47 days on the ground, the team was relieved in place by PIKE HILL 2A.

b. PIKE HILL 2A continued to maintain contact with the villagers and relayed information of communist movements. Some villagers, believing that the PIKE HILL team had authorized an air strike which was inadvertently placed near the village, led a communist patrol to the team's base camp. In the ensuing fire fight, the team leader was lightly wounded but the team escaped to safety. The team was extracted on 2 September.

c. On 12 November PIKE HILL 2B was reinserted. This team consisted of the original PIKE HILL 2 personnel and was able to re-establish friendly relations with the villagers. The communists, still trying to establish area domination, ordered the Mereuch villagers to prepare to move to Kaoh Khek District Headquarters. The villagers, under guidance of the PIKE HILL team exfiltrated to South Vietnam on 12 December. The team remained in the Mereuch area with several sympathizers and were subsequently extracted on 26 December. During their 49 day stay in this area, the team relayed detailed information on communist movements, supply points, cadre personalities and efforts to move villagers to control locations. This general target area will be exploited by two PIKE HILL teams with recruited sympathizers in 1971.

2. Village of Pu Char (Target area P-72, YV 000500). Three insertions into the Pu Char area were accomplished by a PIKE HILL team for a total of 56 days in a continuing effort to locate a reported PW camp. Village sympathizers reported several sightings of American POWs, and PIKE HILL teams will continue to be targeted in this area.

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STRATA

(S) STRATA teams were increased from four in January 1970 to nine in May 1970. This resulted in a corresponding increase in the number of case officers, radio operators, and administrative personnel. An intensive training program was initiated covering all operational aspects to offset the sudden influx of inexperienced personnel. The lack of experienced reconnaissance team leaders and members resulted in three split teams out of four operations conducted between January and March. However, continuous training efforts to correct operational weaknesses, coupled with an increase in the confidence and tactical proficiency of the STRATA teams, resulted in progressive improvement in the mission performance of the 18 missions conducted between 1 April and 30 June 1970.

(TS) The period after 1 July 1970 was characterized by exclusive deployment of STRATA and ARVN reconnaissance Teams in the SH AO. The number of operations increased and STRATA capabilities expanded. A change in mission orientation resulted in increasing STRATA team capabilities to perform ambushes, PW capture, control airstrikes and conduct wire tap missions while maintaining airborne insertion capabilities.

(TS) LTC Tran Ba Tuan, CO, 11th TFG put maximum effort into qualifying as many operational and administrative personnel as possible to support the all ARVN SH AO effort. During the period 1 July thru 31 December, 53 STRATA missions were accomplished for a 1970 total of 75 missions. Highlights of these missions are indicated below:

1. Mission: Point reconnaissance of bridge; location: Laos YC 189571; duration: 15-25 March 1970.

Remarks: Bridge was observed and photographed. Foot traffic was observed, however no vehicles used bridge. Team made contact with an enemy squad killing 5 enemy. Team then made contact with enemy platoon resulting in 3 team members MIA.
2. Mission: Point reconnaissance to locate enemy battalion base camp; location: Laos, YB 870865; duration: 18-27 May 70

Remarks: Team located the enemy base camp and made two contacts with unknown sized force. Team suffered no casualties; enemy casualties unknown.
3. Mission: Point reconnaissance to locate underground bivouac/storage area; location: Laos, XD 603384; duration 12-19 Jun 70.

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Remarks: Team located abandoned battalion base camp which had been damaged extensively by airstrikes. Also found were 20 two-week-old graves. Team made one contact with 10 enemy resulting in no casualties to either side.

4. Mission: Point reconnaissance to locate bivouac area; location: Laos, XD 555550; duration: 17-28 Jun 70.

Remarks: Team verified enemy occupation of the area in strength, confirmed heavy construction activity, and experienced enemy radio jamming from three separate stations.

5. Mission: Riverwatch on Toule Kong River; location: Cambodia, XA 525976; duration: 21-28 Jun 70.

Remarks: Team confirmed use of the river as a line of communication. Team made contact with enemy forces on four different occasions resulting in 2 enemy KIA.

6. Mission: Area reconnaissance of Base Area 702; location: Cambodia, YA 485575; duration: 8-16 Jul 70.

Remarks: Team observed 36 NVA and heard two large explosions in vicinity YA 475573, one of which was estimated to be a demolition charge in excess of 50 kilos.

7. Mission: Riverwatch on the Tonle San River; location: Cambodia, YA 288549; duration: 13-28 Jul 70.

Remarks: Team confirmed use of the river as a line of communication and also found a railroad and heavy bunker complex being used as a trans-shipment point.

8. Mission: Area reconnaissance to determine the relocation of enemy base areas; location: Cambodia, XU 398683; duration: 22 Jul - 1 Aug.

Remarks: Team heard high speed truck traffic moving in both directions on five different days. Team also made contact with enemy force with unknown results and directed an airstrike against another enemy force of 30 NVA with unknown results.

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9. Mission: Roadwatch on Route 14; location: Cambodia, XU 304626; duration: 5 Aug.

Remarks: Insert of team was observed by enemy forces. Team made contact with 15 to 20 man enemy force and was forced to withdraw. Withdrawal was blocked by another force of 15 men. Extraction was conducted under heavy small arms fire.

10. Mission: Roadwatch on Route 13; location: Cambodia, XV 217115; duration 21-28 Aug 70.

Remarks: Team observed and heard motorcycle and cart traffic of Route 13. Contact was made with enemy elements on two occasions resulting in unknown enemy casualties. The team also conducted an ambush of opportunity against 12 enemy soldiers resulting in 3 enemy KIA and an unknown number WIA.

11. Mission: Roadwatch of intersection of Routes 19 and 141; location: Cambodia, YA 094123; duration: 10-12 Sep 70.

Remarks: Team confirmed troop movement on the roads and then came in contact with a 25 man enemy force resulting in unknown enemy casualties. Team later saw 3 enemy and engaged them capturing the point man and causing the other two to withdraw.

12. Mission: Roadwatch; location: Cambodia, YV 502322; duration: 21-23 Sep 70.

Remarks: Team made contact with approximately 30 enemy and were pursued for six hours. The next day the team directed 2 A1E Skyraiders against a suspected base camp resulting in two secondary explosions.

13. Mission: Point reconnaissance to locate and destroy a bridge; location: Cambodia, YV 502322; duration: 28 Sep - 9 Oct 70.

Remarks: Team destroyed all except the concrete abutments of the bridge. Team also captured one PW.

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14. Mission: Roadwatch on Route 141; location: Cambodia, YU 404993; duration: 4-9 Nov 70.
- Remarks: Team confirmed the use of the road by enemy foot travel. Team killed 1 NVA and 1 scout dog and then made contact with an enemy platoon. Team was extracted without casualties.
15. Mission: Roadwatch on Route 13; location: Cambodia, XU 2080; duration: 9-18 Nov 70.
- Remarks: Team watched road for five days but observed no military traffic. Team made contact with 5 NVA and a scout dog resulting in 2 NVA KIA.
16. Mission: Roadwatch on Route 141; location: Cambodia, YV 348190; duration 15-18 Nov 70.
- Remarks: Team observed two groups of five enemy each during the operation and initiated contact with the second group resulting in 3 enemy KIA and 1 WIA. The team was then taken under fire by an unknown sized force resulting in one team member lightly wounded.
17. Mission: Point reconnaissance to locate and direct airstrikes against a bridge and cache site; location: Cambodia, XU 733371; duration: 29 Nov - 1 Dec 70.
- Remarks: Team located the target and directed airstrikes against it resulting in 1 bridge destroyed, 1 ammunition dump destroyed, and one POL cache (15 barrels) destroyed. Photo coverage was also obtained by the team.
18. Mission: Ambush of opportunity on Route 13; location: Cambodia, XV 224111; duration: 6-9 Dec 70.
- Remarks: Team ambushed a motorcycle/cart resulting in 5 NVA KIA and assorted equipment and numerous documents captured.

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APPENDIX X

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(TS) The psychological Studies Group (MACSOG-39) is [] and consists of a directorate and subordinate elements of fiscal/supply, research and analysis, radio operations, and special operations. The organization closely parallels that of the PSYWAR Service of the STD, ARVN and conforms to the MACSOG JTD submitted in November 1970. []

(TS) Psychological Studies Group continued its [] PSYOP mission during 1970. It continued to provide assistance, advice, and support to its counterpart organization, the PSYWAR Service of the STD, and also provided advice and support to the [] organization, the psychological operations element of the ARVN General Political Warfare Department (GPWD).

(TS) [] psychological operations were conducted against the Lao Dong Party, the regime of the DRV (NV), the enemy military and political structure in the RVN (SVN), and the border areas of Laos and Cambodia.

[] (C)
(TS) []

[] The objectives of the program remained unchanged from 1969 and continue to be limited due to restrictions imposed as a result of the bombing halt in November 1968. The [] continued to serve as the primary vehicle for dissemination of PSYOP materials [] of MACSOG.

(TS) [] the nickname for [] GPWD/MACSOG coordinated PSYOP conducted in South Vietnam under MACSOG's direct responsibility. [] MACSOG coordinated and financed all [] activities and furnished advice and guidance to the ARVN GPWD, the originator of all [] programs. []

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TABLE X-1

WEEKLY PROGRAM SCHEDULES

STATION/ PROGRAMMER	DAYS BROADCAST	VIETNAM STANDARD TIME	PROGRAM	FREQUENCY	POWER/KC
[]	Daily	1300-1500	Original	7216	20
	Daily	1300-1500	Simulcast	9430	20
	Daily	1700-1900	Repeat	7216	20
	Daily	1700-1900	Repeat	9430	20
	Daily	2200-2400	Repeat	7216	20
	Daily	2200-2400	Repeat	9430	20
BROADCAST TIME: 12 Hrs Per Day; 84 Hrs Per Week					
[]	Daily	1530-1630	Original	7320	20
	Daily	1530-1630	Simulcast	9800	20
	Daily	2000-2100	Repeat	7320	20
	Daily	2100-2200	Repeat	9800	20
BROADCAST TIME: 4 Hrs Per Day; 28 Hrs Per Week					
[]	Daily	1600-1700	Original	7360	10
	Daily	1900-2000	Repeat	9815	10
	Daily	2200-2300	Repeat	7360	10
BROADCAST TIME: 3 Hrs Per Day; 21 Hrs Per Week					
[]	Daily	2100-2130	Original	9992	10
	Daily	2100-2130	Simulcast	7494	20
BROADCAST TIME: 1 Hr Per Day; 7 Hrs Per Week					

TOTAL PROGRAM HOURS DAILY: 20//TOTAL PROGRAM HOURS WEEKLY: 140

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RADIO PROGRAMING

(TS) Under current policies, radio broadcasting continued to be the principal method of reaching and influencing the target audiences.

Programs were characterized by relatively simple themes and short broadcast periods.

Program themes were kept current and, wherever possible, reflected activities on a real time basis.

(TS) The PSYWAR Service [] planned, wrote, directed, and produced the radio programs for the []

[] The PSYOP Branch of the GPWD planned, wrote, directed, and produced the radio programs for three channels: []

[]
(TS) []

[] Throughout 1970, it emphasized prosperity for all Vietnamese, reunification of the two Vietnams, and termination of foreign influences in the affairs of both Vietnams. [] also exposed corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency among northern cadre members and exploited psychological vulnerabilities of the party and state in North Vietnam.

(TS) In January, for example, [] placed emphasis on the TET holidays and General Giap's speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the VPA. General Giap's speech was picked apart, and he was condemned for his statements which reflected a lack of concern for human life, such as his statement that people are instruments of the revolution. [] complained that the revolution does not serve the people. It was also reported that TET bonuses would be paid in South Vietnam and criticized Hanoi for not offering the same to its people.

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(TS) [] advocated a pro-Soviet line and argued strongly against the dominant role of the Chinese communists in North Vietnamese affairs. []

[] praised the Soviets for negotiating with the US for reducing the nuclear weapons production and condemned communist China for increasing its nuclear weapons stockpiles.

(S) []

(TS) []

(TS) [] advocated dissatisfaction with the dependence of the National Liberation Front upon the Lao Dong Party. It also decried North Vietnamese interference in the insurgency in South Vietnam.

(S) []

(TS) []

(TS) Music and voices [] paralleled those of Liberation Radio; however, []

(S) []

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RADIO BROADCASTING FACILITIES

(S) MACSOG-39 continued to operate the fixed transmitter station at Thu Duc, 10 km outside of Saigon. The station is equipped with two 20 KW SW transmitters, and, during 1970, work was completed on the installation and extensive modification of a 10 KW SW transmitter. The new transmitter is coupled with a rotatable log periodic antenna designed to give a strong reliable signal throughout the South Vietnam target area.

(TS) Until 1 October 1970, []

[] However, [] all broadcasts of the four MACSOG-39 radio stations reverted exclusively to [] transmitter facilities.

(S) Radio studies and production facilities [] were completely removed from the VOF building during 1970, but they are still located in the STD compound []

(S) Studios and facilities for [] and are located in the GPWD compound []

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

(TS) The R&A branch of MACSOG-39 assisted and advised the Vietnamese PSYWAR Service Studies Section in the production of reports, processing of intelligence input for radio and special operations PSYOP activities, [] and the classification and storage of this information. Some of the most valuable benefits provided by R&A Branch are the Radio Reaction Reports which provide feedback about [] PSYOP programs and operations of MACSOG-39. During October 1970, the R&A Branch began its transition to automatic data processing and storage of information available to the organization.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(S) Operations conducted by the Special Operations Branch of MACSOG-39 encompassed three areas: [] Printed Media Operations, and []

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8-x-6

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TABLE X-2

<u>TYPE</u>					<u>TOTAL</u>
	34	24	24	23	105
	98	78	53	73	302
	51	33	30	31	145
	24	29	13	11	77
	260	140	143	282	825
	<u>174</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>535</u>
TOTAL	641	408	362	578	1,989

B-X-7

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TABLE X-3

1.

MONTH

TOTAL

Jan	6	10	22	38
Feb	4	14	25	43
Mar	4	23	20	47
Apr	10	14	28	52
May	8	11	16	35
Jun	32	9	8	49
Jul	1	6	17	24
Aug	17	11	28	56
Sep	14	8	23	45
Oct	25	12	33	70
Nov	25	16	23	64
Dec	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTAL:	154	136	248	538

2.

MONTH

TOTAL

MONTH

TOTAL

Jan	8	Jul	9
Feb	4	Aug	20
Mar	14	Sep	18
Apr	22	Oct	43
May	2	Nov	27
Jun	7	Dec	15
		TOTAL:	189

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3.

MONTH

Dec

21

34

85

TOTAL

140

NOTE: This program began in December 1970.

4.

MONTH

TOTAL

MONTH

TOTAL

Jan

1375

Apr

1384

Feb

988

May

340

Mar

738

Jun

530

TOTAL: 5355

NOTE: This insertion program terminated in Jun 70.

5.

MONTH

7.62mm

82mm

12.7mm

TOTAL

Jan

291

108

15

414

Feb

12

60

235

307

TOTAL:

303

168

250

721

NOTE: This insertion program terminated in Feb 70.

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APPENDIX XI

RADIO STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(S) Radio Studies Group, MACSOG-70, was responsible for coordinating the fiscal, logistical, and administrative activities of the Voice of Freedom (VOF) radio station and for ensuring that VOF program content was in accordance with US policy. Policy guidance was the responsibility of JUSPAO.

(S) A USIA officer, with foreign service rank, directed the activities of MACSOG-70 during 1970. He had the dual function of VOF manager under Chief, MACSOG and US policy coordinator under Chief, North Vietnam Affairs Division, JUSPAO. Serving under the Director was a staff of seven military and one civilian in the subordinate elements of administration, programming, and engineering.

(S) VOF continued to be a US financed, Vietnamese operated, psychological operations radio station, with programs directed against North Vietnam. It purported to be the voice of the free people of South Vietnam and its anti-communist broadcasts sought to help bring the war to a successful conclusion by:

1. Countering the propaganda of Radio Hanoi.
2. Informing North Vietnamese listeners about life in the Free World and, in particular, about life in free South Vietnam.
3. Presenting accurate, timely, and factual information about the Vietnam conflict and other events of national or international importance.
4. Providing the people of North Vietnam with a basis for comparing life in North Vietnam with life in free South Vietnam.
5. Attempting to improve North and South Vietnamese attitudes toward each other by selective programming.

(S) There are about twenty-five Vietnamese military and about two hundred ten Vietnamese civilian personnel regularly engaged in VOF activities (not including security personnel). A large percentage of these personnel are former North Vietnamese who migrated to South


B-XI-1

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FIGURE XI-1

GROWTH OF PRODUCTION



* DISCONTINUED AS OF 1 MARCH 1970; VIETNAMESE INCREASED BY ONE HOUR DAILY STARTING 1 MARCH 1970.

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Vietnam in 1954. They form much of the linguistic and cultural foundation upon which VOF programming is based.

PROGRAMMING

(S) VOF programming continued its high level of technical and artistic quality. Fifteen original hours of programming were produced daily; 12 hours/day in Vietnamese, 2 hours/day in Cantonese, and 1 hour/day in Mandarin. French and English programs were discontinued in March 1970, and then Vietnamese programming increased by one hour at that time. Total hours of production remained unchanged from 1969 (Figure XI-1).

FACILITIES

Saigon

(C) VOF studio and office space was expanded when facilities previously occupied by Psychological Studies Group were vacated. The musical library now has over 4,000 commercial recordings and approximately 5,400 music tapes. The political and research library has increased to 3,698 volumes.

Con-Te

(C) Broadcasting operations continued with no major difficulties. Construction of a retaining wall around the island to prevent portions of it from being washed away began in 1970 and was approximately 80% completed in December.

(S) The 200 KW medium wave transmitter began operating with 100 KW output in March 1970. The American Trading Company (AMTRACO) in Saigon conducted a feasibility study in August 1970 to determine if the transmitter was capable of reaching 200 KW. Study results were positive, and MACSOG commenced contract negotiations with AMTRACO to bring the power plant and transmitters to full power.

Thanh-Lam

(C) Broadcasting operations continued with no major problems. Completion of the bunker renovation project has considerably enhanced the security of the station.

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Tay-Ninh

(S) Construction of a new 10 KW transmitter site at Tay-Ninh ended on 17 November 1970. Broadcasting operations began on 18 November 1970 with 6 hours of programming each evening targeted at NVA cadre and troops and VC infrastructure in the Parrot's Beak and Fish Hook area of Cambodia. No major problems were encountered in this expansion.

BROADCAST HOURS

(S) As a result of the Tay-Ninh expansion, the total VOF broadcast time increased to 50 hours daily at the end of 1970 as indicated below:

<u>STATION:</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>BROADCAST HOURS/DAY</u>	
		<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Thanh Lam/Con-Te	9,670 KHZ	16	16
	655 KHZ*	21	21
Thu-Duc	9,580 KHZ	5	7
	7,235 KHZ	2	0
Tay-Ninh	1,360 KHZ	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL:		45	50

* The medium wave programming is being transferred to the 200 KW transmitter site at Con-Te as it becomes operational.

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APPENDIX XII

RECOVERY STUDIES DIVISION

GENERAL

(S) The Recovery Studies Division is the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) and continued throughout 1970 to function as the Southeast Asia (SEA) focal point for information and activities related to US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) missing and captured personnel in Southeast Asia.

(S) The JPRC acted as the staff agency and joint coordinating authority within MACV for post search and rescue (SAR) personnel recovery operations. In this capacity, it continued to:

1. Develop requirements for collection of intelligence and other data concerning detained and missing personnel.
2. Coordinate and maintain liaison with US and Allied entities to insure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for launch of rescue/recovery operations.
3. Maintain complete files on missing and detained personnel.
4. Monitor and coordinate rescue operations with participating agencies during planning and execution.
5. Assist in debriefing of recovered personnel.
6. Supervise Evasion and Escape Kit maintenance and development.
7. Recommend employment of Fulton Recovery System as required.

(S) Within MACSOG, the JPRC is known as the Recovery Studies Division or MACSOG-80, and consequently utilized the basic MACSOG cover for status. Outside of MACSOG, the JPRC is a separate staff section under MACV. JPRC's relationship with MACSOG is classified SECRET.

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

(S) During 1970, there were 24 PW recovery operations in Southeast Asia in which the JPRC either planned and co-ordinated the operation or

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monitored the efforts of subordinate US and ARVN commands. Eighteen of the recovery operations provided negative results and six of the recovery operations resulted in 100 ARVN/RVN PW's recovered. In addition, fifteen remains of US personnel were recovered by Bright Light Teams or brought in for rewards, one evadee was recovered, and one US PW was released by North Vietnam.

1. The evadee was 1LT Larry D. Parsons USMCR; he evaded for 19 days after surviving a helicopter crash and was recovered after SAR efforts terminated.

2. The US PW released by North Vietnam was SGT Jon M. Sweeney, USMC, who was flown from Hanoi to Sweden upon release.

(S) In-country PW recovery operations were the responsibility of the respective Military Region Tactical Zone commander. COMUSMACV OPLAN 2201, nicknamed BRIGHT LIGHT, provides guidance for local commanders in planning PW recovery operations. It was written by JPRC and published on 22 October 1970.

(TS) Out-of-country recovery operations required coordination at the highest military, government and diplomatic levels.

1. Cambodian operations are coordinated by COMUSMACV with the JCS, CINCPAC, American Embassy (AMEMB) Saigon, and AMEMB Phnom Penh. CINCPAC Msg DTG 060647Z Nov 70 authorized the use of US led recovery forces and US air assets for PW recovery operations in Cambodia until 1 May 1971 with the direct approval of COMUSMACV. The only PW related operations in Cambodia in 1970 were reconnaissance teams and photography missions targeted against suspected PW camp locations. Precise results were not obtained from the reconnaissance teams and operational planning for rescue attempts in Cambodia continues into 1971.

2. To conduct recovery operations in Laos, JPRC is required to coordinate with American Embassy Vientiane and CINCPAC due to a special Joint Memorandum of Agreement of November 1969. Recovery forces are MACSOG BRIGHT LIGHT Teams within the MACSOG area of operation (AO) and [] There were no JPRC operations conducted in Laos in 1970.

3. No JPRC sponsored operations have been authorized or attempted in North Vietnam since the bombing halt of 1968. JPRC was neither consulted nor advised about the 21 November PW recovery operation conducted against the Son Tay Prison Camp, approximately 20 miles west of Hanoi. The operation was planned in the United States and conducted with personnel selected from forces outside South Vietnam. Although the operation was executed with precision, the attempted recovery was unsuccessful because there were no prisoners in the camp.

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(TS) An example of a successfully coordinated PW recovery was an operation conducted by US Navy SEALs on 22 August 1970 in the vicinity of Vi Thanh. Information concerning a VC PW camp was received by the SEALs at approximately 1800H 21 August 1970 from an escapee. Coordination was immediately effected with the Province Headquarters for support to include: gunfire support from a US destroyer; bombing support from the Australian Air Force B-57's; gunships and RF/PF forces. The ground units were inserted along a beach line to the east of the reported camp at 0910H 22 August 1970. The B-57's bombed to the south. Rocket and minigun fire was applied north and west of camp. Naval gunfire and gunships were directed to the south of the camp when it was discovered that the VC camp personnel and PW's were being evacuated to the south. The intent was to apply sufficient pressure so that the VC guards would abandon the PW's. The operation was successful and resulted in the recovery of 28 ARVN. There were no friendly casualties and three VC were KIA. No US PWs had been in this camp. The success of the operation is attributable primarily, to the quick reaction and coordination effected between all commands.

(TS) A brief synopsis of the JPRC missions conducted during 1970 follows: (Figure XII-1 indicates the mission locations within SEA; locations correspond to mission number below.)

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
1. BS 540040	17 Feb	4th Inf Div	Operation conducted; area found to be probable base camp with no evidence of PW facilities.
2. AT 997005	22 Feb	Americal Div	Operation conducted; buildings located but no evidence indicating PWs were held there.
3. XS 625127	22 Feb	3rd Bn, 9th Inf Div	Operation conducted; negative results.
4. AT 935087	22 Feb	5/5 ARVN	PW camp located; 3 ARVN PWs recovered, no US PWs in camp.
5. AT 839090	29 May	XXIV Corps and Americal Div	Ground reconnaissance teams were inserted with Exploitation Company backup; negative results
6. XR 810950	30 May	IV CTZ Navy SEALs	SEAL team inserted; negative results.
7. WT 905776	18 May	SOG RT	RT inserted and located bunker complex; however, it had been vacated and there were no signs of PWs in the area.

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
<u>MISSION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
8. AT 987508	26 May	3d Bn, 7th Marines	Negative results.
9. XR 305370	16 Jul	Navy SEAL Team	Operation conducted; one VN recovered.
10. YU 042525	20 Jul	SOG EARTH ANGEL/RT	Reconnaissance made; negative results.
11. YU 055480	31 Jul	SOG EARTH ANGEL/RT	RT was shot out of target area.
12. XR 770880	31 Jul	SEAL Team and 7/1st Cav	Operation conducted; negative results.
13. AT 839090	1 Aug	SOG RT	Reconnaissance teams inserted; negative results.
14. WR 905836	18 Aug	44th ARVN Rangers	Operation conducted; negative results.
15. WR 440928	22 Aug	Navy SEALs	Operation conducted; 28 ARVN recovered, no US were in the camp.
16. BN 445823	27 Aug	I FFV	RT inserted; operation terminated as no PW camp or PWs were located.
17. WR 916725	5 Sep	Navy SEALs	Operation conducted; 1 VN liberated.
18. XT 7929	15 Sep	11th ACR w/2 RF Companies Supporting	6 US PWs reported; operation conducted with negative results.
19. XT 808371	19 Sep	11th ACR w/RF forces	4 US PWs reported; operation conducted with negative results.
20. XU 2818	3 Oct	SOG RT	RT inserted; negative results.
21. YU 095364	19 Oct	SOG PIKE HILL Team	RT was inserted; found sympathizer who had seen US PWs. Further intelligence was sought with negative results.
22. VQ 880632	22 Nov	Navy SEALs	Operation conducted; 19 ARVN PWs liberated.

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FIGURE XII - I



SOUTH VIETNAM
1970 PW
RECOVERY OPERATIONS

0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

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<u>MISSION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
23. YT 386556	9 Nov	1st ACD	2 US PWs reported; operation conducted with negative results.
24. XR 7073	17 Dec	247th and 342nd RF Co	Operation conducted; 39 VN PWs liberated, 13 VC KIA, 2 VC KBA, 2 VC captured.

(S) In addition to actual recovery operations conducted during 1970, the JPRC became involved in negotiations for the return of several US PWs by ransoming them from the enemy. To date, these efforts have met with negative results. The possibility of fabrication by low level contractors does exist; however, negotiations are continuing with the hope that concrete evidence will be produced.

(C) Results for JPRC sponsored programs follow:

	<u>1970</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTALS</u>
Free World PWs Recovered	0	9
Vietnamese PWs Recovered	90	483
Free World Evadees Recovered	1	10
Remains Recovered	15	88
Rewards Paid	\$1,990.00	\$12,149.00
Leaflets Dropped	56 million	224 million
Free World PWs Released	1	62

PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

(S) Problems continued in several areas including rapid receipt, reaction to, and analysis of PW information reports and determination of source validity. Receipt of PW information became somewhat more timely following the increased emphasis placed on the JPRC briefing program. Periodic JPRC briefings were conducted throughout Southeast Asia to insure that all commands were cognizant to the mission, organization, function, and requirements of JPRC. In addition, briefings were given at the 525th MI Group orientation course on a bi-monthly basis.

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(S) Intelligence collectors and all major commands were made aware of the JPRC SICR (D-7CX-49018) which replaced SICR (I-CX-2000) on 20 July 1970. This SICR outlines specific Essential Elements of Information required by JPRC and required all major commands, down to division level (or equivalent), to furnish a JPRC contact officer. These contact officers became responsible for forwarding to the JPRC any and all PW related information that originated at their echelon.

(S) Reaction times in planning and conducting a PW recovery operation continued to present problems. Planning usually began with the evaluation of a single PW information report or with the comparison of two or more recent PW information reports. However, obtaining current and accurate information on PW camp location continued to be a major problem, since the enemy constantly moved his camps to preclude compromise. COMUSMACV OPLAN J201, BRIGHT LIGHT, should help shorten reaction times by placing more initiative on field commanders.

(S) Source validity presented an ever increasing problem to the JPRC. In the past year, numerous sources offered information on US PWs. Unfortunately, very little information proved useful in the planning of PW recovery operations. Some information was valid but was up to five years old; other information was completely fabricated in hopes of obtaining a monetary reward.

(S) In 1970, the primary sources of information on the treatment of US PWs came from captured documents, and ralliers who had contact with US PWs. Again, the information usually was not current and in some cases may have been fabricated.

REWARD PROGRAM

(S) The program for immediate monetary rewards to indigenous civilians who helped US captured or missing personnel return to friendly control, provided information, returned equipment or other evidence which revealed the status of US personnel, or returned remains of US personnel was continued. A total of \$1,690.00 was paid for returning remains or supplying information leading to the return of seven deceased US personnel, and \$300.00 was paid for aiding evadees or accompanying recovery forces on PW recovery operations.

(S) JPRC briefings, leaflets, and other PSYOPS media continued to be used to apprise the target audience of the reward program. Approximately fifty-six million leaflets were dropped over South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1970 to advertise the rewards program. Additionally, a new series of reward leaflets were designed and approved for use in Laos. These leaflets are printed in two languages, Lao and Vietnamese

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(northern dialectic) as well as in "pointee-talkee" picture for non readers. This new program was coordinated and approved by the AMEMB Vientiane, Laos, and the first leaflets were scheduled to be dropped in Laos in early 1971. The monetary rewards to be paid are approximately half of those paid in South Vietnam, corresponding to the desires of the Royal Laotian Government.

(C) A JPRC proposal to issue a plastic reward card to all military personnel in Southeast Asia is presently being staffed through MACV command elements and major service component commands. This card would provide the same aid to all military personnel that the "blood chit" provides aviators. The card will list those rewards approved under the JPRC Reward Program.

(U) The following monetary rewards were authorized to indigenous civilians who helped US POWs or MIAs during 1970:

1. \$5,000 US - For Returning US personnel to FW Forces Control.
2. \$500 US - For Information Leading to the Return of US Personnel to FW Forces Control.
3. \$400 US - For Return of a Body to FW Forces Control.
4. \$150 US - For Authenticated Information on Status or Location.

PRISONER OF WAR REPATRIATION PLAN

(8) COMUSMACV OPLAN J190 (EGRESS RECAP), dated 13 January 1970, was developed by JPRC and delineated the procedures to be followed in the reception, processing, and evacuation of recovered US prisoners of war. In addition, it provided guidance to US military forces in Vietnam concerning their responsibilities during the repatriation of GVN/FW personnel and third country nationals. The JPRC was tasked to monitor debriefings to insure MACV and higher HQ were appraised of information pertaining to the status of PWs who remained in enemy custody, and to maintain current PW/MIA dossiers.

(C) PW/MIA statistics for SEA follow:

1. <u>Captured Personnel</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
US Military	3	470
US Civilians	0	34

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<u>Captured Personnel</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
3rd National Military	0	1
3rd National Civilians	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTALS:	3	511

2. <u>Missing Personnel</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL</u>
US Military	124	1,128
US Civilians	2	8
3rd National Military	2	6
3rd National Civilians	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
TOTALS:	133	1,151

EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM

Code Letters

(S) The JPRC currently publishes a yearly listing of primary and backup E&E code symbols to be used by aircrew members in a downed status and is notified immediately of any code symbol sighting. Photo interpreters throughout Southeast Asia were made aware of this program and are constantly on the alert for possible code symbols. Numerous possible code symbol sightings were made during 1970. However, on further investigation by visual reconnaissance and aerial photography, the sightings proved negative.

(S) Beginning in October 1970, a new set of E&E code symbols replaced the previously used letters of the alphabet (Figure XII-2). These new symbols make them unique to the E&E program. Previously, regular letters caused a great deal of ambiguity because other organizations also used letters to mark different ground areas. This resulted in confusion as to whether or not a sighted letter had been made by someone in an E&E status..

Evasion and Escape/Survival Kits

The JPRC maintains E&E survival kits with low and high speed delivery capability at Nakhom Phanom, Thailand and Da Nang, RVN. In addition,

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"Expedite Kits" are maintained at: Da Nang, Kontum, Ban Me Thout, and Bien Hoa in SVN; Nakhom Phanom, in Thailand.

(8) The "Expedite Kit" was developed by JPRC in July 1970 for immediate deployment on probable code letter sightings by Forward Air Controllers. The component parts list for the E&E Kit offers complete E&E aids such as radio, food and water, weapon and ammunition, clothing, signal devices, and medical supplies; whereas, the "Expedite Kit" contains the primary aids of radio, food and water, and signaling devices. The JPRC will continue to monitor E&E code letter sightings and determine the feasibility of E&E kit deployment on a case-by-case basis.

Aircrew Briefings

(8) JPRC representatives continued to present briefings on the JPRC mission, organization, and personnel recovery capabilities to aircrew members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and E&E personnel in Southeast Asia. In addition, several live demonstrations of the Fulton Recovery System (Sky hook) were made in the Republic of Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines.


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FIGURE XII-2

E & E CODE SYMBOLS
(OCTOBER 1970 — SEPTEMBER 1971)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>E & E CODE SYMBOL</u>	<u>IDENTIFIER</u>
1. OCTOBER		
2. NOVEMBER		
3. DECEMBER		
4. JANUARY		
5. FEBRUARY		
6. MARCH		
7. APRIL		
8. MAY		
9. JUNE		
10. JULY		
11. AUGUST		
12. SEPTEMBER		

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APPENDIX XIII

TRAINING STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(8) The Training Studies Group, MACSOG-38, continued to administer MACSOG training programs and to advise and assist its STD counterpart organization, the Airborne Operations Training Center. Improvement and Modernization (I&M) as well as increased requirements for MACSOG operations, required expansion of the group's operational and training activities. Training courses involving combat exercises were expanded to include exploitation company training. This automatically increased the number of combat operations and associated command, control, and support requirements.

(8) Instruction was conducted at Camp Long Thanh (CLT), which is the MACSOG designation for the training facilities. The ARVN designation is Airborne Operations Training Center, Camp Quyet Thang. The camp is located approximately 15 miles east of Saigon and utilizes the following cover story:

"Camp Quyet Thang is an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Training Center operated by the Joint General Staff to train selected military and paramilitary units and/or individuals in counterinsurgency operations to include parachute and helicopter infiltration into remote unprepared areas, demolitions, booby-trap and ambush techniques, survival, and psychological operations against Viet Cong base areas and lines of communication within their areas of responsibility."

(8) Combat operations were conducted as part of the training curriculum in three operational areas in MR III. These areas are designated War Zone "D" located approximately 25 miles north of CLT, SILVER WING located approximately 20 miles southeast of CLT, and SIGMA, located approximately 30 miles east of CLT. Night combat parachute jumps were made on an individually required basis in War Zone "D". The drop zones, designated SALLY and ALICE are located in the immediate vicinity of CLT and were used to support normal airborne training. (Figure XIII-1)

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ORGANIZATION

(TS) MACSOG-38 consisted of Detachment B-53 (Special Operations Augmentation), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces with an authorized strength of eight officers and 28 enlisted men. Two additional instructors who are combat experienced in cross-border operations were assigned by each C&C detachment for approximately four months attached duty. One combat experienced training officer was also attached on the same basis.

(S) Until October 1970, MACSOG-38 was directly subordinate to Chief, MACSOG. On 23 Oct 70, the command relationship was realigned, and MACSOG-38 was placed under the operational control of the Director, Operations and Training Division (MACSOG-30).

(S) Since CLT is nominally ARVN and is an excluded area, the detachment maintains a post engineer (for R&U, construction, electrical power, sewage lines, etc), a post transportation (maintaining 33 vehicles varying from road graders and earth moving equipment to 1/2 ton trucks), and a civilian work force of 153 authorized personnel (involving an average monthly payroll of approximately 2,100,000 \$VN).

CONSTRUCTION

(S) Thirteen construction projects were carried out by the detachment engineer section at an estimated cost of \$18,500. This included the hiring of properly cleared laborers, their pay, housing and mess, and the production of cement building blocks in the CLT brick factory.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Mobile Training Teams

(S) Mobile Training Teams (MTT) are composed of CLT personnel and utilized to present special on-site instruction in new subjects, selected areas of resident courses, or refresher training in specific subjects. -

Isolation Compound


(S) An inner isolation compound inside CLT is administered and supported by MACSOG-38 for MACSOG-36. This compound is self-sufficient,



TRAINING STUDIES GROUP
AREAS OF OPERATIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIGURE XIII-1



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and agent personnel never leave the compound except for combat training or launching. It houses and trains BORDEN (C), EARTH ANGEL, and PIKE HILL personnel, and serves as the launching and recovery isolation area for these personnel.

Exploitation Forces

(TS) In support of MACSOG Letter of Instruction, dated 2 Oct 70, CLT designed and conducted a three week program supporting the implementation of the "Improvement and Modernization" of the two Exploitation Force (EF) companies assigned to each C&C. This was a US JCS priority action. The concept of execution at CLT was in three stages:

1. Seven days training at CLT for designated new ARVN leaders concurrent with C&C conducted training of the respective EF unit at the C&C.
2. Arrival of the EF unit and its US personnel, and a change of command ceremony, followed by seven days of platoon level training at CLT.
3. Four days of platoon level combat operations in the SIGMA AO.

(S) The program began on 8 November 1970 with the training of the first EF company's ARVN leaders. The first change of command took place on 16 November, and the sixth and final company on 21 December 1970. The final EF company returned from the SIGMA AO on 31 December 1970. Reports were provided throughout this initial conversion effort in order that the ARVN capability and performance could be compared with future STD Improvement and Modernization programs. Following this training at CLT, sixty day platoon and thirty day company training phases began at the C&Cs.

Reconnaissance Team Leader Training

(S) US Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C. instituted a reconnaissance team (RT) leaders course; however, all personnel utilized in MACSOG programs are still required to attend the regular CLT USRT course because the course provides the following essential features:

1. Vietnam terrain appreciation and familiarization.
2. Familiarization with the varying weather conditions unique to this theater of operation.

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3. Individual acclimatization concurrent with a progressive training program.
4. Thorough grounding in MACSOG and theater SOPs throughout the training process.
5. Habitual training with actual mission equipment, many items of which are not available elsewhere.
6. Continual application of lessons learned concerning the enemy through combat experienced instructors and team monitors.
7. A thorough and individual evaluation concerning RT potential for each student.
8. Combat operation graduation exercise.

CIDG Teams (BRIGHT LIGHT)

(8) CLT trained and maintained two squads of assigned CIDG personnel, nominally US led, for securing and/or rescuing downed aircraft and personnel engaged in CLT operations. They were also used as a reserve force for any CLT element overengaged in a combat operation. A recurring training program was developed and carried out for these specially selected teams.

US Prisoner Recovery Team

(8) CLT developed a training program and organization for a US-led PW Recovery Team for use in recovering US or designated allied personnel from in-country PW confines.

Training Support

(8) Army and Air Force assets were required for most of the resident courses of instruction. Desired air support for CLT courses during 1970 was computed in aircraft (A/C) days. An A/C day is one plane/helicopter with five hours flying time and nine hours on station.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>NUMBER OF A/C DAYS REQUIRED PER CLASS</u>	<u>TOTAL DAYS REQUIRED</u>
US/VN RT -	UH1D & UH1B	32	800
US/VN PW	UH1D & UH1B	32	256

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<u>COURSE</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>NUMBER OF A/C DAYS REQUIRED PER CLASS</u>	<u>TOTAL DAYS REQUIRED</u>
VN BAC	C-123 & C-130	3	15
STRATA	UH1D & UH1B	32	96
AR	C-123 & C-130	3	27
AT	UH1D, C-123 & C-130	<u>Varies</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTAL:		102	1,209

(S) CLT received the following air support for training/combat operations during CY 1970:

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>TOTAL A/C DAYS PROVIDED/REQUIRED</u>
UH1H (SLICK), UH1B & AH1G	759/800
OV2	17/17
C-130 & C-123	<u>48/57</u>
TOTAL:	824/874

(S) Shortfalls were due to steadily decreasing MACSOG air assets in the 4th quarter.

Courses of Instruction

(S) Additional courses of instruction were designed to meet increased demands for US and Vietnamese trained personnel. The following courses were added to the curriculum during 1970:

1. Airborne Refresher (AR). To train operational teams in airborne infiltration under combat conditions. Teams undergoing training have been assigned a mission which requires special refresher training. Training is climaxed with a night combat jump into heavily forested areas of D Zone.

2. Advance Airborne Techniques (AT). To train US and Vietnamese personnel in high altitude, low opening (HALO) parachute insertion techniques and operations. This instruction was conducted by MTTs on an as required basis during 1970. The instruction will be conducted as part of the CLT resident curriculum in 1971.

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3. Hand-Held Low Level Photography (US LLP). To train personnel in hand-held photography techniques to be utilized from low flying aircraft. Low-level, hand-held airborne photography is utilized to gather intelligence.

4. US/VN Prisoner Capture (US PW/VN PW). To train personnel in the techniques of successful prisoner capture. Course of instruction includes an actual combat operation.

TRAINING STATISTICS

CLT GRADUATES

(8) During 1970, over 2,500 personnel graduated from the courses conducted at CLT, as compared to 1,835 in 1969 and 353 in 1968.

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
STRATA	44	0	0	8	52
VN BAC	50	42	52	66	210
US RT	86	61	79	45	271
VN RT	57	55	28	50	190
AR	111	82	47	46	286
AT	0	0	10	0	10
VN COMMO	0	21	17	0	38
CIDG BCT	0	0	0	0	0
US DEMO	0	0	0	0	0
VN DEMO	0	0	0	0	0
SCU BCT	237	74	100	0	411
VN MEDIC	0	35	7	8	50
US EF	10	0	0	0	10
US COVEY	17	0	0	0	17
VN COVEY	9	5	0	0	14

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<u>COURSE</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US LLP	0	0	0	0	0
US PW	0	46	20	0	66
VN PW	25	25	34	35	119
VN EF	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>789</u>	<u>789</u>
TOTAL:	646	446	394	1,047	2,535

MTTs

(S) An additional 408 persons were instructed by MTTs at the C&C's.

<u>MTT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>US TRAINEES</u>	<u>VN & SCU TRAINEES</u>	<u>CLT MAN DAYS OF EFFORT IN THE MTT</u>
1-70	Demo	80	103	10 days
2-70	Wire Tap Comsec	45	42	8 days
2-70	Comsec Wire Tap	20	58	3 days
3-70	PW	<u>12</u>	<u>48</u>	7 days
TOTAL INSTRUCTED:		157	251	

Airborne Proficiency

(S) CLT conducted the following airborne operations designed to maintain the airborne proficiency of MACSOG/STD personnel.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	<u>#US</u>	<u>#VN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>NOTES:</u>
17 Jan	C-123	13	24	37	
7 Feb	C-130	21	26	47	
10 Mar	C-123	16	36	52	
28 Mar	C-123	11	39	50	
11 Apr	C-130	14	44	58	One Injury (VN) (Broken Leg)

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACFT</u>	<u>#US</u>	<u>#VN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>NOTES:</u>
1 May	C-130	31	106	137	
4 May	C-130	14	74	88	
23 May	UH-1H	12	32	44	
27 May	UH-1H	17	43	60	
9 Jun	C-123	17	45	62	
27 Jun	UH-1H	23	39	62	
11 Jul	C-123	15	23	38	
18 Jul	C-123	18	22	40	
28 Aug	C-123	36	50	86	One Fatality (VN) (Broken Neck)
13 Sep	UH-1H	43	10	53	
24 Oct	C-123	23	3	26	
25 Nov	UH-1D	37	28	65	
30 Nov	UH-1D	40	27	67	One Injury (VN) (Broken Hip)
13 Dec	C-123	<u>16</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>16</u>	
TOTALS:		417	671	1,088	

Exploitation Forces

(S) EF training was conducted as scheduled, however, initial planning was based on ARVN ability to provide 20 leaders for each EF company to replace USSF personnel.

<u>C&C</u>	<u>CLT TNG DATES</u>	<u>WEEK ONE ARVN CADRE TRAINED</u>
CCS	8 Nov - 28 Nov	EF 1-70 - 17
CCC	15 Nov - 5 Dec	EF 2-70 - 14
CCS	22 Nov - 12 Dec	EF 3-70 - 11
CCN	29 Nov - 19 Dec	EF 4-70 - 10

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<u>C&C</u>	<u>CLT TNG DATES</u>	<u>WEEK ONE</u> <u>ARVN CADRE TRAINED</u>	
CCC	6 Dec - 26 Dec	EF 5-70 - 17	
CCN	13 Dec - 2 Jan 71	EF 6-70 - <u>16</u>	
		TOTAL: 85	SHORTFALL: 35

Combat Operations

(8) During 1970, combat operations conducted in conjunction with training courses involved 462 combat days. A combat day is defined as one element on one combat operation for one day.

US Team or detachment Combat Days:	165
VN Team or detachment Combat Days:	212
US Platoon Combat Days:	4
VN Platoon Combat Days:	<u>81</u>
TOTAL CY 70:	462

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APPENDIX XIV

AIR STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(TS) Air Studies Group, MACSOG-75, continued to provide the necessary air assets required by MACSOG and other agencies in conducting clandestine air operations in support of unconventional warfare operations in Southeast Asia.

(S) On 28 October 1967, a 7th Air Force/MACSOG Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force and Chief, SOG which created the position of the Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations (DCSO) under the Commander, 14th Special Operations Wing. In MACSOG, the position of DCSO is Director, Air Studies Group. Three special Air Force operating units, each employing specially modified aircraft were assigned: First Flight Detachment and the 15th and 20th Special Operations Squadrons. The 15th Special Operations Squadron was redesignated the 90th Special Operations Squadron on 31 October 1970.

(S) Specific operational directives and guidelines were established in a subsequent 7th Air Force/MACSOG Memorandum of Agreement, dated 1 September 1968. Under this Joint Service Agreement, the Director, Air Studies Group was tasked to provide direct supervision and operational control of his assigned Air Force assets supporting MACSOG activities. The agreement also assigned a staff agency, MACSOG-32, to schedule and task First Flight Detachment and 90th Special Operations Squadron fixed wing air assets and a specified number of 20th Special Operations Squadron helicopter air assets, as necessary, to support MACSOG.

(S) To further define and delineate command and control responsibilities of the Director, Air Studies Group, a change to the Memorandum of Agreement was issued on 12 December 1970 which placed the DCSO directly under the Commander, 7th Air Force. The DCSO became responsible directly to 7th Air Force Headquarters for supervision of personnel, flying safety, mission accomplishment, and other areas not under administrative or logistic support. Commander, 14th Special Operations Wing at Phan Rang AB, RVN was still responsible to 7th Air Force Headquarters for providing administrative and logistics support to the Director, Air Studies Group.


(S) The new structure for command and control relationships with higher headquarters and subordinate units is shown in Figure XIV-1.

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FIGURE XIV-1

AIR STUDIES GROUP — COMMAND AND CONTROL



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FIRST FLIGHT DETACHMENT

General

(TS) First Flight Detachment is located at Da Nang and consists of four specially-configured C-123K's, nicknamed HEAVY HOOK.

Operations

Combat Missions

(TS) During 1970, combat missions were flown in Laos or Cambodia and were limited to:

1. Aerial delivery of agents and agent teams in Laos.
2. PSYOPS Leaflet drops in Laos.
3. Aerial resupply missions in Cambodia.
4. Rehearsal drop missions within South Vietnam for teams scheduled for insertion.

(IS) Drop missions in Laos were flown by American crews due to diplomatic agreements between the Governments of Laos and the Republic of China preventing Chinese crews from flying tactical missions in that country. Both Chinese and American crews flew missions in Cambodia. Additionally, during May and June of 1970, the Chinese Air Force (CAF) crews were tasked with aerial resupply in Cambodia.

(S) One highly classified 7th AF project was nicknamed CHINESE LADY, required one C-123 to be equipped with a special type radio beacon. Calibration flights were completed in March, and the aircraft remains equipped with the beacon to resume operations at any time. Program objectives are unknown.

(TS) Twenty-seven combat missions were completed successfully and there were no mission aborts as indicated in Table XIV-1

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TABLE XIV-1

1970 C-123K COMBAT MISSION SUMMARY

MONTH	AGENT DROPS		PSYOPS		RESUPPLY/TEAM DROP TNG	
	SCHED	COMP	SCHED	COMP	SCHED	COMP
JAN	0	0	2	2	0	0
FEB	1	1	0	0	0	0
MAR	1	1	1	1	0	0
APR	1	1	0	0	0	0
MAY	0	0	0	0	4	4
JUN	0	0	0	0	11	11
JUL	0	0	0	0	1	1
AUG	0	0	0	0	0	0
SEP	0	0	0	0	2	2
OCT	0	0	0	0	1	1
NOV	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEC	0	0	0	0	2	2
TOTALS	3	3	3	3	21	21

Support Missions -

(S) The amount of cargo, number of passengers, number of sorties and flying hours flown during 1970 increased significantly in comparison to 1968 and 1969. This is partially explained by the increase in number of possessed aircraft throughout the year and by the high in-commission rate throughout the first eleven months of 1970. One aircraft was usually in phase maintenance inspection at Taipei, however on a few occasions there were four aircraft on station. Table XIV-2 is a statistical summary of support missions.

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TABLE XIV-2

1970 C-123K SUPPORT MISSION SUMMARY

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CARGO (lbs)</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
JAN	212,564	2,665	280	315.5
FEB	275,597	1,530	296	305.9
MAR	303,778	1,703	273	321.6
APR	234,016	1,431	261	306.0
MAY	285,538	1,603	285	321.4
JUN	402,084	1,827	293	322.8
JUL	296,374	1,677	308	313.0
AUG	225,011	2,561	313	319.1
SEP	343,723	2,329	323	328.3
OCT	245,001	2,229	300	317.7
NOV	304,080	2,758	276	303.5
DEC	<u>130,931</u>	<u>1,747</u>	<u>212</u>	<u>274.6</u>
TOTALS	3,258,697	22,460	3,420	3,749.4

Training

(S) There were a few new Chinese aircrew members introduced into the C-123 program, including some who had previously been assigned to First Flight. It is noteworthy that the Chinese aircrew members are among the most highly qualified in the CAF and they are very experienced in the type of flying conducted by this unit. Language difficulty is the greatest problem encountered during flying activities and mission accomplishment, therefore special attention must be given to mission preparation and planning.

(S) Due to the limited number of combat missions and training missions which are flown by Chinese crews in Vietnam, provisions were made for flying training sessions at Hsin-Chu A/D, Taiwan. This training was devoted to maintaining the CAF crews' tactical proficiency and

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was scheduled in conjunction with aircraft inputs to China Air Lines for phase maintenance. Day and night training missions included pilot transition, low level navigation, air drop training and ECM training. This training was successful in maintaining the tactical proficiency as well as overall flight proficiency for the crews at Hsin-Chu who previously had not flown for 50-60 day periods.

(S) A continuing problem is an adequate and comprehensive ECM training program. Availability of fighters for Airborne Interceptor (AI) training is the main problem. Coordination with the Taiwan Air Defense Command was one avenue which was pursued to obtain one fighter intercept mission in December, and appears to be the best opportunity for continued AI training. Some AAA fire control radar training is available near CCK A/D, Taiwan, and is used on a continuing basis.

(S) There were 193.1 hours of training accomplished with 142 sorties at Hsin-Chu during 1970.

Safety

(S) Flying safety suffered a setback on 21 December 1970 when First Flight experienced an accident during takeoff from Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, causing damage to both wings. The cause was wake turbulence left by a jet transport taking-off prior to the C-123 taking the active runway. Wind conditions held the turbulence on the runway longer than would normally be expected. The fact that only minor damage was sustained by the First Flight aircraft is a credit to the skill of the aircrew.

(S) One aircraft experienced small arms hits in the right wing while on an approach to one of the forward operating locations (FOL). No injuries or complications were encountered.

Support Functions

Maintenance

(S) There were two Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) programs which had a major impact on the overall Operational Readiness rate. The first was a series of TCTO's concerning the flap hinge brackets. This was due to a 315th Air Division C-123K crash which was caused by failure of one bracket. The other major TCTO effort involved the inspection of the vertical and horizontal stabilizers attach-point fittings.

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(8) Light phase inspections (Phases 1, 2, 4 and 5) were conducted at Nha Trang AB by First Flight maintenance personnel, and heavy phase inspections (Phases 3 and 6) were conducted at Taipei by China Air Lines. This has resulted in significant savings to the government and aligns First Flight with the standard USAF phase concept. One aircraft was usually in Taipei undergoing maintenance at all times. Maintenance status during the year is indicated in Table XIV-3.

TABLE XIV-3

C-123K MAINTENANCE STATUS

MONTH	AIRCRAFT POSSESSED (1)	PERCENT OPERATIONALLY READY	PERCENT NORM (2)	PERCENT NORSG (3)
JAN	3.29	89.20	10.80	00.00
FEB	3.10	88.79	9.79	01.42
MAR	3.32	85.88	13.33	00.79
APR	3.29	86.30	13.70	00.00
MAY	3.10	87.33	11.60	01.07
JUN	3.33	87.83	11.43	00.73
JUL	3.10	87.43	10.00	02.57
AUG	3.10	85.70	8.29	06.10
SEP	3.10	88.49	7.89	03.62
OCT	3.30	89.49	10.51	00.00
NOV	3.03	93.56	5.83	00.61
DEC	3.32	80.33	14.93	04.74
ANNUAL AVERAGE	3.28	87.60	10.70	01.79

NOTE: (1) POSSESSED - Aircraft on-station at Nha Trang, RVN

(2) NORM - Not operationally ready maintenance

(3) NORSG - Not operationally ready supply grounded

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Administration

(U) Administrative support was provided by the 483rd Tactical Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN when the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing departed Cam Ranh Bay in March 1970.

(U) First Flight continued to receive personnel without a mandatory TOP SECRET security clearance. This limited their utilization and placed an additional workload on those personnel with the proper clearance until the required clearances were obtained. Some flying personnel arrived without instructor qualifications, though this problem is minimal since the instructor checkout can be completed concurrently with the 30-day in-country indoctrination period.

Logistics

(S) Logistical support was provided by the MACSOG Logistics Division (MACSOG-40) and the 483rd Air Base Group, Cam Ranh Bay.

(S) Some confusion developed between SOG-40 and First Flight as to responsibilities regarding the support agreement made with First Flight early in the year. This was coordinated between the two agencies and resulted in an understanding that the Air Force will provide weapons system support, and SOG-40 will support other phases of the First Flight program and mission. Rationale supporting this philosophy was based on the fact that First Flight exists to support the MACSOG mission.

90TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

General

(S) The 90th Special Operations Squadron is stationed at Nha Trang AB, RVN and flies four specially equipped C-130E's, nicknamed COMBAT SPEAR.

(S) Prior to October 31, 1970 the unit was the 15th Special Operations Squadron; therefore, all references to the squadron as the 90th SOS contained herein will in fact be referring to the 15th SOS through October 31st, and to the 90th SOS from that date on.

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Operations

Combat Missions

(TS) All combat missions were flown over Laos except four re-supply and two infiltration-training missions flown in-country. A total of 21 combat missions were flown; 18 were complete and three missions were incomplete due to weather obscuring the target area. One infiltration mission was reflown and carried as complete.

(S) One combat mission was a successful high-altitude (HALO) infiltration. This was the first time a mission of this nature was attempted in Southeast Asia.

(TS) A total of 65 teams/agents, 12,238 pounds of resupplies, and 19,525 pounds of leaflets were dropped during the combat missions. A summary of these missions 1970 is given in Table XIV-4.

TABLE XIV-4
1970 C-130E COMBAT MISSION SUMMARY

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>SCHEDULED</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>COMPLETE</u>	<u>INCOMPLETE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
JAN	RESUPPLY	1	1	1	0	
FEB	RESUPPLY	1	0	0	0	CX by MACSOG-32
MAR	INFIL/PSYOPS	1	1	1	0	
	RESUPPLY	1	1	1	0	
APR	INFIL/PSYOPS	1	1	1	0	
	RESUPPLY	3	3	1	2	DZ Obscured
	PSYOPS	1	1	1	0	by Weather
MAY	INFIL/PSYOPS	2	2	2	0	
JUN	INFIL/PSYOPS	1	1	1	0	
JUL	----- NONE FRAGGED -----					
AUG	INFIL/PSYOPS	1	1	1	0	(1 CX by MACSOG-32)
	INFILTRATION	4	3	2	1	(1 Air Abort-Wx)
SEP	INFIL/PSYOPS	1	1	1	0	

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>SCHEDULED</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>COMPLETE</u>	<u>INCOMPLETE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
OCT	HALO/INFIL	1	1	1	0	
NOV	INFILTRATION	1	1	1	0	
	INFIL/RESUPPLY	1	1	1	0	
DEC	INFILTRATION	2	2	2	0	

ANNUAL TOTALS

INFILTRATION	7	6	5	1
INFIL/RESUPPLY	1	1	1	0
INFIL/PSYOPS	7	7	7	0
RESUPPLY	6	5	3	2
PSYOPS	1	1	1	0
HALO/INFIL	1	1	1	0

Support Missions

(8) There were 432 in-country logistic missions, with a total of 2,739.2 hours flown in support of MACSOG activities. Table XIV-5 gives a breakdown of logistic support flown in 1970.

TABLE XIV-5

C-130E COMBAT SUPPORT SUMMARY

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MISSIONS FRAGGED/FLOWN</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>	<u>OPS READY RATE %</u>
JAN	38/38	234.9	1,736	223.7	82.0
FEB	43/43	205.2	2,042	238.1	79.3
MAR	30/30	224.3	1,989	233.6	83.2
APR	45/45	232.9	1,638	206.7	85.0
MAY	37/36	287.7	2,443	234.8	78.0
JUN	39/37	236.0	1,942	244.0	86.0

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MISSIONS FRAGGED/FLOWN</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>	<u>OPS READY RATE %</u>
JUL	36/36	279.1	2,105	236.7	84.2
AUG	33/33	143.7	1,832	213.9	79.0
SEP	34/34	219.5	1,691	234.7	83.5
OCT	34/34	80.1	1,459	229.0	76.7
NOV	30/30	136.8	1,858	214.2	74.1
DEC	<u>36/36</u>	<u>157.1</u>	<u>2,780</u>	<u>229.8</u>	<u>89.6</u>
TOTALS:	435/432	2,437.3	23,515	2,739.2	81.7 (Average)

Training

(S) Most of the training in the use of the aircraft specialist equipment, Fulton Recovery System, and low level radar was performed at Clark AB, P.I.. A constant problem has been a lack of time, dictated by mission requirements, to satisfy all training requirements. Weather has also been a big factor. There were nine (9) live pick-up demonstrations with the Fulton Recovery System during the year.

(S) A summary of all training time and live recoveries is given in Tables XIV-6 and XIV-7 respectively.

TABLE XIV-6

C-130E TRAINING TIME

TRAINING TIME

JAN	19.6
FEB	23.6
MAR	25.8
APR	5.6
MAY	25.9
JUN	29.4
JUL	22.0
AUG	18.7
SEP	24.1
OCT	49.3
NOV	44.5
DEC	30.3

FULTON SYSTEM

1st Quarter	10.7 hrs
2nd Quarter	10.2 hrs
3rd Quarter	7.2 hrs
4th Quarter	10.2 hrs

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TABLE XIV-7

FULTON RECOVERY LIVE PICK-UPS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>VOLUNTEER</u>	<u>PILOT</u>
25 Feb 70	Nha Trang AB	MAJ Gordon Booth, USMC	MAJ E. Popejoy
25 Feb 70	Lop Buri, Thai.	Classified	CPT J. E. McReynold
14 Mar 70	Clark AB, P.I.	SSgt. C. W. Arnold, USAF	MAJ K. P. Henderson
23 May 70	Clark AB, P.I.	LCDR Ronald Earle, USN	MAJ Glen Bentz
10 Oct 70	Clark AB, P.I.	MAJ Fred Hopewell, USAF (JPRC)	MAJ R. E. Hite Jr
30 Oct 70	Udon RTAB	MAJ Robert E. Hite Jr, USAF	MAJ R. E. Clinton
31 Oct 70	Ubon RTAB	TSgt Raymond L. Hughes, USAF	MAJ R. E. Clinton
14 Nov 70	Clark AB, P.I.	Capt C. J. Kraft, USAF (JPRC)	CPT D. L. Green
5 Dec 70	Clark AB, P.I.	SSgt James E. Everman, USAF (PJSS)	MAJ C. McClellan

Support Functions

Maintenance

(S) Since the movement of the 14th SOW from Nha Trang AB to Phan Rang AB in October of 1969, maintenance support has been provided by specialists assigned to the Squadron Phase inspections and heavy maintenance continues to be performed at Ching Chuan Kang AB, Taiwan, by the 314th FMS

(S) Maintenance remained satisfactory throughout the year, although the time required to complete phase maintenance lengthened by a considerable amount. Abort, NORM and HORS rates are summarized in Table XIV-8.

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TABLE XIV-8

ABORT, NORM AND NORS RATE

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TYPE ABORT AIR/GND</u>	<u>ABORT RATE %</u>	<u>NORM RATE %</u>	<u>NORS RATE</u>
JAN	0/0	0.0	10.3	9.4
FEB	1/0	0.4	10.0	0.0
MAR	0/0	0.0	10.3	0.4
APR	0/0	0.0	15.0	0.0
MAY	1/0	2.2	21.0	1.0
JUN	1/1	8.2	10.0	4.0
JUL	1/2	5.6	12.5	3.3
AUG	0/1	2.2	16.2	4.8
SEP	1/1	3.8	14.9	1.6
OCT	0/3	6.1	19.7	3.6
NOV	0/0	0.0	10.5	5.4
DEC	0/3	5.9	7.3	3.2

Supply

(U) Supply support is provided by a Forward Supply Point operated by the 483rd Supply Squadron at Cam Ranh Bay AB.

(U) The major problem areas have been overlong delays in getting vital aircraft parts and frequent breakdowns in communication leading to the wrong parts being sent. In addition, with the supply point being 15 miles from Nha Trang, transportation of parts has been a problem. With the FSP making only a weekly run to Cam Ranh Bay, pilot pick-ups continue to be the only sure way of receiving parts in a timely manner.

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Personnel

(U) All personnel and finance actions were controlled by the 483rd Combat Support Group at Cam Ranh Bay AB. The only problems encountered were due to the time and distance between bases. This was partially solved by scheduling squadron aircraft through Cam Ranh Bay twice a week to provide transportation for those having business there.

(U) The 327th Combat Support Squadron at Nha Trang provided the necessary housekeeping functions, but did not provide direct support for the unit's administrative or operational needs.

Civic Action

(U) Members of the 90th SOS have been exceptionally active in civic action projects. One continuing project has been the modernization and improvement of living conditions at the Bing Cang Convent. Security conditions and weather severely hampered the efforts at the convent this year so more emphasis was put on the Mau Tam and Ba Long Day Care Centers.

1. Furniture, fixtures, and food supplies were purchased and donated throughout the year.

2. Arrangements were made for medical and dental services through the combined efforts of Air Force and Navy medical personnel.

3. A cistern water supply and a new kitchen facility were installed at Mau Tan.

4. Baby chicks and fertilized eggs were provided to the Ba Long Center after they lost their first hatch.

5. At Christmas, candy, clothes, and gifts were provided for the children of both orphanages from the 90th SOS and several other units in the area.

(U) As the only large Air Force unit in the Nha Trang area, the 90th SOS intends to continue its efforts in the Civic Actions Program.

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TWENTIETH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

General

(S) The Main Operating Base (MOB) of the 20th SOS was relocated from Tuy Hoa to Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN on 25 September. Combat operations continued to be conducted out of the Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Ban Me Thuot and the Sub Forward Operating Locations (Sub FOL) at Duc Co, Duc Lap, Ban Don or Tieu Atar. Duc Co was released in mid-year to other uses. Due to the location at Cam Ranh Bay, extensive logistic support is afforded the squadron in accordance with letters of agreement.

(TS) Three evolutions greatly affected operations during 1970:

1. The President's decision to ban US ground forces from Cambodia after 30 June and allow only TAC AIR as needed.

2. The move of the 20th SOS from Tuy Hoa AFB to Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN.

3. The advent of the UH-1N.

(S) The losses of experienced personnel and aircraft due to engine failures and hostile action were eased considerably in 1970. The extensive IRAN program and severe in-house maintenance procedures, initiated by Major Frank Walls, appear to have solved the engine failure problems, as no aircraft losses were attributed to maintenance. Enemy fire in the hostile areas gradually decreased throughout the year.

Operations

(TS) The 20th SOS continued to provide helicopter support for counterinsurgency and reconnaissance teams, base defense, psychological warfare, special air warfare training of the US Special Forces, and logistic support of USAF units and US sponsored activities.

(TS) Operational statistics for 1970 are indicated in Table XIV-9.

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TABLE XIV-9

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

1970 QUARTER	GROUND ALERT	COMBAT MISSIONS		AMMO EXPENDED	
		FRAGGED/FLOWN	SORTIES	POCKETS	7.62 AMMO 40mm
FIRST	2,014.6	414/406	1,234	973,500	2,307 6
SECOND	2,891.5	364/356	1,545	1,019,100	1,801 313
THIRD	2,615.2	368/352	1,888	827,600	1,566 237
FOURTH	2,672.4	368/352	1,573	848,300	1,857 58
TOTALS	10,193.7 hours	1,514/1,466	6,240	3,718,500	7,531 614

QUARTER	MISSION	TNG	HOURS FLOWN		MSN SUPPORT	TOTAL	PAX CARRIED	CARGO (TONS)
			FCF					
FIRST	1,085.8	201.3	217.8		66.8	1,571.5	46	4,200
SECOND	1,022.0	327.9	153.7		149.2	1,652.8	54	6,300
THIRD	1,112.7	413.7	167.4		206.4	1,900.2	Not Rpt	Not Rpt
FOURTH	1,045.2	503.9	146.5		155.3	1,850.7	Not Rpt	Not Rpt
TOTALS	4,265.7	1,446.8	685.4		577.7	6,975.2	102	10,500

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Gunships

(TS) The year began with the 20th SOS providing gunship cover for US Army UH-1H "xlicks" which were inserting and extracting reconnaissance teams (RTs) in Cambodia. These RTs included American advisors. When the President banned US ground forces from Cambodia and restricted US air coverage to TAC AIR after 30 June, the Army helicopters were replaced by Vietnamese H-34 aircraft (King Bees) and American advisors were no longer included in the RTs. Language differences then created a significant problem. As a result, emphasis had to be shifted to understanding and accurate communication with Vietnamese personnel, and changes in operational procedures resulted.

1. Tactics changed.
2. Smoke was used to mark the Landing Zone (LZ).
3. An overhead spiraling approach was instituted.
4. Letter call signs were used instead of numbers for identification.
5. An additional UH-1P aircraft was used to provide a rescue capability due to performance limitations of the H-34.

Combat Losses

(S) During the year 1970, the 20th SOS UH-1B "Green Hornets," lost 4 aircraft in combat, none of which was attributed to mechanical failure as a primary cause. The losses are summarized in the following table:

TABLE XIV-10

20th SOS LOSSES

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>A/C No.</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>REASON</u>
MAR	64-15491	Capt Dilley	Capt Loper SSgt Thorburn A1C Carpenter	Possible hostile action
MAR	65-7944	Capt Enderle Capt Estrada TSgt Greenwood	A1C Visnesky	Hostile action

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>A/C No.</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>INJURED</u>	<u>REASON</u>
JUL	65-7930		Capt Clapper 1Lt Messenger SSgt Farmer Sgt Clark A1C McGregor	Possible hostile action
SEP	64-15484	Capt Heil MSgt Cooper	Capt Carrington SSgt Galvan	Operational

Two incidents of engine failure occurred in 1970. The aircraft landed successfully and were returned to service in both cases. A third aircraft experienced engine problems and made a precautionary landing.

(U) On 25 September, the 20th SOS moved to Cam Ranh Bay AB. Problems associated with moving were aggravated by maintaining a classification of Secret on the movement until completed. This was particularly true in the supply area.

(U) During the tour at Tuy Hoa all support areas continually improved due to increased appreciation of the squadron mission and the emphasis placed on it by 7th Air Force. With the move to Cam Ranh Bay, the educational process was repeated. Two factors which contributed to the problem of the move were the usual problems of the new tenant with unfamiliar requirements and the unique nature of the 20th SOS in that it is the only USAF helicopter unit using UH-1 aircraft in South Vietnam. Supply problems were not alleviated by the receipt of a new model UH-1 with the requirement for additional supplies peculiar to it.

(U) The physical separation of squadron facilities and the location of the operations building away from the main part of the base and the scheduled base bus routes were factors which increased transportation difficulties after the relocation at Cam Ranh Bay. Some of these problems were alleviated by the loan of three vehicles from the Base Motor Pool. However, the problem of operation of old vehicles with the high level of maintenance still remained.

(U) December 31st saw the Squadron still in temporary operations and maintenance facilities with low priority on the completion of permanent structures. The mission at the FOL continued to be supported in an uninterrupted manner with no decrease in the requirements.

(U) The OJT program was effective and worthwhile. On 20 June 1970, Base CBPO rated it excellent and this level of performance was maintained throughout the year.

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(U) Pilot inputs from the Phase II training at Hurlburt AFB, Florida continued to arrive with limited training. Limitations on the direction of fire and altitudes flown have not permitted realistic training. Pilots must be retrained in Vietnam.

(S) At the end of the year, the 20th SOS had 4 FE's 10 IP's 10 AC's (Combat Capable), and 26 First Pilots. The latter 26 are in various stages of upgrade training. Adequate personnel inputs have been arriving to fulfill the requirements of the increased UMD and normal rotation. Five new training areas for gun work and one new transition training area were approved near Cam Ranh but coordination with the controlling agencies continued to be a problem. This had to be done on a daily basis and there were some instances of dual usage. Training at Ban Me Thuot was suspended.

Lessons Learned

(U) Lessons learned during 1970 included:

1. Units should be free to develop tactics as the circumstances demand.
2. Experienced personnel departing the theatre should be encouraged to make an end-of-tour report. Lessons learned and tactics developed in this one-of-a-kind unit may be of value in future operations.
3. The language difference is increasing in importance as Vietnamization grows.
4. More lead time is needed to move a unit of this type. If this is not possible, a restudy of the squadron organization to permit greater mobility is required.
5. Where possible, the Main Operating Base of the squadron should be colocated with the next higher command echelon.
6. That operational training conducted at Hurlburt AFB should be more closely aligned with tactical experience to minimize the requirement for conducting training in the combat area.

Maintenance

(S) Two maintenance officers were required due to the maintenance functions at the FOL and MOB. Toward mid-year, shortage of gunner and helicopter mechanic inputs began to reflect the impending arrival of the UH-1N. However, of the first 37, only three had previous experience

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in the UH-1. The procedure of assigning twin engine helicopter mechanics who were not familiar with the UH-1 required retraining on the older UH-1P aircraft, particularly since only eight of the proposed 23 UH-1N (Twin Engine Bell Aircraft) were received.

(U) The significant maintenance problem at the end of 1969 was engine failure. The primary cause appeared to be Foreign Object Damage (FOD). An extensive IRAN program, still in effect at the close of 1970, and a procedure for water washing the engines every night was instituted. Surfacing of the sub-FOL's was completed and a rust lick program was implemented. These actions corrected the problem. The 20th SOS received the 31st TFW FOD Prevention Award for the month of June at Tuy Hoa.

Special Projects

Field Tests

(U) Several field projects were undertaken to improve operations during the year.

1. The XM-174 hand-held grenade launcher was tested and acceptance was recommended. Action is still pending.

2. Field testing of the UH-1N for Category III began in December.

3. A new logistics system to supply FOL aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay AB was attempted, but it proved unsuccessful and was discontinued in November. The support aircraft did not always fly direct to the FOLs, and parts were sometimes delayed for several days.

Construction

(U) Construction of a permanent maintenance facility at Ban Me Thuot was completed in 1970. New revetments were constructed and AM-2 matting was installed which permitted Blue Card inspections to be performed. Existing billets were completely renovated and painted to house the TDY personnel.

Civic Action

(U) Work continued on the three room addition to the one room schoolhouse at Buon Ea Niach, near the FOL. The supplies distributed by 20th personnel to the local populace near the FOL included dental care kits, laundry soap, and food. Numerous haircuts, clothing and baths were given to the children.

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APPENDIX XV

MARITIME STUDIES GROUP

GENERAL

(IS) Maritime Studies Group, MACSOG-37, in conjunction with the Coastal Security Service (CSS) of the Strategic Technical Directorate, continued to execute covert maritime interdiction, intelligence, psychological and cross-beach operations under the cover name US Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Da Nang. Operations were conducted in the coastal areas and inland waterways of South Vietnam and the DMZ to harass the VC/VCI/NVA and to maintain proficiency for possible operations in North Vietnam.

(IS) There were several "firsts" during 1970.

1. Four Patrol Torpedo Boats (fast)(Nasty class PTF), and two Sea Commando Teams (SCTs) were used in a united, covert operation into the DMZ.

2. Forward operating bases (FOBs) were established at Cua Viet and Qui Nhon when high surf conditions hampered normal DODGE MARK missions. This procedure accounted for the increased number of total missions launched during 1970.

3. CSS, NAD's counterpart organization, was reorganized and actually acquired a fully operational status. They are now locating targets, planning missions, writing operation orders, obtaining clearances, and launching highly successful missions with minimal US support. This greatly assisted NAD in moving toward a complete advisory capacity.

FACILITIES

(8) NAD is located in East Da Nang, RVN, with the main operating base (Lower Base) adjacent to the VN Naval Base (ref Vietnam 1:50,000, sheet 6641 III series L7014, coordinates BT 035837). Living, messing and support facilities are located at Camp Fay which is 3.2 miles east of Lower Base and adjacent to Camp Tien Sha, a US Naval Support Facility.

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1. Lower Base. Lower Base is the operational base of NAD and CSS. It has a total of 12 buildings with a gross area of 33,573 sq ft. This site includes a water distribution system, an electrical generation and distribution system, personnel bunkers, and defensive positions, four piers, boat fuel storage and distribution system, and approximately 600 sq yds of oil gravel roadway.
2. Camp Fay. Camp Fay is the principal berthing and support area for all US personnel assigned to NAD and Monkey Mountain Forward Operating Base (MMFOB)(MACSOG-36). There are 22 buildings and the camp area is 71,332 sq ft.
3. Upper Base. This is the principal berthing area for the CSS, the STD/VNN counterpart organization. It is located across the road from Lower Base, consists of 26 buildings and has a gross area of 44,923 sq ft.
4. Camp Black Rock. Camp Black Rock houses members of MMFOB's Vietnamese organization (STRATA), CSS training teams, and civilian irregular defense guards (CIDG). It is located approximately 1 mile east of Camp Fay, and has a total of 37 buildings and a gross area of 58,048 sq ft.
5. Nung Camp. Nung Camp is another living area for CIDG and CSS guard personnel and is located close to Lower Base. It has 8 buildings and a gross area of 12,774 sq ft.
6. Beaches. In addition to the above camps there are two beaches reserved for NAD/CSS use.
 - a. Coral Beach contains a pistol range, rifle range, infiltration training area and grenade area.
 - b. Spanish Beach contains three magazines for stowage of demolitions, explosives, and PTF ammunition as well as a small pavillion for recreational use.

DEPARTMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Public Works

(S) The NAD Public Works Department consisted of the Public Works Officer, a Navy civil engineer corps lieutenant; one Senior Chief Utilities-man, the Public Works Chief; five Filipino supervisors, and a work force varying between 130 and 160 Vietnamese workers.

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It was responsible for the physical assets of NAD which included the five camps, a motor maintenance facility, an automotive warehouse, storage facilities for PW material, and shops for electrical repair, air conditioner/refrigeration repair, carpentry, upholstery, painting and metalwork.

(C) During 1970, the department:

1. Rewired 10 barracks, the Camp Fay BOQ, and administrative buildings at Upper Base to remove faulty and inadequate wiring.
2. Painted the outside of 97 buildings and the inside of 32 and established a rotational painting schedule.
- 3.- Constructed a barracks for the CIDG personnel manning the highway check point.
4. Improved the perimeter fence and installed an eight foot inner perimeter cyclone chain link fence at Camp Fay.
5. Remodeled living quarters for the VN Maritime Training Team (MTT) at the Lower Base.
6. Constructed quarters for the Commander, CSS.
7. Constructed a seawall at Spanish Beach to preserve the training area and protect the ammo dump road.

Supply

(U) The Supply Department was headed by a Navy Supply Corps Lieutenant Junior Grade, and was assisted by a Chief Storekeeper, a Storekeeper First Class, one Filipino technician, and fifteen Vietnamese Nationals filling billets of clerks, clerk typists and filing clerks.

(U) The supply officer also served as the civilian personnel officer and was responsible for administration of some 210 Vietnamese nationals employed by NAD in jobs such as guards, laborers, mechanics, carpenters, clerks, etc. The 1970 payroll for these personnel amounted to over \$300,000.00. Although there was a reduction of 40 civilian personnel from 1969, a 10% pay increase effective in June, 1970 kept the annual payroll approximately the same.

(C) On 30 June, the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, reduced to become Naval Support Facility, Da Nang, thus transferring material support from the Da Nang area to the Army's 80th Support Group.

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There was a large cutback in the availability of material and services; however, NAD supply received over \$40,000.00 worth of material from the US Army depot, consisting mostly of POL and ammunition.

(U) Over 1.2 million pounds of supplies, mostly construction material, were shipped to other SOG units by NAD. \$48,000 worth was transferred to MMFOB and \$50,000 worth to CSS. A large amount of material was also procured at no cost to SOG from the 32nd Naval Construction Regiment from listings of excess material.

Administration

(U) The Administration Department was headed by a USN limited duty Administration Lieutenant and assisted by one yeoman (E-6) and two hospitalmen (E-7 and E-6). The department provided personnel and administrative support to all other departments and advised and assisted the CSS in matters pertaining to administration. The medical section provided medical support of US personnel, emergency first aid to indigenous personnel, and advised Vietnamese military personnel in medical procedures.

(U) In February, a new joint table of distribution was placed into effect and the unit reorganized without loss of mission efficiency. NAD's authorized strength decreased from 14 officers and 44 enlisted personnel to 13 officers and 34 enlisted. Average on board strength during the year was eleven (11) officers and thirty-five (35) enlisted.

(U) When the Naval Support Activity phased out, the department assumed responsibility for maintaining all Navy enlisted records and personnel related actions for NAD personnel and the Mobile Support Team. Navy officer service records were also maintained. These tasks were accomplished even though the strength of the branch was decreased by one yeoman (E-6).

Security

(U) The Security Section was headed by a Captain, USMC, with one SSgt, USMC, and the following Vietnamese nationals: one translator/secretary, four interpreter/translators, one armorer, three matrons, one guard chief, four guard team chiefs, and thirty three guards.

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(e) All aspects of the security effort were covered, however primary emphasis was applied to the improvement of Camp Fay's physical security defenses and the upgrading of the performance of the civilian guard force.

1. Improvements included the installation of weapons on a permanent basis and the establishment of an alternate method of communications.

2. Ineffective members of the guard were replaced by former Vietnamese military personnel who had been wounded and exempted from further military service. This also reduced the average age of the guard force and improved its performance.

(8) During 1970, the Security Section:

1. In coordination with the CSS security office, participated in 62 search and clear operations within that organization's area of responsibility.

2. Initiated a new pass system jointly operated by NAD and CSS.

3. Permanently emplaced stanchions in pillboxes for M-60 machine guns for interlocking fire at all points in front of the perimeter.

4. Mounted a .50 caliber machine gun in tower #3 to counter fire from the direction of Monkey Mountain.

Operations and Training

Counterintelligence

(U) The Counterintelligence Section was headed by a USMC CWO-2 (0210) who was assisted by a USMC GySgt (0211) both of whom were specially trained in the counterintelligence field. In February 1970, the security officer was transferred without relief, consequently, the CI officer was assigned duty as NAD Security Officer with collateral duties of CI. Upon being relieved as security officer, and during the last six months of 1970, operational requirements required the CI officer be assigned to NAD operations section. During this entire period, the counterintelligence section was under the cognizance of the security officer.

(U) During the period July through November 1970, 136 personnel security investigations (background investigations) were completed on civilian employees who are employed at Camp Fay and Lower Base.

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(S) CSS counterintelligence controlled three paid informants.

1. One agent was executed by the VC when he was discovered to be working for the GVN. NAD received a letter of appreciation from the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force for the accuracy of this informant's early warning of rocket/mortar attacks. Sixteen of eighteen attacks were known in advance. The paid informant's widow received a gratuity of 12,000 \$VN from C&CI funds.

2. A second paid informant revealed the location of a booby trapped 105mm artillery round in October 1970. The round was buried near the entrance of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regimental Command Post and was rigged with a command detonator. The round itself was booby trapped with four hand grenades.

3. The third informant and several casual sources resulted in the neutralization of one VC cell and the capture of several low level VCI.

Intelligence

(TS) In February of 1970 the CSS and the NAD intelligence personnel moved into the same office space at Lower Base. This move enabled the two units to coordinate and work together with maximum efficiency.

1. Intelligence was gathered for over one hundred and sixty potential missions and filed by priority in a target bank. Of these, sixty were chosen and missions planned.

2. Dedicated air support became available in July which improved the operational photography in quality as well as quantity. Photography was provided for over fifty percent of planned missions.

3. Liaison was established and maintained with other units in the I Corps area. Intelligence provided by these units led to the capture of documents which were translated and further exploited. Information was sent to the Combined Document Exploitation Center for evaluation, publication and dissemination.

4. Over 20 targets in North Vietnam were evaluated in cooperation with MACSOG-20. The targets were photographed by the 7th AF and USN. After careful scrutiny and evaluation, seven of those targets were submitted to Chief, SOG for approval.

5. Twenty-eight areas were cleared for pending operations. This included setting up communications, medevac, artillery and air support for the operations.

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(S) The intelligence officer also assisted on over twenty-five operations by serving as OTC liaison in the boats and debriefing missions upon their return to base.

Sea Commando Training Section

(S) During 1970, the NAD training section conducted two complete classes for action team replacement personnel. Each class ran for twelve weeks and consisted of lectures and practical work in small boat operations and a rigorous physical training program coupled with extensive swimming instruction. Class 1/70 was convened on 25 May with 24 personnel and was graduated on 12 August with 17 personnel (4 officers, 13 enlisted). A-1 graduates were immediately incorporated into the four existing action teams. Class 2/70 began on 7 October with 24 men and was graduated on 18 December with 14 enlisted men. Instead of moving directly into the action teams, personnel from class 2/70 will proceed to Cam Ranh Bay in January, 1971 for open circuit diving training to be conducted by advisors from NAD.

(S) In addition to performing the primary duty of conducting courses for action team replacements, the training section was tasked to organize a series of parachute jumps from 18 April to 23 May. In six separate operations, 60 US Navy, Marine Corps and Army personnel and 85 Vietnamese military personnel executed over 300 parachute jumps. All jumps were conducted during the day from a CH-46 helicopter using the standard static line rig without serious injury to any participating individual. All operations were conducted within the Red Beach drop zone located outside the city of Da Nang.

(U) On 24 November two advisors from the training section conducted a class on riverine warfare for elements of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. Over 400 USMC personnel attended this lecture and demonstration and their enthusiastic response has led other units in the I Corps area to request similar classes.

(TS) An underwater demolition class was conducted for C&C riverwatch personnel from 16 to 19 November. Six Vietnamese were trained to use command detonated mines to counter and interdict NVA motorized river traffic in the AIZ and SH AO. Unfortunately, the 37 pound mines were too heavy for the team members, and the missions were never conducted.

MOBILE SUPPORT TEAM

(U) The Mobile Support Team (MST) was composed of three officers and sixteen enlisted men. They were assigned on TAD orders from their parent command, Boat Support Unit One in Coronado, California, to the Officer in Charge, Naval Advisory Detachment for operational control and to Boat Support Unit One and Naval Special Warfare Group, Vietnam for administrative control.

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(S) MST supported NAD/CSS operations through the supervision of training and maintenance efforts of indigenous personnel in the operation, maintenance, and repair of high speed patrol craft (PTFs and PCFs) and their associated base support facilities, and by providing logistic support for the boats through liaison with the Navy Special Program Office in Subic Bay. During 1970, MST's mission evolved from a maintenance, repair, and training effort to an advisory effort with the large cutback in personnel strength early in the year. Responsibility for upkeep and basic maintenance passed to the Vietnamese Maritime Training Team (MTT).

(U) Though listed as advisors, MST personnel continued many of the more complicated tasks beyond the capabilities of the Vietnamese. However, all work was coordinated through the Vietnamese, to enable them to participate for training purposes. Some of the major tasks performed by MST and MTT personnel included:

1. Changing 6 PTF, 3 PCF and 3 LCM engines.
2. Changing 7 PTF generators.
3. Changing 4 PTF/PCF shafts, screws, and rudders.
4. Repairing 2 PTF air compressors and 1 V-drive.
5. Making major repairs of typhoon damage on the floating drydock.

(S) Prior to the cutback, MST scheduled and conducted all boat crew training with MTT assistance. At the end of the year, scheduling was done by the CSS Operations Department and MTT conducted the majority of the training with assistance as necessary from MST personnel. Training was divided into two general phases.

1. The classroom or lecture phase covered all areas of PTF operating procedures, basic boat maintenance, equipment familiarization, theory, and operating procedures. Approximately 363 hours were devoted to classroom work. Each class was approximately one hour in length and was attended by an average of five men per class. In December an English language course was initiated by the boat training officer for Vietnamese programmed to attend the Naval Ship Repair Facility School on PTF engineering, electrical, and electronics systems in Subic Bay. Four classes a week were scheduled; each class lasted approximately one hour.

2. Underway training included gunshoots, night transit and navigation problems, multi-boat tactics (formation steaming, maneuvering, etc), damage control drills, man overboard drills, piloting, precision anchoring, radar navigation, searching of junks and other small craft, mooring to a buoy, and going alongside a boat or pier.

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During the past year, approximately 528 hours were devoted to underway training. This figure was based on an average of two boats participating in each underway exercise with an average time of three hours per exercise.

OPERATIONS

DODGE MARK

(TS) DODGE MARK missions were cross-beach covert landings in South Vietnam. They were conducted under actual combat conditions in VC-controlled or influenced areas to maintain proficiency for operations in North Vietnam and to prepare for subsequent operations. A total of 65 DODGE MARK missions were launched and recovered from Da Nang in 1970. Forty-two missions were launched from six separate forward operating bases as indicated below:

1. From 1 January to 15 February at Qui Nhon, SVN (12 missions).
2. From 24 January to 17 February at Sea Float in the Mekong Delta (9 missions).
3. From 25 August to 8 September at Cua Viet, SVN (7 missions).
4. From 20 September to 24 October at Qui Nhon, SVN (8 missions).
5. From 23 October to 15 November at Cua Viet, SVN (3 missions).
6. From 3 November to 7 November at Coastal Group 13, Phu Loc, SVN (3 missions).

(S) Results for the 107 DODGE MARK missions were as follows:

1. Number of friendly casualties: KIA 1
WIA 1
2. Number of enemy casualties: KIA 29
WIA 3
Captured 16
3. Kilos of documents captured: 35
4. Weapons captured: AK-47 13

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SKS 12

US Carbine 2

CHICOM Grenade 2

5. Rice/vegetables captured/destroyed: 3,240 lbs

6. Clothing captured/destroyed: Pajamas 40 pr

Uniforms 20 pr

WEATHER

(U) On 3 October, typhoon Joan with sustained winds of 75 knots and gusts over 85 knots hit the Da Nang area. Of the 105 buildings in the NAD/CSS complex, 21 sustained damage, 9 were completely de-roofed and 12 others sustained minor damage. Before jamor repairs could be completed, typhoon Kate with winds up to 50 knots raced by off shore on 24 Oct bringing a deluge and more flooding. Seven days later on 31 October, tropical storm Louise came ashore 50 miles south bringing more rain and flooding into the area.

(U) On 31 October, five NAD SEALs and USMC Reconnaissance advisors participated in the rescue of Vietnamese civilians in the flooded MR I area southwest of Da Nang. Over 600 civilians, including nearly 200 children, were rescued by NAD personnel in rubber boats during those operations.

(S) High winds and high surf conditions hampered cross-beach missions, especially during the northeast monsoon season which commenced in mid-October and continued throughout the remainder of the calendar year. With the long unprotected sea reaches, ground swells built-up and crashed on the beaches causing up to 16 feet plus surf.

(S) During these monsoon periods, usually accompanied by cloudy, moonless nights and torrential rains, conditions were ideal for conducting missions in the rivers and flooded areas where normal troop activities were restricted. As a result, NAD operational areas were expanded to include rivers and waterways to a depth of 5000 meters from the coast and 5000 meters on either side of the water passages.

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APPENDIX XVI

STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE

GENERAL

(S) The 1970 mission of the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) was:

To exercise operational control over forces and personnel assigned or attached to execute special operations or conduct unconventional warfare (UW) as directed by the Joint General Staff/RVNAF or other competent authority.

(S) At the beginning of the year, the STD had made a promising start in its development of ground reconnaissance elements to conduct special operations; however it did not have a UW capability, and its activities were inhibited by deficiencies in command and staff and a lack of adequate RVNAF support. Manning levels were approximately 75 percent of the authorized strength, but even this did not adequately reflect the "short-falls." Experienced command and staff personnel, both in quality and quantity, were required, and this constituted the STD's weakest point. The organization of the STD headquarters was, however, conducive to the development of a Joint Service JUWTF which could exercise operational control over all RVNAF operations and UW assets.

(S) In consonance with the Improvement and Modernization Program for RVNAF forces, and in accordance with the desires of the Director of STD, MACSOG assisted in realigning the assets of the STD along more functional lines. This reorganization was designed to centralize all UW and special operations assets of the RVNAF component services under the command and/or control of the STD and, in effect, established a JUWTF. The composition of the assigned forces was based on the existing STD organization and placed the most experienced and capable personnel in critical positions. Extensive coordination between the STD, RVNAF JGS, MACSOG and other elements of MACV eventually resulted in a reorganization which was to be fully implemented on 1 January 1971.

ORGANIZATION

(S) Until 1 November 1970, the STD was structured in accordance with the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 40-201C approved by MACV for programming and budgeting on 4 June 1969. On 1 November, the STD began its transformation to the proposed reorganization effective in 1971.

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The old organization included a Headquarters and five operational elements: The Liaison Service, the Special Task Force, the Coastal Security Service (CSS), the Airborne Training Center, and the Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) Service.

(C) The STD headquarters was authorized 107 personnel plus a 14 man coordination and liaison detachment. It directed the overall activities of the STD.

(TS) The Liaison Service was the STD reconnaissance element with an authorized strength of 250. It was the counterpart organization of SOG's Ground Studies Group, and three Task Forces, one at each of the C & C's, provided the ARVN personnel for reconnaissance and exploitation operations. Effective 1 July, when no U.S. personnel were allowed on the ground in Cambodia, the Liaison Service conducted all SH operations with the advice and assistance of Special Forces personnel OPCON to MACSOG.

(S) The Special Task Force was the agent operations element of the STD and operated in two groups, Group 11 at MMFOB, Da Nang and Group 68 in Saigon. It was authorized 199 personnel and was assisted by the Airborne Studies Group.

(S) The CSS was a naval UW element capable of performing special maritime and cross-beach operations along the coast of Vietnam. It was authorized 412 Vietnamese Navy and 184 ARVN personnel. The CSS was located at Da Nang, and it was advised by Maritime Studies Group.

(C) The Airborne Training Center was located at Camp Long Thanh and was authorized 72 personnel to conduct airborne and reconnaissance type training. Its counterpart organization was the Training Studies Group consisting of advisors from a Special Forces B detachment, 5th SFGA.

(S) The PSYWAR Service was authorized 91 personnel for the conduct of PSYOPS. Two SOG elements, the Radio Studies Group and the Psychological Studies Group, advised and assisted the PSYWAR Service.

(C) Personnel occupying significant positions within the STD organization during 1970 are indicated in the following table.

TABLE XVI-1

STD KEY PERSONNEL

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>
<u>Headquarters</u>		
Director	1 Jan - 31 Dec	[]
Deputy Director	1 Jan - 31 Dec	

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<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>INCUMBENT</u>
Secretariat	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Inspector General	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Director of Security	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Chief Personnel and Logistic Service	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Personnel Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Log Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Finance Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Chief Intelligence and Operations Service	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Intelligence Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Operations and Training Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
PSYWAR Staff Officer	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Communications Officer	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
Plans Officer	29 Dec - 31 Dec	
<u>Liaison Service</u>		
Director	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
CO, TF1, Da Nang	1 Jan - 10 Sep 10 Sep - 31 Dec	
CO, TF2, Kontum	1 Jan - 10 Sep 10 Sep - 31 Dec	
CO, TF3, Ban Me Thuot	1 Jan - 10 Sep 10 Sep - 31 Dec	
<u>Special Task Force</u>		
Director	1 Jan - 31 Dec	
CO, 11th Task Force Group (MMFOB)	27 Mar - 31 Dec	


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<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
CO, 68th Task Force Group	1 Jan - 31 Dec
<u>Coastal Security Service</u>	
Commander	1 Jan - 31 Dec
<u>Airborne Training Service</u>	
Commander	1 Jan - 30 Apr 1 May - 31 Dec
<u>PSYWAR Service</u>	
Chief	1 Jan - 31 Dec
Plans and Research Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec
Operations Branch	1 Jan - 31 Dec
Broadcast Branch	1 Mar - 31 Dec

INCUMBENT



REORGANIZATION

Composite Staff Study

(S) In January, a Composite Staff Study was initiated to assess future unconventional warfare and special operations for RVNAF. This was one of the initial steps in the process of reorganizing RVNAF unconventional and special operations assets into a more functional unit. The most significant recommended change was that the Vietnamese Special Forces should come under the command of the STD in order to provide the required UW capability. With the special operations capability of its Liaison Service, the STD could then fulfill its mission requirements.

(S) The study also included a discussion of the chronological development of the existing STD force structure with its capabilities and limitations, an analysis of three organizational concepts for a Vietnamese JUWTF, proposed force structures for the VN Army, Navy, and Air Force UW assets, and requirements for aircraft and boats to conduct the required operations. COMUSMACV approved the study on 15 May 1970.

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Modifications

(C) Further modifications to the recommendations proposed in the UW study were necessary after President Thieu's Decree 614 a TT/SL of 1 July 1970, "Organization of the National Defense Structure." The Decree tasked the Ministry of Defense to fix the details concerning the JGS/RVNAF organization and management. On 8 July 1970 the VN Ministry of Defense issued Arrete 812/QP/NP, "Reorganization of the JGS/RVNAF" in which the STD became part of the JGS/RVNAF organization. Ministry of Defense Memorandum 2419-TTM/P312/K of 11 July 1970, "Reorganization of the JGS/RVNAF," further specified that the STD would be directly subordinate to the Chief, JGS/RVNAF.

(C) In consonance with these directives, the proposed STD structure was modified and then presented jointly by MACSOG and the STD to the "Combined Committee for Organization of UW Forces," chaired by Major General Nguyen Xuan Trang, JGS Deputy for Personnel. This reorganization was studied by the committee, approved by the JGS, and then directed to be implemented.

(S) On 24 October, General Cao Van Vien, Commanding General, JGS, issued letter order number 3963, "Reorganization of STD and Subordinate Units - Transformation of Special Forces." This order directed that the STD temporarily implement the new organization effective 1 November 1970 with the exception that the Special Forces element would not change over and become an integral part of the STD until 1 January 1971. In Memorandum 3963/TTM/P372/M dated 29 October 1970, the organization portion of the revised TO&E (40-201D) was approved. The memorandum also reaffirmed that all STD units would be reorganized or newly activated effective 1 January 1971. The equipment portion of the TO&E was still being coordinated at the end of the year.

(TS) The STD was charged as the sole RVNAF force responsible for carrying out special operations and directing UW activities. It was directed to coordinate with MACSOG as its counterpart in organizing these activities in accordance with instructions from the JGS. The sphere of operations for the STD units was designated as the area outside the borders, on the territory of third countries along the RVN border (as agreed upon by the GVN and the countries concerned), enemy rear areas, or areas within RVN temporarily occupied by the enemy. Chief JGS was designated as the only authority who could determine utilization of the STD units.

Headquarters

(S) The STD headquarters was reorganized along the lines of a JUWTF. The overall personnel authorization increased from 107 to 227, but this figure also included the 91 personnel previously assigned to the PSYWAR Service. The PSYWAR Service was incorporated into the headquarters as the PSYWAR Division. In addition to these 227 personnel, a 139-man Service

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Company was established to provide administrative and supply support to all units of the STD headquarters. A 192-man Signal Company was also added to bolster the STD's communication capabilities. A 107-man Medical Company was formed to provide required medical support.

Liaison Service

(S) The Liaison Service continued its ground reconnaissance role in conjunction with SOG's Ground Studies Group, but the number of reconnaissance teams increased from 21 to 30. This increase in teams was accompanied by an increase of authorized personnel from 250 to 512.

Coastal Security Service

(S) The CSS continued its maritime missions in coordination with the Maritime Studies Group. The 184 ARVN personnel authorized under the old TO&E were to return to the Liaison Service, and the CSS was scheduled to become a 412-man all VNN organization by 1 January 1971. However, ARVN personnel occupied many of the key billets in the staff and the Sea Commando Teams, and there were no trained VNN personnel available to fill these positions. Consequently, the transition to an all-VNN element was delayed until 1 July 1971 to enable the CSS to train qualified replacements.

Special Mission Service

(TS) The Vietnamese Special Forces, redesignated the Special Mission Service (SMS), was placed in the STD organization at an authorized strength of 1450 personnel to provide the required UW mission capability. The old VN Special Task Force was also absorbed into the SMS as Detachments 11 and 68 in order to stay within ARVN force structure limitations. It was envisioned by STD HQ that the STRATA, EARTH ANGEL and PIKE HILL personnel of the Special Task Force would provide area oriented expertise in future UW efforts. Three other detachments for the SMS were organized at Nha Trang during December from hand-picked members of the VNSF, and the VNSF was deactivated on 31 December.

(S) Transition to the SMS organization delayed until 1 January 1971 to avoid obstacles in recruiting. Training for employment as UW forces was also scheduled to commence 1 January 1971 at Nha Trang under the auspices of a new organization established under MACSOG's OPCON. This organization was to be entitled the Special Mission Advisory Group (SMAG) and would be composed of US Special Forces personnel from 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

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Airborne Training Center

(S) The "Combined Committee" also determined that the STD could have only one training center to support its operations. Camp Ouyet Thang (Camp Long Thanh) was selected as the training site, and the Airborne Training Center continued with its mission of conducting training programs for the Liaison Service with the advice and assistance of the Training Studies Group. In addition the center assumed the responsibility of conducting specialized training for the SMS, and the authorized strength was increased from 72 to 200 personnel.

Air support Service

(S) The Air Support Service was added to the STD organization to provide liaison with the VNAF for obtaining required air assets. It was tasked to carry out airborne, air support, and air reconnaissance for the STD operational units.

(S) The necessary air support for STD operations was discussed at a special meeting of the "Combined Committee" on 24 October. Dedicated air assets were requested by the STD for the Air Support Service. These assets included an augmented helicopter squadron, observation and fighter squadrons, a transportation detachment and an aerial reconnaissance detachment. The VNAF representative, Colonel Nguyen Huu Tan, stated that existing Air Force Divisions could support operations for Corps and MR's only and could not support the STD with dedicated air assets; aircraft would have to be provided on a mission priority basis only. STD attempted to reclaim this decision on two separate occasions but was unsuccessful. The 219th Helicopter Squadron would, however, continue to provide support for STD/SOG operations.

EXPLOITATION FORCES

(TS) JCS requested that plans be developed to intensify exploitation operations in the PFAO utilizing all-indigenous leadership (Msg (TS), CJCS 7233/121213Z Aug 70). These plans were prepared by MACSOG and submitted on 13 September (Msg (TS), COMUSMACV 130015Z Sep 70). The immediate goal of the plans was to produce six all-indigenous led company size forces, capable of combat operations without US ground presence in either leadership or advisory roles. Three companies were to be targeted against the SHAO and three against the PFAO; however, all companies were to have the capability of conducting combat operations in either AO, provided air and logistical support was available.

(TS) MACSOG intelligence gathering activities would continue to have top priority. Exploitation operations were to be directed against targets.

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developed by RTs or by aerial visual and photo reconnaissance. Forces in strength, not to exceed three platoon equivalents, would be launched from existing MACSOG support sites to interdict, harass, and disrupt the VC/NVA LOCs within the AOs. Ambushes, mining, sniping, and raids on way stations, cache sites, truck parks, POL storage sites, communications centers, transshipment points, and river posts were to be emphasized. Operations were to be planned as short term (up to five days), but the actual length would be determined by the operational situation.

(S) The Plan was scheduled to be implemented in four phases. Phase I involved the reorganization of six existing companies, selection of VN leaders to replace US personnel, and assignment and retraining of the newly organized VN platoon size elements. Although the STD had difficulty in obtaining leaders for the companies, Phase I was completed in December at CLT. (See Appendix XIV.) Platoon operations were to be conducted from the C&C's during Phase II. Phase III involved advanced training and company operations. Phase IV expanded the interdiction operations and increased the number of exploitation companies.

(S) Eight additional exploitation companies were scheduled to be trained and equipped for Phase IV and were supposed to be recruited and ready to start training at the completion of Phase I. The STD however, continued to experience difficulty in obtaining capable ARVN leaders. Although there were sufficient troops available to form five additional companies, no more than three companies could be provided ARVN leadership (five officers and 15 NCO's per company). The number of additional companies was subsequently reduced to three.

(S) Personnel for the three additional companies were primarily Montagnards and were to be transferred from the 5th Special Forces Group Mobile Strike Force assets on 1 January 1971. Two companies would then be organized at Kontum and one at Ban Me Thuot, and the training cycle was scheduled to start later in January. ARVN leaders for these companies were to be provided by the STD and would commence training at CLT with their assigned companies. Although the potential areas of employment of the Montagnards was restricted, the Director, STD, was of the opinion that they would be very effective in the Kontum, Ban Me Thuot area in particular and the Highlands areas in general.

SPECIAL MISSION SERVICE

(S) On 8 December, COMUSMACV approved the concept of employment for the SMS and the proposed US Special Forces Advisory Element for the SMS, SMAG. The SMS was to be organized with a Headquarters, a Support/Service Company, and five Special Mission Detachments. A Signal Platoon and a Medical Platoon was to be provided on an as required basis from STD Headquarters. Each Special Mission Detachment was to command and control nine subordinate 12-man Special

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GLOSSARY CODE WORDS, SOG WORDS, PHASES and COMMON CALL SIGNS

ABCCC	Airborne Command and Control Center (Laos, BARREL ROLL Area)
ABLE MABEL	Tactical Reconnaissance in South Vietnam
AIZ	Air Interdiction Zone
ALASKA	Thu Duc (SOG-33)
ALLEY CAT	Call sign for ABCCC during night time in BARREL ROLL Area
ANGRY TALKER	Secure word for Golf-5 Radio Relay Site
ARC LIGHT	B-52 Strike
ARIZONA	Cambodia (SOG-33)
BARREL ROLL	Northwest Area of Laos (SOG-32)
BI FROST	NVA [] inserts discontinued Aug 70 (SOG-33)
BLACKBEARD	Cross-beach missions in-country in support of CAS, 3MAF and XXIV Corps in the IFFV/I Corps area. Originates from NAD (now DODGE MARK) (SOG-33)
BLUE BOOK	Intel collection plan for DANIEL BOONE AO (both obsolete)
BLUE CHIP	Psyop material (SOG-33)
BLUE TREE	7th AF Command Post (TSN) (SOG-60)
BORDEN (C)	Tactical Reconnaissance over NVN (SOG-20)
BRIGHAM	A diversionary operation of Airborne Studies Group designed to confuse the enemy counterintelligence apparatus using NVA/VC volunteers
BRIGHT LIGHT	Call word for GCI (Ground Control Intercept) at Udorn, RTAFB, Thailand
BUGS	JPRC (Joint Personnel Recovery Center) recovery mission (SOG-80)
BUFFALO HUNTER	SOG commo. [] Clark AFB, Philippines (SOG-60)
CADO	Drone photography flown by SAC over NVN, also known as BUMPY ACTION (SOG-20)
CALIFORNIA	Maritime intelligence, psyops, and cross-beach missions (SOG-31)
CANDLES	Russia (SOG-33) (discontinued) (SOG word)
CEDAR WALK	Radio tapes (SOG-33)
CIRCUS ACT	Indigenous Cambodian intelligence collection teams (SOG-36)
CLSC-V	Wire tap operations run by SOG 35/36
COLD TURKEY	COMSEC Logistic Support Center - Vietnam (SOG-60)
COMBAT SPEAR	Psyops material (leaflets, gift kits, radios, [])
COMMANDO HUNT	90th Special Operations Squadron, C-130E's (SOG-32)
COVEY	7th AF program for enemy interdiction in Laos
CRICKET	PRAIRIE FIRE FAC call sign
CSS	Daytime call sign for ABCCC in BARREL ROLL Area
DANIEL BOONE	Vietnamese counterpart organization of Maritime Studies Group (Coastal Security Service)
DCPG	Now known as SALEM HOUSE
	Defense Communications Planning Group

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DEWEY RIFLE	Nickname referring to cross-beach missions conducted in-country (SOG-31)
DIAMOND HEAD	Use of people sniffers
DODGE MARK	Cross-beach operations in-country (SOG-31)
DORSAL FIN	Tactical reconnaissance photography over Cambodia run by 7th AF (now FACE VALUE) (SOG-20)
DOUBLE CROSS	RT operations into DMZ under control of 3d MAF
DUEL BLADE	Replaced nickname DYE MARKER. Ground obstacle system to impede infiltration into RVN. Compatible with IGLOO WHITE
DUEL SPEAR	A ground obstacle to infiltration
DUFFLE BAG	Employment of DCPG resources in SEA for purposes other than to impede infiltration from NVN to SVN
DUMP TRUCK	Air supported antipersonnel sub-system of IGLOO-WHITE program
DUST COVER	Modular transportable sensor data collection and processing system
EARTH ANGEL	NVA Hoi Chanh recon teams
EGGS	Gift kits (SOG-33) (discontinued)
[]	Relating to introduction of [] in enemy hands. Also known as [] and [] (discontinued)
EL PASO	COMUSMACV OPLAN for overground operations across Rte 9 in Laos
FACE VALUE	Tactical recon in Cambodia
FLAMING ARROW	Unclass name for in-country recon operations conducted by 5th SFGA under the control of Senior Corps Advisors using assets (teams, etc) programmed for SALEM HOUSE (discontinued)
FLYING HORSE	Now known as SALEM HOUSE
FOOTBOY (C)	SOG covert operations against NVN
FORAE (C)	Diversionsary operations against NVN. Active sub-programs are BORDEN (C) and OODLES (C) under FOOTBOY (C) program
FORD DRUM	Low level, hand held aerial photography over the SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE AO's
FOUNTAIN PEN	High altitude leaflet drop along RICE RIVER, Cambodian-SVN borders
FRANTIC GOAT	High altitude leaflet drop along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos, Cambodia
FULL CRY	Unclass name for MACV plan to conduct large-scale military operations in S. Laos
GAME WARDEN	Inland waterways patrols interdicting VC shipping
GIANT NAIL	High altitude photography (U-2) over SEA
GIANT SCALE	High altitude photography over SEA (other than U-2)
GOLDEN EARRING	Unclass name for TAC AIR missions (strikes) in support of RT's
HAILSTONES	M4A resupply containers
HATCHET FORCE	OP-35 platoon size exploitation force. No longer used
HAVOC FORCE	OP-35 Multi-platoon size exploitation force. No longer used
HAYMAKER FORCE	Battalion-size force. No longer used
HEAVY HOOK	SOG C-123's

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HICKORY
HILLSBORO
HORNET FORCE

OP-35 Hill 950 Radio Relay Site
Call word for ABCCC during the day (STEEL TIGER)
Platoon-size force

ICE CUBES

Psyops against NVN under FOOTBOY(C)

IGLOO WHITE

Leaflets (SOG-33)

IGLOO WHITE/

Sensors placed on LOC's

DUFFLE BAG

IGLOO WHITE in-country

IGLOO WHITE/

COMMANDO HUNT

IGLOO WHITE operations in Laos or DMZ and NVN

INSISTENSE (S)

SOG MAROPS in coordination with MARKET TIME (NAVFORV) to prevent infiltration by sea into SVN

INVERT

Call word of GCI radar at NPN, RTAFB, Thailand

Introduction of

Also

and

in enemy hands.
(discontinued)

JGS

Joint General Staff, RVNAF

LEAPING LENA

Superseded nickname for cross-border operations in Laos

LIAISON SERVICE

Counterpart to SOG-35. Subordinate element of the STD

LEGHORN

Call sign for Golf-5 Radio Relay Site

LOKI

SOG Naval recon activities against NVN

MARKET TIME

Coastal patrol in waters of SVN to interdict infiltration into the Delta

MIDRIFF (C)

Compromised code word replaced by SHEDDER (C)

MINT

A MAROPS interdiction boat mission where 2 or 3 PTF's are sent to one of six specific OP areas of the coast of NVN to destroy shipping and take prisoners

MOON BEAM

Call sign of ABCCC at night (STEEL TIGER)

MUD RIVER

Air supported anti-vehicular sub-system of the IGLOO WHITE program

Psyop program

Cambodia and SVN

into Laos,

NAD

Naval Advisory Detachment. Operates base for MAROPS

NASTY PTF's

Craft employed by MAROPS on missions north of 17.00N

NEW YORK

SOG-33 word for NVN

NICKEL STEEL

SOG operations in the DMZ

OODLES (C)

Notional agent teams in NVN; under FORAE (C) program

PANAMA

Call sign for GCI radar at Da Nang AFB

PARADISE

CU LAO CHAM Island (closed down)

PARBOIL (C)

MAROPS in support of FOOTBOY (C) operations in NVN.

PARFAIT (C)

Formerly PLOWMAN (C)

PATIO (C)

SSPL pseudo organization in NVN, under FOOTBOY (C)

TAC AIR strikes in support of SALEM HOUSE

PFSP

(SOG-33)

People's Front for Social Progress (SOG-33)

PIKE HILL

Ethnic Cambodian intel collection teams

Program by which various types

Inserted into NVA/VC areas of Cambodia

Laos and RVN. Also known as

and

(Discontinued 23 Feb 70)

POLLACK (C)	Project to incriminate North Vietnamese personalities as anti-regime, dissident elements; under FORAE (C), never implemented
PRACTICE NINE	Unclas name for a series of plans concerning the establishment of barriers in the vicinity of the DMZ and augmented by air interdiction, mining and recon in Laos
PRAIRIE FIRE	Cross-border operations into SOG's Laotian AO
PROJECT ATHENS	COMUSMACV operations to cut Rte 110 in Laos
PROJECT BUFFALO	COMUSMACV operations to cut Rte 547 A Shau Valley
PROJECT JENNY	Abn Psyops broadcasts (no longer operational)
RED ROCKET	Special alerting message originated at JCS level
ROLLING THUNDER	Area in NVN north of TALLY HO Area
RUB DOWN	Unclas name for MACV plans to conduct large-scale operations into Cambodia
SALEM HOUSE	Cross-border operations into Cambodia
SCU	Special Commando Unit
SEA DRAGON	USN interdiction of NVN coastal shipping 17.00N to 18.00N
SEALS	Sea Air Land - the term applies to specially qualified Naval personnel
SHEDDER (C)	Airdrops in support of FOOTBOY (C)
SHOT GUN	Unclas name for SOG draft deception plan (June 66) to simulate preparatory actions of an amphibious landing force in the area north of the DMZ
SINGLETON	An agent operation of Airborne Studies Group
SLAM	Search, locate, annihilate and monitors special missions often performed by the C&C detachments
SNOW FLAKES	SOG word for MA6 containers
SOAP BUBBLES	Indigenous RT members
[REDACTED]	Psyops [REDACTED] in Laos and Cambodia
SPIKE TEAM	OP-35 twelve man recon team. No longer used. Applied to short term operation concept to exploit an identified situation
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] (SOG-33)
SSO	Special Security Office
STEEL TIGER	Panhandle of Southern Laos
STRATA	Short term reconnaissance and target acquisition teams used in cross-border ops
STRAW HATS	US RT members
STRAY GOOSE	Now known as COMBAT SPEAR
SWIFT POPS	A 50 foot American built patrol boat craft capable of 25 knots, used mostly for logistic support
TALLY HO	Area extending from south of the DMZ to the northern border of Route Package One (Vicinity of VINH, NVN)
TAR HEELS	Incapacitating gas
TASK FORCE ALPHA	AF organization that operates IGLOO WHITE
TEAR DROPS	Materials for drop on the HO CHI MINH TRAIL
TIGER HOUND	Southern portion of Laos panhandle
TIMBERWORK (C)	Agent operations in NVN in support of FOOTBOY (C) program
TOTEM POLE	Identification of wire tap equipment
TRAFFIC COP	Destroyer operations against coastal shipping of NVN 17.00N to 18.00N also known as SEA DRAGON

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TROJAN HORSE
WACO CITY

WATERBOY
WILD WEASEL

YANKEE STATION

YANKEE TEAM
YOUNG TIGERS

PSYOPS in SVN of

High level U-2 photography, now known as GIANT NAIL
Reaction teams inserted at sites of enemy contact or
downed a/c to recover bodies or survivors
Call sign for GCI at Dong Ha, SVN
Aircraft employment electronic detection equipment used
to detect and destroy SAM sites
Term to describe TASK FORCE 77; that unit of 7th Fleet
that conducts air operations against NVN. Team is made
of 3 CVAs and associated destroyers providing screening
support and SAR support and also protection to MAROPS
when requested
Tactical recon over Laos
SAC program for re-locating KC-135s to Taiwan in support
of an increased B-52 effort

Addendum

C & C
CCC
CCN
CCS
CLT
NKP
SCT

Command and Control Detachment (SOG-35)
C & C Central located at Kontum
C & C North located at Da Nang
C & C South located at Ban Me Thuot
Camp Long Thanh, MACSOG-38 training HQ
Nakhon Phanom, Thailand
Sea Commando Team - CSS special operations team (SOG-37)

20 October 1970

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Paramilitary Actions in South Laos, Northeast Cambodia and Northwest Republic of Vietnam (TS)

CURRENT STATUS

- On 11 August 1970, the Chairman, JCS, dispatched a message to CINCPAC requesting: initiation of an accelerated training program to train VN leaders for PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) exploitation operations; intensification of Reconnaissance Team (RT) operations with US participation; and preparation of a plan to intensify exploitation operations as additional VN leaders are trained.
- On 30 September 1970, CINCPAC provided the above requested outline plan. (Details and time phasing at Tab 3.)
- [] a coordinated interdiction effort in the Sakong and Mekong River Valleys, Operation GAUNTLET, involving approximately 5,000 troops which began and terminated in September.
- A three (3) platoon PRAIRIE FIRE operation (TAIL WIND) was conducted in Laos, east of Chavane, in support of [] Operation GAUNTLET from 11-14 September 1970. The primary mission of this operation was reconnaissance in force with a secondary mission of providing diversionary action for the introduction [] SGUs in the area. (Results of this operation at Tab 4.) Additional [] MACSOG operations in South Laos are planned in the future.
- JCS efforts to expand the PFAO have met with some reservations at State due to recent press releases concerning downed helicopters in the PFAO. However, on 27 August, Amb Golley posed no objection to the use of helicopter LZs up to 5 miles west of the present AO and the ground movement of the personnel east back into the AO for operations.
- On 2 September, SecDef informed the UnderSecState that the exploitation phase of PF operations should not be terminated immediately for legal reasons, but should be a political determination. To continue PF operations without US ground support would result in an unacceptable drop in effectiveness if done immediately; but a training program for total Vietnamization is being initiated in accordance with the WSAG decision of 4 August 1970.

~~TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL~~

2	CALCULATED
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	98-F-0410
	98-TS-045
	3

DISCONTINUING POSITION

- On 5 September 1970, the Acting Secretary of State, in a memorandum to the SecDef, stated that he understood that a decision had been reached to discontinue the use of US personnel in PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation operations and felt that this problem should be placed before the highest authority for resolution.

- As a result of the 10 September NSAC, a request for decision on US participation in PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation operations was referred to highest authority. On 13 October the highest authority authorized the continued use of US personnel in the exploitation phase of PRAIRIE FIRE operations for 90 days beginning 18 Sep 70, pending training of Vietnamese leadership for this type operation. No change in policy of employing US personnel on intelligence gathering operations is contemplated at this time.

BACKGROUND

- Subject operations have been under discussion by interagency groups since May 1970 and the subject of State, CIA, JCS, CINCPAC, and MACV message traffic since 2 June 1970.

- [] expanding its operations on the Bolovens Plateau and in the Sekong River Valley in Laos as well as introducing small teams into northeastern Cambodia.

- The JCS have proposed intensifying and expanding PF operations to the Sekong River; however, State objects to the use of US-advised (led) PF forces in populated areas of Laos.

Prepared by:
Lt Col J. Seay III, USA
J-3
Special Operations Division
Ext: 72602

Attachments

Operating Authorities for PRAIRIE FIRE (Laos) and
SALEM HOUSE (Cambodia)

19 November 1970

FACT SHEET

Subject: Expansion and Intensification of
PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS

CURRENT STATUS

- PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) operations are small reconnaissance and exploitation operations conducted into South Laos from RVN to a depth of approximately 20 kilometers under the command and control of the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG).

- PF assets consist of reconnaissance teams (RT), exploitation platoons and exploitation companies.

- MACSOG is presently conducting an accelerated training program to train Vietnamese leaders to replace US advisors in exploitation (platoon and company) operations (PHASE II).

- Immediate goal - train 6 all Vietnamese-led exploitation companies.

- Time phasing.

- 2 Nov 70 - first 3 platoon element begins training at Camp Long Thanh.

- 23 Nov 70 - first 3 platoon element completes training.

- 28 Dec 70 - last 3 platoon element completes training.

- 23 Jan 71 - first company element begins company training.

- 13 Feb 71 - first company element completes training and is prepared for employment as an all-indigenous unit.

- 23 Mar 71 - last company element completes training and is prepared for employment as an all-indigenous unit.

- Long Range goal-train 8 additional ARVN-led exploitation companies. Personnel to be provided by 12 CIDG companies not committed to the Border Base Defense Program.

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3	GATEWAY
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Case No.	98-F-0410
T.S. No.	98-15-045
Document No.	2

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2

- Anticipated by MACV that ARVN inputs will be available to permit start of training for this group on 1 Jan 71.

- MACSOG plans to intensify RT operations (Phase I).

- Dependent on weather, enemy troop concentrations and air support.

- More Phase I RT insertions using night low-level parachute drops.

- Increase high altitude - low opening parachute insertion techniques.

- Train more Vietnamese in this technique.

- Increase overland infiltration missions.

- Expand number of helo landing zones.

- A 5 KM insertion zone -- beyond existing PF boundary -- coordinated with CAS and Vientiane.

- Increase number of false inserts to provide deceptive cover.

- Presently have - 55 US-led reconnaissance teams
7 ARVN-led reconnaissance teams

- Plans to intensify Exploitation Operations (PHASE II).

- Exploitation operations launch overland or by helo.

- Conduct operations to interdict, harass, and disrupt VC/NVA LOC.

- Focus on LOC and will not normally be directed against enemy troops.

- Emphasize ambushes, mining, sniping.

- Conduct raids on way stations, cache sites, truck parks, POL sites, communication centers, transshipment points, river ports.

- Short duration operations (up to 5 days).

BACKGROUND

- Subject operations have been under discussion by

interagency groups since May 1970 and the subject of State.
CIA, JCS, CINCPAC and MACV message traffic since 2 June 1970.

- [] expanding its operations in South Laos.

- The JCS have proposed intensifying and expanding PF
operations to the Sekong River.

- MACSOG [] planning and conducting coordinated
operations in South Laos (TAIL WIND - GAUNTLET).

Prepared by:
LTC Jeff Seay III, USA
Special Operations Division, J-3
Ext: 72602/72650

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01

P R I O R I T Y

27 SEP 78

P 271732Z ZFF-6

FM ADMIRAL MCCAIN, CINCPAC

TO GENERAL ABRAMS, COMUSMACV

INFO ADMIRAL MOORER, CJCS

ZEN/LT GAN CORCORAN, ADMIN CINCPAC

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET LINDIS EYES ONLY~~

GOLF 8 FOR ADMIN CINCPAC

OPN TAILWIND

A. COMUSMACV 280919Z SEP 78

B. COMUSMACV 251130Z SEP 78

1 (U) REFS A AND B PROVIDED SUMMARY INFORMATION ON OPN TAILWIND.

2. GPST I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE IMPRESSIVE RESULTS OF OPN TAILWIND. WHILE THE HELQ LOSSES ARE REGRETTABLE THE TANGIBLE RESULTS, AS HIGHLIGHTED IN ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES; AND THE VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED, SHOULD PROVE OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO THE OVERALL INTERDICTION EFFORT. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT UPON THE ENEMY OF KNOWING THAT HE POSSESSES VERY FEW SANCTUARIES, OTHER THAN HIS HOMETLAND, IS A VALUABLE ANCILLARY WHICH MAY PROVE OF EVEN GREATER VALUE THAN THE PHYSICAL RESULTS OF THIS MISSION.

3. (U) PLEASE PASS MY HIGHEST COMMENDATIONS TO THE MEN INVOLVED IN OPN TAILWIND AND TO THEM A SINCERE "WELL DONE".

4. (U) WARM REGARDS.

DECLASSIFIED

BY JCS

DATE 6/15/98

GP-1.

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~~ONLY~~

CSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ONLY~~

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Case No. 98-A-0410
T.S. No. 98-TS-045
Document No. 4

CONTROL NUMBER: 2909

OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS
ROOM 2E855, THE PENTAGON

DATE RECEIVED
23 Sep 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER

DJSM 1381-70

COPY NUMBER

Q+1

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJECT

DATE OF DOCUMENT

22 Sep 70

Operation TAIL WIND

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION. THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

TO	NAME	INITIAL
2	CHAIRMAN, JCS	11/11

REMARKS

23 September 1970

23 September 1970

1. Attached memo provides an initial wrap-up of Operation TAIL WIND. Helo losses to TAIL WIND remain as previously reported (2 CH-53s and 1 AH-1G). There are no indications at this time that the operation was compromised prior to launch into the target area.
2. The final

2. The final report will be forwarded on or about 27 September.

Very respectfully,

DAVIS

Lib-0

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TOP SECRET CONTROL

Copy No. 68-3
Case No. 98-1-0410
T.S. No. 98
Document No. TS-045

Doc 2



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1381-70
22 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

1. (TS) This memorandum will provide you an interim wrap-up of Operation TAIL WIND. Because of the complexity of the operation, all the data have not been compiled and analysed as of this date.
2. (TS) The mission of Operation TAIL WIND was to conduct a reconnaissance in force with three (3) exploitation platoons along the PRAIRIE FIRE western boundary. A secondary objective was to provide diversion for forces conducting interdiction operations on Route 165 in the vicinity of Chavane, Laos.
3. (TS) Initiation of Operation TAIL WIND was delayed due to weather conditions from 3 Sep 70 to 11 Sep 70. The extended standby status for supporting aircraft initially caused minor problems which were promptly resolved. Weather delays as such, however, caused no major changes to the initial plan for Operation TAIL WIND.
4. (TS) There are no indications that Operation TAIL WIND was compromised in any manner prior to the launch into the target area. All planning and coordination were conducted only in US channels on a strict need-to-know basis.
5. (TS) Reaction of CAS/Vientiane to Operation TAIL WIND was favorable as reflected in the following messages transmitted 15 Sep 70:

a. To Colonel Sadler, Chief SOG, []
QUOTE:

(1) I wish to express our thanks and admiration for the manner in which your assets have assisted Operation GAUNTLET with aggressive activities in Operation TAIL WIND.

(2) Note that you have had a rather rough time south of Chavane but we are confident that had it not been for your efforts, [] losses would have been even higher. We cannot help but believe that our combined efforts are greatly confusing the enemy as to friendly intentions and are effectively handicapping his ongoing logistical efforts.

(3) Once again thanks for a job well done and please accept our appreciation for the high degree of professionalism shown by you and your staff.
UNQUOTE.

b. To General Abrams, from Ambassador Godley. QUOTE:

(1) Greatly appreciate the assistance your MACVSOG forces have rendered Operation GAUNTLET. Operation TAIL WIND seems to be running into tough sledding even as are the forces of Operation GAUNTLET south of Chavane.

(2) The aggressiveness of the forces under your command as exemplified by Col Sadler's men participating in Operation TAIL WIND is certainly contributing to our relatively successful infiltration into the Chavane area.

(3) I wish to extend my personal thanks to you and all your officers who have contributed to this joint effort and hope that in the future we may successfully enter into other operations of this nature which contribute to the accomplishment of our objectives in the Panhandle. All the best. As ever. UNQUOTE.

6. (TS) Helicopter losses for Operation TAIL WIND were two (2) CH-53 helicopters destroyed and one (1) AH-1G helicopter gunship destroyed.

7. (TS) The results of Operation TAIL WIND have not been completely correlated at this time, however, the following is an extract of a briefing presented to COMUSMACV by J-2 during the Weekly Intelligence Evaluation Update on 19 September 1970:

a. A friendly guerrilla exploitation force operating 25 KM east of Chavane between 11-14 Sep 70, captured a large volume of documents which appear to be the most significant collateral intelligence found on the 559th Transportation Group since the beginning of the war.

b. There were thirty-four (34) documents consisting of 401 pages evaluated as Category A by the Combined Document Exploitation Center, "of immediate tactical value."

c. Initial readout of these documents revealed information such as:

(1) The complete order of battle of the transportation battalion subordinate to Binh Tram 44.


(2) That the transportation battalion had 145 vehicles.

(3) That only 17 of these vehicles were used during Aug 70.

(4) That the battalion only reached 50% of its quota for moving supplies during Jul 70 due to shortage of fuel and spare parts.

(5) That the Binh Tram elements have shown great concern during the last few months over increasing guerrilla activity in their areas. Combat service support personnel are being trained in infantry tactics; fortifications are being prepared; and counterattack plans are being made to counter the threat from guerrillas.

8. (TS) A final wrap-up and summary will be forwarded on or about 27 Sep 70 when the after action reports are evaluated by MACV.



JOHN W. VOGT
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20381
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

16 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR LT GEN KNOWLES

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

Per your request, the attached correspondence and messages pertain to Operation TAIL WIND, a 3 platoon PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation force operating in Laos in support of [] Operation GAUNTLET:

Memo to CJCS (16 Sep)	TAB A
Memo to CJCS (15 Sep)	TAB B
Memo to CJCS (14 Sep)	TAB C
PRAIRIE FIRE Progress Rpt No. 1346	TAB D
PRAIRIE FIRE Progress Rpt No. 1345	TAB E
PRAIRIE FIRE Progress Rpt No. 1344	TAB F
PRAIRIE FIRE Progress Rpt No. 1343	TAB G
PRAIRIE FIRE Progress Rpt No. 1342	TAB H
SECSTATE to VTN 15 Sep 70	TAB I
VTN to SECSTATE 13 Sep 70	TAB J
VTN to SECSTATE 27 Aug 70	TAB K
COMUSMACV to CINCPAC	TAB L
[] Operation GAUNTLET	TAB M

44	OATSD(PA)DFOISR
	TOP SECRET CONTROL
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Case No.	98-F-0410
T.S. No.	98-TS-045
Document No.	6

Doc 3



THE JOINT STAFF

~~TOP SECRET - SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 Sep 70

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND (U)

1. (TS) This is an updated report concerning Operation TAIL WIND, a 3 platoon PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) force operating in support of [] Operation GAUNTLET in Laos.
2. (TS) On 141100H Sep 70, while enroute to the extraction LZ, the unit made contact with an unknown size enemy force at YC 440037, resulting in no friendly casualties and one (1) enemy KIA. The unit also captured numerous military documents and one (1) 120mm mortar which was subsequently destroyed.
3. (TS) On 141300H Sep 70, the unit arrived at the extraction LZ at YC 446036 and was extracted at 141421H Sep 70 under heavy small arms fire. One (1) CH-53 helicopter, tail number YH-18 sustained extensive damage during extraction and subsequently crashed at 652921 resulting in one (1) SCU KIA and six (6) US crew members WIA. The crew and passengers were extracted and returned to RVN without further incident.
4. (TS) The total aircraft loss for Operation TAIL WIND is three (3) CH-53s, one (1) AH-1G and one (1) AH-1H.
5. (U) Attached is an interim report on Operation GAUNTLET []

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification



THE JOINT STAFF


THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1356-70
15 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

1. (TS) This is an updated report concerning Operation TAIL WIND, a 3 platoon PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) force operating in support of Operation GAUNTLET in Laos.
2. (TS) On the morning of 13 Sep 70, it was reported that there was heavy activity around the PF force's perimeter. The unit then moved from its RON position to an LZ. Under the protection of suppressive fires, one (1) CH-53 helicopter, tail number YH-14, while attempting to extract the force, hit a tree with its rotor blade and aborted the landing. The aircraft then began movement back to its base but was hit by a B-40 rocket and crashed at YB 450056. The crew members suffered minor injuries and were rescued by a second CH-53 helicopter. The downed helicopter was subsequently destroyed by TAC AIR. The second helicopter, tail number YH-20, sustained extensive damage from small arms and .51 caliber fire but was able to return to base without further incident. A doorgunner in YH-20 reported that he shot one (1) enemy soldier during the rescue mission.
3. (TS) A second attempt to extract wounded from the ground unit was conducted by one (1) UH-1H helicopter, tail number 560, but received heavy small arms fire in the vicinity of the LZ (YC 441042) and sustained minor damage. One (1) AH-1G helicopter gunship, tail number 640, sustained extensive damage while providing suppressive fires during the extraction attempt. Both aircraft returned to their base without further incident.



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4. (TS) At 131445H Sep 70, the force moved to YB 437033 and established a defensive position and reported no further enemy activity as of 132400.
5. (TS) By separate message on 14 Sep 70, MACSOG indicated that the TAIL WIND exploitation force would be exfiltrated by helicopter. (Ref MACV 140530Z Sep 70 to JCS, JCS IN 22254.
6. (TS) On 140245 EDT Sep 70, one CH-53D was hit by enemy ground fire during an attempted extraction operation and crashed. The crew was recovered safely and the aircraft was destroyed by friendly aircraft to prevent capture.
7. (TS) One UH-1H was shot down and destroyed by enemy ground fire on 14 Sep 70, 13 nautical miles west-southwest of the A SEAU Valley. All four crew members were rescued but were slightly wounded. This aircraft was in support of PRAIRIE FIRE operations.
8. (U) We are not now aware of the status of extraction of the force. (As of 141100 Sep 70)

JOHN W. VCCT
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

1 Attachment -- Map

~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~
~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1345-70
14 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND


1. (TS) On 11 September 1970, three PRAIRIE FIRE platoons were inserted in the TANGO-2 target area (YB 430930) with a mission of reconnaissance in force. The operation is being run in conjunction with [] Operation GAUNTLET and will provide a diversion in support.

2. (TS) During the insertion, moderate to heavy small arms fire was received from SW of the LZ. Friendly casualties were two (2) SCU WIA. Later on 11 September 1970, the force discovered an ammo supply dump that contained an unknown number of rockets, large caliber artillery rounds, small arms ammo, and bicycles. The supply dump was destroyed. The force then made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in two (2) US WIA; enemy casualties are unknown. The team then established an RON position and reported negative enemy activity.

3. (TS) The following aircraft damage was sustained on 11 September 1970 during the insertion on TANGO-2:

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Tail No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
2 CH-53 (USMC)	12, 13	Light damage from small arms fire	Returned to KONTUM
1 AH-1G, Gunship (USA)	081	1 hit in canopy	Returned to DAK TO
3 AH-1G, Gunships (USMC)	21, 25, 13	Light damage from small arms fire	Returned to KONTUM

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1 AH-1G, Gunship C6
(USMC)

Moderate
damage from
small arms
fire

Returned to
KONTUM

4. (TS) On 12 September 1970, the force was moving west and heard tracked vehicles to the north. A short time later, the force made contact with an estimated ten (10) man enemy squad resulting in one (1) US WIA and one SCU WIA. Enemy casualties are unknown. Several hours later, the unit made contact with an estimated thirty (30) man enemy platoon. Later, the enemy platoon had been reinforced to an estimated company size element (100-150 personnel). Total friendly casualties were one (1) SCU KIA and fifteen (15) SCU WIA; enemy casualties are unknown. TAC AIR strikes were directed against enemy positions and the enemy broke contact.

5. (TS) During an attempted medevac mission, the following aircraft damage was sustained from heavy ground fire in the vicinity of YC 435079:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Tail No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1 AH-1G, Gunship (suspected USA)	849	Shot down and de- stroyed	Two pilots rescued and sustained only minor injuries
1 AH-1G, Gunship (suspected USA)	571	Minor damage	Returned to base
4 UH-1H (suspected USA)	135, 153, 487, 554	Minor damage	Returned to base

6. (TS) On the night of 12 September 1970, the unit reported in-coming small arms, B-40 rocket and mortar fire but sustained no further casualties. A C-130 gunship was directed against suspected enemy positions with unknown results.

7. (TS) Additional information: AMEMBASSY, Vientiane, in his 6184 to SECSTATE recommended that this loss be reported as having occurred in "the South Vietnamese/Laothian

border area". The Ambassador feels that reporting the loss of this gunship in the Lao Panhandle will attract unnecessary attention to PRAIRIE FIRE operations in Laos since helicopter gunships are primarily used in support of ground forces.

3. (TS) Total casualties for Operation TAIL WIND as of 12 September 1970 are as follows:

<u>US</u>			<u>VN</u>			<u>EN</u>
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	Unknown
0	0	3	1	0	13	
<u>Aircraft</u>						
<u>Damaged</u>		<u>Lost</u>				
11		1				

JOHN W. VOGT
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Attachment
1 Map

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

W/2

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24914
SECT 01 OF 24596

ACTION:
DISTR SACSA(03) NMCC(01) J3(04) SECDEF(05) CSA CSAF CNO CMC NSC(08).
DIA(31) CIA NSA MOCO AMCCO NEOP STATEOP FILE(1)
(025)

ADV DISTR NMCC(01) SECDEF(05) DIA(J3)
TRANSIT/151230Z/151537Z/0001070R2501535
DE RHMSMVA #4012 2501515
ZNY TTTTT
O 151230Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMKAA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS
RUMJFS/AMEMB VIENTIANE
RUSVAF/AMEMB BANGKOK
RUMCUVA/USARMA VIENTIANE
RUMKBSA/CINCSARPAC
RUMHMTA/COMUSMACTHAI
RUMAAVA/CG IFFV
RUMHFA/CG XXIV CORPS
RUMJCS/UDORN BIRDDOG
BT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE

03

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS
SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL JPCCO 1925 (SOG)
A. COMUSMACV 1697 (SOG) DTG 141140Z SEP 70 (TS)
1. (U) THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD 132400H - 142400H SEP 70
2. (S) INTENTS: INTEND TO INSERT ONE (1) RT INTO THE FOLLOWING
TARGET AREA ON 16 SEP 70: INDIA-4 (XD 553515) POINT
RECONNAISSANCE, POL FACILITIES.
3. (S) STATUS OF TEAMS PREVIOUSLY INTENDED: THE INSERTION OF
ONE (1) RT INTO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TARGET AREAS HAS NOT BEEN
COMPLETED AT THE TIME OF THIS REPORT:
A. ECHO-8 (YD 021047) ROADWATCH, RTE 922
B. JULIETT-9 (YB 440352) AREA RECON
C. LIMA-4 (YC 325721) ROUTE RECON, RTE 923
D. GOLF-7 (YB 675370) PW CAPTURE
4. (S) TEAMS CURRENTLY ACTIVE:
A. THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS REMAIN IN THEIR TARGET AREAS AND
CONTINUE THEIR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS BUT HAVE REPORTED NO ENEMY
ACTIVITY OR SIGHTINGS;

PAGE 1

ANNEXES: COPY NUMBERS: SACSA(3)1-3 NMCC(01)4 J3(4)5-8 SECDEF(5)9-13
NSC(9)14-21 DIA(3)22-24 FILE(1)25

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BY JCS

DATE 6/15/98

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

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24914

TGT/LOC/COT/UNIT/MISSION/INSERTED/CURRENT LOC/DTG

(1) G-5/N-BA 607/YB 604355/US-LED RT/RADIO RELAY/20 AUG 70/
YB 604355/142000H SEP 70.

(2) RVN/S-BA 607/YC 375400 (RVN/US-LED PLT/RADIO RELAY/
7 SEP 70/YC 375400 (RVN)/142000H SEP 70.

(3) G-5/N-BA 607/YB 604355/US-LED RT/AREA RECON/11 SEP 70/
YB 613375/141620H SEP 70.

(4) H-9/S-BA 607/YC 375400/US-LED RT/AREA RECON/7 SEP 70/
YC 375400 (RVN)/142000H SEP 70.

(5) AS-4/BA 607/YC 470722/US-LED RT/RIVERWATCH. DAK PALLY
RIVER/11 SEP 70/YC 450682/141747H SEP 70.

B. THE FOLLOWING TEAM IS ACTIVE AND HAS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: RVN/S-DMZ/XD 843450/US-LED PLT/RADIO RELAY/20 AUG 70/
XD 843450 (RVN): ON 141800H SEP 70, THE PLATOON REPORTED THAT ONE

(1) AH-1G HELICOPTER GUNSHIP HAD OBSERVED AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY
FORCE AT XD 803457 (RVN). AFTER COORDINATING THROUGH 1ST BDE,

5TH INF DIV (MECH), THE GUNSHIP ENGAGED THE ENEMY FORCE WITH
UNKNOWN RESULTS. DURING THE MISSION THE GUNSHIP RECEIVED SMALL

ARMS FIRE FROM THE TARGET AREA, 775 7 5-8.3S, 9 #85, ON
141820H SEP 70, THE PLATOON ENGAGED THE ENEMY FORCE WITH

.50 CALIBER AND 7.62MM MACHINE GUN FIRE AND EIGHTEEN (18)
60MM MORTAR ROUNDS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS (NFI).

5. (2) EXTRACTIONS:

A. T-3/W-BA 607/YC 182748/US-LED RT/RIVERWATCH ON JUNCTIONS
XKONG, XE RON, AND XE SAP RIVERS/13 SEP 70.

ON 141345H SEP 70, AT YC 173752, THE TEAM REPORTED THAT AN UNKNOWN
SIZE ENEMY FORCE WAS MOVING SOUTH AND EAST OF THEIR LOCATION.

DUE TO THE POSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF THEIR POSITION, THE TEAM WAS
EXTRACTED ON 141613H SEP 70, AT YC 173752. DURING THE EXTRACTION

THE AIRCRAFT RECEIVED HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM SE OF THE LZ,
AND ONE (1) UH-1H HELICOPTER, TAIL NUMBER 6815741, WAS SHOT DOWN

IN THE VICINITY OF THE LZ RESULTING IN ONE (1) SCU KIA, TWO (2)
US WIA, 529 (2) SCA WIA, AND FOUR (4) US HELICOPTER CREW MEMBERS

WERE SUBSEQUENTLY EXTRACTED BY ADDITIONAL HELICOPTERS AND RETURNED
TO RVN WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENTS. ADDITIONAL DETAILS WILL BE

PROVIDED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.

B. I-4/E-BA 604/XD 553505/US-LED RT/POINT RECONNAISSANCE,
POL FACILITIES/14 SEP 70, THE TEAM WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER

WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 141441H SEP 70, AT XD 543477. ON 141757H
SEP 70, IN THE VICINITY OF XD 543477, THE TEAM REPORTED THAT AN

UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE WAS ATTEMPTING TO SURROUND THEM. ON
141815H SEP 70, THE TEAM MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH TWO (2) FIVE (5)

PAGE 2

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MAN ELEMENTS CLOSING IN ON THEIR POSITION FROM THE WEST AND NORTH. THE TEAM EVASDED TO THE EAST, AND, DUE TO THE COMPROMISE OF THEIR POSITION, THE TEAM WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXTRACTED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 141915H SEP 70, AT XD 650477. HELICOPTER GUNSHIP STRIKES WERE DIRECTED ON SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THE TEAM WILL BE REINSERTED INTO THE TARGET AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ADDITIONAL DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.

(1) ON 141100H SEP 70, WHILE ENROUTE TO THE EXTRACTION LZ, THE UNIT MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE AT YC 440037, RESULTING IN NO FIREFELY CASUALTIES AND ONE (1) ENEMY KIA. THE UNIT ALSO CAPTURED NUMEROUS MILITARY DOCUMENTS AND ONE (1) 120MM MORTAR WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DESTROYED.

(2) ON 141300H SEP 70, THE UNIT ARRIVED AT THE EXTRACTION LZ AT YC 440036.

(3) ON 141421H SEP 70, THE UNIT WAS EXTRACTED UNDER HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE. ONE (1) CH-53 HELICOPTER, TAIL NUMBER YH-12, SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE DURING THE EXTRACTION AND SUBSEQUENTLY CRASHED AT YD 652921 RESULTING IN ONE (1) SCU KIA AND SIX (6) US CREW MEMBERS KIA. THE CREW AND PASSENGERS WERE EXTRACTED AND RETURNED TO RVN WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

6. UPDATES:

A. REF PROG RPT 1327 (U) COMUSMACV 1734 (SOG) DTG 261030Z AUG 70 (2), PARA 4 (TANGO-5). DURING THE CONDUCT OF THIS MISSION 24-26 AUG 70, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED:

(1) THE FOLLOWING TRAILS WERE RECONNOITERED BY THE TEAM:
(A) XD 644375/241900H AUG 70: THIS NS TRAIL WAS TWO (2) METERS WIDE AND SHOWED SIGNS OF RECENT USE BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WEARING CLEATED SOLE BOOTS.

(B) XD 620376/250910H AUG 70: THIS NS TRAIL WAS ONE (1) METER WIDE AND SHOWED SIGNS OF RECENT USE BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF NORTH SOUND PERSONNEL WEARING CLEATED SOLE BOOTS.

(C) XD 606379/261200H AUG 70: THIS NS TRAIL WAS 1.5 METERS WIDE AND SHOWED SIGNS OF EXTENSIVE USE BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF SOUTHBOUND PERSONNEL WEARING CLEATED SOLE BOOTS.

(2) ON 261000H AUG 70, AT XD 609379, THE TEAM OBSERVED A WELL CAMOUFLAGED STEEL-STRINGER BRIDGE AND OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING DATA:

LENGTH-----	15 METERS
WIDTH-----	3----- 4 METERS
DECKING-----	5 CENTIMETERS (CM) THICK
TREADWAY-----	8 CENTIMETERS (CM) THICK
STRINGERS-----	3----- STEEL I-BEAMS (NFI)
CONCRETE ABUTMENTS---	NO DIMENSIONS WERE GIVEN, BUT THE TEAM

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ESTIMATED THAT THE ASUTH NTS WOULD
SUPPORT A FIVE (5) TON TRUCK.

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ACTION

DISTR SACSA(20) NMCC(31) JS(04) SECDEF(05) CSA CSAF CNO CMC NSC(05)
DIA(03) DIA NSA NMCC NMCC NEACP STATEC FILE(1)
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ADV DISTR NMCC(31) SECDEF(05) DIA(03)
TRANSIT/151200Z/151200Z/002158TOR2581917
DE RHMSMVA 44010 2501500

IMMEDIATE

ZNY TTTTT
O 151200Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS
RUHJFS/ANEMB VIENTIANE
RUSVAF/ANEMB BANGKOK
RUHOUVA/USARMA VIENTIANE
RUHKRBA/CINCSARPAC
RHHMTA/COMUSMACTHAI
RHHMAVA/CG 1FFV
RUHUFPA/CG XXIV CORPS
RUHJOD/UDORN BIRDDOG
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03

~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDS PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL JPCCO 1935 (SOG)
FINAL SECTION OF 2 SECTIONS

THE BRIDGE HAD NOT BEEN RECENTLY MAINTAINED; HOWEVER, THE TEAM
REPORTED THAT ONLY MINOR REPAIRS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE THE
BRIDGE OPERATIONAL. A WELL PREPARED FORDING POINT WAS OBSERVED
APPROXIMATELY TWENTY (20) METERS NORTH OF THE BRIDGE (NFI).

(3) ON 261230H AUG 70, AT XD 603377, THE TEAM MADE CONTACT WITH
AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE RESULTING IN NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AND
FIVE (5) ENEMY KIA (POS). THE ENEMY PERSONNEL WERE WEARING GREEN
SHIRTS, EXCEPT ONE (1) SOLDIER WHO WAS WEARING A KHAKI SHIRT, AND
THEY WERE ARMED WITH AK-47 AND SKS WEAPONS (NFI).

8. REF PROG RPT 1339 (U) COMUSMACV 1836 (SOG) DTG 071100Z SEP 70
(78) PARA 41- (DELTA MIKE-3), DURING THE CONDUCT OF THIS MISSION,
01-07 SEP 70, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED:

(1) ON 031730H SEP 70, AT XD 839692, THE TEAM HEARD AN ESTIMATED
FIVE (5) PERSONS 200 METERS WEST OF THEIR LOCATION SPEAKING IN A
NORTH VIETNAMESE DIALECT, THE TEXT WAS NOT DETERMINED.

(2) ON 031730H SEP 70, AT XD 839692, THE TEAM ENCOUNTERED
JAMMING ON FREQUENCY 37.80 (PRC-25, FM). THE JAMMING WAS

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ANNOTED COPY NUMBERS:

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FILE-(1)25

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24378

ACCOMPLISHED BY BREAKING SQUELCH WITH A HIGH POWER TRANSMITTER
ON THE SAME FREQUENCY.
7. (78) COMMENTS: THE FOLLOWING REPORT ON ROUTE 10329 WAS OBTAINED
FROM FAC DEBRIERS FOR MISSIONS FLOWN ON 13 SEP 78: THREE (3) ROAD
CREWS, EACH HAVING FIVE (5) PERSONNEL, WERE OBSERVED BETWEEN
XD 553509 AND XD 563530.

ANEMB VTN/606 521

ANEMB VTN/MAC/ 571

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(2) RVN/US-D 843450/US-LED PLT/RADIO RELAY/20 AUG 70/
XD 843450/132800H SEP 70.
(3) 6-345-04 677/YC 378400/US-LED RT/AREA RECON/7 SEP 70/
YC 378400/132800H SEP 70.
(4) AS-14BA 607/YC-70722/US-LED RT/RIVERWATCH, DAK PALLY
RIVER/ 11 SEP 70/YC 450632/130900 SEP 70
(5) G-57A-04 009/YB YP ET XAIS A LED RT/AJEA TSZIUJZC 30 70/
YB 021307/131000H SEP 70.

6. THE FOLLOWING TEAMS ARE ACTIVE AND HAVE REPORTED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(1) 12-1-21 614/YC 403220/3 PLTS/RECON IN FORCE/11 SEP 70.
(2) ON 130740H SEP 70, A FIXED WING GUNSHIP REPORTED THAT
THERE WAS HEAVY ACTIVITY AROUND THE UNITS PERIMETER AND THAT
THEY HAD BEEN IN CONTACT SINCE 130644H SEP 70 (NFI).
(3) ON 130900H SEP 70, THE UNIT MOVED FROM ITS RON POSITION
TO AN LZ AT YC 441042. AT 131210H SEP 70, WHILE BEING
PROVIDED SUPPRESSIVE FIRES BY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER
GUNSHIPS, AIRCRAFT ATTEMPTED TO EXTRACT THE UNIT, WHILE DESCENDING
INTO THE LZ. ONE (1) CH-53 HELICOPTER, TAIL NUMBER YH-14, HIT A
TREE WITH ITS ROTOR BLADE AND ABORTED THE LANDING. THE AIRCRAFT
BEGAN MOVEMENT BACK TO ITS BASE BUT WAS HIT BY ONE (1) 9-10
ROCKET AND CRASHED AT YC 450056. THE CREW MEMBERS SUFFERED
MINOR INJURIES AND WERE RESCUED BY A SECOND CH-53 HELICOPTER.
AIRCRAFT YH-14 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DESTROYED BY TACTICAL AIR STRIKES.
THE SECOND CH-53 HELICOPTER, TAIL NUMBER YH-20,
SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE 149. SMALL ARMS AND .51 CALIBER FIRE
DURING THE EXTRACTION OF YH-14 CREW BUT WAS ABLE TO RETURN TO ITS
BASE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. A DOORGUNNER, IN AIRCRAFT YH-20,
REPORTED THAT HE SHOT ONE (1) ENEMY SOLDIER DURING THE RESCUE MISSION.
A SECOND ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT WOUNDED FROM THE GROUND UNIT WAS CONDUCTED
BY ONE (1) UH-1H HELICOPTER, TAIL NUMBER 560, BUT IT RECEIVED
HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE IN THE VICINITY OF THE LZ AT YC 441042
AND SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE. ONE (1) AH-1G HELICOPTER GUNSHIP,
TAIL NUMBER 540, SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE FROM ESTIMATED .31
CALIBER FIRE WHILE PROVIDING SUPPRESSIVE FIRES DURING THE EXTRACTION
ATTEMPT. BOTH AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO THEIR BASE WITHOUT FURTHER
INCIDENT.

(4) AT 131445H SEP 70, THE UNIT MOVED TO YC 437036 AND ESTABLISHED
A DEFENSIVE POSITION, AND AS OF 132400H SEP 70 THE UNIT
REPORTED NO ENEMY ACTIVITY SINCE 131600H SEP 70.

(2) RVN/US-D 843450/US-LED PLT-RADIO RELAY/7 SEP 70/
YC 378400 (RVN). ON 122300H SEP 70, THE PLATOON REPORTED THAT
IT WAS RECEIVING HEAVY 12.7MM MACHINE GUN FIRE FROM THE VICINITY

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

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OF YC 359364. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF POUNDS WERE RECEIVED IN THE VICINITY OF THE HELICOPTER PAD (LFI), ON 132000H SEP 70, THE PLATOON REPORTED NO FURTHER ACTIVITY OR SIGHTINGS.

() T-34N-DA 607/YC 152743/US-LED RT/RIVERWATCH ON JUNCTIONS X KONG, X ROL, AND XE SAF RIVETS/13 SEP 70. ON 131705H SEP 70, THE RT WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER WITHOUT INCIDENT AT YC 17 752. NO ROL REPORT WAS SCHEDULED FOR 13 SEP 70.

(5) () EXTRACTION: D-62/N-DA 609/YC 552542/US-LED RT/AJEA RECON/ 10 SEP 70. 100500H SEP 70, THE TEAM REPORTED THAT AN UNKNOWN SIZE, ENEMY FORCE WITH TRACK RS WAS IN THEIR VICINITY, DU TO COMPROMISE OF THEIR POSITION. THE TEAM WAS SUBSEQUENTLY WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 131730 H SEP AT YC 592504. ADDITIONAL DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.

6. () UPDATES: REF PROG RPT 1342 (U) COMUSMACV 16)8 (SOG) DTG 091100T SEP 70 (TS): PARA 55(1). UPDATE (GOLF-1). THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED:

A. THE MORTAR ROUNDS OBSERVED WERE GRAY WITH A RED BAND AROUND THE TOP. THE ROUNDS ALSO HAD BLACK MARKINGS AND SCREW-IN TYPE FUZES.

B. THE TEAM ALSO OBSERVED A SINGLE BLACK MORTAR ROUND THAT HAD NO MARKINGS OR COLORED BANDS.

7. () COMMENTS: THE FOLLOWING ROUTE STATUS REPORTS WERE OBTAINED FROM FAC DEBRIEFS FOR MISSIONS FLOWN ON 12 SEP 70.

A. ROUTE 90 SHOWED SIGNS OF TRUCK TRAFFIC FROM XD 430411 TO XD 504423.

B. ROUTE 1332 B SHOWED SIGNS OF BULLDOZER ACTIVITY AT XD 525513.

C. A FIVE (5) MAN CONSTRUCTION CREW WAS OBSERVED ON ROUTE 1332B AT XD 565536.

D. THREE (3) CONSTRUCTION CREWS, EACH HAVING FIVE (5) PERSONNEL, WERE OBSERVED ON ROUTE 1332B FROM XD 553509 TO XD 565530.

AMEMB VTN/SOG 517.

AMEMB VTN/MACV 562

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NEACP STATEOP FILE (01) 25 WY

ADV DISTR NMCC (1) SECDEF (35) DIA (33)
TRANSIT/131050Z/131325Z/000:35TOR2551245
DE RHNSHVA #3552 2551222

ZNY TTTTT
O 131050Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKAAX/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS
RUHJCS/ANEMB VIENTIANE
RUSVAF/ANEMB BANGKOK
RUHNSA/CINCSARPAC
RHHNTA/COMUSMACTHAI
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RUHURFA/CG XXIV CORPS
RUHJOD/UDORN BIRDDOG
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~~SECRET~~ LIMBIO PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL JPCCO 1890 (SOG)
SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL PROGRESS REPORT 1344 (U)

A. COMUSMACV 1869 (SOG) DTG 121445Z SEP 70 (TS)
1. (U) THIS REPORT COV RS THE PERIOD 112400H - 122400H SEP 70.

2. (U) INTENTS: NONE

3. (TS) STATUS OF TEAMS PREVIOUSLY INTENDED: THE INSERTION OF ONE (1) RT INTO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TARGET AREAS HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED AT THE TIME OF THIS REPORT.

A. TANGO-3 (YC 195920) RIV RWATCH ON JUNCTIONS OF XE KONG, XE RON, AND XE SAP RIVERS.

B. INDIA-4 (XD 553515) POINT RECONNAISSANCE, POL FACILITIES.

C. ECHO-5 (YD 221347) ROADWATCH, RTE 922

D. JULIETT-9 (YB 443350) AREA RECON

E. LIMA-4 (YC 325721) ROUTE RECON, RTE 923

4. (TS) TEAMS CURRENTLY ACTIVE:

A. THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS REMAIN IN THEIR TARGET AREAS AND CONTINUE THEIR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS BUT HAVE REPORTED NO ENEMY ACTIVITY OR SIGHTINGS.

TGT/LOC/COT/UNIT/MISSION/INSERTION DATE/CURRENT LOC/DTG

(1) G-5/M-BA 609/YB 624355/US-LED RT/RADIO RELAY/20 AUG 70/

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YB 604355/122000H SEP 70.
 (2) RVN/S-BA 607/YC 375400/US-LED PLT/RADIO RELAY/7 SEP 70/
 YC 375400 (RVN)/122000H SEP 70.
 (3) RVN/S-BA 607/YC 375400/US-LED PLT/RADIO RELAY/22 AUG 70/
 XD 843450 (RVN)/122000H SEP 70.
 (4) S-9/S-BA 607/YC 375400/US-LED RT/AREA RECON/7 SEP 70/
 YC 375400/122000H SEP 70.
 (5) S-9/S-BA 607/YC 375400/US-LED RT/AREA RECON/10 SEP 70/
 YB 591350/121300H SEP 70.
 (6) AC-4/BA 607/YC 470720/US-LED RT/RIVERWATCH, DAK PALLY
 RIVER/11 SEP 70/YC 450652/120300H SEP 70.
 (7) S-9/S-BA 609/YB 604355/US-LED RT/AREA RECON/11 SEP 70/
 YB 604355/121300H SEP 70.
 5. THE FOLLOWING TEAM IS ACTIVE AND HAS REPORTED THE FOLLOWING
 INFORMATION: TO/W-BA 614/YC 450652/US-LED PLT/RECON IN FORCE/11 SEP 70.
 (1) ON 120810H SEP 70, THE UNIT WAS MOVING WEST AT YC 432052
 AND REPORTED HEARING TRACKED VEHICLES TO THE NORTH (NFI).
 (2) ON 12080030H SEP 70, THE UNIT MADE CONTACT WITH AN
 ESTIMATED TEN (10) MAN ENEMY SQUAD RESULTING IN ONE (1) US KIA AND
 ONE (1) SCU KIA; ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.
 (3) ON 121245H SEP 70, AT YC 4 5049, THE UNIT MADE CONTACT
 WITH AN ESTIMATED THIRTY (30) MAN ENEMY PLATOON. BY 121425H
 SEP 70, THE ENEMY UNIT HAD BEEN REINFORCED TO AN ESTIMATED COMPANY
 SIZE ELEMENT (100-150 PERSONNEL). TOTAL FRIENDLY CASUALTIES
 SUSTAINED WERE ONE (1) SCU KIA AND FIFTEEN (15) SCU KIA; ENEMY
 CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES WERE DIRECTED
 AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS AND ON 121535H SEP 70, THE ENEMY
 FORCE BROKE CONTACT (NFI). FROM 121730H TO 121750H SEP 70,
 DURING AN ATTEMPTED MEDEVAC MISSION, THE FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
 WAS SUSTAINED FROM HEAVY GROUND FIRE IN THE VICINITY OF YC 435079:
 (A) ONE (1) AH-1G HELICOPTER GUNSHIP, TAIL NUMBER 849, WAS
 SHOT DOWN AND DESTROYED IN THE VICINITY OF YC 4107. THE TWO (2)
 PILOTS WERE RESCUED AND SUSTAINED ONLY MINOR INJURIES (NFI).
 (B) ONE (1) AH-1G HELICOPTER GUNSHIP, TAIL NUMBER 571, SUSTAINED
 MINOR DAMAGE. THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO BASE WITHOUT FURTHER
 INCIDENT.
 (C) FOUR (4) UH-1H HELICOPTERS, TAIL NUMBERS 135, 153, 457,
 AND 554, SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGES. ALL AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO
 BASE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.
 (4) ON 122005H SEP 70, AT YC 435049, THE UNIT REPORTED THAT
 THEY WERE RECEIVING SMALL ARMS FIRE, 8-40 ROCKETS, AND MORTAR FIRE
 BUT SUSTAINED NO FURTHER CASUALTY. A C-130 GUNSHIP WAS DIRECTED
 AGAINST SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITIONS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS (NFI).

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5. (U) EXTRACTED: NONE

6. (U) UPDATED: NONE

7. (S) COMMENTS: ON 111610H SEP 70, PILOTS, FLYING IN SUPPORT OF MACBORG OPERATIONS, OBSERVED A RECENTLY USED ROAD SOUTH OF THE XE POW RIVER FROM XD 593350 TO XD 603340. ONE (1) SUSPECTED TENT, 8' (6) FEET BY SIX (6) FEET, WAS OBSERVED ADJACENT TO THE ROAD (NFI). AT XD 603357, THREE (3) EMPTY BOATS WERE OBSERVED MOORED UNDER AN OVERHANGING TREE (NFI).

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ARENS VTR/MACV 547

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ACTION:
DISTR SACDA(3)1-3 NMCC(1)4 JB(4)5-9 SECDEF(5)9-13 CSA CSAF CNO CMC
NSC(3)14-21 DIA(3)22-24 CIA NSA NMCC ANMCC NEACP STATEOP FILE(1)25
(025)

LIMDIS
IMMEDIATE

ADV DISTR NMCC(1) SECDEF(05) DIA(03)
TRANSMIT/121400Z/121700Z/PMO INTCR3501700
DE HONGKONG 43051 2301550
ZNY TTTT

O 121400Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHRAAL/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS
RUMJCS/ANEMB VIENTIANE
RUSWAF1/AMEMB BANGKOK
RUHRRBA/CINCPAC
RHHENT1/COMUSMACV
RHHMAY1/CS 1FFV
RUMJCS/CS XXIV CORPS
RUMJCS/UDORN BIRDCG
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL JPCCO 1800 (SOG)
SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL PROGRESS REPORT 1343(U)
A. COMUSMACV 1875 (SOG) DTG 111230Z SEP 70 (TS)
1. (U) THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD 102400H-112400H SEP 70.
2. (TS) INTENTS: INTEND TO INSERT ONE(1) RECONNAISSANCE TEAM(RT)
INTO THE FOLLOWING TARGET AREA ON 13 SEP 70: LIMA-4 (YC325/21)
ROUTE RECON, RTE 923
3. (TS) STATUS OF TEAMS PREVIOUSLY INTENDED: THE INSERTION OF ONE(1)
RT INTO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TARGET AREAS HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED AT
THE TIME OF THIS REPORT.
A. TANGO-3 (YC 195822) RIVERWATCH ON JUNCTIONS OF XE KONG, XE
RON, AND XE SAP RIVERS.
B. INDIA-4 (XB553515) POINT RECONNAISSANCE, POL FACILITIES.
C. ECHO-8 (YB 221847) ROADWATCH, RTE 922
D. JULIETT-9 (YB 440358) AREA RECON
4. (TS) TEAMS CURRENTLY ACTIVE:
A. THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS REMAIN IN THEIR TARGET AREAS AND
CONTINUE THEIR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS BUT HAVE REPORTED NO ENEMY
ACTIVITY OR SIGHTINGS.

TGT LOC COT UNIT MISSION INSERTED CURRENT LOC DTG

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33720

- (1) S-5 H-BA 607 YB 604105508-LED RADIO 23 AUG 70 YB 604355 112000H
RELAY
- (2) RVN S-BA 607 YC 375400 US-LEF RADIO 7 SEP 70 Y 375430(RVN) 112000H
RELAY
- (3) RVN S-BA 607 YC 375400 US-LEF RADIO 20 AUG 70 YC 375450(RVN) 112000H
RELAY
- (4) S-9 S-BA 607 YC 375400 US-LEF AREA 7 SEP 70 YC 375400 112000H
RECON

PAGE 3 RUMONNA 3351 ~~TOP SECRET~~

- (5) S-9 H-BA 610 YB 604105508-LED AREA 11 SEP 70 YB 604359 111720H
RECON

8. THE FOLLOWING TEAMS ARE ACTIVE AND HAVE REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (1) AS-4/BA-607 YC 375400 US-LEF RT/RIVERWATCH-DAK PALLY RIVER/11 SEP 70. ON 111225H SEP 70, THE TEAM WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER WITHOUT INCIDENT AT YC 430077. ON 111015H SEP 70, THE TEAM ESTABLISHED AN RON POSITION AT YC 400592, AND REPORTED NEGATIVE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(2) S-5/BA-607 YB 604105508-LED RT/AREA RECON/11 SEP 70. ON 111630H SEP 70, THE TEAM WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER WITHOUT INCIDENT INTO A RADIO RELAY SITE AT YB 604459, FOR SUBSEQUENT OVERLAND INFILTRATION INTO ITS TARGET AREA ON 12 SEP 70.

(3) S-4/BA-607 YC 375400 PLTS/RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE/11 SEP 70.

(A) ON 111921H SEP 70 AT YC 430049, THE FORCE DISCOVERED AN AMMO SUPPLY DUMP THAT CONTAINED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ROCKETS, LARGE CALIBER ARTILLERY ROUNDS, SMALL ARMS ROUNDS, AND BICYCLES(1). THE SUPPLY DUMP WAS DESTROYED ON 111610H SEP 70. ON 111945H SEP 70, AT YC 435849 THE FORCE MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE RESULTING IN TWO(2) US KIA; ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN. ON 111925H SEP 70, THE TEAM ESTABLISHED AN RON POSITION AT YC 432052, AND REPORTED NEGATIVE ENEMY ACTIVITY.

9. THE FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED ON 11 SEP 70 DURING THE INSERTION OF TANGO-2 AT YC 436039:

1. TWO(2) USMC HELICOPTERS (OH-53), TAIL NUMBERS 12 AND 13, SUSTAINED LIGHT DAMAGE FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE. 90TH AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO KONTUM WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

2. ONE(1) US ARMY HELICOPTER GUNSHIP (AH-1G), TAIL NUMBER 281, SUSTAINED ONE(1) HIT IN THE CANOPY. THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO DAK TO WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

3. THREE (3) USMC HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS (AH-1G), TAIL NUMBERS 21, 25, AND 13, SUSTAINED LIGHT DAMAGE FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE. ALL AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO KONTUM WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

4. ONE(1) USMC HELICOPTER GUNSHIP (AH-1G), TAIL NUMBER 26, SUSTAINED MODERATE DAMAGE FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE. THE AIRCRAFT RE-

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TURNED TO KONIUD WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENTS

5. (13) EXTRACTIONS:

A. R-2/S-5A-67/BS72262/US-LED RE/AREA RECON/11SEP 70. ON 111015H SEP 70, THE TEAM REPORTED THAT IT WAS SEPARATED INTO THREE (3) ELEMENTS. ON 111540H SEP 70, THE TEAM WAS EXTRACTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. FROM LZ'S IN THE VICINITY OF YC374287. ON 111600H SEP 70, AT YC 375295, WHILE SUPPORTING THE EXTRACTION, TWO (2) UH-1H HELICOPTERS,

TAIL NUMBERS 431 AND 185, SUSTAINED ONE(1) HIT EACH FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE. NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED AND BOTH AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO BASE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.

B. D-542-D464/XD740170/RT/ROAD BLOCK/11SEP70. 9, 11 SEP 70, THE TEAM MADE CONTACT WITH A SIX(6) TO TWELVE(12) MAN ENEMY FORCE RESULTING IN ONE(1) SCU KIA. ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN. ON 111614H SEP 70, AT XD 581005, THE TEAM WAS EXTRACTED UNDER MODERATE SMALL ARMS FIRE RESULTING IN NO AIRCRAFT DAMAGE OR FURTHER CASUALTIES. HELICOPTER GUNSHOTS PROVIDED SUPPRESSIVE FIRES DURING THE EXTRACTION ON AN ENEMY POSITION AT XD 585300 WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED IN SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.

6. (U) UPDATES: NONE.

7. (13) COMMENTS:

A. THE FORMAT FOR TODAY'S DAILY IS A REVISION, AND COMMENTS CONCERNING IT ARE ENCOURAGED. ADDRESSEES WHO DESIRE TO PROPOSE ADDITIONS OR CHANGES ARE REQUESTED TO FORWARD THEM IN THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR CONSIDERATION NOT 30 SEP 70.

B. ON 100905H SEP 70, AT XD 616364, A PILOT, FLYING IN SUPPORT OF MACSOG OPERATIONS, OBSERVED TWO(2) BOATS, EACH TWN(10) TO FIFTEEN(15) FEET LONG, MOORED AT A BOAT DOCK. THE PILOT ALSO OBSERVED A POSSIBLE FOOT BRIDGE ACROSS THE STREAM AT THE SAME LOCATION.

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AVENUE WITH/503 536

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O 111200Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
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RUHJCS/AMEMB VIETNAM
RUHJCS/AMEMB XXIV CORPS
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LIMDIS
IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL JPCCO 1875 (SOG).

SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL PROGRESS REPORT 1342 (U).

A. COMUSMACV 1856 (SOG) DTG 291130Z SEP 70 (70)

1. (70) INTENTS:

A. INTEND TO INSERT ONE (1) RECONNAISSANCE TEAM (RT) INTO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TARGET AREAS ON 12 SEP 70:

- (1) WHISKEY-3 (YB 633272) WIRETAP
- (2) JULIETT-9 (YB 443350) AREA RECONNAISSANCE
- (3) ASHAU-4 (YC 464721) RIVERWATCH
- (4) TANGO-3 (YC 195823) RIVERWATCH
- (5) ECHO-6 (YD 021047) ROADWATCH
- (6) INDIA-4 (XD 553515) POINT RECONNAISSANCE

B. THE REQUIRED 48 HOUR INTENT IS PROVIDED FOR THE FOLLOWING TARGET: GOLF-5 (YB 60455) AREA RECONNAISSANCE

C. SEE PARA 9- OPERATION TAILWIND

2. (70) STATUS OF TARGETS INTENDED FOR 11 SEP 70: TARGETS LISTED IN PARA 1A (1-6) WERE INTENDED FOR 11 SEP 70, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED PRIOR TO THIS REPORTING PERIOD DUE TO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER

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CONDITIONS OR OTHER OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES.

3. ~~(TS)~~ STATUS OF ELEMENTS CURRENTLY ACTIVE:

A. THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS REMAIN IN THEIR TARGET AREAS AND CONTINUE THE RESPECTIVE MISSIONS BUT HAVE REPORTED NEGATIVE ENEMY ACTIVITY OR SIGHTINGS:

- (1) ONE (1) RT, GOLF-5 (YB 604355) RADIO RELAY SITE
- (2) ONE (1) PLATOON, (YC 375400) RADIO RELAY SITE (RVN)
- (3) ONE (1) PLATOON, (XD 843453) RADIO RELAY SITE (RVN)
- B. ONE (1) RT, WITH A MISSION OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE IN THE BRAVO-9 (YC 300340) TARGET AREA, WAS INSERTED ON 7 SEP 70. ON 10 SEP 70, THE TEAM RETURNED TO THE RADIO RELAY SITE, AT YC 375400. UPON COMPLETION OF ITS MISSION, AND REPORTED NEGATIVE ENEMY ACTIVITY.
- C. ONE (1) RT, WITH A MISSION OF ROADWATCH IN THE DELTA-5 (XD 714199) TARGET AREA, WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 100138Z SEP 70. AT XD 578385, NO RON POSITION WAS SCHEDULED FOR 10 SEP 70.
- D. ONE (1) RT, WITH A MISSION OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE IN THE DELTA-6 (YB 656330) TARGET AREA, WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 100412Z SEP 70. INTO A RADIO RELAY SITE AT YB 604355. FOR SUBSEQUENT OVERLAND INFILTRATION INTO THE TARGET AREA ON 11 SEP 70.
- E. ONE (1) RT, WITH A MISSION OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE IN THE ROMEO-2 (YC 381203) TARGET AREA, WAS INSERTED BY PARACHUTE ON 121045Z SEP 70. AT YC 370265. NO RON POSITION WAS SCHEDULED.

4. (U) SPOT REPORTS: NONE

5. ~~(TS)~~ UPDATES:

A. PER PROC RPT 1335 (U) COMUSMACV 1334 (SOG) DTG 031042Z SEP 70

~~(TS)~~ PARA 4 (MIKE ALPHA-6). DURING THE CONDUCT OF THIS MISSION 30 AUG 70-23 SEP 70 THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED:

- (1) ON 310012Z AUG 70, AT XD 493575, THE TEAM OBSERVED A NS TRAIL THAT WAS 2.5 METERS WIDE. THE TRAIL SHOWED SIGNS OF RECENT USE BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY SQUAD WEARING BATA BOOTS AND HEADING SOUTH.
- (2) ON 310130Z AUG 70, THE TEAM HEARD VOICES FROM AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY IN THE VICINITY OF XD 492574. ON 310800Z AUG 70, THE TEAM DIRECTED A TACTICAL AIR STRIKE ON THE SUSPECTED COMPANY POSITION WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.

(3) ON 210215Z SEP 70, AT XD 492579, THE TEAM MADE CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY SQUAD RESULTING IN NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES; ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN. THE ENEMY PERSONNEL WORE GREEN JUNGLE UNIFORMS AND NVA ARMO BELTS AND WERE ARMED WITH AK-47S.

(4) ON 030200Z SEP 70, AT XD 480584, THE TEAM MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE RESULTING IN NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. ONE (1) ENEMY KIA NAD THREE (3) ENEMY WIA. THE ENEMY KIA WAS WEARING A KHAKI SHIRT, GREEN TROUSERS, AND AMMUNITION V ST WITH THREE (3) MAGAZINES AND WAS ARMED WITH AN AK-47. THE INDIVIDUAL APPEARED TO

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HAVE BEEN IN GOOD HEALTH AND HAD A NEATLY TRIMMED HAIRCUT. NO IDENTIFICATION OR DOCUMENTS WERE FOUND ON THE BODY.
B. REF PROG RPT 1338 (U) COMUSMACV 1831 (SOG) DTG 061005Z SEP 70.
(757) PARA 4 (GOLF-1). DURING THE CONDUCT OF THIS MISSION 1-6 SEP 70 THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED:
(1) ON 032200Z SEP 70, AT YB 598335, THE TEAM OBSERVED ONE (1) 82MM MORTAR PIT AND TWO (2) ADJOINING BUNKERS. IN A NEARBY AREA THE TEAM FOUND SEVEN (7) GAS (NFI) AND TWO (2) H.E. 82MM ROUNDS THAT HAD FAILED TO FIRE. THE TEAM ESTIMATED THAT THE POSITION HAD NOT BEEN USED WITHIN THE PREVIOUS THREE (3) DAYS.
(2) ON 052300Z SEP 70, AT YB 580318, THE TEAM OBSERVED AN ABANDONED BASE CAMP THAT WAS 200 METERS BY 200 METERS IN SIZE. THE TEAM ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE 250-300 ONE (1) AND TWO (2) MAN FOX HOLES IN THE AREA ALL OF WHICH WERE TWO (2) TO THREE (3) WEEKS OLD.
6. (757) COMMENTS: A. ON 09 SEP 70 AT XD 593507, A PILOT, FLYING IN SUPPORT OF MACSOG OPERATIONS, OBSERVED A FERRY CROSSING SITE THAT INCLUDED A CAMOUFLAGED RAFT AND A ROPE GUIDE LINE (NFI).
B. DURING THE WEEK 21-27 SEP 70, EMPHASIS ON MONITORING ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AND WEST OF THE DMB WILL CONTINUE. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS ARE PLANNED WEST OF BASE AREA 607 AND NORTH OF BASE AREA 611. EMPHASIS WILL ALSO CONTINUE ON MONITORING ENEMY INFILTRATION FROM LAOS INTO CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA.
7. (757) STATISTICAL SUMMARY:

	PFAO	TOTAL	IN COUNTRY
	WEEKLY		WEEKLY TOTAL
A. MISSIONS (RT/PLT/CO)	8/#/0	1241/188/1	UNCHANGED
B. PRISONERS	0	40	
C. US WIA/KIA/MIA	3/0/0	444/85/38	
D. VN WIA/KIA/MIA	2/2/0	715/234/145	
E. ENEMY KIA (BC)	6	1559	
F. ENEMY KIA (EST)	6	3008	
G. GUNSHIP SORTIES	10	1546	
H. TAC AIR SORTIES	15	6504	
I. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS	0	2143	
J. STRUCTURES (DEST/DAMAGED)	0/0	1037/597	
K. C			
CHES (DEST/DAMAGED) &&	0	152	
L. ARTY (MSN/RDS)	0	440/4559	
M. BRIDGES (DEST/DAMAGED)	0/0	9/9	
N. PER/V H/MINES EMPL	0/0	1785/69	
O. VEH (DEST/DAMAGED)	0/0	136/152	
P. EN WPN CAPTURED	1	117	
Q. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS RELATED TO PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS:			
IR NUMBER			

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8006 19 SEP 70 ENEMY ACTIVITY G-1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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RUHNRD/COMUSMACV
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RUHNVAF/CS 1774
RUMHFA/CS XXIV CORPS
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FINAL SECTION OF 2 SECTIONS
2 SINCE 11 JUL 68 22 SINCE 4 AUG 68

		AUTH	OPNL	IN TNG	FILLING	
A. RECON TEAMS:		60	50	1	9	
B. EXPLOITATION FORCES:						
(1) BATTALIONS		3	2	0	0	
(2) COMPANIES		12	6	0	0	
(3) PLATOONS		36	18	0	0	
C. AIRCRAFT:		AUTH	ASSND	POSSD	OPNL	MAINT
(1) FIXED WING	1	1	1	1	0	

9. ~~OPERATION TAILWIND: THREE (3) PLATOONS, WITH A MISSION OF~~
~~RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE IN THE TANGU-2 (YS 430980) TARGET AREA, WERE~~
~~INSERTED BY HELICOPTER ON 184362 SEP 70, AT YC 436239. DURING THE~~
~~INSERTION MODERATE TO HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM SW~~
~~OF THE LT. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES SUSTAINED WERE TWO (2) SCU KIA. NO~~
~~ROW POSITION WAS SCHEDULED FOR 11 SEP 72. (NFI)~~
~~ANEMP 17/342-1 586~~

PAGE 1
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 INFO: SACSA-3(1-5) INICC-1(4) JS-4(5-8) 30101012
 (C-14-21) DIA-3(22-24) FILE-1(25)

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DATE 6/15/98

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PAGE 01 STATE 152261

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INFO OCT-01 /0401R

DRAFTED BY IEA/LC/FNSBURNET
APPROVED BY IEA/MARSHALL GREEN
CLEARANCES IEA/MR CORCORAN
EA/MR CARPENTER
S/PRINCE McCLOSKEY (SUBST)
S/DEAN CURRAN
DDO/ISA/MAJ COOKE (SUBS)
DDO/MAJ LORFAND (SUB)
EA/AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN

EDS
EXCISE

R 151712Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
CINCPAC
COMUSMACV

116662

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DISTR: J3(4)1-4 NMCC(1)5 SECDEF(5)
6-10 ASD/ISA(5)11-15 ASD/PA(1)
16 DIA(3)17-19 CIA(1)20 CSA(1)
21 CHO(1)22 CSAF(1)23 CMC(1)
NSA(1)25 MCCC(1)26 SACS(1)27
RF/FILE(1)28 HAT/TMP/LE

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE COMBAT LOSS

REF. A: VIENTIANE'S 6184

REF. B: VIENTIANE'S 5645

1. YOUR RECOMMENDATION IN REETELS A AND B HAS BEEN RECONSIDERED AND DISAPPROVED.
2. DEFENSE HOLDS POSITION THAT USG HAS UNALTERABLE COMMITMENT TO DISCLOSE ALL AIR LOSSES IN LAOS AND WE CONCUR TO EXTENT THAT POLICY AND PATTERN OF DISCLOSURE ESTABLISHED AND PRACTICED SINCE MARCH 10 SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CHANGED.
3. WE STRONGLY OF OPINION THAT USE OF UNQUALIFIED PHRASE QUOTE SOVIET VIETNAMESE-LAO BORDER AREA UNQUOTE WOULD NOT HOLD UP VET

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PAGE 02 STATE 130061

LONG UNDER INTENSE PRESS QUESTIONING WHICH WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE
FROM SUCH A CHANCE OF FORMULA, ROGERS

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INFO: CJC5(5)1-5 DJ5(1)G J3(1)7 J5(1)8
NMCC/DDO(1)9 SECDEF(5)10-14 ASD/ISA(5)15-19
ASD/PA(1)20 DIA(1)21 CSA(1)22 CNO(1)23
CSAF(1)24 CMC(1)25 FILE-1 (25) *93936*

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PAGE 01 STATE 143600

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INFO OCT-01 7045 R

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APPROVED BY: [illegible]
EA/LC GORDON
EA/VINCENT
EA/SULLIVAN
EA/WILSON
S/S CURRAN

023069

FM [illegible]
TO [illegible]

~~TOP SECRET STATE 143600~~

EXDIS

REF: VIETNAM 1830

1. APPRECIATE YOUR RAPID RESPONSE TO STATE 135790.
2. WHILE WE ARE WEIGHING POSITION YOU HAVE TAKEN AGAINST EXTENDING PRAIRIE FIRE AREA OF OPERATIONS, WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON OPERATIONS AND ARE ATTEMPTING WITH MACOS EAST OF CHAVANE (PARA 04 REF ID: [illegible]). SPECIFICALLY, WILL AMERICAN PERSONNEL PARTICIPATE AND IF SO HOW MANY AND IN WHAT CAPACITY? JOHNSON

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~~STATE 143600~~



INFO: CUCB(5)1-5 DJS(1)6 J3(1)7 J5(1)8
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ASD/PA(1)20 DIA(1)21 CSA(1)22 CNO(1)23
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PAGE 01 VIENTI 05907 001300Z

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0016

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EXDIS

REF: STATE 143603

1. MACSOG INFORMS US THIS MORNING THAT IT INTENDS INSERT
SEPTEMBER 5 THREE PLATOONS (APPROXIMATELY 100 MEN)
INTO AREA FOR A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE IN
THE VICINITY OF CHANUM (YB 361969), APPROXIMATELY TEN
KILOMETERS WEST OF CURRENT PRAIRIE FIRE LINE. THIS
HAS BEEN CAREFULLY COORDINATED WITH CCAS VIENTIANE.
WE DO NOT KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHETHER AMERICAN PERSONNEL
WILL PARTICIPATE BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT ABOUT THREE
AMERICANS ARE NORMALLY ATTACHED TO EACH PLATOON. I ASSUME
SACSA IN WASHINGTON IS INFORMED OF THIS DIVERSTORYARY
ACTION AND CAN INDICATE IF ANY AMERICAN PERSONNEL ARE
INVOLVED.

2. AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED IN VIENTIANE 5944
I MENTIONED "GAUNTLET" TO THE KING AUGUST 31.
I ALSO TOLD HIM WE WERE STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY
OF A SMALL DIVERSTORYARY ACTION EAST OF CHAVANE
AND SAID THAT IF THIS ACTION OCCURRED IT WOULD BE
FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THE KING SAID THIS WAS EXCELLENT.
HE ALSO ADDED THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HAD
SPOKEN TO HIM IN GENERAL TERMS OF POSSIBLE HARASSING

ACTIONS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM (SEE PARA 2 VIENTIANE 5971).
KING HAD TOLD THUY THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THEY
WERE TO OCCUR PROVIDED SECRECY COULD BE MAINTAINED. GP-1-
GODLEY

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DATE 7/20/98

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9915

INFO RUEHJCS/SECDEF IMMEDIATE

RUMKAA/CINCPAC 5262

RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 5166

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~~TOP SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 6184

EXDIS EXPLATE

IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE FIRE COMBAT LOSS

REF: A. COMUSMACV 1502 SOG 121240Z SEP 70
B. VIENTIANE 5645 DTG 191109Z AUG
C. STATE 135406 DTG 203103Z AUG

1. ON 12 SEPTEMBER A HUEY COBRA GUNSHIP WAS SHOT DOWN IN LAO ABOUT TEN MILES FROM THE SVN BORDER WHILE SUPPORTING PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATION TAILWIND WHICH IS A DIVERSIONARY EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION GAUNTLET. SINCE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS ARE PRIMARILY USED IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES, I BELIEVE THAT REPORTING THE LOSS OF THIS GUNSHIP AS QUOTE IN THE LAO PANHANDLE UNQUOTE WILL ATTRACT UNNECESSARY ATTENTION TO PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS IN LAOS.
2. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE LOSS BE REPORTED AS HAVING OCCURRED IN QUOTE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE/LAOTIAN BORDER AREA UNQUOTE AS OUTLINED IN MY 5645 DATED AUGUST 19. GP-1.

PAGE 1

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DISTR: 113(5)1-5 DJS(3)4-8 JS(1)9 JS(1)10 SACS(2)11 NMCC(1)12
SECDEF(5)13-16 ASD:ISA(5)19-23 ASD:PA(1)24
CINCPAC CMC DIA(3)25-27 MCCC RF TERMSVC FILE(1)28

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~ 101

PAGE 01 VIENTI 05000 271220Z

41
ACTION 55-55

INFO OCT-01 1000 W

R 271139Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0749

113163

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5050

EXDIS

THIS MSG REFERS TO SENSITIVE **L** OPERATIONS AND ITS DISTRIBUTION SHOULD BE LIMITED WITHIN DEPT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARSHALL GREEN OR HIS DEPUTY WILLIAM SULLIVAN TO THOSE OFFICIALS KNOWLEDGEABLE RE OPERATION GAUNTLET.

SUBJ PRAIRIE FIRE SOUTHERN LAOS

REF STATE 139790

1. VIENTIANE 5797 WHICH PROBABLY CROSSED WITH REFTEL INDICATES HOW PREOCCUPIED SOUVANNA IS WITH PRESS TREATMENT OF PRAIRIE FIRE AND RELATED ACTIONS. NEVERTHELESS HE DOES ACCEPT HIT AND RUN ATTACKS WITHIN A LIMITED BUT UNDEFINED AREA ALONG LAO/SVN BORDER.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING I AM STILL OPPOSED FORMALLY TO EXTENDING PRAIRIE FIRE ZONE WESTWARD AND SOUTHWARD ALONG CAMBODIAN BORDERS BUT I AM FULLY PREPARED TO STUDY FAVORABLY ANY PROPOSALS FOR SPECIFIC INCURSIONS WEST OF THE EXISTING LINE. TO THIS END, YESTERDAY I INFORMED THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF MACSOG THAT I WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HIS USING HLZ'S UP TO FIVE MILES WEST OF THE PRESENT PRAIRIE FIRE LINE AND THEN MOVING HIS PERSONNEL EASTWARD FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE PRAIRIE FIRE ZONE. THIS WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT PRAIRIE FIRE AREA IS GENERALLY SPEAKING SO HOSTILE THAT INFILTS AND EXFILS FROM EXISTING HLZ'S WITHIN THE AREA ARE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

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27



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 VIENTI 05050 271200Z

3. I ASSUME THAT RECIPIENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ARE AWARE OF OPERATION "GAUNTLET". IN CONNECTION WITH "GAUNTLET" I AM ENDEAVORING TO ARRANGE FOR MACSOG TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION JUST EAST OF CHAVANE SO THAT A DIVERSION WOULD EXIST, FACILITATING THE INSERTION PROVIDED FOR IN "GAUNTLET" IN THE CHAVANE AREA. THIS TYPE OF COORDINATION AND JOINT EFFORT IS WHAT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE AND WHAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE ACHIEVED THANKS TO THE EXCELLENT WORKMANLIKE ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH MACSOG PERSONNEL.

4. ANOTHER POINT I BELIEVE THAT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF DEPT PERSONNEL STUDYING THIS PROBLEM IS THE CURRENT STATE OF MACSOG ASSETS. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, MACSOG CURRENTLY HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL ONLY SIX REPEAT SIX COMPANIES OF PERSONNEL TRAINED FOR CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS. THREE OF THESE COMPANIES ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING IN CAMBODIA, WHICH LEAVES ONLY THREE TO OPERATE IN SOUTHERN LAOS. OPERATION "GAUNTLET" ALONE WILL ENTAIL SOME TEN REPEAT TEN BATTALIONS REPEAT BATTALIONS. MACSOG MAY BE ABLE TO EXPAND ITS PERSONNEL BUT PRESENT PLANS PROVIDE FOR AN IMPORTANT EXPANSION OF ASSETS WHICH I BELIEVE WILL PROBABLY BE READY TO TAKE THE FIELD PRIOR TO AN EFFECTIVE EXPANSION OF MACSOG ASSETS.

5. ANOTHER FACTOR IN MY RELUCTANCE TO SEE PRAIRIE FIRE FORMALLY EXPANDED WESTWARD IS THAT I FRANKLY DO NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN MACV STAFF BEING AS SENSITIVE TO LAO POLITICAL REALITIES AS I AM. THE RECENT FRACAS OVER PUBLIC DISCLOSURE POLICY IS A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF WHAT I HAVE IN MIND. I'M FULLY PREPARED AND LOOK FORWARD TO COLLABORATING IN A MOST CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL MANNER WITH MACSOG AND I WILL ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AUTHORIZE OPERATIONS WEST OF THE EXISTING PRAIRIE FIRE LINE. HOWEVER, I THINK IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE AND I WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE FORMALLY ESTABLISHING THE LINE AS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 6.

6. IT MIGHT WELL BE ARGUED THAT PRAIRIE FIRE LINE BE MOVED

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 VIENTI 65050 271228Z

WESTWARD AND ON AT-CASE-BY-CASE BASIS MACV AND MACSOG
CONSIDER [] ASSETS BEING UTILIZED EAST OF
THE NEW LINE. THIS CASE I BELIEVE IS NOT VALID WHEN ONE
COMPARES THE RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH VIENTIANE CAN
AUTHORIZE CASE-BY-CASE EXCEPTIONS AND THE DIFFICULTIES
WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED IN WORKING WITH MACV STAFF. I DO NOT
NEAR TO CRITICIZE THE LATTER. IT IS JUST A MATTER OF
RELATIVE SIZE, I.E., TWO OR THREE PEOPLE IN VIENTIANE
NEED BE CONSULTED TO AGREE TO AN EXCEPTION WHICH
CAN THUS BE GRANTED IN A MATTER OF HOURS OR EVEN
MINUTES. IN AN ORGANIZATION AS LARGE, CUMBERSOME AND
WITH SUCH MAJOR OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES AS MACV, EVEN
THE MOST URGENT DECISIONS MAY TAKE MANY HOURS OR EVEN DAYS.

7. I THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THERE BE NO FURTHER
CONSIDERATION OF MOVING THE EXISTING PRAIRIE FIRE LINE
WESTWARD. RGP-1.
GODLEY

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ACTION
DISTR SACSA(03) NMCC(01) J3(04) SECDEF(05) CSA CSAF CNO CMC NSC(06)
DIA(08) CIA NSA MCCC ANMCC NEACP STATEOP FILE(1)
(042)

ADV. DISTR NMCC(01) SECDEF(05) DIA(03)
TRANSIT/130930Z/131039Z/001:09T0F2561037
DE RMNSMVA #3557 2561042
ZNY TTTT
C 130930Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHNA44/CINCPAC
INFO RUHNA44/JCS
BT

2

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMBIS PRAIRIE FIRE JPCCO 1988 (SOG)
SUBJ: MACSOG COMBAT MISSION SS 124 (S)
REF: CINCPAC 060607Z AUG 69

1. (20) IAW REF FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED:
 - A. MISSION NUMBER: SS 124
 - B. DROP ZONE (DZ) LOCATION YC 419035
 - C. AN OPERATION TAILWIND RESUPPLY VOF APPROX 3700LES WILL BE MADE FROM A COMBAT SPEAR C-130.
 - D. SCHEDULED LAUNCH DATE AND TIME: 141800Z SEP 70.
 - E. LAUNCH AND RECOVERY BASE: NHA TRANG, RVN.
2. (20) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MISSION IS TO RESUPPLY OPERATION TAILWIND, A US/IN EXPLOITATION FORCE, IN THE PRAIRIE FIRE AO. MANEUVERING OF THE FORCE AND DELAYED SELECTION OF THE DZ PREVENTED THE NORMAL 48 HOUR NOTICE.

GP-1

BT

#3557

ANNOTES

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JMR 331

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NSC(08)14-21 DIA(03)22-24 CIA NSA MCCC ANMCC NEACP STATEOP FILE(C)
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~~TOP SECRET~~

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BY JCS
DATE 6/15/98

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

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ACTION

DISTR SACSA(03) NMCC(01) J3:(04) SECDEF(05) CSA CSAF CNO CMC NSC(08)
DIA(20) CIA NSA MCCC ANMCC NEACP DCPG STATEOP FILE(1)
(042)

ADV DISTR NMCC(01) SECDEF(05) DIA(03)
TRANSIT/140530Z/140523Z/000:53TOR2570613
DE RHHSNVA #3711 2570545
ZNY SSSSS
O 140530Z SEP 70
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHQBQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS
BT

~~SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ PRAIRIE FIRE JPCCO 1894 (SOG)
SUBJ: MACSOG COMBAT MISSION BS-124 (S)
A. MACSOG MSG JPCCO 1806/130930Z SEPT 70, (TS)
1. (S) MACSOG COMBAT MISSION BS-124 IS CANCELLED.
2. (S) OPERATION TAILWIND EXPLOITATION FORCE WILL BE
EVACUATED BY HELICOPTER.
GP-1
BT
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REF A IS 21484
HAT 331

PAGE 1

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OPERATION GAUNTLET

Operation GAUNTLET was planned in mid-August 1970 by the [] as the initial step in the South Laos Interdiction Program. The objective was harassment and interdiction of enemy LOC, coupled with efforts to clear the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau of enemy in order to secure friendly launch bases. More than 5,000 existing irregulars were to be used in the operation, which was designed to attack Route 23 from Muong Sen south to Toumlane by mining and ambushing the road, to attack enemy traffic on Route 96 north and south of Chavane and on Route 165 to the east, and to interdict Routes 13 and 16 and the Se Kong River north and south of Attapeu. Action teams were to be employed in the areas of Ban Bac, Lao Ngam, Paksong, and in the Mekong Valley south of Pakse to ambush and harass LOC or to call in air strikes on suitable targets. Operation GAUNTLET was designed to pull together in a single coordinated effort an offensive which would have greater impact than a number of similar activities conducted [] in the above mentioned areas in the past.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Although several units were in place or in movement toward the operational area at the time Operation GAUNTLET was being considered and approved, the [] has settled on 27 August 1970 as the beginning date of the operation. Since that time five SCU battalions have been committed against enemy LOC or positions around the Bolovens, and five more SCU battalions against Route 23 in the central Laos panhandle.

Action teams consisting of a total of 230 men were air lifted beginning 11 September into the Chavane area, with 163 men targetted north of Chavane on Route 96, and 112 on Route 96 south and Route 165 east of Chavane. Another 42 men are awaiting infiltration to HLZs south of Chavane. These teams made contact with the enemy soon after infiltration and have lost 4 killed and 7 wounded with unknown enemy casualties. They mined Route 96 about 50 kilometers south of Chavane and destroyed the lead truck in an enemy convoy. They have also called in air strikes against reported enemy positions with results unknown thus far.

Four Commando/Raider teams were infiltrated into the Ban Bac area on 8 September and have established a base camp east of that location. Two teams reported on 11 September that they were

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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OPERATION GAUNTLET

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100 17

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Action teams consisting of a total of 290 men were air lifted beginning 11 September into the Chavane area, with 163 men targeted north of Chavane on Route 96, and 112 on Route 96 south and Route 165 east of Chavane. Another 42 men are awaiting infiltration to HLZs south of Chavane. These teams made contact with the enemy soon after infiltration and have lost 4 killed and 7 wounded with unknown enemy casualties. They mined Route 96 about 50 kilometers south of Chavane and destroyed the lead truck in an enemy convoy. They have also called in air strikes against reported enemy positions with results unknown thus far.

Four Commando/Raider teams were infiltrated into the Ban Bac area on 8 September and have established a base camp east of that location. Two teams reported on 11 September that they were

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departing to commence their missions, but no results have been reported yet.

In the Bolovens area, one SGU battalion (from Savannakhet) moved from PS-22 to Route 16 and the Se Kong, then south to a point west of Attapeu. A second SGU (which comes from Luang Prabang) moved from Phou Tapak on the south edge of the plateau to Route 13 and the Se Kong, from which it moved north to link up with the first SGU. The first SGU clashed with two NVA companies on 3 September, killing five enemy and wounding ten while losing two killed and five wounded. The second SGU clashed three different times between 4 and 6 September, killing 25 enemy, wounding 23, and sinking four boats while calling in air strikes that killed 30 enemy and wounded 10 more. The two battalions linked up on 9 September and turned west on 10 September, moving to attack enemy-held PS-26 from the rear. On 11 September the second SGU clashed with an NVA unit, killing 11 enemy while losing 2 killed and 10 wounded in a mine field. At last report, the battalion was positioned two kilometers southwest of PS-26. On 12 September, the first SGU clashed with enemy troops dug in along a hill one kilometer north of PS-26. The irregulars were repulsed during three

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

assaults losing eight friendly wounded. The SGU was last reported in positions two kilometers northeast of PS-26.

A third SGU battalion of Meo from MR II was launched against Phou Nong Tao, a hill overlooking the Attoupeu area. They captured the hill with little trouble and on 10 September dispatched one company along the rim of the plateau to capture Phou Khoumphouk, five kilometers northeast of PS-26. On 13 September they clashed with an enemy company before reaching the objective and were held up while directing air strikes into enemy positions.

A fourth SGU battalion, also from Savannakhet, was assigned to attack PS-26 from PS-38. The unit has been tied down by heavy enemy resistance and nightly heavy weapons fire. It has not advanced significantly.

The fifth SGU, a Pakse unit, was assigned to move on PS-38 from PS-166. The enemy hit them first, on 29 August, and seized PS-166 with 20 friendly killed and 41 wounded. Although PS-166 was reoccupied on 5 September, the SGU has not moved out since that time.

In central Laos, two SGU battalions are moving east along Route 9 toward Muong Phine. One is north of Route 9 and about 16 kilometers west of Muong Phine, the other is south of Route 9 and about 13 kilometers west of Muong Phine. Their objectives are Route 23 north and south of Muong Phine. Both [] sources have indicated two NVA battalions moving out to counter their advance, but no contact has been reported yet. The SGU north of the road has encountered sporadic harassment from small enemy units and 12.7mm fire that has hindered air resupply and medical evacuation.

A third SGU is moving east along the south side of the Se Bang Hiang River with no contact until 12 September when they clashed with a Pathet Lao battalion, killing 14 enemy and wounding 20 while suffering 7 wounded.

The fourth and fifth SGUs in MR III are moving east from Houey Mun toward Toumlane on Route 23. They are hindered by heavy rains, mud and high waters, as are the SGU moving along the Se Bang Hiang. The units advancing on Toumlane have reported only light clashes in the past few days with Pathet Lao reconnaissance units.

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DATE RECEIVED

16 Sept 70

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ROOM 2E565, THE PENTAGON~~SENSITIVE TOP SECRET~~

DOCUMENT NUMBER

DJSM-1365-70

COPY NUMBER

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DATE OF DOCUMENT

16 Sept 70

SUBJECT

Operation TAIL WIND (U)

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TO NAME INITIAL

REMARKS

✓ CHAIRMAN, JCS 00 *[initials]*

3 EXECUTIVE 02 *[initials]*

2 THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN 01 *[initials]*

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP SPECIAL MBR 01A

1 CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MBR 01B *[initials]*

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MBR 01C

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MBR 01D

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MBR 01E

MILITARY ASSISTANT (L AND L) 01F

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA) 01G

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 04

ADMIN AIDE 03

AIR FORCE AIDE 05

MARINE AIDE 06

SOCIAL SECY 03A

16 Sep 70
1. Attached is the latest update of Operation TAIL WIND. The latest count of the downed helos is five (3 CH-53s, 1 AH-1G, and 1 AH-1H).

2. Also attached is [] interim report on Operation GAUNTLET.

DAVIS

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7 OATSD(PA)DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL

Copy No. R-3
Case No. 98-F-0410
T.S. No. 98-TS-045
Document No. 7

DOC 4



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1365-70

16 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND (U)

1. (TS) This is an updated report concerning Operation TAIL WIND, a 3 platoon PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) force operating in support of [] Operation GAUNTLET in Laos.
2. (TS) On 141100H Sep 70, while enroute to the extraction LZ, the unit made contact with an unknown size enemy force at YC 440037, resulting in no friendly casualties and one (1) enemy KIA. The unit also captured numerous military documents and one (1) 120mm mortar which was subsequently destroyed.
3. (TS) On 141300H Sep 70, the unit arrived at the extraction LZ at YC 446036 and was extracted at 141421H Sep 70 under heavy small arms fire. One (1) CH-53 helicopter, tail number YH-18 sustained extensive damage during extraction and subsequently crashed at 652921 resulting in one (1) SCU KIA and six (6) US crew members WIA. The crew and passengers were extracted and returned to RVN without further incident.
4. (TS) The total aircraft loss for Operation TAIL WIND is three (3) CH-53s, one (1) AH-1G and one (1) AH-1H.
5. (U) Attached is an interim report on Operation GAUNTLET []

JOHN W. VOGT
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

OPERATION GAUNTLET

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Action teams consisting of a total of 280 men were air lifted beginning 11 September into the Chavane area, with 168 men targetted north of Chavane on Route 96, and 112 on Route 96 south and Route 165 east of Chavane. Another 42 men are awaiting infiltration to HLZs south of Chavane. These teams made contact with the enemy soon after infiltration and have lost 4 killed and 7 wounded with unknown enemy casualties. They mined Route 96 about 50 kilometers south of Chavane and destroyed the lead truck in an enemy convoy. They have also called in air strikes against reported enemy positions with results unknown thus far.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

In central Laos, two SGU battalions are moving east along Route 9 toward Muong Phine. One is north of Route 9 and about 16 kilometers west of Muong Phine, the other is south of Route 9 and about 13 kilometers west of Muong Phine. Their objectives are Route 23 north and south of Muong Phine. Both [] sources have indicated two NVA battalions moving out to counter their advance, but no contact has been reported yet. The SGU north of the road has encountered sporadic harassment from small enemy units and 12.7mm fire that has hindered air resupply and medical evacuation.

A third SGU is moving east along the south side of the Se Bang Hiang River with no contact until 12 September when they clashed with a Pathet Lao battalion, killing 14 enemy and wounding 20 while suffering 7 wounded.

The fourth and fifth SGUs in MR III are moving east from Houey Mun toward Toumlane on Route 23. They are hindered by heavy rains, mud and high waters, as are the SGU moving along the Se Bang Hiang. The units advancing on Toumlane have reported only light clashes in the past few days with Pathet Lao reconnaissance units.

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REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

CONTROL NUMBER

2040

DATE RECEIVED

15 Sep 70

CLASSIFICATION

DATE OF DOCUMENT

15 Sep 70

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ROOM 2E845, THE PENTAGON

DOCUMENT NUMBER

DJSM 135-70

COPY NUMBER

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SUBJECT

Operation TAIL WIND

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TO NAME INITIAL

REMARKS

15 September 1970

✓ CHAIRMAN, JCS 00

3 EXECUTIVE 01

2 THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN 01

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP SPECIAL MBR 01A

1 CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MBR 01B

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MBR 01C

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MBR 01D

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MBR 01E

MILITARY ASSISTANT (L AND L) 01F

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA) 01G

4 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 04

ADMIN AIDE 03

AIR FORCE AIDE 05

MARINE AIDE 06

SOCIAL SECY 05A

1. Attached is the latest update on Operation TAIL WIND. The latest count of downed helos in this operation is three (one AH-1G, 2 CH-53D). We do not have the detailed information yet to determine whether the UH-1H, which was well North of the other helos, was a part of the TAIL WIND Operations. We do know that it was in support of PRAIRIE FIRE Operations.

2. MACSOG has indicated that the TAIL WIND force will be exfiltrated by helicopter.

Very respectfully,

DAVIS

4 OATSD(PA)DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL
Copy No. R-3
Case No. 98-F-0410
T.S. No. 98-TS-045
Document No. 8

Doc 5



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1356-70
15 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

1. ~~(TS)~~ This is an updated report concerning Operation TAIL WIND, a 3 platoon PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) force operating in support of [] Operation GAUNTLET in Laos.
2. ~~(TS)~~ On the morning of 13 Sep 70, it was reported that there was heavy activity around the PF force's perimeter. The unit then moved from its RON position to an LZ. Under the protection of suppressive fires, one (1) CH-53 helicopter, tail number YH-14, while attempting to extract the force, hit a tree with its rotor blade and aborted the landing. The aircraft then began movement back to its base but was hit by a B-40 rocket and crashed at YB 450056. The crew members suffered minor injuries and were rescued by a second CH-53 helicopter. The downed helicopter was subsequently destroyed by TAC AIR. The second helicopter, tail number YH-20, sustained extensive damage from small arms and .51 caliber fire but was able to return to base without further incident. A doorgunner in YH-20 reported that he shot one (1) enemy soldier during the rescue mission.
3. ~~(TS)~~ A second attempt to extract wounded from the ground unit was conducted by one (1) UH-1H helicopter, tail number 560, but received heavy small arms fire in the vicinity of the LZ (YC 441042) and sustained minor damage. One (1) AH-1G helicopter gunship, tail number 640, sustained extensive damage while providing suppressive fires during the extraction attempt. Both aircraft returned to their base without further incident.


4. (TS) At 131445H Sep 70, the force moved to YB 437038 and established a defensive position and reported no further enemy activity as of 132400.

5. (TS) By separate message on 14 Sep 70, MACSOG indicated that the TAIL WIND exploitation force would be exfiltrated by helicopter. (Ref MACV 140530Z Sep 70 to JCS, JCS IN 22254.)

6. (TS) On 140245 EDT Sep 70, one CH-53D was hit by enemy ground fire during an attempted extraction operation and crashed. The crew was recovered safely and the aircraft was destroyed by friendly aircraft to prevent capture.


7. (TS) One UH-1H was shot down and destroyed by enemy ground fire on 14 Sep 70, 18 nautical miles west-southwest of the A SHAU Valley. All four crew members were rescued but were slightly wounded. This aircraft was in support of PRAIRIE FIRE operations.

8. (U) We are not now aware of the status of extraction of the force. (As of 141100 Sep 70)



JOHN W. VOGT
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

1 Attachment -- Map



2823

RETURN TO

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

DATE OF DOCUMENT
14 Sept 70

Operation TAIL WIND

TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS

14 September 1970

1. Attached memo provides an update of Operation TAILWIND being conducted by MACSOG as a diversionary operation in support of Operation GAUNTLET in Southern Laos.

2. The helicopter loss referred to by Ambassador Godley in paragraph 7 of the attached memo is the AH-1G gunship downed on 12 September.

3. As regards the Marine CH-53D loss in Laos which was also covered in the morning brief, this loss occurred some 19 hours after the earlier AH-1G loss and some 10 miles East and North of the TAILWIND area of operation. The primary field report did not connect it with the TAILWIND Operation; however, subsequent follow-up reports received this afternoon state that one of the TAILWIND units have moved North-east to a landing zone in order to be extracted. The Marine helo was hit and downed during this attempted extraction.

4. The Joint Staff will continue to forward you updated reports as they are received.

Very respectfully,

DAVIS

6 OATSD(PA)DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTR
Copy No. _____
Case No. 98-F-0410
T.S. No. 98-F-0451
Document No. 9

Doc 6



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1348-70
14 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

1. (TS) On 11 September 1970, three PRAIRIE FIRE platoons were inserted in the TANGO-2 target area (YB 430980) with a mission of reconnaissance in force. The operation is being run in conjunction with [] Operation GAUNTLET and will provide a diversion in support of [] forces.
2. (TS) During the insertion, moderate to heavy small arms fire was received from SW of the LZ. Friendly casualties were two (2) SCU WIA. Later on 11 September 1970, the force discovered an ammo supply dump that contained an unknown number of rockets, large caliber artillery rounds, small arms ammo, and bicycles. The supply dump was destroyed. The force then made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in two (2) US WIA; enemy casualties are unknown. The team then established an RON position and reported negative enemy activity.
3. (TS) The following aircraft damage was sustained on 11 September 1970 during the insertion on TANGO-2:

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Tail No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
2 CH-53 (USMC)	12, 18	Light damage from small arms fire	Returned to KONTUM
1 AH-1G, Gunship (USA)	081	1 hit in canopy	Returned to DAK TO
3 AH-1G, Gunships (USMC)	21, 25, 13	Light damage from small arms fire	Returned to KONTUM

1 AH-1G, Gunship 06
(USMC)

Moderate
damage from
small arms
fire

Returned to
KONTUM

4. (TS) On 12 September 1970, the force was moving west and heard tracked vehicles to the north. A short time later, the force made contact with an estimated ten (10) man enemy squad resulting in one (1) US WIA and one SCU WIA. Enemy casualties are unknown. Several hours later, the unit made contact with an estimated thirty (30) man enemy platoon. Later, the enemy platoon had been reinforced to an estimated company size element (100-150 personnel). Total friendly casualties were one (1) SCU KIA and fifteen (15) SCU WIA; enemy casualties are unknown. TAC AIR strikes were directed against enemy positions and the enemy broke contact.

5. (TS) During an attempted medevac mission, the following aircraft damage was sustained from heavy ground fire in the vicinity of YC 435079:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Tail No.</u>	<u>Damage</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1 AH-1G, Gunship (suspected USA)	849	Shot down and de- stroyed	Two pilots rescued and sustained only minor injuries.
1 AH-1G, Gunship (suspected USA)	571	Minor damage	Returned to base
4 UH-1H (suspected USA)	135, 153, 487, 554	Minor damage	Returned to base

6. (TS) On the night of 12 September 1970, the unit reported in-coming small arms, B-40 rocket and mortar fire but sustained no further casualties. A C-130 gunship was directed against suspected enemy positions with unknown results.

7. (TS) Additional information: AMEMBASSY, Vientiane, in his 6184 to SECSTATE recommended that this loss be reported as having occurred in "the South Vietnamese/Laotian

border area". The Ambassador feels that reporting the loss of this gunship in the Lao Panhandle will attract unnecessary attention to PRAIRIE FIRE operations in Laos since helicopter gunships are primarily used in support of ground forces.

8. (TS) Total casualties for Operation TAIL WIND as of 12 September 1970 are as follows:

<u>US</u>			<u>VN</u>			<u>EN</u>
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	Unknown
0	0	3	1	0	18	


Aircraft

<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Loss</u>
11	1

John W. Voge

JOHN W. VOGT
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Attachment
1 Map





THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

J3M 1661 1970

14 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

Recommend the attached memorandum be approved, signed
and forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Melvin Zais", is written over a horizontal line.

MELVIN ZAIS
Lieutenant General USA
Director for Operations

1 10

TOP SECRET

CONTROL NUMBER 2808

OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS
ROOM 2E865, THE PENTAGON

DATE RECEIVED

11 Sep 70

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SUBJECT

11 Sep 70

Operation TAIL WIND

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2 OATSD(PA)DFOISR
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T.S. No. 98-TS-045
Document No. 10

Doc 7



THE JOINT STAFF


THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM 1332-70
11 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Operation TAIL WIND

The three (3) MACSOG PRAIRIE FIRE platoons originally intended for insertion into Laos (vicinity YB 361969) on 5 September 1970, in support of [] Operation GAUNTLET, have not yet entered LAOS due to adverse weather conditions. The force has been rescheduled for 11 September 1970.


JOHN W. VOGT
Lt. General USAF
Director, Joint Staff

1 of 7 Copies

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DATE RECEIVED
5 Sep 70

RETURN TO

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DOCUMENT NUMBER

DJSM 1301-70

COPY NUMBER

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DATE OF DOCUMENT
5 Sep 70

SUBJECT

Paramilitary Operations (U)

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TO NAME INITIAL

REMARKS

CHAIRMAN, JCS 00

3 EXECUTIVE 02

2 THE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN 01

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP SPECIAL MBR 01A

1 CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP AIR FORCE MBR 01B

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP NAVY MBR 01C

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP MARINE MBR 01D

CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP ARMY MBR 01E

MILITARY ASSISTANT (L AND L) 01F

MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA) 01G

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 04

ADMIN AIDE 03

AIR FORCE AIDE 05

MARINE AIDE 06

SOCIAL SECY 05A

9 September 1970

1. As regards your request for Joint Staff comments on the State message to Vientiane which requested the extent of American participation in the MACSOG operation east of Chavane, MACSOG reports that there will be 16 Americans involved.

2. In that CINCPAC and MACV were not addressees on all of the State and Vientiane traffic on expanded PRAIRIE FIRE operations, attached DJSM recommends dispatch of a back-channel message to CINCPAC and MACV which updates them on the situation. In addition to the proposed update, the proposed message also suggests that if there are lucrative targets west of the existing PF line, CINCPAC/MACV may desire to take advantage of Godley's offer to favorably study the proposals on a case-by-case basis; informs CINCPAC/MACV of the SecDef position regarding use of US personnel in PF exploitation phase, pending acquisition of trained Vietnamese to replace US.

3. Recommend release.

OATSD(PA)DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL

Very respectfully,

Copy No. B-3
Case No. 98-F-0410
T.S. No. 98-TS-045
Document No. 11

DAVIS

Returned to DJIS
14 Sep

DOC 8

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

" DJS 9/11

Held until
President ~~settles~~
settles issue
noon "

lib-0



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2. DJS m

DJSM 1301-70
5 Sep 1970

274

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Paramilitary Operations (U)

References: a. State 143603
b. Vientiane 5937
c. Vientiane 3350

1. (U) Reference a was forwarded for Director, Joint Staff comment. Reference b is the Vientiane response to reference a. Both messages concern an operation discussed in reference c.

2. (S) In reference c, Ambassador Godley mentions his endeavors to arrange for an operation by MACSOG east of Chavane. This operation is to provide a diversion during [] Operation Gauntlet".

3. (S) MACSOG intentions are to insert two reconnaissance teams and three platoons, by helicopter on a landing zone at YB 430930 on 5 September 1970. These platoons will then conduct a reconnaissance in-force in the vicinity of Chanun (YB 361959). This operation has been fully coordinated with []

4. (U) In that CINCPAC and COMUSMACV are not in receipt of referenced and previous STATE/VIENTIANE message traffic referring to PRAIRIE FIRE operations, recommend dispatch of the draft message at TAB A.

19
FRANK B. CLAY
Major General, USA
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Prepared by:
LCol N. R. Little, USAF
J-39 (SACSA)
Lxt: 72602/72650

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION	PRIORITY		
INFO	PRIORITY		

OTG

FROM: Admiral T. Moorer, CJCS

TO: Admiral McCain, CINCPAC, Hawaii

INFO: General Abrams, COMUSMACV, Saigon

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~ - CJCS/

SEP 70

SUBJ: Paramilitary Operations(U)

REF: CJCS 11139/112302Z Aug 70

1. (S) Referenced message noted that expansion of the present PRAIRIE FIRE Area of Operations (PFAO) would continue to be a subject of discussion at the Washington level and that a decision on continued US participation in Phase II Exploitation operations was expected soon.

2. (TS) In regard to PFAO expansion, STATE first queried Ambassador Godley as to possible expansion to the Sekong using Vietnamese irregulars. The Ambassador's initial response stated Souvanna Phouma's objections to Vietnamese operations in populated areas. Ambassador Godley later amended his initial response as too restricted

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GP-1

DD FORM 173
NOV 67

REPLACEMENT OF 1 MAY 67 WHICH WILL BE USED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

and discussed Lao concurrence with lightning attacks against clearly identifiable enemy territory in southern Laos providing the operations would be of short duration and not cause too much international publicity. Notwithstanding, the Ambassador felt the PF boundary should not be moved, however, ARVN operations to the west of the PFAO would be considered by Vientiane on a case-by-case basis.

3. (TS) STATE then queried the Ambassador for comments on moving the PF boundary westward to a line generally 200 meters west of Route 92 and Route 96, south to Route 110 to the Cambodian border in the vicinity of the Sekong River, thus restricting operations from population centers. The Ambassador responded stating continued objection to PFAO expansion but that he was prepared to study favorably any proposals for specific incursions west of the existing line. The Ambassador also stated that on 26 Aug 70, he had informed the Commanding Officer of MACSOG that he had no objections to the use of LZs up to 5 miles west of the PFAO for

CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIAL
DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-1				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	

DD FORM 173-1
NOV 65

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

subsequent eastward movement of inserted personnel. 7
 Additionally, Ambassador Godley mentioned his endeavors to arrange a MACSOG operation east of Chavane as a diversion during Operation "GAUNTLET" as an example of the coordination and joint effort that can be achieved due to excellent workmanlike arrangements established with MACSOG personnel.

4. (TS) STATE then requested information on the operation east of Chavane to include the number and capacity of US personnel participating. The Ambassador responded stating MACSOG intended to insert three platoons at YB 430980 for a reconnaissance in-force and that the operation had been fully coordinated with [] American participation was assumed to be three per platoon.

5. (S) Although the PFAO has not in fact been expanded, the working relationship between Vientiane and MACSOG appears excellent and effective for coordination of paramilitary actions within present capabilities. Current daily PF reports should be adequate to keep us abreast of the Chavane operation. J

CONTROL NO.	TON/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-1				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

6. (TS) In regard to continued US participation in PF Exploitation operations, the SECDEF forwarded a letter to State on 2 September stating his intention to continue PF operations with US personnel at this time. The SECDEF added, however, that a training program was being initiated which would result in eventual Vietnamization of the Program. This response does not preclude continued State pressure for termination of US participation or appeal by State to higher authority for resolution of this State/DOD disagreement.

Warm regards. GP-1

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DEGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-1				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 68 WHICH WILL BE USED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Gist of CINCPAC Message to CJCS, 022229Z June 1970

Interdiction of North Vietnamese Supplies (U)

(PS) In the near time frame there appears to be no cheap innovative method for improving effectiveness of interdiction programs while simultaneously reducing costs. The most promising interdiction improvement is not the gunship; but rather the gunship-fighter team. CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group reports that laser kits and utilization of single mission airframes might produce savings, but the time span involved is probably not compatible with the requirement. The B-57G (TROPIC MOON III) is due in SEA on 1 Oct 70 and holds promise of enhancing effectiveness. Riot-control agents should be authorized in Cambodia and Laos as now authorized in RVN. Recommend that current programs be continued until evaluation of the Commando Hunt III results (intensified interdiction in the Laos during the monsoon sked for mid-June). Cambodia offers new vistas for Chieu Hoi and informant program revealing supply caches.

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF
DATE: JUL 20 1998

Don B. Mc CDR, USN

~~TOP SECRET~~

①



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

*Para-01A am
military*

CM-44-70
16 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs

The Honorable David Packard
Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

The attached paper regarding paramilitary actions is
circulated to WSAG principals as a matter for discussion
during the meeting scheduled for 17 July 1970.

This proposal has not yet been cleared with the
Secretary of Defense but will be addressed at the first
opportunity on 17 July.

for Richard T. Moorer
T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
a/s

DECLASSIFIED BY JOINT STAFF
DATE: 20 1998

Dr. The CDR, USN

(2)
38

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

16 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP

SUBJECT: Paramilitary Actions

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the principals of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) with information as to the current status of military proposals for intensifying and expanding paramilitary operations to interdict and/or harass enemy lines of communication.

2. During the last WSAG discussion on this subject the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that he intended to ask CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to examine the feasibility of developing a plan to conduct expanded paramilitary operations in southern Laos in the area east of the Sekong River to the RVN border using US-led paramilitary forces. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV have responded and there is general agreement that an intensified paramilitary campaign in south Laos is feasible; however there are detailed problems of personnel and resources yet to be resolved. These include the provision of additional paramilitary forces to PRAIRIE FIRE, possible additional helicopters and fund adjustments.

3. In order to complete these plans [the following specific authorities are needed from] the Washington Special Action Group:

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

should consider
the following
specific items:

a. Authority to operate in an expanded area, i.e., from the intersection of the present PRAIRIE FIRE boundary and route 92, south along route 92 to the Sekong River, south along the Sekong River to Attopen, due south to the Cambodian border.


b. Authority to employ up to company size US-led exploitation forces operating from battalion size mobile base areas in Laos. *this expanded area.*


c. Authority to use CS/CN agents.

4. In recent weeks, enemy activity north of the DMZ along route 1039, south to the Cambodian border, has increased appreciably. The enemy's expansion of his southern Laos LOC to offset his losses in Cambodia offers a unique and fleeting opportunity to any allied harassment and interdiction efforts. In order to exploit this opportunity and since any increase in the effectiveness of interdiction operations in southern Laos would be complementary to the Vietnamization program and security efforts in the Republic of Vietnam, CINCPAC has been tasked to continue the development of his plan for a modest paramilitary interdiction program in Laos. This plan will be based on the assumption of Washington area acceptance of the authorities requested in paragraph 3 above and can be executed at an early date.

T.H. Moore

VIETNAM





TOP SECRET/NODIS

Extract of Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)
Meeting on July 17, 1970

.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
.

2. Interdiction in Southern Laos and Northeast Cambodia. The WSAG was informed of plans already under way to recruit, train, and equip additional Lao special guerrilla units. The WSAG approved going ahead with a program to set up four battalions of Cambodian irregulars for use in interdiction operations in Southern Laos. The State Department will sound out Souvanna about increasing the strength and depth of interdiction operations in Laos involving South Vietnamese and Cambodian personnel, and the JCS will obtain General Abrams' views on the feasibility of conducting expanded interdiction operations with largely Vietnamese personnel and without US personnel. The WSAG agreed that Defense and CIA should work out arrangements to upgrade weapons for existing special guerrilla units.

.
[DISCUSSION]

Dr. Henry Kissinger [NSA]: (to Moorer) What have you done about developing a coordinated plan on this?

Mr [U. Alexis] Johnson [DOS]: The plan has not been coordinated with State.

Adm. [Thomas H.] Moorer [CJCS]: We currently conducting platoon size operations to points up to 20 kilometers inside Laos. General Vogt can explain what we are now proposing.

Gen [John] Vogt [DJS]: The enemy is now operating in the area of the Bolovens Plateau and has started swinging west making attacks toward Routes 23 and 13. This would provide him control of a good dry weather supply route, and in the rainy season he could send supplies down the Se Kong to the Mekong. There are indications that the enemy may move west of the Mekong into the area next to the Thai border.

TOP SECRET/NODIS

TOP SECRET/NODIS

We are proposing a change in the ground rules to permit expansion of our operations by expanding the limit for penetration into Lao territory and increasing the size of the operations. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Our present operations are too dispersed and serve principally for intelligence gathering. The additional assets for an expanded program would come from other programs such as the CIDG in II Corps. We will be sending a draft message to the Cincs possibly tomorrow asking them for their views about doing this.

A CH-47 squadron could be brought in September and would help with moving the units in. We would be adding 2200 assets to the 200 presently there.

We would like to obtain authority to use riot gas when required for extracting our people, to expand the area of operations in Laos, and to increase the size of the units involved.

Mr. Johnson: What about the use of US personnel?

Gen Vogt: They are being used now.

Mr. Johnson: Bu the number is being increased.

Dr. Kissinger: Alex, what are your views?

Mr. Johnson: Introducing Vietnamese personnel in Laos creates problems with Souvanna. Involving additional US personnel in combat operations in Laos puts us on shaky ground both because of the Church Amendment—the old Church amendment—and the President's previous statements.

We have been impressed [REDACTED] using Lao assets in that area.

Mr. [Marshall] Green [DOS]: The sinkings of enemy vessels on the Se Kong show what can be achieved. Sixteen new special guerrilla units (SGUs) are being trained in that area. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET/NODIS

TOP SECRET/NODIS

Mr. [William] Nelson [CIA]: [REDACTED]

Mr. Green: Having Lao groups do the job in their own country makes sense.

Mr. Johnson: We would have to check with Souvanna before expanding out interdiction operations. This morning I wrote Dave Packard about this.

Dr. Kissinger: What are Ambassador Godley's views?

Mr. Johnson: He knows about the proposal and feels about the same way as we do.

Mr. [G. Warren] Nutter [OSD]: Remember that we are now reporting losses from these operations as occurring in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: The President thinks that Prairie Fire is considered part of the Vietnam operations.

Gen Vogt: The press guidance on reporting losses was changed, so we are not announcing Prairie Fire casualties as occurring in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) Do you believe an American presence would be difficult to defend? If we extend the range of operations, the problem is compounded. We should clear with Souvanna before putting additional Vietnamese personnel deeper into Laos. If Souvanna approves and there are no U.S. personnel involved, do you object?

Mr. Johnson: More in the case of combat than intelligence operations..

Dr. Kissinger: (to Moorer) Then General Abrams ought to be asked if it would be feasible to conduct the operations with largely Vietnamese personnel, while having Americans involved only in an intelligence role.

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TOP SECRET/NODIS

Adm. Moorer: We can discuss it with him.

Mr. Johnson: Abrams will say it would be less effective.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Moorer) Will you ask him?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Nelson: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mr. [Cord] Meyer [CIA]: This is all in train.

Dr. Kissinger: What do the options mean?

Mr. Nelson: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mr. Meyer: \$4.8 million is required.

Dr. Kissinger: Where does the money come from?

Mr. Meyer: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mr. Nelson: That should present no problems.

Mr. Green: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mr. Nelson: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mr. [Dennis] Doolin [OSD]: How much pressure has the North Vietnamese Army put on the interdiction teams? If we increase the scope of operations in Southern Laos, what will happen?

Mr. Meyer: Probably the NVA will attack the Boloven Plateau.

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Mr. Nelson: Can 2,000 [REDACTED] do anything against 32 North Vietnamese battalions?

Dr. Kissinger: What are the possibilities for funding?

Col. [Richard] Kennedy [NSC Staff]: We have checked this out with the Office of Management and Budget. Funding can be arranged if the project is approved.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, let's do it.

Mr. Johnson, Adm. Moorer, and Mr. Nutter: I agree.

Mr. Meyer: Do we wait to get the President's okay?

Dr. Kissinger: He will go along. What about your Option 3?

Mr. Nelson: This is a much iffier proposition.

Mr. Meyer: These are things we might do later on.

Dr. Kissinger: [REDACTED]

Mr. Nelson: We also have the question of upgrading weapons for the existing SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have any opinion on that. Alex, am I right that the only consideration here is weapons availability and priorities?

Mr. Johnson: Yes. I have no objection to the upgrading.

Dr. Kissinger: In that case, let Defense and CIA work it out.

Adm Moorer: (to Johnson) Can you query the Lao government [REDACTED] You could also ask about the South Vietnamese.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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RW
CM-346-70
5 November 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Participation of US Personnel in the Exploitation
Phase of PRAIRIE FIRE Operations in Laos (TS)

Ref: Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) memorandum
dated 24 October 1970, subject as above

Encls: (1) Operation TAIL WIND Evaluation
(2) Proposed message

1. (TS) The reference requested an outline plan to comply with the provisions of the Presidential authorization to use US personnel in the exploitation phase of PRAIRIE FIRE operations for a 90-day period beginning 18 September 1970 and a prognosis on meeting the deadline to provide Vietnamese replacements for US personnel now engaged in exploitation-type operations.
2. (TS) In response to my request of 12 August 1970 for a plan to accelerate the training of Vietnamese replacements for US leadership positions in PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation, CINCPAC submitted a plan which was approved on 28 September 1970. The CINCPAC plan specified three distinct phases in which ARVN-led exploitation platoons/companies progress to an acceptable level of combat readiness. Phase I, ARVN leadership and platoon training, will be initiated 8 November 1970, and the first company will complete training on 28 November 1970. The last company will complete Phase I training on 2 January 1971. Phase II, platoon operations, will require an estimated 60 days for each company. Phase II for the first company will be completed 28 January 1971 and 2 March 1971 for the last company. Phase III, company operations, is three weeks in length and will be concluded 18 February 1971 for the first company and 23 March 1971 for the last company. This time-phasing is designed to insure that there is no degradation of combat effectiveness during the transition from US to ARVN leadership. The competency and effectiveness of ARVN leaders selected to assume command of the existing exploitation forces cannot be evaluated until each company has completed Phase I training and ARVN leaders have

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been observed. The specific date each exploitation company attains an acceptable level of combat proficiency to execute cross-border operations without US presence depends entirely on the command ability of the leaders of each unit. Phase II and Phase III time-frames may be reduced materially for specific companies if the ARVN leadership warrants such a reduction. However, based on the above timing, both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV state that, if US leadership of exploitation operations is withdrawn on 16 December 1970, exploitation operations of any consequence would be suspended for a minimum of 60 days.

3. ~~(TS)~~ The need for PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation operations has been enhanced since the loss of Kompong Som eliminated the enemy's southern Cambodian LOC and greatly increased his reliance on the Laos LOC, which has now become his lifeline. For that reason, any friendly operations in the Laos Panhandle can be expected to meet with ever-increasing enemy security forces, especially during the coming dry season. Operation TAIL WIND was the first of a planned series of PRAIRIE FIRE US-led company-size exploitation operations to be conducted by MACV in [REDACTED] interdiction operations in South Laos. The significant results attained during Operation TAIL WIND attest to the importance of US leadership during PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation operations. (A summary of TAIL WIND results is attached at Enclosure (1).) Premature termination of US leadership would seriously degrade the planned, coordinated MACV/[REDACTED] interdiction operations in South Laos at this most critical time. Additionally, the other opportunities to impede the expected massive enemy dry season logistics effort in the PRAIRIE FIRE Area of Operations will for all practical purposes be lost for at least 60 days.

4. ~~(TS)~~ In view of the above time requirements to accomplish the Vietnamization of PRAIRIE FIRE exploitation operations, it is strongly recommended that US leadership of these exploitation operations be continued until 1 April 1971. Accordingly, it is also recommended the message at Enclosure (2), which authorizes this extension, be approved.

(Sgd) T. H. MOORER

T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Operation TAIL WIND Evaluation

1. This memo contains an evaluation of the results of Operation TAIL WIND, which was conducted in the southern Laotian panhandle from 11-14 September 1970. The primary purpose of the mission was to conduct reconnaissance in force to collect intelligence information. A secondary objective was to conduct a diversionary action in support of [REDACTED] Operation GAUNTLET.

2. Three exploitation platoons consisting of a total of 16 US and 120 indigenous were inserted by helicopter into the Chavane area of southern Laos. Contact with enemy forces was almost continuous during the 72-hour operation, and the force relied heavily on close air support to sustain its momentum and integrity. Enemy casualties were 432 killed and wounded. Approximately 288 of the killed were as a result of air support, while an estimated 144 were killed as a result of ground action. In addition to the enemy killed, the following enemy materiel was destroyed

500	-	140 mm rockets
300	-	82 mm rounds
300	-	B-40 rounds
2,000	-	23 mm rounds
12,500	-	rounds of small arms ammunition

A large volume of documents was captured by the TAIL WIND forces and represents the most significant collateral intelligence found on the 559th Transportation Group since the beginning of the war. This unit directs the enemy logistic and infiltration flow through the Lao Panhandle and is a high priority intelligence collection target. As of 25 September 1970, 400 pages of the 851 pages of captured enemy documents have been classified as Category A--the highest rating for intelligence value. Exploitation of these captured documents also affords 7th Air Force an ideal opportunity to evaluate the validity of reports derived from sensor systems.

3. Friendly losses from this operation were 3 killed (all indigenous), 50 wounded (17 US, 33 indigenous). Of the wounded, only 5 required hospitalization. Three helos were lost--2 CH-53s and 1 UH-1G.

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Enclosure /

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4. This operation achieved the objectives set forth. It not only collected valuable intelligence information, it also provided a diversion for the GAUNTLET forces. The operation also bears out the fact that in order to obtain firsthand, detailed information concerning the enemy in the heavily canopied jungle, ground reconnaissance teams are required. While photo reconnaissance and sensor systems provide some information, the coverage is not complete. Reconnaissance in force operations, such as TAIL WIND and other PRAIRIE FIRE operations, directed against specific target areas, represent the most effective means for obtaining specific items of information. Even though the primary purpose of these operations is to collect information for the development of intelligence, the collateral effects are often of equal benefit. The enemy must divert an ever-increasing number of troops and critical assets to a rear area security role, and when these enemy forces react to the friendly forces' intrusion into sensitive areas, the enemy becomes more susceptible to allied tactical air operations. The success of the secondary mission has been attested to by Ambassador Godley and, as reported in daily sitreps from [REDACTED] GAUNTLET forces have been relatively successful without encountering stiff enemy resistance.

5. Reconnaissance in force operations, directed against specific target areas, which are properly planned, coordinated, and executed, represent one of the most effective means for obtaining enemy intelligence in southern Laos, as well as providing the collateral effect of diverting NVA troops and service forces from enemy LOC.

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SUBJ: PRAIRIE FIRE

REFS: COMUSMACV 011234Z NOV 70, CINCPAC 012200Z 01NOV 70

1. REFERENCES PROVIDED LATEST TIME PHASING REQUIRED TO PROVIDE TRAINED VIETNAMESE LEADERS FOR EXPLOITATION PHASE OF PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS. REFERENCES ALSO PROVIDED IMPACT STATEMENTS IF US LEADERS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS EFFECTIVE 16 DECEMBER 1970.

2. IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE IMPACT ON INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN LAOS CAUSED BY PREMATURE TERMINATION OF US LEADERSHIP OF THESE OPERATIONS, AUTHORIZATION DTO USE US PERSONNEL IN THE EXPLOITATION PHASE OF PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS IS EXTENDED UNTIL 1 APRIL 1971. GP 1

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